Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

After Saint Thomas had determined the production of things with respect to its substance, he now determines it with respect to its quality ¹. In this matter he does two things principally: first, he treats of the magnitude and extension of the divine power and of the divine action; second, of the mode of action, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, the following conclusion is proposed: The divine power is not determined to any single effect.

To make this evident, it must be considered that, since an active power, in its very notion, implies an order to an effect, and has its species from the object insofar as that order is implied by it, while a thing receives its species and formal unity from the same source: it is necessary that one formal object correspond to one power. For to the heating power there corresponds the heatable, and to the house-building power the buildable-into-a-house, and so with the others. But an unlimited active power, such as the divine power, differs from a limited power, such as every power of a creature: because each active power of a creature is determined to some one genus of producibles, contained under this common thing which I call producible; but the divine power is not determined to any one genus of producibles, but has as its formal object this which I call producible taken simply and absolutely. Therefore, when it is said that the divine power is not determined to any one effect, the meaning is not that it does not have one formal object—for since it is one power, it is necessary that one formal object correspond to it—but rather that it is not limited to one genus of producibles, such that it could not produce another; indeed, it can produce everything producible in nature.

To this sense, then, the conclusion is proved first. No power producing immediately diverse effects not from matter is determined to one effect. But the divine power immediately produces several effects not from matter. Therefore, etc. — To make the major premise clear, Saint Thomas notes that it was fittingly added immediately, and not from matter: for if God acted through diverse intermediaries, diversity could arise from the diversity of the intermediate causes; likewise, if he acted from matter, diverse effects could arise on account of the diversity of the matter, just as the heat of fire by one and the same action hardens clay and melts wax. — But he proves the minor premise: because all things that can be produced only through creation, such as all separate substances and all corporeal matter, namely prime matter, existing as diverse producible things, are produced immediately by God; since to create belongs to God alone.

To make this argument evident, it must be considered that, although a single created power might be given that could produce several effects immediately in a material way, nevertheless it could not do so formally: rather, all its effects would be reduced to one genus of producibles, just as the power itself would have a limited nature. But separate substances and corporeal matter do not agree in one determinate genus of producibles: since they agree only in the genus of substance, which does not signify one genus of producibles per se, but comprehends all things producible per se. Indeed, the power that is productive of these is not determined to one genus of per se producibles, but to many genera—indeed, it extends itself to all genera of producibles. For since it produces all things separated from matter and all material things, because all corporeal matter is produced by it as well, it follows that it produces all things producible per se. And because accidents follow upon substance, it also produces the accidents themselves, which are produced secondarily. And thus it extends itself absolutely to all producibles.

2. But a doubt arises concerning what is said, since, if power were to produce through intermediaries, diversity could arise on the side of the intermediate causes. For if the power be determined to one genus of producible things, however many diverse media it may operate through, it will never be able to produce except within that genus: just as the house-builder, although he uses diverse instruments, nevertheless produces nothing but a house. Therefore the power cannot be determined of itself to one effect, and yet produce diverse effects not contained under that one.

It is answered that St. Thomas does not mean to say that a power which is of itself determined to one effect can, on account of the diversity of the mediating causes, extend to several formally distinct effects in the order of producibility as they are referred to that power itself; but rather that it can extend to several formally distinct effects as they are referred to the mediating causes themselves, which nevertheless, insofar as they are referred to the higher power itself, are distinguished only materially. For the objects of the lower powers, if they are referred to those lower powers themselves, are distinguished formally; but materially if they are referred to a higher power; just as color and sound, when compared to sight and hearing, are formally distinguished in the order of object, but when referred to the common sense, they agree in one formal order of object and are distinguished only materially.

The mind of St. Thomas, therefore, is that if some power immediately produces several producibles formally distinct according to the rationes of producible, which agree in no particular ratio of producible, that power is not determined to any one particular genus of producibles: because then the objects would be compared only to the power itself. Hence, just as they agree in no particular ratio of producible, so the power itself does not determine to itself one particular object of producible. But if the power, through the mediation of other causes, were to produce several formally distinct genera of producibles, which agree in no particular ratio of producible as they are referred to the mediate causes, that power could nevertheless be determined to one genus of producibles, to which those several are compared materially. And thus, although it would be formally determined to one effect, it could nevertheless be said in some way to produce several formally distinct things, inasmuch as several producibles would be contained under its formal object, which are formally distinguished in comparison to the mediate causes.

3. Concerning that proposition, "The same agent, by the same action, causes different effects according to the diversity of the matter," it must be known that the action of fire by which it hardens clay and melts wax, if compared to the agent, is one, because it proceeds from one of its powers, namely from heat. If, however, it is compared to the subjects, it is several: for according to the plurality of the matter it must be multiplied, since one and the same accident cannot exist numerically in diverse subjects. Therefore when Saint Thomas says that by the same action it hardens clay and melts wax, the identity of the action is taken from the side of the agent, not from the side of the recipients.

II. Second. Esse is the proper and per se effect of God. Therefore the power of God can extend to all things that do not conflict with the ratio of being. But this is only non-being. Therefore God can do all things that do not include the ratio of non-being. But those things do not include the ratio of non-being which do not imply a contradiction. — The antecedent is manifest from what precedes. — The first consequence is proved. First, because every perfect power extends itself to all those things to which its own proper and per se effect can extend itself. Second, because if it could produce only some effect, it would not be the cause of being inasmuch as it is being, but only of this being.

It must be noted that, although Saint Thomas ought to have inferred that the power of God extends to all things to which the ratio of being extends, he inferred instead that it extends to all things to which the ratio of being is not repugnant: because he wished at the same time to show both to what things the divine power extends and what things are excluded from its causality. For in the statement that the power of God can act upon all things to which the ratio of being is not repugnant, it is given to be understood that it extends to every being, and that only what is repugnant to the ratio of being is excluded from the causality of God. Now this is only non-being, which involves a contradiction.

2. For the clarification of what is said here, it must be considered that "to include the reason of non-being" can be understood in two ways. In one way, materially and denominatively: namely, because of the thing itself it is truly said that it is not a being in act, just as of Socrates not existing in nature it is truly said that he is a non-being in act. — In another way, formally and according to its proper reason: namely, when non-being in act is included in its reason, or necessarily and inseparably accompanies its reason. And thus a non-being is said to be that which lies entirely outside the whole compass of being, insofar as being is divided by act and potency: that which, namely, is nothing; neither existing, I say, in act, nor in potency. — To include the reason of non-being in the first way is found also in those things that do not imply a contradiction: for, Socrates not existing in the nature of things, it is true to say that Socrates' being is a non-being; and, Socrates not existing as white, it is true to say that Socrates' being white is a non-being; because, namely, Socrates existing does not exist, nor does Socrates white exist in nature. But to include the reason of non-being in the second way belongs only to those things that imply a contradiction, such as this, that I say man is an ass: for neither is this in act in nature, since no man who is an ass is found; nor can it be in nature.

Therefore, when Saint Thomas says that God can do whatever does not include the reason of non-being, this is understood of non-inclusion in the second way, opposed to the second mode of inclusion. Such are those things that do not include a contradiction. For although such things are sometimes not in act—on account of which they are said to include materially and denominatively the reason of non-being—they nevertheless do not formally include that reason of non-being within their own reason, since they are beings in potency, to which being in act can indeed belong.

III. Third. God is pure act, possessing in himself all perfections. Therefore his power extends to all things whatsoever that do not conflict with the notion of being in act. But this is only what involves a contradiction. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the mode of a power in acting is according to the mode of the act of the agent.

It must be noted that, since esse is the actuality of every form and perfection, and also of anything whatsoever that has the character of being, nothing is repugnant to esse of actual existence except what in its very character includes the negation of every perfection and of all being. Now such is only that which involves a contradiction. For a thing of this kind is absolutely nothing, and thus is in no way contained under being; wherefore it must be contained formally under non-being. Therefore, since esse is the actuality of being, but not of non-being, it is necessary that what involves a contradiction be impossible to be, and thus have a repugnance to esse. Hence Saint Thomas rightly says that only what involves a contradiction has a repugnance to that which is esse in act.

IV. Fourth. Whatever is within the potentiality of created being, God can bring about entirely through His active power. But everything that does not conflict with created being lies within the potentiality of created being: just as everything that does not destroy human nature lies within the potentiality of human nature. Therefore God can act upon every created being.

The major is proved. To every passive power there corresponds an active power. Therefore to a universal power there corresponds the active power of a universal and first agent. — The antecedent is proved. First, because otherwise such a power would be idle, since it is ordered to act; but being in potency cannot attain act except through the virtue of that which exists in act. Second, because we see that all things which are in the potency of matter among generable and corruptible things can be reduced to act (namely immediately or mediately) through the virtue of the heavenly body, which is the first material active principle, that is, the first agent among corporeal agents.

2. Concerning that proposition, In the potentiality of created being is everything that does not repugn to created being, it must be noted that the potentiality of created being is not to be taken in the manner of the potentiality of natural forms, as if it were some entity in which every created being exists potentialiter and from which it is said to be educed into act; for it is evident that intellectual things and prime matter are not educed from the potentiality of matter, since they were produced out of nothing. But in this place the potentiality of created being is called logical potentiality, which signifies the possibility of a predicate with a subject. For thus matter is said to be created being in potentiality, because this proposition is possible: Matter is created being; just as when it is said, Socrates can be a man, the meaning is: This proposition is possible, Socrates is a man. And universally, whatever can be a man, or is in the potentiality of human nature, is everything of which a possible proposition can be formed by saying, This is a man. And similarly, whatever can be created being, or is in the potentiality of created being, is everything of which a possible proposition can be formed by saying, This is created being. Now this is everything that does not repugn to created being: namely, that which in its ratio includes nothing repugnant to the ratio of created being. There are two things, however, that repugn to the ratio of created being: namely, what is entirely outside the ratio of being, as what is formally non-being, such as what implies a contradiction; and what is outside the ratio of creature, though not outside the ratio of being, such as God. Therefore only these do not fall under divine power.

From these things it is evident that, when it was said above ² that the divine power extends itself to all those things that do not contradict the ratio of being, this must be understood of those things that do not contradict the ratio of created being creati. For this is the question at issue when it is asked to what the divine power extends being.

3. But then a doubt arises. For the argument of St. Thomas concerning passive potency will not serve the purpose, if the potency of created being does not signify a passive potency, but a logical potency.

It is said that, although the potency of created being is not a passive potency existing in nature, it nevertheless bears a certain likeness to passive potency: insofar as, just as what exists in passive potency can be brought into act by something, and thus to be in such a potency is to be able to be produced from such a potency, so what is in the potency of created being can be created. Therefore St. Thomas wishes to argue proportionally that, just as to every passive potency in nature there must correspond an active potency, and the first corporeal agent can bring into act whatever is in such passive potency; so to every logical potency with respect to created esse there must correspond some creative principle. For if this can have created esse, it is necessary that there be something able to create it: for to a potency toward produced esse there corresponds a productive potency, just as to a passive potency there corresponds an active potency. And thus it is necessary that in the first and universal agent there be the productive power of every created being, or of every producible being: just as in the first corporeal agent there is the potency productive of every other corporeal thing.

V. Fifth. No effect can be withdrawn from the divine power on account of the dissimilarity of the effect with God Himself, since each thing, insofar as it has esse, is like Him. Nor on account of the excellence of the effect, since God is above all things in goodness and perfection. Nor on account of a defect in matter—that is, that the effect should determine for itself some matter upon which God could not act—since He Himself is the cause of matter; and also He does not require matter as a subject out of which He might produce the thing, since without anything presupposed He produces the thing into esse. Therefore no effect is withdrawn from the divine power, but He can do all things simply. And this is for Him to be omnipotent. — The consequence is proved: because that any effect does not fall under the power of some agent arises from one of the said causes.

The conclusion is confirmed Genesis XVII, "I am God almighty" etc.; Job XLII, "I know that you can do all things" etc.; and Luke I, "No word shall be impossible" etc.

The error of the philosophers is also excluded—those who say that only one effect is produced by God immediately, and that He can do nothing except as the course of natural things stands. Of these Job 22, "As if He were nothing" etc.

VI. Concerning the foregoing a doubt arises: because St. Thomas, in I Sentences, d. XLII, q. II, a. 2, seems to hold that God cannot make even that which in itself is repugnant to the reason of non-being. For there he holds that whatever does not in itself repugn the reason of being or the reason of non-being, God can do. For if he can do whatever does not repugn the reason of being or the reason of non-being, it follows that what repugns the reason of being he cannot do, and likewise what repugns the reason of non-being. Therefore not only that which formally in itself repugns the reason of being is withdrawn from the divine power. The opposite of this was said above.

Again, there seems to be another contradiction. For, in the place cited above, and in On Power, q. I, a. 3, it is said that what implies a contradiction has neither the character of being nor the character of non-being. But here it is said that what implies a contradiction includes the character of non-being.

VII. For the clarification of this point, two things must be noted. The first is that although that which involves a contradiction, since it involves both affirmation and negation, includes at once esse and non-esse, it is nevertheless neither simply a being, because the non-being included in it destroys the being; nor simply a non-being, because the being included in it destroys the non-being. Hence it cannot be said simply and absolutely that that man is an ass is a being, since that man is an ass includes that man is not rational, which states a non-being; nor can it be said simply and absolutely that that man is an ass is a non-being, since it includes that man is an animal, which is a being.

The second is from the teaching of Saint Thomas, where above ³: that every action of an active cause by which something is produced terminates in esse; but it terminates in non-being when something is destroyed by it. But it is true that it terminates first in esse, and in non-being only secondarily: because it does not terminate in non-being except insofar as the esse produced of one thing does not admit the esse of another. Nor does annihilation stand in the way, in which no esse is produced, and yet a thing ceases to be: because a thing is not annihilated by any action, but because God ceases from the action by which He grants esse to the thing, as is said in Potentia, q. 5, a. 3, ad 2. Therefore every terminus of an action must be either simply a being, if something is produced into esse, or simply a non-being, if its esse is destroyed. For when Socrates has been produced, it is absolutely true to say, Socrates is; but when he has perished, it is absolutely true to say, Socrates is not.

Therefore, since that which implies a contradiction cannot be said absolutely to be nor absolutely not to be, because it includes both being and non-being at once, such a thing cannot be the primary term of an action, nor even a secondary one. For "man to be an ass," because it includes man's being rational and man's not being rational, cannot be the term of a production by which something is brought into esse: for since the term of production must absolutely be a being, or have esse, it would be necessary that it could be said absolutely that a rational animal is, when it has been made that man be an ass; but this is false, since "man to be an ass" includes not only his being rational but also his not being rational. Nor can it be the term of corruption: for then it could be said absolutely, when it comes about that man is an ass, that man is not rational; which is also false, since "man to be an ass" includes man's being rational. The same reason holds for whatever affirmation and negation is found in that which implies a contradiction. Hence things of this kind are called simply impossible: because in no way can they be the term of production or of corruption; and consequently they have a repugnance both to actual esse and to actual non-esse, namely in the way in which beings that previously existed are said after corruption not to be. For what is not in this manner must be something to which esse does not belong but which nevertheless previously had esse; whereas that which implies a contradiction is not something, but nothing, and therefore cannot be a non-being in the manner explained.

But if one insists: The implication of a contradiction, by your account, is nothing; therefore it is absolutely non-being; the opposite of which was said above — it is answered that it is indeed simply non-being, if non-being is said to be that which can in no way be in the nature of things. It is not, however, non-being if non-being is said to be that which is not now in the nature of things but nevertheless previously was, as the terminus of corruption is said to be non-being. Now it was in this second sense that Saint Thomas understood that what implies a contradiction is not non-being simply, but rather has a repugnance to non-being.

VIII. From these points the response to the objections is easy⁴. To the first, then, it is said that Saint Thomas touched upon the principal act and the principal object of the active power, thereby also giving an understanding of the secondary ones. Now the principal act of an active power is to give esse, and its principal object is that which receives esse. Therefore he said that from the divine power—whose proper effect is esse—only that is withheld which is repugnant to the ratio of being, namely what is repugnant to having esse in act. By this, however, he gives it to be understood that even with respect to the secondary act, which is to destroy a thing, and with respect to the secondary object, which is non-being, only that is withheld from its power which is repugnant to the ratio of non-being, that is, what cannot be a non-being yet previously have been a being. For just as the divine power, with respect to the production of things, extends to everything that can have esse, so with respect to destruction it extends to everything that, being some nature, can have non-being.

Therefore there is no contradiction. For here Saint Thomas explicitly speaks of the power of God with respect to the first and principal act, while implicitly giving it to be understood that it pertains to the secondary act: for what cannot be in act cannot, after first existing, cease to be. In the First Sent., however, he spoke explicitly of both acts.

Note, however, that I do not say that in God the secondary and primary act are as though there were several acts on the part of God; rather, it is because there is a distinction on the part of the object. For esse is the principal terminus, whereas non-esse is secondary.

2. To the second, it is answered first that there is no contradiction. For in those passages Saint Thomas speaks of being and non-being taken absolutely and simply: for a man being an ass is neither, speaking absolutely, a being nor a non-being. Here, however, he speaks with respect to inclusion: for although what implies a contradiction cannot be called absolutely a non-being, it nevertheless includes non-being within its intelligible content.

It is answered secondly, and better, that "non-being" can be taken in two ways. In one way, for that to which it is altogether repugnant to have esse in act, namely what is nothing at all, so that nothing is opposed to being not only as taken participially, but also nominally. And thus that which implies a contradiction is a non-being: for to be in act is altogether repugnant to it. — In the other way, for that which, having previously been, afterwards is not. And thus it is not a non-being, as though something capable of terminating a destructive action. — Saint Thomas therefore took non-being here in the first way: hence in the third argument he said that only what implies a contradiction is repugnant to the notion of that which is to be in act. But in the passages cited he took non-being in the second way, as appears from his words.