Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

The sixth conclusion is ¹: The distinction of things did not proceed from the diverse motions of the free will of rational creatures.

Regarding this conclusion, Saint Thomas does three things: first, he sets out the opinion of Origen; second, he refutes it ²; third, he shows whence Origen was deceived ³.

I. As to the first, he says that Origen, in the book Periarchon, wishing to resist the objections and errors of the ancient heretics, who held that there was a different nature of good and of evil in things, arising from contrary agents, on account of the great distance found both in natural things and in human affairs, which no merits seem to have preceded—namely, that some bodies are luminous and others obscure, while some men are born of barbarians, that is, of infidels, and others of Christians—was compelled (that is, because of the arguments brought forward by those heretics) to hold that every diversity found in things proceeded from a diversity of merits, according to the justice of God.

Origen's opinion rests on four points. The first is that all creatures were produced by God from the beginning as equal, and all rational and spiritual. — The second is that of these, some by free will adhered to God more or less, while others withdrew from him more or less. — The third is that from this, as divine justice so required, different degrees followed among them: namely, that some became angels according to the various orders, some human souls according to the various states, while others became demons. — The fourth is that on account of this diversity among bodily creatures God instituted their diversity.

II. As to the second ⁴, an argument is brought against this opinion, which holds that the distinction of things was instituted by God on account of the diversity of merits.

First, thus. The best among created things is the perfection of the universe, which consists in the order of distinct things. Therefore the diversity of things proceeds not from a diversity of merits, but from the principal intention of the first agent. — The consequence is proved: because the better something is in its effects, the prior it is in the intention of the agent.

Note that, given that position, it followed that the distinction of things was intended on account of merits to be rewarded and demerits to be punished: but it would not be intended first by God. Against this this argument proceeds.

Second. It would follow that the order and distinction of things would be a matter of chance. — The consequence is proved. For what proceeds from the concurrence of two causes, one of which does not depend on the other, is casual. But if all rational creatures were equal from the beginning, one must say that one does not depend on another in its operation. Therefore, etc.

2. Concerning this proposition, also adduced above ⁵: What proceeds from the concurrence of two causes, one of which does not depend on the other, is casual, a doubt is raised. For two men could intend one thing, say a house, each from his own work, without the action of one depending on the other. Therefore not everything that depends on causes of this kind is casual.

It is answered that it is impossible for two causes, each of which is sufficient of itself, to intend one common effect, unless either they are moved by one third cause, or one is moved by the other. For, since the effect is common to this cause and the other, it cannot proceed from this cause by that which is proper to it, but by that which is common to it and to the other cause. And consequently it must be that either they are moved by one common cause intending that common effect, as having from it that common principle by which they act, or that one moves the other toward the intended effect. Therefore, if some effect should proceed from the concurrence of two causes, neither of which depends on the other (supplement) nor does each depend on a cause common to both, such an effect must be accidental: for no common effect can be intended by them insofar as they are distinct. For proper causes, as such, have a proper end, not a common one. — Hence the assumption is denied, taking it with the gloss added, namely: or each depends on one common cause.

III. Third. If a diverse degree was acquired for rational creatures through the motion of free choice, then no creature will have its degree as natural, but as accidental. But this is false. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because what is natural to something is not acquired by it through the will, since the motion of the will presupposes the existence of the one willing. — The falsity of the consequent is also proved: because, this being granted, it would follow that all created rational substances would be of one species; since, as you hold, they are not distinguished except by accidental degrees, they could not be distinguished specifically by those degrees, because the specific difference would be natural to each. That this is false, the diverse mode of understanding demonstrates. Therefore, etc.

Fourth. It would follow that the union of this soul with this body is not natural, being acquired through the motion of free choice. Therefore neither will the composite be natural. Therefore the noblest things among beings—man, the sun, and the other stars—will be unnatural, which is most absurd.

Fifth: and it is a confirmation of the preceding argument. It would follow that man, the sun and the moon, and other things of this kind, are not any species. For the union of this substance with this body, since it depends as it were by merit, would be accidental. But from things united accidentally no species results.

Sixth. It would follow that the rational soul which has obtained this body could be joined again to another body, even a sidereal one. For merits and demerits can be increased and diminished: especially according to Origen. And thus those things which follow upon merits can be changed for better or worse. But this is false even according to philosophy, according to which determinate forms are assigned to determinate matters; and according to faith it is heretical, since faith holds that the soul must reassume in the resurrection the same body it laid down. Therefore, and so on.

Seventh. In the rational substances themselves, before merits, there was a distinction by origin, such that one had something that another did not have; otherwise there would not have been many. Therefore, by equal reasoning, it was not necessary that the diversity of degrees arise from the diversity of demerits. ⁶

IV. Eighth. Such substances were distinct from the beginning according to formal division, but not according to material distinction, since division according to quantity exists only in bodies. Therefore they were distinct according to a diversity of degrees: because formal division is reduced to privation and form; and thus one of the forms must be better and the other worse, as is clear from the Philosopher saying in Book VIII of the Metaphysics, ⁷ that the species of things are like numbers, of which one adds to or subtracts from another. Therefore etc.

It must be noted, first, that the formal division, which is made through differences, is not reduced to privation and form in such a way that one difference or form is a privation and the other is a form. For this is impossible, since privation is a non-being, to which it cannot belong to constitute any nature. Rather, this is said because one difference is always related as imperfect in comparison with the other, as is evident to one who runs through the differences of all the genera; but the imperfect, as such, has a likeness to privation.

2. Concerning this proposition adduced from the Philosopher, VIII Metaphysics, text 10, "The species of things are like numbers, of which one adds to or subtracts from another," it must be noted that it can bear a twofold sense. One sense is that, just as a later number comprehends in itself all the earlier ones and adds unity, so every more perfect species would include formally in itself all the differences of any less perfect species, and would add its difference to them. And this sense is not Aristotle's intention: for it is false and impossible, if taken universally, namely in all species. For one most special species of substance does not enter into the composition of another species. For the constitutive difference of ox, ass, and other less perfect animals is not included in the ratio of man. First, because then man would be an ox, an ass, and the other animals. Second, because man could not be known quidditatively unless all the differences of animals were known: for all of them would necessarily have to be posited in his quidditative ratio in their order. — But according to this sense, it has truth only in subordinate species within a predicamental line. For the more perfect species, which is posterior, contains the less perfect, which is superior, according to perfection, and adds its difference to it, just as a more perfect number contains the less perfect and adds unity. And therefore, whether a contracting difference be added to one species or its ultimate difference be subtracted from it, there does not remain the same species. For if, as St. Thomas exemplifies in VIII Metaphysics ⁸ rational is added to animal, there no longer remains the species that was animal merely, but there is constituted the species of animal which is man; and if sensible is removed from animal, there does not remain the species of animal, but of plant. The same holds in numbers. For if unity is added to four, four does not remain except materially, but five comes to be; and if unity is removed from it, three remains.

The second sense can be that, just as each species of number is constituted by an indivisible, namely by the ultimate unit; and each number either exceeds another by an added unit or falls short of it by the subtraction of a unit: so each species of things is constituted by an indivisible difference; such that whatever attains to that difference is contained under that species, while whatever falls short of it or exceeds it belongs to another species. And therefore every other species is constituted either by a worthier and more excellent difference, or by a less noble one. Thus to add one species to another is not for the latter to contain the former formally and further include some nobler difference: rather it is for it to be itself constituted by a nobler and more excellent difference, one containing eminently the difference of the other; in which way also a nobler species is said in some measure to contain a less noble one, not indeed formally, but eminently. — In this sense, then, Saint Thomas takes Aristotle's proposition: because from it the inequality of substances which are formally distinct is most excellently argued. Although the first sense also has truth, as was said, in species ordered according to superior and inferior within the predicamental line.

V. Ninth. Either rational creatures can subsist without bodies, or they cannot. If the first, it was not necessary that a diversity of bodies be instituted on account of diverse merits; for even among spiritual substances, without any diversity of bodies, different degrees could be found. — If the second, then bodies were produced together with them. But the distance between corporeal substance and spiritual is greater than that between spiritual substances themselves. Therefore, if God produced both substances without preceding merits, neither was it necessary for merits to precede in order that spiritual substances be instituted in diverse degrees.

Tenth. It would follow that, on account of the uniformity of the rational creature—that is, if diverse merits had not preceded—a uniform corporeal nature would have been created. Therefore prime matter would have been created under only one form. Therefore it would have remained imperfect, since there are in it several forms in potency. But this is not fitting to the divine goodness. Therefore, and so on.

Eleventh. It would be contingent that there be only one sun in the world. — The consequence is evident, because it was contingent that only one substance sinned in such a way as to merit being joined to such a body.

Twelfth. It would follow that visible bodies are joined to invisible substances on account of sin, which is close to the error of the Manichaeans.

Note that this consequence is said to be close to the error of the Manichaeans, because, just as the Manichaeans said that visible things proceeded effectively from an evil principle, so this consequence says that they proceeded finally from evil.

It is confirmed by the authority of Genesis 1, where Moses, in speaking of each of the works of visible creatures, uses this manner of expression, "And God saw that it was good" etc.; afterward, concerning all things together, he adds, "And God saw all the things that he had made" etc.

VI. As to the third ⁹, Saint Thomas says that Origen erred from two causes. First, because he did not consider that there is no injustice if we give unequal things without any diversity of merits, when we give not out of obligation but liberally. And thus it does not follow that God is unjust if He produced creatures unequal to one another: since He brought things into being not out of any obligation, but out of mere liberality.

Second, because he did not consider that the Maker of all things, God, would not make the whole universe the best of its kind if he made all its parts equal. For many degrees of goodness would be lacking in the universe, and thus it would be imperfect. But since the good of the whole is better than the good of the individual parts, it is not the part of the best maker to diminish the good of the whole in order to increase the goodness of some of the parts. This is illustrated by the example of the house-builder.

It must be noted that by what Saint Thomas says here, two arguments of Origen are resolved, by which he showed first that God created all creatures equal. The first was that otherwise God would have been unjust, giving unequal things to those in whom there was no inequality of merits. — The second was that it belongs to the best to make the best. But God is the best. And so it followed that he made all things the best, and consequently equal.

To the first, the answer is clear from the first point made. For there is no injustice where something is given not out of merit but out of mere liberality, as God produced things. — To the second, the answer is given by the second point made. For it belongs to the best to make the best things with respect to the parts of the whole, not simply, but insofar as it accords with the perfection of the whole.