Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II
Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)
Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles
First published 1918
In Book II of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's account of creation, the distinction of creatures, and the human soul. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XIII (1918). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.
Caput I: Continuatio sequentium ad praecedentia
Caput II: Quod consideratio creaturarum utilis est ad fidei instructionem
Caput III: Quod cognoscere naturam creaturarum valet ad destruendum errores qui sunt circa Deum
Caput IV: Quod aliter considerat de creaturis philosophus et theologus
Caput V: Ordo dicendorum
Caput VI: Quod Deo competit ut sit aliis principium essendi
Caput VII: Quod in Deo sit potentia activa
Caput VIII: Quod Dei potentia sit eius substantia
Caput IX: Quod Dei potentia sit eius actio
Caput X: Qualiter potentia in Deo dicatur
Caput XI: Quod de Deo dicitur aliquid relative ad creaturas
Caput XII: Quod relationes dictae de Deo ad creaturas non sunt realiter in Deo
Caput XIII: Quomodo praedictae relationes de Deo dicantur
Caput XIV: Quod Deus sit omnibus causa essendi
Caput XV: Quod Deus ex nihilo produxit res in esse
Caput XVI: Quod creatio non est motus neque mutatio
Caput XVII: Quomodo solvantur ea quae contra creationem obiiciuntur
Caput XVIII: Quod in creatione non sit successio
Caput XIX: Quod nullum corpus potest creare
Caput XX: Quod solius Dei est creare
Caput XXI: Quod Deus omnia possit
Caput XXII: Quod Deus non agat ex necessitate naturae
Caput XXIII: Quod Deus agit secundum suam sapientiam
Caput XXIV: Qualiter omnipotens dicatur quaedam non posse
Caput XXV: Quod divinus intellectus non coartatur ad determinatos effectus
Caput XXVI: Quod divina voluntas ad determinatos effectus non artatur
Caput XXVII: Qualiter in rerum productione debitum inveniatur
Caput XXVIII: Qualiter in rebus creatis esse potest necessitas absoluta
Caput XXIX: Quod non est necessarium creaturas semper fuisse
Caput XXX: Rationes volentium probare aeternitatem mundi ex parte Dei acceptae
As to the second point, the arguments raised against the conclusion of the preceding chapter must be answered 1. On this matter Saint Thomas does two things. First, he sets forth those arguments in order; second, he replies to them, in chapter xxxv.
Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he sets out the arguments taken from the side of God; second, the arguments taken from the side of creatures, in chapter 33; third, the arguments taken from the side of the opposing party, in chapter 34.
As to the first, * the argument is made first.* Because God is not moved, neither per se nor per accidens. But everything that does not act always is moved per se or per accidens.
Second. Because the effect proceeds from the agent cause through its action. But the action of God is eternal.
Third. Because, once a sufficient cause is posited, the effect must necessarily be posited as well. Now God is the sufficient cause of the production of things, and He exists from eternity.
Fourth. Because an agent acting through will does not delay carrying out its purpose of doing something except on account of some future thing awaited that is not yet present. But whatever God now wills to be, He willed from eternity that it be; nor could anything else have been awaited for the production of the universal creature.
Fifth. Because the will of God stands equally disposed toward producing a creature throughout the whole of eternity. Therefore either it is His will that the creature never be established under His eternity, or that it always be. But it is evident that it is not His will that the creature never be established under His eternity. Therefore it is necessary that the creature has always existed.
Sixth. Because the end of creatures is the divine goodness, which throughout all eternity stands in the same manner in itself and in relation to the divine will.
Seventh. Because the divine goodness is infinite. And consequently it belongs to it to communicate itself infinitely, not merely for some determinate time.