Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

Francesco Silvestri

Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)

Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles

First published 1918

In Book II of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's account of creation, the distinction of creatures, and the human soul. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XIII (1918). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.


Caput I: Continuatio sequentium ad praecedentia

Caput II: Quod consideratio creaturarum utilis est ad fidei instructionem

Caput III: Quod cognoscere naturam creaturarum valet ad destruendum errores qui sunt circa Deum

Caput IV: Quod aliter considerat de creaturis philosophus et theologus

Caput V: Ordo dicendorum

Caput VI: Quod Deo competit ut sit aliis principium essendi

Caput VII: Quod in Deo sit potentia activa

Caput VIII: Quod Dei potentia sit eius substantia

Caput IX: Quod Dei potentia sit eius actio

Caput X: Qualiter potentia in Deo dicatur

Caput XI: Quod de Deo dicitur aliquid relative ad creaturas

Caput XII: Quod relationes dictae de Deo ad creaturas non sunt realiter in Deo

Caput XIII: Quomodo praedictae relationes de Deo dicantur

Caput XIV: Quod Deus sit omnibus causa essendi

Caput XV: Quod Deus ex nihilo produxit res in esse

Caput XVI: Quod creatio non est motus neque mutatio

Caput XVII: Quomodo solvantur ea quae contra creationem obiiciuntur

Caput XVIII: Quod in creatione non sit successio

Caput XIX: Quod nullum corpus potest creare

Caput XX: Quod solius Dei est creare

Caput XXI: Quod Deus omnia possit

Caput XXII: Quod Deus non agat ex necessitate naturae

Caput XXIII: Quod Deus agit secundum suam sapientiam

Caput XXIV: Qualiter omnipotens dicatur quaedam non posse

Caput XXV: Quod divinus intellectus non coartatur ad determinatos effectus

Caput XXVI: Quod divina voluntas ad determinatos effectus non artatur

Caput XXVII: Qualiter in rerum productione debitum inveniatur

Caput XXVIII: Qualiter in rebus creatis esse potest necessitas absoluta

Caput XXIX: Quod non est necessarium creaturas semper fuisse

Caput XXX: Rationes volentium probare aeternitatem mundi ex parte Dei acceptae

Caput XXXI: Rationes volentium probare aeternitatem mundi sumptae ex parte creaturarum

Caput XXXII: Rationes ad probandum aeternitatem mundi ex parte factionis

Caput XXXIII: Solutio rationum supra positarum et primo earum quae sumebantur ex parte Dei

Caput XXXIV: Solutio rationum quae sumuntur ex parte rerum factarum

Caput XXXV: Solutio rationum quae sumebantur ex parte factionis rerum

Caput XXXVI: Rationes quibus quidam conantur ostendere mundum non esse aeternum

Caput XXXVII: Quod distinctio rerum non est a casu

Caput XXXVIII: Quod materia non est prima causa distinctionis rerum

Caput XXXIX: Quod distinctio rerum non est propter contrarietatem agentium

Caput XL: Quod causa prima distinctionis rerum non est secundorum agentium ordo

Caput XLI: Quod rerum distinctio non est per aliquem de secundis agentibus inducentem in materiam diversas formas

The fifth conclusion is : False is the opinion of those who say that God created the matter of all visible things, but that it was distinguished through an angel by means of various forms.

  1. It is proved. Heavenly bodies cannot be made from matter, since there is no contrariety in them. Therefore an angel could not have formed those very bodies from matter created by God.

Second. The heavenly bodies do not agree with lower bodies in any matter, unless perhaps in prime matter. But prime matter could not have existed of itself before all formed bodies, since it is pure potency, and every esse in act is from some form. Therefore an angel could not have formed all visible bodies out of matter created by God.

Third. To be made properly belongs to a composite alone, and not to form in itself or to matter in itself, just as neither does esse. Therefore it is not the case that one agent creates matter alone and another induces form.

Fourth. The first induction of forms into matter cannot be by an agent through motion alone. Therefore it cannot be by an agent creating the form alone. — The antecedent is proved: because every motion toward a form is from a determinate form to a determinate form, and thus some form must be presupposed in matter for motion. — The consequence is also proved: because, since material forms are not subsistent per se, but their esse consists in informing matter, they cannot be brought into being except either by the creation of the composite or by the transmutation of matter into a form.

II. Fifth. Motion toward form is caused by motion according to place. Therefore by the motion of the heavens. Therefore those things that cannot come about through the mediation of the heavens' motion cannot come about from an agent acting through motion alone. But through the motion of the heavens many sensible forms cannot come to be except through determinate principles: just as certain animals are not generated without seed. Therefore the first institution of those forms cannot be brought about by an agent acting through motion alone. But such is an agent that can induce nothing except form into matter. Therefore, and so on. — The antecedent is proved: because motion toward form is naturally posterior to local motion, since it is the act of a more imperfect thing. — The first consequence is also evident: because the first motion according to place is the motion of the heavens.

It must be noted that motion regards two things, namely its terminus and its subject. If motions are compared in respect of their order to the terminus, then local motion is not more perfect; rather it is less perfect than motion toward a form: for the terminus of local motion is "where," which is less perfect than quality and substantial form. But if they are compared according to their order to the subject, then local motion is more perfect: because its subject is more perfect, being more in act, and in potency only as to "where." And since the terminus to which a motion tends is intrinsic to the motion, existing as one with it, while the subject is extrinsic to it, it may be said that local motion is extrinsically more perfect than motion toward a form, namely by reason of the subject; and this is how Saint Thomas understood the matter at this place, as is evident from the argument he adduces. Intrinsically, however—that is, by reason of the terminus—it is the reverse: for motion toward a form is more perfect than motion according to place, and prior in nature.

VI. The parts of these generable and corruptible things acquire forms in act through generation from the forms that are in matter, not from forms existing outside matter: since the generator, namely the proximate and immediate one, must be like what is generated; from Metaphysics VII. Therefore also the total acquisition of forms in matter cannot come about through motion from any separate substance, unless by means of a corporeal agent, or a creating one, who acts without motion. — The consequence is proved. Because from Physics III, local motion is the same, and the mutation of generation is the same, of the whole and of the part.

Seventh. Esse is the proper effect of the first cause. Therefore it is also the first causality of forms: because esse is through form.

Eighth. All things are assimilated to God insofar as they have forms, by which they are in act; and insofar as they desire their forms, they are said to desire the divine likeness. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident. For an effect acquires the form of that to which it is assimilated through the form.

Note that by this argument it is not proved that forms are in no way impressed upon matter by an angel; rather, it is proved that they are impressed even by God, and not only by an angel. And thus the angel will not be the first cause of the introduction of forms into matter. The opposite of this was asserted by the opinion attacked here.

This is confirmed by Genesis 1, where Moses, after saying that God created in the beginning, etc., adds how He distinguished all things into their proper species. Likewise Colossians 1: "In Him were all things created."

Caput XLII: Quod distinctio rerum non processit ex meritorum vel demeritorum diversitate

Caput XLIII: Quae sit prima causa distinctionis rerum secundum veritatem

Caput XLIV: Quod oportuit ad perfectionem universi aliquas creaturas intellectuales esse

Caput XLV: Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt volentes

Caput XLVI: Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt liberi arbitrii in agendo

Caput XLVII: Quod substantia intellectualis non sit corpus

Caput XLVIII: Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt immateriales

Caput XLIX: Quod substantia intellectualis non sit forma materialis

Caput L: Quod in substantiis intellectualibus creatis differt esse et quod est

Caput LI: Quod in substantiis intellectualibus creatis est actus et potentia

Caput LII: Quod non est idem componi ex substantia et esse, et materia et forma

Caput LIII: Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt incorruptibiles

Caput LIV: Per quem modum substantia intellectualis possit corpori uniri

Caput LV: Positio Platonis de unione animae intellectualis ad corpus

Caput LVI: Quod nutritiva, sensitiva et intellectiva non sunt in homine tres animae

Caput LVII: Quod intellectus possibilis hominis non est substantia separata

Caput LVIII: Quod homo non sortitur speciem per intellectum passivum, sed per intellectum possibilem

Caput LIX: Quod praedicta positio est contra sententiam Aristotelis

Caput LX: Contra opinionem Alexandri de intellectu possibili

Caput LXI: Quod anima non sit complexio, ut posuit Galenus

Caput LXII: Quod anima non sit corpus

Caput LXIII: Contra ponentes intellectum et sensum esse idem

Caput LXIV: Contra ponentes intellectum possibilem esse imaginationem

Caput LXV: Qualiter substantia intellectualis possit esse forma corporis

Caput LXVI: Solutio rationum quibus supra probatur quod substantia intellectualis non potest uniri corpori ut forma

Caput LXVII: Quod secundum dicta Aristotelis oportet ponere intellectum uniri corpori ut formam

Caput LXVIII: Quod anima immediate unitur corpori

Caput LXIX: Quod anima sit tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte

Caput LXX: Quod intellectus possibilis non est unus in omnibus hominibus

Caput LXXI: De opinione Avicennae, qui posuit formas intelligibiles non conservari in intellectu possibili

Caput LXXII: Solutio rationum quibus videtur probari unitas intellectus possibilis

Caput LXXIII: Quod intellectus agens non sit substantia separata, sed aliquid animae

Caput LXXIV: Quod non est impossibile intellectum possibilem et agentem in una substantia animae convenire

Caput LXXV: Quod non fuit sententia Aristotelis de intellectu agente quod sit substantia separata, sed magis quod sit aliquid animae

Caput LXXVI: Quod anima humana, corrupto corpore, non corrumpitur

Caput LXXVII: Rationes probantes animam corrumpi corrupto corpore (et solutio ipsarum)

Caput LXXVIII: Quod animae brutorum animalium non sunt immortales

Caput LXXIX: Quod anima humana incipiat cum corpore

Caput LXXX: Solutio rationum praemissarum

Caput LXXXI: Quod anima non sit de substantia Dei

Caput LXXXII: Quod anima humana non traducatur cum semine

Caput LXXXIII: Quod anima humana producatur in esse a Deo per creationem

Caput LXXXIV: Rationes ad probandum quod anima humana causetur ex semine

Caput LXXXV: Solutio rationum praemissarum

Caput LXXXVI: Quod nulli alii corpori nisi humano unitur substantia intellectualis ut forma

Caput LXXXVII: Quod sunt aliquae substantiae intellectuales corporibus non unitae

Caput LXXXVIII: De multitudine substantiarum separatarum

Caput LXXXIX: Quod in substantiis separatis non sunt multae unius speciei

Caput XC: Quod substantia separata et anima non sunt unius speciei

Caput XCI: Quomodo accipiatur genus et species in substantiis separatis

Caput XCII: Quod substantiae separatae non accipiunt cognitionem a sensibilibus

Caput XCIII: Quod intellectus substantiae separatae semper intelligit actu

Caput XCIV: Quomodo una substantia separata intelligit aliam

Caput XCV: Quod substantiae separatae cognoscunt materialia

Caput XCVI: Quod substantiae separatae cognoscunt singularia

Caput XCVII: Utrum substantiae separatae naturali cognitione cognoscant omnia simul

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