Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

After Saint Thomas determined the necessity of the production of the creature in itself, he now determines its necessity with respect to eternal duration ¹. Concerning this he does three things: first, he shows that it is not necessary for creatures to have existed from eternity; second, he resolves the arguments proving such necessity ²; third, he shows that even the arguments by which it is shown that the world is not eternal do not conclude necessarily ³.

As to the first, it is proved that it is not necessary that creatures have existed from eternity.

But it must be noted that in this place it does not matter whether something can be produced from eternity or not. For, supposing that creatures have been produced, what is proved here is that they have not been produced of necessity from eternity: whatever may be the case concerning the possibility of eternal production.

It is proved, therefore, first as follows. It is not necessary that a creature be absolutely. Therefore neither is it necessary that it be from eternity.

The antecedent is proved. A creature has no necessity of essendi from itself, nor from another. Therefore etc. — The first part of the antecedent is proved. Because if it had from itself a necessity of essendi, it would have esse from itself. For what is necessary to be, it is impossible not to be; and consequently what is necessarily to be from itself is, from itself, impossible to be non-being. But this was shown above to be false. — The second part is also proved. Because it does not have this necessity from the efficient cause, which is God: since it was shown that God does not act necessarily. Nor from the final cause, which is the divine goodness: since that neither as regards esse nor as regards bene esse depends on creatures. Therefore etc.

Second. God produces creatures by will. And he does not will them necessarily. Therefore he does not produce them necessarily. Therefore, and so on.

Third. Things are in this way because God wills them to be so. But it is not necessary that God should have willed creatures always to exist, just as it is not necessary that they exist. Therefore, etc. — The major is proved: because God's willing is his acting.

Fourth. God produces a creature from no debt. Therefore not from necessity. Therefore etc. The first inference is proved: because nothing proceeds from an agent acting by will out of necessity except by reason of some debt.

It must be noted that in what proceeds from someone acting by will, the effect, as regards its esse and non-esse, proceeds freely from the will, speaking absolutely, and has no absolute necessity: for an agent acting by will, as such, can produce the effect or not produce it. But insofar as the will is subject to some condition of what is owed, it can have necessity. For example, one who owes a hundred to another can indeed give or not give; but if he wishes to act justly, he will necessarily give; and thus there will be there a necessity of justice, though not an absolute necessity. And therefore Saint Thomas rightly said that from an agent acting by will nothing proceeds by necessity except by reason of some debt, in which, namely, the necessity of justice is preserved.

Fifth. There is no absolute necessity in created things with respect to the first principle, but only in their order to other causes. And those other causes are not of themselves necessary causes. Therefore, and so on. The consequence is evident, because necessity in relation to that which is not of itself necessary in its esse does not compel anything to have always existed.

It must be noted that per se necessary causes can be said in two ways: namely, either in causing, or in being. Causes are called per se necessary in causing which do not have the necessity of causing from another. But they are called per se necessary in being which have from themselves the necessity of being and not from another. In neither way is any created thing a per se necessary cause. For, just as every created thing has esse from another, so too it has the necessity of being and the necessity of causing from another, if it be necessary. And therefore, by comparison to it, it is not necessary that anything has always been: for neither is that cause itself, whichever created one we posit, necessary to have always been, since it proceeded from a voluntary cause.

It should also be noted that where it is said of the other causes that they are not necessary causes, the text is perhaps corrupt, and should read that they are not necessary for being. And thus the text is clear and consistent with what was said above ⁴.