Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

Having shown that the divine action and the divine power extend to all possibles, it remains now to determine the mode of the divine action itself¹. On this point St. Thomas does two things: first, he treats of the mode of action considered on the side of the agent; second, of the mode considered on the side of the thing produced, in chapter xxix.

As to the first, he does four things: first, he shows that God does not produce things out of the necessity of nature; second, not out of the necessity of intellect, chapter 26; third, not out of the necessity of will, chapter 27; fourth, not out of the necessity of justice, chapter 28.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he demonstrates the proposition; second, he draws out two corollaries in the two chapters that follow.

I. As to the first point, the following conclusion is proposed: God acts in creatures not from necessity of nature, but through the arbitrament of his will.

To make this evident, it must be known that to act of necessity is to be so determined to a given action that in the agent's power there is not the ability not to act. But acting of necessity of nature can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that the necessity of nature signifies the necessary inclination of a natural form to act, insofar as a natural form is distinguished from a cognizable form. And thus to act by necessity of nature is to be determined to act according to the inclination of that form by which the agent is naturally in act with respect to its esse of nature. And this is distinguished from acting by cognition and the appetite consequent upon it. — In another way, so that the necessity of nature signifies nature's mode of acting. And thus to act by necessity of nature is to be necessarily inclined to act: just as nature is necessarily inclined toward its operations. Then acting by necessity of nature is distinguished from acting by freedom of will.

How "acting by the necessity of nature" is to be understood in this conclusion is doubtful. For from what he adds, but by the choice of the will, it seems to be taken in the second way; and also from certain arguments set forth in this chapter. — But from what he proves below ² that neither the divine intellect nor will is confined to determinate effects, it seems it should be understood in the first way.

It seems to me, considering the procedure of St. Thomas, that it is to be taken in the first way. For, wishing to show that creatures are not produced by God of necessity, he runs through every mode of necessity: namely, that they are produced neither on account of a necessary inclination of the substance and divine nature;

nor on account of the necessity of knowledge; nor on account of the necessity of will. This appears more clearly, however, in chapter XXVI, where he says it has been shown, namely in this chapter, that divine power is not confined to determinate effects, and hence that God does not act from necessity of nature.

But what is added, but by the arbitration of the will, does not stand in the way. For by that Saint Thomas wishes nothing other than that he acts through the will; but how he acts through the will—namely, whether necessarily or freely—will be declared below. ³

Similarly, although in certain arguments it may seem to be inferred that God acts freely, this is nevertheless inferred so that it may be further concluded that he acts by will, not by nature; but not so as to show absolutely that he acts by freedom.

II. To this sense, then, the conclusion is proved first. Divine power is not ordered to one effect only. Therefore it does not act by the necessity of nature. — The antecedent is clear from what was said above. — The consequence, however, is proved: because every agent acting by the necessity of nature has its power determined to one thing. The sign of this is that natural things always come about in the same way, unless there is an impediment.

For the understanding of this argument, it must be considered that, since every agent produces something like itself with respect to the form that is the principle of its action, that whose principle of acting is nature alone produces what is like itself only according to nature; by this it is distinguished from an agent acting through knowledge, which produces what is like itself according to a form conceived in advance, but not according to nature as such. Therefore, unless there is some defect on the part of the power or of the passive potency, it produces its equal, as Saint Thomas deduces in the Potentia, q. 3, a. 15. Nature is therefore determined to one thing: because it is determined to producing its equal according to nature. And so, if God were to produce a creature by the necessity of nature, he would be determined to a creature equal to himself in nature. Which is impossible: for thus only the Son of God and the Holy Spirit are produced by nature. Therefore Saint Thomas fittingly argues from the fact that nature is determined to one thing that God does not act by the necessity of nature.

III. Second. Many things are subject to the divine power which are not found in the nature of things. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident, because whoever, of the things he is able to make, makes some and does not make others (defects and impediments being set aside), acts by an election of the will, not by a necessity of nature. — But the antecedent is proved as follows: whatever things do not imply a contradiction are subject to the divine power; yet many things are not in created things which nevertheless, if they existed, would not imply a contradiction.

2. Third. God is intelligent by His essence. Therefore the likeness of His effect is in Him in an intelligible manner. Therefore He acts through intellect. Hence also through will, not by necessity of nature. — The first consequence is proved: because whatever is in another is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. — The second is likewise proved: because every agent acts in that way according to which the likeness of the thing made is in it. — The last is also proved: because intellect produces no effect except through the mediation of will.

Concerning that proposition, Every agent acts in such a way as the likeness of the thing made is in it, it must be noted that the mode of acting can be taken both on the part of the agent and on the part of the thing made. If it were taken on the part of the thing made, the sense would be that the agent causes in the thing made that mode of being which the likeness of the thing made has in the agent. And then the proposition would not be universally true: for the likeness of an artifact has immaterial esse in the mind of the craftsman, and yet the artifact has material esse. Hence Saint Thomas does not take it in this sense. — But if it is taken on the part of the agent, the sense is that action, insofar as it proceeds from the agent, has the same mode which the form that is the principle of acting, and the likeness of the thing made, has. And then the proposition is universally true, and this is what is intended here. And it is proved by Saint Thomas, because every agent acts like itself. From this proposition he wishes to argue thus. In every agent there must be a likeness and form of the thing made as the principle of its action. But the action must, on the part of the agent, be measured and proportioned to its formal principle. Therefore the mode of the action, on the part of the agent, is according to the mode of the likeness of the thing made in the agent.

3. But then a doubt arises according to the second sense: for it does not seem to be universally true. For the likeness of corruptible things in the heavenly bodies has esse in an incorruptible manner. And yet the action by which a corruptible thing proceeds from a heavenly body does not have an incorruptible mode, but proceeds corruptibly: since it is a transient action, and, once the thing is made, it no longer is; or at least it is corrupted along with the corruption of the effect.

It is answered that the proposition of St. Thomas is to be understood of the mode that is naturally apt to make a diversity in the mode of acting, and not of every mode of likeness in the thing made. Now this mode is twofold: namely, the natural mode and the intelligible mode; and the modes that necessarily accompany these are also reduced to them, as it were. Therefore, if such a likeness has a natural mode of being, the mode of action will be that it proceeds naturally; but if it has an intelligible esse, the mode of action is that it be brought about intelligibly. But the corruptible or incorruptible esse of a form does not, as such, vary the mode of acting: for these are modes of the form as form, that is, as perfecting the subject in itself, and not as perfecting in relation to another as the principle of action. From this it is clear that the objection adduced is not against the mind of St. Thomas.

IV. Fourth. Since there is a twofold genus of action, according to the Philosopher in Book IX of the Metaphysics, the divine action is not of the genus of actions that are not in the agent, since its action is its substance; rather it is of the genus of actions immanent in the agent. Therefore etc. — The consequence is evident. For immanent actions are only those of a knower and an appetitive being. And consequently they are not actions of an agent acting by necessity of nature.

Note that from this passage it appears that what we determined above, ⁴, is true: namely, that an action passing forth into another, strictly speaking, is not in God, although it is there according to the mode of signifying.

2. Fifth. God acts for an end. Therefore through intellect and will. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is evident, because, according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics XII, ** ⁵ text 52, the universe, which is God's effect, is not from chance but is ordered to some good. — But the consequence is proved as follows: the first agent acting for an end must be an agent through intellect and will; for things lacking intellect act for an end as directed by someone who knows both the end and that which is ordered to the end, and the proportion between them—which belongs to intelligence alone. This is clear from the example of an arrow directed by the archer. — On the modes and diversity of appetites Saint Thomas determines at length in the First Part of the Second Part. Hence it is not necessary to prolong the discussion here.

3. Sixth. God is the first agent. Therefore he is the lord of his own acts. Therefore he acts by will. — The first consequence is proved: for if he were not the lord of his own acts, he would not be the first agent. For one who is not the master of his own action does not act through himself, but is, as it were, acted upon by another. But what acts through itself is prior to what acts through another, since everything that is through another is reduced to that which is through itself.

It must be known at this point, from the teaching of Saint Thomas in On the Power of God, cited above at ⁶, that an agent acting by nature—one who is not master of his own action—is moved by another when what is produced is ordered to an end, but not when it is not ordered to an end but is itself the end. Hence, although the Son is produced naturally in the divine persons, it does not follow that God is moved to his production by an agent acting through will, because he proceeds not as ordered to an extrinsic end, but as the end of all things.

Note also that quasi is taken as it is expressive of truth, not as importing likeness. For it is necessary that one who is not master of his own action be moved by another to act, since it is not in his power to act and not to act; hence he must act according to the inclination given him by another.

V. Seventh. To the first agent is owed the first action, just as to the first moved thing belongs the first motion. But the action of the will is naturally prior to the action of nature, as being more perfect. For even among us agents acting through will are more perfect than agents acting through the necessity of nature. Therefore, and so on.

But a doubt arises at this point. For the Son in the divine proceeds by way of nature, while the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will. But the production of the Holy Spirit is not nobler than the production of the Son. Therefore it is not universally true that the action of will is more perfect than the action of nature.

It is answered that, although the Son proceeds by the mode of nature and the Holy Spirit by the mode of will, this is not to be understood as if the Son were produced naturally and necessarily, while the Holy Spirit were produced voluntarily and freely; for the Holy Spirit is produced as naturally as the Son. Rather, it is because the Son proceeds by a procession that does not require another procession beforehand, which is the mode of nature; whereas the Holy Spirit proceeds by a procession that presupposes another procession, which is the mode of will.

2. But this response does not seem to remove the difficulty; rather, it increases it. For if both the Son and the Holy Spirit are produced naturally, while creatures are produced freely and by will, it follows that the production of a creature is nobler than the production of the divine Persons, if the action of will is nobler than the action of nature.

The consequence is denied. For when St. Thomas says that the action of the will, or of an agent acting through the will, is nobler than the action of nature, this is understood when both are terminated at something extrinsic, as St. Thomas seems to explain in Potentia, q. III, a. 15. But when the action of nature is terminated at that which is intrinsic to the essence, while the action of the will is terminated at something extrinsic, then the action of nature is nobler than the action of the will. Such is the case in our question. For the production of the divine Persons is terminated at that which is within the divine essence, whereas the production of creatures is terminated at something extrinsic. Hence the objection is not against the mind of St. Thomas.

VI. Eighth. The divine power is supreme among all beings. Therefore it acts upon all things through will. — The consequence is proved. For we see that where the action of nature and of will are joined together, the power which acts through will is superior to that which acts through nature, and uses the latter as an instrument. Thus in man, the intellect, which acts through will, is superior to the vegetative soul, which acts by necessity of nature.

2. But a doubt arises. For St. Thomas, in De Potentia, q. II, a. 3, ad 6, says that in diverse things indeed the action of the will precedes the action of nature — understand this where something ordered to an end is produced by the action of nature; I say this on account of what was said above ⁷ concerning the production of the Son in the divines — but in one and the same thing the action of nature precedes the action of the will, inasmuch as nature is understood as the principle by which a thing subsists, while the will is understood as the last thing by which it is ordered to its end. Therefore it is not true that a virtue acting through intellect uses in the same subject those things which it does through nature as instruments, as was said in the argument. For the action of an instrument does not precede the action of the principal agent, since the instrument acts only when moved by the principal agent; and thus one would have to understand that the principal agent first moves the instrument before the instrument itself acts.

It is answered that the proposition of St. Thomas is to be understood with respect to those things that are outside the thing. For as is said in Potentia, above ⁸, ad 4, nature does not lie subject to the will in those things that are internal to the thing; and consequently with respect to these it cannot be the instrument of an agent through the will within it. But with respect to those things that are outside the thing, nothing prevents nature from being subject to the will; and consequently with respect to them from being its instrument, as is clear in the movement of an animal, where the nature of the muscles and nerves lies subject to the commanding appetite. Therefore what is said in Potentia q. II is to be understood with respect to those things that are internal to the thing, whereas what is said here is to be understood with respect to what is external. And thus there is no contradiction.

VII. Ninth. An agent acting through will is compared to an agent acting through nature as the universal to the particular agent. Therefore the first agent is an agent acting through will. — The antecedent is proved: because the object of will is good according to the absolute ratio of good, whereas the object of nature is this particular good which is its perfection. And every agent acts insofar as it tends toward good, since the end moves the agent. — The consequence is proved: because a particular agent is compared to a universal agent as that which is posterior, and as an instrument.

It must be noted that will and nature can be compared in two ways: in one way, according to their absolute rationes; in another way, according to the particular rationes of this will and this nature. In both ways what is said here is true, namely that the object of the will is the good absolutely, while that of nature is this good. For just as the formal object of sight and of this sight is color, so the object of the will and of this will is the good absolutely; and likewise the object of nature and of this nature is the good which is the perfection of that nature itself.

VIII. The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm, "All things whatsoever he willed, etc."; and at Ephesians 1, "Who works all things, etc."; and by Hilary, in the book On the Synods, "To all creatures substance, etc."; and further on, "For all such things, etc."

Also removed by the foregoing is the error of those who say that God acts from the necessity of nature.

It should be noted that this opinion seems to be that of Aristotle and the Commentator, especially in Book VIII of the Physics, text and commentary 6 through 10 ⁹, where they prove the eternity of motion from the fact that the first mover cannot begin to move when previously it was not moving at all; and commentary 36 ¹⁰, where they show that the first mover is not moved per accidens, because then it could fail to be moved, and consequently fail to move, and thus it could happen that at some time nothing is moved, which they regard as impossible. This also seems to be the opinion of Avicenna, Book IX of the Metaphysics, chapter IV.