Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

After Saint Thomas has shown that God does not act by the necessity of nature, but by his will and wisdom, he further shows that neither does he act by necessity of intellect ¹.

I. And he sets down this conclusion: The knowledge of God, or His intellect, is not confined by any limits of effects.

For the clarification of which, it must be noted that Saint Thomas does not speak here of God's knowledge and intellect as they are taken in a purely speculative sense, but as they are taken practically, either simply or in a certain respect. Knowledge is said to be restricted in this way to determinate effects when someone knows certain producible effects, but not all, and causes those to which his knowledge extends necessarily, after his manner. In this sense Saint Thomas understands that the divine knowledge and the divine intellect are not restricted or limited to determinate effects: namely, because God does not know by his intellect and through his knowledge only some producible things and some modes of producible things, but all producible things and all the modes of producible things. Therefore he is not necessitated to produce these effects and not others because his intellect is determined to knowing these and does not extend to others.

II. It is proved first. The divine power is not limited to certain effects. Therefore neither is the divine intellect. — The consequence is evident. Because God, in knowing his essence, comprehends all other things that can proceed from God, in which all things of this kind must be by some likeness, just as effects are contained virtually in their cause.

It must be noted, however, that the antecedent of this argument is to be understood of the power of God considered absolutely and in itself. For thus it can extend to everything capable of participating in the ratio of a made being: and therefore it is not limited to any number of things makeable. But if it be considered as executing the command of the will and the direction of knowledge—in which way it is called the ordinary power of God—then it is limited to determinate effects; for God by His wisdom has ordained which effects He wills to produce.

III. Second. The divine essence is infinite. Therefore it exceeds all other things infinitely. Therefore also the intellect. — The first consequence is proved: because the infinite, however great an addition of finite things be made, cannot be equaled without exceeding by infinity any finite quantity, even if they existed in infinite number. But all things other than God are finite in essence, since they are limited to genus and species. — The second is also proved: because the divine intellect perfectly knows the divine essence.

It must be noted that, since the infinity of the divine essence is an infinity according to perfection, while all other things, even if they were infinite in number, are of finite perfection, because they have their essence limited to a genus and species: therefore the divine essence infinitely exceeds all created things, and could be the ratio productive of many other things. From this it follows that the divine intellect, which knows the divine essence perfectly, and consequently knows that it can be participated by creatures in infinite ways, transcends every finitude of effects through its cognition. And thus it is not limited to determinate producible effects, such that it would not know others besides those. And this is the foundation of this argument.

Note that almost all texts have, even if they exist finite in number ². If this is so, the sense is that the infinite exceeds any finite things whatsoever, namely in essence, granted that they are also finite in number: because clearly, if they were infinite in number, ordered by the addition of one perfection to another, some infinite could well be equaled by things finite in essence. But I think the more accurate text has infinite. For the infinite in essence and perfection, the way the divine essence is infinite, exceeds any finite things whatsoever in essence, even given that they are infinite in number, as we have explained.

Similarly, what we set out in the conclusion, that the intellect, by its cognition, must transcend the finiteness of effects, nearly all texts have infiniteness ³. If it is so written, this must be understood of material infiniteness. Nevertheless I think one should say "finiteness," because this is more to the purpose, since it must be concluded that the divine intellect is not limited to finite effects.

IV. Third. The divine intellect is the knower of infinite things. Therefore its causality is not restricted to finite effects. — The consequence is evident, because God produces things in esse through the knowledge of his intellect.

It must be noted that in this place Saint Thomas speaks of knowledge insofar as it has the character of a directive cause of operation. Now the directive cause extends to producibles according to the mode in which they are producible. Therefore it is the same to say, the divine intellect knows only finite producibles, and, the divine intellect can cause, in its own way, only finite effects: for one accompanies the other. Similarly there follow one another, that the divine intellect knows infinite producible effects, and, that it can cause infinite effects. For this reason, when Saint Thomas wishes to show that it is not limited to determinate effects, he concludes that its causality is not confined to finite effects.

Fourth. If the causality of the divine intellect were limited to determinate effects, acting as it were of necessity, this would be with respect to those things that are produced in being. But this cannot be, since God understands even those things that neither are nor will be nor have been; and the causality of the intellect extends only as far as its knowledge of producibles extends, insofar as they are producible. Therefore, and so on.

Fifth. The subject of the divine art and science is being, namely the makeable. Therefore the divine intellect extends to all things, according to its causality, to which the ratio of being is not repugnant. Therefore it extends to all makeable things. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because God through his intellect is the universal principle of being. But a universal object must correspond to a universal principle. — The first consequence is also proved. Because every art extends to all things that can be contained under its subject-genre. — The second is also evident. Because all makeable things, insofar as they are of themselves, are naturally apt to be contained under being.

The conclusion is confirmed by the Psalm, Great is the Lord etc.

There is also excluded from these the error of those who say that, from the fact that God understands himself, such a disposition of things flows from him of necessity.

Finally, note that, although the divine intellect is not limited to determinate effects (namely, so far as concerns the intellect itself), nevertheless God Himself has appointed for Himself determinate effects which He produces in an ordered way through His wisdom: according to that saying of Wis. xi, Thou hast ordered all things in number etc.

V. A difficulty arises here: how, if the divine intellect is not in itself limited to determinate effects, can God establish for himself a certain number of producible things? For the act of the intellect by which he judges something to be producible precedes the act of the will by which God wills to produce it, since the will is not borne toward anything except as known. Therefore the divine will cannot will certain determinate effects unless the intellect first apprehends them, in the order of reason, as producible. Therefore it is false that God establishes for himself determinate effects, if the intellect is in itself unlimited; or else one must seek something else that limits the intellect to determinate effects. But it does not appear what that could be.

It is answered that, notwithstanding the indetermination and illimitation of the intellect, God nevertheless established for himself determinate effects which he would produce, and this through the freedom of his will. For although the act of the intellect, in respect of the thing and its producible mode, precedes the act of the will as such, according to our way of understanding, yet the very ordination to producing is through an act of the will. This is easy to see in the production of artificial things. For first, the house-builder conceives a house and its mode as it is producible, and judges it good that it be produced; then, by his will, he chooses to produce the house; third, his intellect knows that it ought to be produced, and by art directs its production. In a similar way we can imagine in God that first the divine intellect knows all producibles and all the modes of producibles, and judges it good that some be produced. Then the will chooses to produce certain of those producibles and not others. In the third place, the intellect knows that these effects ought to be produced in such a way, and not others. And thus it is clear that there is no need to posit anything besides the divine will that would limit the divine practical science to determinate effects; and that it is false that the act of the intellect by which it judges something ought to be produced, or that it is produced, precedes the act of the will. On the contrary, it follows from the action and determination of the will.