Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II
Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)
Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles
First published 1918
In Book II of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's account of creation, the distinction of creatures, and the human soul. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XIII (1918). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.
Caput I: Continuatio sequentium ad praecedentia
Caput II: Quod consideratio creaturarum utilis est ad fidei instructionem
Caput III: Quod cognoscere naturam creaturarum valet ad destruendum errores qui sunt circa Deum
Caput IV: Quod aliter considerat de creaturis philosophus et theologus
Caput V: Ordo dicendorum
Caput VI: Quod Deo competit ut sit aliis principium essendi
Caput VII: Quod in Deo sit potentia activa
Caput VIII: Quod Dei potentia sit eius substantia
Caput IX: Quod Dei potentia sit eius actio
Caput X: Qualiter potentia in Deo dicatur
Caput XI: Quod de Deo dicitur aliquid relative ad creaturas
Caput XII: Quod relationes dictae de Deo ad creaturas non sunt realiter in Deo
Caput XIII: Quomodo praedictae relationes de Deo dicantur
Caput XIV: Quod Deus sit omnibus causa essendi
Caput XV: Quod Deus ex nihilo produxit res in esse
Caput XVI: Quod creatio non est motus neque mutatio
Caput XVII: Quomodo solvantur ea quae contra creationem obiiciuntur
Caput XVIII: Quod in creatione non sit successio
Caput XIX: Quod nullum corpus potest creare
Caput XX: Quod solius Dei est creare
Caput XXI: Quod Deus omnia possit
Caput XXII: Quod Deus non agat ex necessitate naturae
Caput XXIII: Quod Deus agit secundum suam sapientiam
Caput XXIV: Qualiter omnipotens dicatur quaedam non posse
Caput XXV: Quod divinus intellectus non coartatur ad determinatos effectus
Caput XXVI: Quod divina voluntas ad determinatos effectus non artatur
Caput XXVII: Qualiter in rerum productione debitum inveniatur
Caput XXVIII: Qualiter in rebus creatis esse potest necessitas absoluta
Caput XXIX: Quod non est necessarium creaturas semper fuisse
Caput XXX: Rationes volentium probare aeternitatem mundi ex parte Dei acceptae
Caput XXXI: Rationes volentium probare aeternitatem mundi sumptae ex parte creaturarum
Caput XXXII: Rationes ad probandum aeternitatem mundi ex parte factionis
Caput XXXIII: Solutio rationum supra positarum et primo earum quae sumebantur ex parte Dei
Caput XXXIV: Solutio rationum quae sumuntur ex parte rerum factarum
Caput XXXV: Solutio rationum quae sumebantur ex parte factionis rerum
Caput XXXVI: Rationes quibus quidam conantur ostendere mundum non esse aeternum
Caput XXXVII: Quod distinctio rerum non est a casu
Caput XXXVIII: Quod materia non est prima causa distinctionis rerum
Caput XXXIX: Quod distinctio rerum non est propter contrarietatem agentium
Caput XL: Quod causa prima distinctionis rerum non est secundorum agentium ordo
Caput XLI: Quod rerum distinctio non est per aliquem de secundis agentibus inducentem in materiam diversas formas
The fifth conclusion is 1: False is the opinion of those who say that God created the matter of all visible things, but that it was distinguished through an angel by means of various forms.
- It is proved. Heavenly bodies cannot be made from matter, since there is no contrariety in them. Therefore an angel could not have formed those very bodies from matter created by God.
Second. The heavenly bodies do not agree with lower bodies in any matter, unless perhaps in prime matter. But prime matter could not have existed of itself before all formed bodies, since it is pure potency, and every esse in act is from some form. Therefore an angel could not have formed all visible bodies out of matter created by God.
Third. To be made properly belongs to a composite alone, and not to form in itself or to matter in itself, just as neither does esse. Therefore it is not the case that one agent creates matter alone and another induces form.
Fourth. The first induction of forms into matter cannot be by an agent through motion alone. Therefore it cannot be by an agent creating the form alone. — The antecedent is proved: because every motion toward a form is from a determinate form to a determinate form, and thus some form must be presupposed in matter for motion. — The consequence is also proved: because, since material forms are not subsistent per se, but their esse consists in informing matter, they cannot be brought into being except either by the creation of the composite or by the transmutation of matter into a form.
II. Fifth. Motion toward form is caused by motion according to place. Therefore by the motion of the heavens. Therefore those things that cannot come about through the mediation of the heavens' motion cannot come about from an agent acting through motion alone. But through the motion of the heavens many sensible forms cannot come to be except through determinate principles: just as certain animals are not generated without seed. Therefore the first institution of those forms cannot be brought about by an agent acting through motion alone. But such is an agent that can induce nothing except form into matter. Therefore, and so on. — The antecedent is proved: because motion toward form is naturally posterior to local motion, since it is the act of a more imperfect thing. — The first consequence is also evident: because the first motion according to place is the motion of the heavens.
It must be noted that motion regards two things, namely its terminus and its subject. If motions are compared in respect of their order to the terminus, then local motion is not more perfect; rather it is less perfect than motion toward a form: for the terminus of local motion is "where," which is less perfect than quality and substantial form. But if they are compared according to their order to the subject, then local motion is more perfect: because its subject is more perfect, being more in act, and in potency only as to "where." And since the terminus to which a motion tends is intrinsic to the motion, existing as one with it, while the subject is extrinsic to it, it may be said that local motion is extrinsically more perfect than motion toward a form, namely by reason of the subject; and this is how Saint Thomas understood the matter at this place, as is evident from the argument he adduces. Intrinsically, however—that is, by reason of the terminus—it is the reverse: for motion toward a form is more perfect than motion according to place, and prior in nature.
VI. The parts of these generable and corruptible things acquire forms in act through generation from the forms that are in matter, not from forms existing outside matter: since the generator, namely the proximate and immediate one, must be like what is generated; from Metaphysics VII. Therefore also the total acquisition of forms in matter cannot come about through motion from any separate substance, unless by means of a corporeal agent, or a creating one, who acts without motion. — The consequence is proved. Because from Physics III, local motion is the same, and the mutation of generation is the same, of the whole and of the part.
Seventh. Esse is the proper effect of the first cause. Therefore it is also the first causality of forms: because esse is through form.
Eighth. All things are assimilated to God insofar as they have forms, by which they are in act; and insofar as they desire their forms, they are said to desire the divine likeness. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident. For an effect acquires the form of that to which it is assimilated through the form.
Note that by this argument it is not proved that forms are in no way impressed upon matter by an angel; rather, it is proved that they are impressed even by God, and not only by an angel. And thus the angel will not be the first cause of the introduction of forms into matter. The opposite of this was asserted by the opinion attacked here.
This is confirmed by Genesis 1, where Moses, after saying that God created in the beginning, etc., adds how He distinguished all things into their proper species. Likewise Colossians 1: "In Him were all things created."