Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

Since it has been shown that no necessity is found on the part of the will absolutely, in the production of things, there remains to be shown that in this production of things there is also no necessity of justice ¹.

I. Three conclusions are posited ² The first of which is: God did not produce the universe of things out of a debt of justice by which anything would be owed to a creature.

For the clarification of this, it must be known that "due" implies a certain obligation with respect to another: for someone is said to be a debtor to another because he is obligated to him in some respect. Now someone is said to do something out of the debt of justice when he is bound to do it if he is to be just, and, by not doing it, would be unjust. Hence, if God had produced things out of the debt of justice, He would have produced them justly in such a way that, by not producing them, He would have been unjust. But since we hold that, even if He had not produced things, He would not on that account have been unjust—indeed, He could have refrained from producing them without injustice—therefore the conclusion is stated that He did not produce them out of debt and obligation of justice.

It is proved first as follows. Nothing is presupposed to the production of things to which anything is owed. Therefore, and so on. — The consequence is evident, because justice is directed toward another, to whom it renders what is owed, in book V of the Ethics.

Second. The act by which something first becomes someone's own cannot be an act of justice. But through creation a created thing first begins to have something of its own. Therefore, etc. — The major is proved: since it belongs to justice to render to each what is his own, the act of justice must presuppose the act by which something becomes someone's own, as appears in human affairs.

Note that an act of justice need not always presuppose the act of the one to whom something is owed, by which something of his own comes to be; rather, such a thing must be either his or another's. For sometimes something begins to belong to someone through his own act, as when someone earns something by laboring; sometimes indeed through another's act, as when someone is made heir by another's testament. And in this way a creature begins, through the operation of God creating, to have something of its own.

2. • Third.* God depends on no one, nor does He need anything that He might receive from another. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident. For no one is indebted to another except on account of something from the other of them.

But a doubt arises. For although someone may not need what he receives from another, it is not on that account removed that he is bound to the other by a debt of justice: just as one who receives something from another by way of deposit is bound to return it by a debt of justice, even though he does not need that deposit. Therefore, although God does not need, since he receives many things from creatures, such as sacrifices and oblations and so forth, he seems to be bound to the creature by a debt of justice.

It is answered first that God receives nothing from a creature which is not God's own and not owed to Him, since He is the cause of all things. Now the debt of justice in giving back or compensating for what has been received consists in taking from another what belongs to that other and not to the receiver. Therefore, even if God were to receive something from creatures, He would not on that account be bound to them by a debt of justice; for He gave before He received.

It is said secondly, that one can be held to render something back in two ways: in one way, by reason of the thing itself considered absolutely, namely because he possesses another's property; in the other way, by reason of a thing received as a kind of benefit, for which recompense is owed. In the first way, no need is considered on the part of the receiver. In the second way, however, a certain need is considered: for from a benefit some utility is gained. Saint Thomas, therefore, speaks here of a debt in the second way, not the first, as is clear from the course of his argument, where he gives the example of a son with respect to a father, of a lord with respect to a servant, and of man with respect to God; for in all these cases it appears that one receives some benefit from the other, for which recompense is owed. But the rendering back of a deposit pertains to debt in the first way. Therefore it is not a fitting objection against the intent of the argument: for regarding the first mode of debt it is sufficiently evident that God does not retain what belongs to another.

3. Fourth. God is the first agent. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because an agent acts by a debt of justice not for himself alone, but for that to which he owes it. And thus he cannot be the first agent: since what is for its own sake is prior to what is for the sake of another.

The conclusion is confirmed Romans 11, "Who has first given" etc., and Job 41, "Who has given anything before him" etc.

By this, moreover, the error of those who say that God can do nothing except what he does is excluded.

II. The second conclusion is: God did not produce creatures out of a debt of the divine goodness taken absolutely, which is a cause by way of an end: that is, as though he were bound by his goodness to produce creatures, such that, had he not produced them, he would have done an injustice to his own goodness.

It is proved first. Either this would be because something would be ordered to it itself, namely as owing to refer back to it what it received from it, just as it is owed to a benefactor that thanks be rendered to him for his benefits; and therefore things would have to be created so that the debt due for the benefit might be repaid to the divine goodness. Or because something would be owed to him in itself and by necessity, as required for his perfection. Not the first: because nothing preexists creation which, on account of a benefit received, owes anything to God. Nor the second: because the divine goodness needs nothing external for its perfection. Therefore, etc.

Second. If this were so, then it would follow that, if God wills His goodness to be, He would will of necessity other things to be produced by Himself, since by willing He brought things into esse. But this is false: because, as was shown in the First Part, God wills His goodness of necessity, but not things other than Himself. Therefore, and so on.

Third. It was shown in the preceding sections that God produced things not from a necessity of nature; nor from a necessity of knowledge; nor from a necessity of will; nor from a necessity of justice. Therefore in no way is it owed to the divine goodness that things be brought into being.

2. But St. Thomas notes that, although the production of creatures cannot be said to have been from a debt of justice by which the creature or his own goodness would be a debtor to it, if justice is taken properly, because thus justice requires a debt of necessity—for what is rendered to anyone from justice is owed him by necessity of law—nevertheless, if justice is taken broadly, it can be said that there is justice in the creation of things, insofar as it befits the divine goodness.

Note that justice, properly speaking, concerns the rendering of what is owed out of necessity—that is, of what is owed to someone by necessity of right. Justice taken in a common sense, however, extends to the rendering of what is owed in whatever way something is owed to someone—whether, I say, out of necessity or out of a certain fittingness. And it is in this second way that justice is found in the creation of things: for there is rendered to the divine goodness what is owed to it according to a certain congruence and fittingness. For it is fitting that the highest goodness be communicated and manifested in the production of creatures, since good is self-diffusive ³. Saint Thomas calls this mode of justice the condignity of the divine goodness.

III. Third conclusion: The production of things proceeds from the necessity of the divine disposition.

It is proved. For it cannot be that God should have decreed to do something which he would afterward not do. Otherwise his decree would be either mutable, or weak and feeble.

Now Saint Thomas notes that, although it is a debt that the divine disposition be fulfilled, this debt nevertheless does not suffice for the notion of justice properly so called in the creation of things. For, as is said in Ethics V, justice properly so called does not obtain between a thing and itself. Now in the creation of things, insofar as we consider the divine disposition to which something is owed, nothing can be considered but the action of God himself creating: for such a disposition is an act of the divine intellect and of the divine will. And thus, if God renders what is owed to his own disposition, he renders what is owed to himself. Therefore, and so on.

⁴ After Saint Thomas determined the mode of divine action considered from the side of the agent, he now determines the mode of that action considered from the side of the thing produced ⁵. Concerning this, however, he does two things: for first he treats of the necessity of production absolutely; second, with respect to the measure and duration of production ⁶. Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows how in the production of things there is found in some way a debt of justice; second, how in certain created things there is also found an absolute necessity ⁷.

I. As to the first point, then, the following conclusion is proposed: In producing the first divine effects no debt is found, but there is indeed one in the production of later effects; and this is understood of those effects that are later by nature. The first part he leaves as proven from what precedes. The second, however, he proves by explaining and arguing inductively.

He notes, therefore, that what is due by necessity is always taken from that which is prior in nature. Yet that which is prior in nature is sometimes also prior in esse. And then the posterior things draw from the prior ones a due order in esse: for it is due that, once the causes are posited, there be actions by which the effects are produced. But sometimes it is posterior in esse. And then those things that are prior in esse draw their due order from things posterior in esse, though prior in nature: just as it is due that medicine precede so that health may follow.

II. From these things, however, it is evident that a twofold debt is found in the production of things: one, namely, from what is posterior in being; the other, indeed, from what is prior in being.

As to the first obligation, Saint Thomas notes in the first place that the necessity which is a posteriori in esse, though prior according to nature, is not an absolute necessity but a conditional one: as when we say, if this must be done, it is necessary that this be prior.

It should be noted, secondly, from what has been said, that according to this conditional necessity of what is owed in the production of creatures, a threefold indebtedness is found in the parts that pertain to the perfection of the universe: namely, from the whole universe of things to any part of it; from one creature to another; and within each creature, from its parts and properties and accidents, on which the creature depends with respect to its esse or with respect to some perfection of itself. For if such a universe was to be made, it was fitting that the elements be made; and if God willed that animals and plants exist, it was fitting that He make the heavenly bodies; similarly, if He willed to make man, it was fitting that He join soul and body together in him.

It is noted thirdly that, if these modes of debt and necessity are carefully considered, God is not said to be a debtor to the creature, but to the fulfillment of his own ordinance.

2. As to the second debt, however, five things are said. The first is that the necessity of production, which is taken from prior causes in esse, is called absolute necessity.

The second point is that, with respect to the efficient cause, this necessity is not found in the first creation of things. For God alone is there the efficient cause. But He does not act from necessity of nature, but by will. Now things that come about by will cannot have necessity except on supposition of an end.

The third point is that in the first creation of things nothing prevents due order and necessity from being found in material and formal causes.

The fourth point is that this necessity is according to the order of the effect to its material or formal cause. And therefore, in respect of it, God cannot be called a debtor; rather, the debt of necessity falls upon the creature: namely, because this necessity arises not from God's owing anything to the creature, but because from the material or formal cause itself something must necessarily follow.

The fifth point is that in the propagation of things, where a creature is the efficient cause, necessity from an efficient cause can be found. For it is evident that by the motion of the sun bodies are necessarily altered.

III. From these the proposition is concluded: namely, that a debt of natural justice is found (that is, according as something is owed to nature) both with respect to the creation of things and with respect to their propagation, insofar as what comes later is ordered to what comes earlier by nature.

From which it also follows as a corollary that God justly and rationally created and governs all things.

By these considerations, moreover, the error is excluded of those who say that God cannot make anything other than what he does make, and of those who say that all things follow from the divine will as simple, without any other reason.

It must be noted that God, although He does not produce things under the impulsion of any extrinsic cause moving the divine will, nevertheless produces them in accordance with the exigency of each nature, and according to what is owed to each nature. And this is what it means for God to have produced things justly and rationally, and not according to His simple will without reason.