Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

The fourth conclusion is ¹: The distinction of things is not caused by the order of secondary agents. And this conclusion is set down against Avicenna, Metaphysics IX ², who held that God made only one substance; and because this substance could not match the simplicity of the first cause, but has some multiplicity in itself, therefore some plurality could proceed from it; and thus, in effects falling short of the simplicity of the cause, as the effects are multiplied, a diversity of causes is likewise established. Hence it followed that the distinction of things would arise from the order of agents, one of which stood farther from the simplicity of the first cause than another, and according to their multiplicity many things proceeded.

I. Therefore, rejecting this position, Saint Thomas argues first as follows. It would follow, if that position were granted, that the order of the universe and the distinction of things would be from chance. But this is false. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because a distinction of this kind would not proceed from one cause, but from the concurrence of all causes. Now those things which proceed from the concurrence of diverse causes and not from some one determinate cause we say come about by chance. — For the foundation of this argument see the first argument of the preceding chapter ³.

Second. The best thing among all created beings is the order of the universe: just as, in human affairs, the good of a people is more divine than the good of one man. Therefore it is reduced to that which is best among causes. Therefore it is not caused by secondary causes: namely, first. — The first consequence is proved. Because effects must be proportional to their causes.

Third. The order of the universe is the best thing among things. Therefore it is not caused by the fact that secondary causes fall short of the simplicity of the first cause. — The consequence is evident. For what is best ought not, as into a cause, to be traced back to a defect in things.

II. Fourth. The order and distinction of the universe is the ultimate end in caused things, since it is as it were the ultimate form — understand this of the intrinsic end, not the extrinsic one, for that latter is the divine goodness. Therefore it does not exist for the sake of the actions of secondary causes; rather, actions of this kind exist for the sake of establishing order and distinction in things. — The consequence is evident. For in all ordered agent causes, where action occurs for the sake of an end, the ends of secondary causes are for the sake of the end of the first cause. But the end of the first cause is the ultimate end in caused things.

2. But it seems that this argument does not conclude the proposed point. For those who say that the distinction of things arises from the order of agent causes do not say that distinction exists on account of the actions of secondary causes as on account of an end, but rather that it is from their actions as from an efficient cause in its own way. The argument, however, concludes that there is no distinction on account of actions as on account of an end, but rather the reverse. That this is not to the point is plainly evident.

It is answered that this argument proceeds not according to the order of being in the thing, but according to the order of being in the intention of the agent. For it can happen that something is prior to another in real esse, and yet posterior in the agent's intention: just as, when health is caused by medicine, medicine precedes health in reality, but in intention it is posterior, because medicine is desired only on account of the desire for health. Therefore, even if these thinkers said that the order and distinction of things are caused through the actions of secondary causes, they nevertheless had to say that those agents intend their own actions first, and that distinction follows as a consequence, as was argued in the first argument ⁴ And thus it followed that the distinction of things arises because the actions of causes are intended by their agents first and per se, from which the distinction of things followed either entirely beyond the intention, or beyond the primary intention. Just as if we were to say that someone wills medicine first and per se, and that if health should follow upon the medicine, we would say that health either was not intended, or was intended secondarily on account of its concomitance with the medicine; and thus health would come about because the medicine had been taken, but the medicine would not have been taken so that health might come about.

It is said, therefore, in reply to the doubt that those who so held said explicitly, indeed, that order and distinction in things are produced effectively by the actions of secondary agents; but implicitly they also said that those very actions are intended first, and that the distinction of things exists on account of the actions as on account of an end. And against this the argument of Saint Thomas proceeds.

III. Fifth, an argument is brought against the foundation and reason of the aforesaid position: namely, when they say that many and diverse things cannot be caused immediately by the first cause because it is most simple.

The distinction and order of the universe must exist in the intellect of the first cause. Therefore there must be there the forms of distinct things. Therefore many things can be caused immediately by the first cause. — The antecedent is proved: because the distinction of the parts of the universe and their order is the proper effect of the first cause, as it were the ultimate form and the best thing in the universe. But in agents that act through intellect, the form of the effect preexists in the intellect of the agent. — The first consequence is evident. — The second is proved on this supposition, that from the forms which are in the intellect things outside the soul proceed, in those cases where things are done through intellect.

It must be noted that this argument does not presuppose what it intends to prove when it assumes that the distinction of things is a proper effect of God: for it does not assume it as conceded, but as proven in the preceding argument.

It must also be noted that this argument presupposes that things proceed outward immediately from the forms that are in the intellect, since this seems to belong to the very notion of an agent acting through intellect. For just as an agent acting through nature can immediately produce something like itself with respect to its natural form, so an agent acting through intellect produces something like itself with respect to the form preconceived in it.

IV. Sixth. God is an agent acting through intellect, and cannot fail in his action. Therefore he produces his effect by this, that he understands and intends that effect itself. Therefore he can create many things at once without any intermediary. — The first inference is proved. Because the action of an agent acting through intellect is terminated at the form which it understands, and not at another except accidentally and by chance: which cannot happen where the action cannot fail. — The second is also evident. Because by the same reason that he understands one effect, he can understand many other effects as well.

Seventh. That only one thing should come from one is necessary only when the agent is determined to one effect. But the divine power is not determined to one, as appears from what was said above; and this because it is supremely simple. For the more united a power is (that is, the more perfectional), the more infinite it is—that is, more unlimited and indeterminate—and the more things it can extend itself to. Therefore from God, because He is one and altogether simple, it is not necessary that only one thing proceed. Indeed, precisely because He is altogether simple, a multitude can proceed from Him.

Eighth. Many beings cannot come into esse except through creation, such as the intelligences, the heavenly bodies, and prime matter. But God alone can create. Therefore, etc. — The major premise is evident, because those beings are ungenerable, since they are not composed of matter and form subject to contrariety.

V. It is confirmed Gen. 1, In principio etc.; and Job xxxvii, Tu forsitan etc.

There is excluded, moreover, from these the error of Avicenna, who said that God, understanding Himself, produced one first intelligence; in which, since there is potency and act, by understanding God it produces a second intelligence; and this latter, by understanding itself insofar as it is in act, produces the soul of the heavens; but insofar as it is in potency, it produces the substance of the first orb; and so on, proceeding in this way.

The error of the ancient heretics is also excluded, who said that God did not create the world, but angels. Of this error Simon Magus is said to have been the first inventor.