Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

I. Thirdly, an answer is given to the arguments drawn from the side of the faction of things ¹.

1. To the first, it is said first that "from nothing nothing comes" holds true in particular making, which the philosophers considered; but not in the production of the whole of being.

It is said second, that the name of "making" does not properly belong to this universal production of things, since such a name implies motion or change: although it is transferred to that origin by a certain likeness, so that we call "made" those things whose nature draws its origin from others.

It must be noted, as was touched upon above ², that a making can be called particular in two ways. In one way, by comparison to the first and per se terminus of the making; and thus a making is called particular whose first and per se terminus is a particular being, whereas one is called universal whose first and per se terminus is some universal. — In the other way, by comparison to the essential parts of the terminus materially produced; and thus a making is called particular by which not all the parts of the terminus are made, but some, whereas one is called universal by which all the parts of the thing are produced.

If we take a particular making in the first way, creation is not a particular making but a universal one: because esse taken absolutely and without limit is the formal terminus of creation first and per se, and not according to some particular aspect taken. If we take it also in the second way, then again creation is not a particular making but a universal one: because through it not only the form of a thing is produced, as happens in other makings, which presuppose matter, but all the parts of the created thing are produced, namely both matter and form. In this sense Saint Thomas says that creation is not a particular but a universal making.

II. To the second, it is said first that creation is not a change except metaphorically.

It is said second, that what in no way is does not stand in any way whatever: so that it cannot be concluded that, when it begins to be, it now stands otherwise than before. Therefore the argument does not follow.

It must be considered, as the argument states, whatever begins to be anew does not hold itself in the same way now and before, and that everything of this sort must have been changed in some way: namely, that what I say, not to hold itself in the same way now and before, although as to the wording it expresses a negation, nevertheless as to its meaning can be taken simply negatively; and it can also be taken affirmatively. If it is taken negatively, then for something not to hold itself in the same way now and before, it suffices that it now has some mode which it did not have before. And thus what in no way was before this instant and is in this instant can be said not to hold itself in the same way now and before: for if before it was in no way, it is evident that it was not in the way it now is. And thus, what is created does not hold itself in the same way now and before. But this is not the same as being changed, taking change properly. — If, however, it is taken affirmatively, then something is said not to hold itself in the same way now and before when it now has one mode and before had another mode. And this is properly to be changed: for what is changed tends from an imperfect mode to a more perfect one, or conversely. But this belongs only to that which previously existed in some way: for what in no way exists, as Saint Thomas says, does not exist in another way. And thus, what is created cannot be said not to exist in the same way now and before, taken affirmatively: for it did not previously exist in some way. On account of this Saint Thomas, in responding, so that the true sense in which the argument proceeded might be accepted, denied that what is created holds itself in one way and another now and before: accepting affirmatively what in the argument had been accepted negatively, as to the wording.

III. To the third, it is said that a created being, before it existed, was possible through the power of the agent, or on account of the relation of the terms, but not through any passive potency in beings: for this is necessary only in those things which take their principle of existing through motion.

To the fourth, he says that in those things which do not come to be through motion, becoming is not prior to being; but this holds well in those things which come to be through motion. And therefore it is not necessary that such things have some preexisting subject.

Finally, Saint Thomas confirms the principal proposition by the authority of Gen. 1, In the beginning God created etc.; and of Prov. 8, Before he made anything etc.