Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

The second conclusion ¹ is: Creation is the proper action of God, and to create belongs to God alone.

I. It is proved first. The first action is proper to the first agent. But creation is the first action. Therefore it is proper to God, who is the first agent. — The major premise is evident: because according to the order of agents there must be an order of actions, since the action of a nobler agent is nobler. — The minor, however, is proved: because creation presupposes no other action, namely a transitive one; but all other actions presuppose it.

But a doubt arises concerning that proposition, The first action is proper to the first agent. For the first action is taken either according to the order of nature and perfection, or according to the order of generation. If in the second way, then the proof is worthless, since it proceeds from priority according to dignity. — If in the first way, then the minor premise is false. For creation is not prior to the others in dignity: since it is not said to be prior to the others, as is clear from the proof, except because it is presupposed by the others; which argues only for a priority of generation; but what is prior in generation is more imperfect.

It is answered that this is understood of priority of nature and of perfection. And it is said that the subsumption is rightly made, Because creation is prior not only according to the order of generation but also according to perfection: since, as was shown ², it requires infinite power in the agent; which the other actions of particular agents do not require.

But when it is urged that what is prior in generation is more imperfect, it is said that this is true in one and the same thing proceeding from potency to act; for such a thing arrives at imperfect esse before perfect esse, at what is potential before what is actual. But in diverse things this is not true, especially in the actions of diverse agents that are subordinated. For the action of the first agent, which is most perfect, must precede the action of the secondary agent, just as the secondary agents themselves derive their power of acting from the first cause.

II. Second. If anything other than God could create, this would be because it would be a universal cause of being: namely, because nothing could exist that was not caused by it. But this is false: for God alone is the universal cause of being. Therefore, etc. — The inference is evident. For by this it has been shown that God creates, since nothing can exist apart from Him that is not caused by Him.

It must be noted that by saying that nothing can be uncaused by God, Saint Thomas wishes to convey that God alone causes whatever is in a thing, and that no other agent does so, since it does not cause matter. And therefore creation belongs to God alone: since to create is to produce whatever pertains to the esse of a thing.

III. Third ³. Esse is the first caused thing. Therefore the proper cause of being simply is the first and universal agent, which is God. But esse simply is caused by creation: because nothing can preexist that would be outside being simply. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because esse is the most common effect. — The consequence is also proved. Because effects must be proportionate to their causes, so that particular effects correspond to particular causes, but universal ones to universal causes.

But since someone might press against this argument by saying that esse is produced not only through creation but also through the action of other causes, he removes this objection, saying that other agents are not the cause of being simply, but are the cause of being this, namely a man or something white.

2. Concerning the antecedent of this argument, it must be noted that, since the first can be taken in many ways, just as there are many kinds of order, in this context "first" is understood as first by the priority of commonness and presupposition. For esse is the most common effect: because nothing is produced unless it receives esse; and every other perfection coming to a thing in act presupposes that the thing exists; for nothing can be a man or white or musical in reality unless it is a being, just as nothing is a man unless it is a substance. Just as we say that substance is first in the genus of substance because it is predicated of all things contained in the category of substance, and because none of the lower predicates belongs to anything except on the supposition that it is a substance; so too in the genus of existing things esse is first, because it is predicated in concreto of all things that are in the genus of existing things, and no particular esse belongs to a thing except on the supposition that it exists.

IV. Concerning this proposition, The cause of being simply is the first agent, whereas other agents are not causes of being simply, but of being this, it must be considered that simply can determine is, and can determine of being. In the first way, the sense is that this proposition, "God is the cause of esse," is true simply and absolutely, and not merely in a qualified respect: just as "Fire is hot." But "Socrates is a cause of esse" is not true simply, but only with this qualification, instrumentally: just as "The sun is hot," which is not true except with this addition, virtually. And this sense perhaps is indeed true also for the second part, since causing esse would not belong to a creature except as it is an instrument of the divine power, as is shown below in the third book by many arguments ⁴: but that is not what is intended here.

In the second way, the sense is that God is per se the cause of being absolutely and without any limitation, in which it is shown that He is the cause of whatever pertains to the esse of a thing, and of whatever participates in the ratio of being insofar as it is such: just as, when we say that the object of sight is the colored thing simply, we understand that the colored, without any limitation or contraction, is the object of sight, and therefore sight can act upon every colored thing. Other agents, however, are not the cause of being simply, that is, without limitation, but of being this, for instance a man or a white thing. And therefore they are not the cause of whatever pertains to the ratio of being, nor of whatever pertains to the esse of a thing.

If to this is added that God is the proper cause of being, such that his proper effect is being simply, it follows that esse, as such, is the reason why something is produced by God, and that esse is produced by God first and per se. But the reason why something is produced by others is not esse, but this esse—for instance, a man or a white thing—as is said here. For God produces each thing first and per se insofar as it is a being, because he produced it when there was absolutely nothing before; other things, however, if they produce anything, produce it insofar as it is this or such a being. Hence, since being absolutely and without limitation is produced first and per se through creation, which is from nothing presupposed, it follows most fittingly that creation is the action of God alone, not of any other particular agent.

When, therefore, Saint Thomas says that God is the proper cause of esse simply, the meaning is that He is the cause of esse according to the whole extent of being by participation or caused being, and not merely of some particular mode of being; and that esse is the formal and adequate object of the divine power. Other things, however, although they cause esse, do not cause whatever participates in esse, but cause only what participates in some particular mode of being as such—for instance, being a man or a horse or something of this kind. Nor is esse the formal and adequate object of any particular agent.

V. From these things it is clear that Scotus misunderstood the mind of St. Thomas when he argued, IV Sent., q. 1 ⁵, that esse simpliciter is not the proper effect of God, because particular agents also cause esse. For he thought that, according to St. Thomas, no other cause besides God gives esse: which St. Thomas never dreamed of. For Scotus did not consider what those terms, proper and simpliciter, signify. St. Thomas indeed grants that other causes give esse; but he denies that they are proper causes of being simpliciter, and he willed that this belong to God alone.

But against this, an argument can be drawn from Scotus's own words. To be simply, and to be this, are in the same thing really identical, distinct only by reason, just as the common and the limited. Therefore what causes to-be-this in this thing also causes being simply: although according to its proper reason, the being of this is referred to a particular cause, while according to the common reason of esse itself it is referred to God. And consequently it will follow that another cause creates: for to create is to produce esse simply.

The answer is that this objection proceeds as if we were to say that God is the proper cause of being simply on this ground alone, namely, that it belongs to Him alone to produce in any thing common being insofar as it is said of that thing, while other causes produce this being. But this is not the meaning of the words of St. Thomas. For he intends that God has as the adequate formal object of His power the very ratio of esse without limit, and that He is the cause of being for all things to which being belongs in any way whatever. Hence He is the cause of being simply for Socrates: because He is the cause of all things that pertain to the esse of Socrates, and He produces it first and per se inasmuch as it is a being. And since all things that are in Socrates, even his matter itself, pertain to esse, therefore God causes all things that are in Socrates. Yet He does not thus cause the esse of a particular cause of Socrates. For He does not cause everything that participates in esse in Socrates, but only the form itself: but He does not cause the matter with respect to its potential esse; although He gives it this actual esse, inasmuch as the actual esse of the whole and of the parts is one and the same. Nor does He cause Socrates first and per se inasmuch as he is a being, since a being preceded him from which Socrates was made: but inasmuch as he is this being.

To the argument, therefore, it is said that to create is not to produce in any manner whatever that which is being materially common: rather, it is to produce being first and per se, and formally insofar as it is a being. But in this way no particular agent produces being, but only in the first way. For it does not produce being first and per se, since it produces from some being; nor does it produce it insofar as it is a being; but it produces being per accidens, namely insofar as it is materially identical with this being. Hence the consequence is denied.

2. But concerning the proof of that proposition, "God alone is the cause of being simply," namely because a universal effect requires a universal cause, Scotus raises doubts ⁶. For he asks whether the universal, both in the subject and in the predicate, is taken as the universal according to perfection; or as the universal according to predication; or whether in the subject the universal is taken according to predication, while in the predicate it is taken according to perfection. If the first, then the minor premise is false: because esse is not more perfect than other things. For what is included in many things is not more perfect than any of those things in which it is included. — If the second, it does not follow that God, insofar as He is being, which is the most universal predicate, is the proper cause of esse. For God is not common by predication. — If the third, then the major premise is false. For an effect that is most universal according to predication does not come from a cause that is most universal according to perfection: for it can come from an imperfect cause, because it is found in many imperfect things.

It is answered that universality is received in the effect indeed according to predication, but in the cause according to perfection. Now I take the causality of the universal not only with respect to the common character of the universal, that which is predicated of many, but also with respect to the whole scope of that common character. For thus the most universal effect according to predication, in respect of its whole scope, that is, in respect of all things which participate in that character, is from a most universal cause according to perfection: because the higher and more perfect the power of a cause, the more widely it extends itself; and so it must be that the formal object of a power more universal according to perfection be more universal according to predication; otherwise a more perfect power would not extend itself to more things.

But when it is urged that a common effect can come from an imperfect cause, the reply is that indeed it can come from an imperfect cause materially, secondarily, and per accidens, as it is realized in some particular determinate thing; but not formally, primarily, per se, and according to its whole scope—which is how we say that an effect most universal in predication requires a cause most universal in causality and perfection.

And thus it is clear that all of Scotus's objections proceed from a failure to understand the reasoning and foundation of Saint Thomas.

VI. Fourth ⁷. Whatever is caused according to some nature cannot be the first cause of that nature, but a second and instrumental cause. But every other cause besides God has esse as something caused. Therefore no other cause is a cause of being except instrumentally and as acting in virtue of another. But an instrument is employed for something only by way of motion, since the definition of an instrument is that it be a mover moved. Creation, however, is not a motion. Therefore, and so on.

The major premise is proved. First, as to the first part: because otherwise something would be the cause of itself; just as Socrates, since he is what he is through humanity, if he were the first cause of humanity, he would be the cause of himself. As to the second part, it is proved by a sign. First because the univocal generator must be as it were an instrumental agent with respect to that which is the primary cause of the whole species. And also because all inferior agent causes must be reduced to superior causes, as instrumental ones to primary ones. Namely because both the univocal agent and the inferior cause is something caused according to its nature.

2. It must first be noted that the first cause of any nature is so related to that nature that it cannot be caused by anything without being caused by the first cause itself: for no second cause acts unless moved by the first, because the first acts on the effect earlier and more immediately than the second, as is said in the book De Causis ⁸. Therefore, if something has a nature caused by another, it must have it from the first cause more principally. And thus such a thing, having a nature caused by another, if it be the first cause of that nature, must be the cause of its own nature. And because from its nature it is what it is, it follows that it must be the cause of itself: just as Saint Thomas gave the example of Socrates, whose humanity is caused by another, say by Plato. For if Socrates were the first cause of humanity, Plato could not cause the humanity of Socrates unless the causality of Socrates concurred at the same time, since a second cause does not act without the first. And thus Socrates would also be the cause of his own humanity and of himself: because from his humanity he has it that he is this man. This is the foundation of this argument.

It must be noted further that, when it is said that a caused thing is caused according to some nature, if it is the cause of that nature, it is a second and instrumental cause — for Saint Thomas calls an instrumental cause in this place the cause which acts as it is moved by another prior cause, even though it produces the same effect as the first cause. Thus every second cause is an instrumental cause; and every univocal agent is an instrumental cause, that is, a second cause, acting as it is moved by the primary cause of the whole species. For a univocal agent, since it has being caused according to the nature of the species, cannot be the first cause of that species: because, as was argued, it would be the cause of itself. But, since it causes something like itself in species, it is only a secondary cause of that nature in comparison with the cause of the whole species; although in comparison with other things which it uses as instruments, it may be called a first cause.

VII. Concerning this proposition, An instrument is not employed to cause something except by way of motion, because it is a mover of the moved, there is doubt. For the phrase by way of motion, on the side of the instrument, is taken either passively or actively. In the first way, the sense is that an instrument is not applied to causing something except from the fact that the instrument itself is moved by the principal cause. And this sense is suggested by the proof, when it is said, because it is a mover of the moved. But then neither does the proposition seem true, nor does it seem to establish what was proposed. It is not indeed true. For, since an intelligence acts in the power of the first cause, it is not moved, taking motion properly, since motion properly belongs only to bodies; but only improperly, insofar as every reception or application by another to acting is called motion. But we are speaking here of motion properly so called, which we say is removed from creation. — Nor does it establish what was proposed, even if it were granted to be true. For it does not follow: An instrument does not act unless it itself be moved; Creation is not a motion; Therefore an instrument cannot create. For the minor is not rightly subsumed under the major. For it ought to be subsumed: But that which creates is not moved; Therefore that which creates is not an instrument. Which certainly is not to the point.

In the second way, the sense is that an instrument does not act except through motion, that is, it does not produce an effect except by moving something. And if it is taken thus, its proof does not seem to be to the point. For from the fact that the instrument itself is a mover of what is moved, it is not proved that it acts by moving: just as, although the higher angel, in illuminating the lower one, is the instrument of God who illuminates it, and is thus in some way a mover of what is moved, nevertheless it does not illuminate the lower one by moving it.

2. For the clarification of this point, it must be considered that, although there are diverse genera of instruments, all instrumental agents nevertheless agree in this, insofar as they are instruments: that they do not move unless moved by those whose instruments they are. For they would not be instruments if they acted by themselves alone, since the principal agent uses the very instrument to bring about its effect, as is evident in all artificial instruments. But it is true that not all instruments are moved in the same way toward acting. Some are applied to their operation by local motion: as is evident when a craftsman uses a saw to make a bench. Some by alteration: as when fire heats the air so that through it the form of fire may be introduced into matter. Some by spiritual motion from the first cause: as when an intelligence, moved by God, acts; for then the instrument is moved improperly, insofar as every reception from another is called motion.

In the matter at hand, therefore, motion is taken in a broad sense, such that it extends both to motion properly so called and to motion improperly so called. And it is understood of the motion of an instrument, both passive and active. The sense is that an instrument is not employed for acting unless it is moved by the principal agent, insofar as every reception is called motion, and unless it moves in some way. With the proposition thus understood, the thesis is excellently proved. For if it belongs to the notion of an instrument that it be a mover moved by another in some way; and if it does not act unless moved: then it must be that it too does not act except by moving something, whether by proper or improper motion. And thus, however it may itself be moved, it must by its action move some preexisting subject: for action follows the mode of the agent. For if it were to act while moving nothing, but producing the whole substance of the thing, then the action of the instrument, as instrument, would not be proportionate to the instrument itself: since the instrument would act by being moved by another, while the effect would be produced not through the motion of anything by the instrument. Creation, moreover, is in no way a motion, neither taking motion properly nor improperly, insofar as every action upon a preexisting subject is called motion: because creation presupposes no receptive subject of its action. Therefore it follows that an instrumental cause would not act by creating.

VIII. Fifth ⁹: and this is a confirmation of the earlier argument; for it is proved that nothing can create as an instrument. An instrument is employed only so that the influence of the first agent may reach the effect through the instrument. Therefore it is necessary that in what is caused through an instrument there be something receiving the influence of the first. But this is contrary to the nature of creation: for creation presupposes nothing. Therefore, and so on.

From this, then, together with the preceding arguments taken as a whole, it follows that nothing other than God can create, neither as principal agent nor as instrument.

IX. In the sixth ¹⁰. If something acts instrumentally toward creation, it follows that something is produced by the operation of the instrumental creator that is prior by way of generation than esse, which is the principal effect of the creator. But this is impossible: since, the more common something is, the more prior it is by way of generation, as is clear from Aristotle in the book On the Generation of Animals. Therefore, etc.

The antecedent is proved. Every instrumental agent carries out the action of the principal agent by means of some action proper and connatural to itself, as is evident in the natural heat of an animal and in a saw. Therefore, if something is an instrument of creation, it must operate by some action due to it and proper to its own nature. But the effect corresponding to the proper action of the instrument precedes, in the way of generation, the effect responding to the principal agent; the sign of this is that the intended end, which is last in execution, corresponds to the first agent, as is evident in artificial things. Therefore etc.

2. Concerning this proposition, understood in this argument, that esse, as the most universal quid, is prior by way of generation than the effect of any other cause, it must be noted that we can speak of esse of actual existence in two ways. In one way, absolutely, without determining it to this or that esse. In another way, of the esse of each effect taken particularly, as it is compared to that effect as its actuality and the complement of its perfection. In the first way, esse is prior by generation to every other effect: because for every effect of a second cause some being must be presupposed, since esse in the absolute sense is the proper effect of God; for as there is an order among causes, so also among effects. And thus it is said to precede others by way of generation, because every other effect, and every esse produced by a particular cause, presupposes some esse produced by the first cause. That which is presupposed in the order of producible things by others, as that without which the others cannot be, while it itself can be without any one of them taken separately, is said to be prior by way of generation, even if it is produced at the same time with them: just as animal is prior by generation than this animal, although animal and this animal are generated at the same time. — In the second way, however, esse is posterior to the others, as the actuality of all things and their ultimate complement, with which once had the action of the agent rests and the passion of the patient, as is said in book three, chapter LXVI: for act presupposes potency in the order of generation.

Saint Thomas therefore takes esse here in the first way, not in the second.

X. But against the foundation of this argument—namely, that an instrumental agent carries out the action of the principal agent by means of some action proper and connatural to itself, and that it has a proper effect corresponding to its proper action—a doubt arises from Scotus, where above ¹¹. For he denies, first, the proposition, and proves it to be false. First, because every action of an instrument belongs to it in virtue of the principal agent. For in whatever action that which you posit as an instrument would have not in virtue of the principal agent, in that action it would not be an instrument but the principal agent. Therefore an instrument, as such, has no proper action.

Then, because at that time every instrument would act dispositively toward the effect of the principal agent. But this is false: for, even according to Saint Thomas, it is possible for an instrument to attain the effect of the principal agent, just as the moneyer induces the form into the coin and the seal-maker into the wax. Therefore not every instrument must operate dispositively. Hence it is concluded that that proposition has no truth except when the instrument cannot, by the power of the principal agent, attain the principal effect. But then one would have to prove that a creature cannot attain the effect of its creator.

He says second, regarding the example of the axe and similar things, that by these it is not proved universally that this is so of every instrument. For although it is thus in the axe, because it is an instrument in the cutting of wood, which precedes the induction of form, nevertheless it is not thus in all other instruments.

The doubt can also be strengthened. For when the principal agent moves the instrument only toward that which the instrument is capable of by virtue of its own nature, then there is no proper action of the instrument having an effect distinct from the effect of the principal agent: as when someone uses a saw only for cutting. Therefore not every instrument has a proper action and its own effect.

XI. For the clarification of this doubt, it must be considered, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas in the Fourth Book, distinction 1, question 1, article 4¹², that every instrument, properly speaking, insofar as it is an instrument, whether or not it reaches to the effect of the principal cause, always extends to something beyond what belongs to it according to its own nature; and, as is said in the First Part, question XLV¹³, it always acts according to that which is proper to itself; otherwise it would be employed in vain for acting, nor would there need to be determinate instruments for diverse actions. And thus it must be that there belong to an instrument, insofar as it is an instrument, a twofold action: one suitable to it according to its own power, on account of which it is assumed rather than another instrument; another suitable to it insofar as it is moved by the principal agent. And because a twofold effect corresponds to the twofold action of the same cause, it is necessary that an instrument produce both its own effect and that which it reaches by the power of the principal agent: yet so that its own effect stands related to the other in some way as a preceding disposition.

But whether these actions are really distinct: I think it must be said that they are, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas. For those actions are really distinct whose principles are distinct and whose terms are distinct; for actions are distinguished by their terms and their formal principles. Now the proper action of an instrument, and the action that belongs to it insofar as it is the instrument of the principal agent, are of this kind. For, as was adduced from Book IV of the Sentences and from the First Part, an instrument taken properly, as such, always reaches to something beyond what is fitting to it according to the power of its own nature; and thus there must be there an effect beyond the proper power of the instrument, and a proper effect of the instrument disposed toward the effect of the principal agent. Similarly, one thing is the proper power of the instrument, and another is the power by which it acts as an instrument: since the first is a permanent form, while the second is a power having diminished esse, after the manner of an intention, as is said in Book IV of the Sentences, at the place cited above¹⁴. I say, however, that although these actions are really distinct, it does not follow that every proper effect of the instrument precedes in time the principal effect; it suffices that it precede in the order of nature, just as disposition precedes form: for the ultimate disposition to the form and the introduction of the form are simultaneous.

XII. To the first argument of Scotus¹⁵ it is said that, since two things belong to the notion of an instrument properly so called—namely, to be moved by the principal agent toward its proper action for the sake of bringing about the effect of the principal agent, and to operate something by the power communicated to it by the principal agent—these two can be separated in thought. And thus an instrument can be taken in three ways: in one way, properly and completely, insofar as it has both; in another way, insofar as it has only the first condition; thirdly, insofar as it has only the second condition. If an instrument is taken in the third way, it is granted that the conclusion follows, namely, that every action of an instrument, as instrument, belongs to it by the power of the first and principal cause. But this is not against the intention of St. Thomas. For his mind is that an instrument taken properly, insofar as the principal agent uses it, has a twofold action: one, which belongs to it according to its own power, which the principal agent orders toward its own action so that through it a disposition may be made for the effect which he principally intends; another, which belongs to it as acting by a power superadded to it. These, however, are not incompatible: that an instrument necessarily have a twofold action, one its own and another from the principal agent; and that it have only one insofar as it acts by the power of the principal agent. — But if it is taken in the second or first way, the assumption is denied. For something has also, according to its own action, the character of an instrument when it is applied by another to that very action for the sake of bringing about a higher effect. It is called then only a principal agent when it operates of itself toward its own effect.

To the second ¹⁶, the falsity of the consequent is denied. For whether the instrument attains the principal effect or not, it always does something that is a disposition toward the principal effect. For the moneyer and the seal-maker produce the image by means of some disposition which the coin and the seal produce by their own power: for instance, by the division of the matter, and the like.

When he further says¹⁷ that from those examples it is not concluded to be so universally: it is said that indeed an example does not demonstrate universally; yet examples are brought forward for the manifestation of what reason demonstrates to be universally true. For just as by an axe some disposition is produced toward the form of a bench, so through every other instrument some disposition is induced toward the effect of the principal agent; otherwise it would not be necessary, as was said, to employ determinate instruments for determinate effects.

At the end¹⁸ it is said first that there are two kinds of instrument: one which can in no way be applied to its proper action except by another through motion, as a saw, which cannot cut by itself but only insofar as it is moved by another; and another which can act by itself in its proper operation and does not need some particular mover to act, as fire, which someone can use as an instrument for some particular effect. The first kind of instruments is properly an instrument, according to its own nature: because it is instituted for this purpose, that it serve an art as its principal agent. But the second kind is not an instrument according to its own nature; rather, it takes on the character of an instrument only when some agent uses it to bring about something beyond its proper effect: as when someone uses fire to produce silver through the art of alchemy.

It is said secondly that, if something is moved by another toward its own action only, it is not then properly an instrument—unless by the name of instrument we understand everything that acts with a motion from another, just as we say that all created agents are instruments of the first agent. But it is true that we are more accustomed to call instruments those of the first kind, even if they are moved only toward their own operation: because in no way can they act unless they are moved by another, and their action is instituted to bring about something higher, and their action receives some determinate motion from the mover. Those, however, that do not absolutely need a particular mover to elicit their own action are not usually called instruments insofar as they are applied to their own operation: because such an applier has more the role of one removing a hindrance—for example, because it removes the distance of the agent from the patient—than of a principal agent; since they operate by their own power and absolutely need no particular mover for their action, just as a stone does not absolutely need any mover in order to descend, although sometimes something removing an impediment may concur.

XIII. Seventh ¹⁹. Nothing that has caused esse according to some nature can be the cause of a thing having that nature through creation. But every created being has caused esse in the very nature of being. Therefore no created being can be the cause of esse in another being through creation.

The major is proved. Because no such thing can be the cause of that nature simply, but only in this respect. But what is the cause of something in this respect attributes the common nature to something by which it is specified or individuated. And thus it cannot be the cause, by creation, of a thing having such a nature: since creation presupposes nothing to which something might be attributed by an action. — The assumption is proved. First by example. Then because otherwise it would be the cause of itself.

It must be noted that this argument differs formally from the fourth ²⁰, although in both it is inferred that the same thing would be the cause of itself. For in that one the argument proceeded from the nature of a first cause; but in this one it proceeds from the passive causation of an agent nature.

2. Concerning that proposition, "That which has caused esse according to some nature cannot be the cause simply of that nature, but only in this respect," we must first consider that something can be understood to be the cause of some nature in two ways. In one way, because its causality is directed toward that nature considered absolutely and without limitation, and not merely as determined to this or that. For although everything that is caused is singular with respect to the esse it has outside the intellect, nevertheless the very nature can formally terminate the causality of some cause, not as it is this particular singular thing, but insofar as it is such a nature absolutely, according to its own intelligible content and without limitation: just as the sun is the cause of the nature of an ant, considered absolutely and according to its unlimited intelligible content, if one considers the formal character of causality in such a nature; although no ant is produced by the sun that is not singular and this particular one. Conversely, however, this singular ant is not formally the cause of antness absolutely, but of this or that ant. Similarly, the sun is the cause of humanity simply, speaking formally, because it is its cause absolutely and without limitation as humanity is; Socrates, however, is the cause not of humanity as humanity is, but of this humanity as it is this humanity, received, namely, in this matter. In another way, because it is the cause that that nature exists absolutely, when previously it did not exist at all; and not merely with some further addition, namely, that it be of such a kind or another, or that it exist in this or that. Both ways together are how the proposition of Saint Thomas is to be understood. For what has caused esse in some nature neither produces that nature formally as such a nature absolutely, but as this particular one; nor does it make it exist absolutely, since it preexists in potency in matter and in act in the very caused agent itself—for what was previously caused does not begin to exist anew simply—but it does make it exist in this respect. And thus there is presupposed to that action something in which such a nature receives esse.

It must be considered, second, that whatever is the cause of some nature formally, absolutely and without limit as that nature is taken according to its proper ratio, and makes that nature to be absolutely, is its cause in whatever it is found. Just as we see in passive powers that a power having some nature as its formal object, whether primarily or secondarily, can act upon everything in which such a nature is found: thus sight can act upon every colored thing and every white thing, because it regards "colored" absolutely, not contractedly, as its formal object; and similarly it regards "white" as white, not as this white. For it is common to every power that it can act upon everything that participates in its formal object, whether that be its primary or secondary object. Likewise, what makes a nature to be absolutely causes its esse in whatever it is found. For if it were found in something of which it were not the cause, then it would no longer make the nature to be absolutely, but only to be in this thing. And therefore Saint Thomas rightly proves the said proposition by the fact that otherwise the same thing would be the cause of itself. For it is manifest from what has been said that, if something is the cause of some nature simply, it is the cause of that nature in whatever it is found according to caused esse. Therefore, if something has the caused esse of that nature of which it is simply the cause, it is necessary that it be the cause of itself.

XIV. But a doubt arises against the first sense. For when it is said that a being having caused esse according to some nature is the cause of that nature not simply, but only in this respect, it is understood either that it is the cause of the nature in this respect materially only, or also formally. If materially only, then it does not differ from what is the cause of the nature simply: for even that does not produce the nature except as limited and singular, since the universal, as such, has no esse in the order of real things. If formally, therefore it will be able to produce only one singular of that nature. And thus Socrates could not produce and generate except one man. Which is clearly false: since he can generate many sons. The consequence is proved. Because something determines to itself some formal ratio of an object contracted under some common thing, it cannot go beyond that contracted ratio to anything else contained under that common thing: just as, if sight determined to itself as formal object this white thing, say Socrates, it could not see any other white thing than Socrates.

It is answered that the proposition of St. Thomas is to be understood formally. To the objection it is said, first, that certainly one singular of that nature, by the production whereby it produces this singular, cannot produce except this designated singular. For Socrates, in generating Socrates, does not produce per se the humanity of Socrates simply, but not humanity simpliciter: since he cannot produce into everything that participates in humanity.

It is said secondly, that what is common to every generation proceeding from Socrates is that through it there is produced formally and per se a certain humanity, that is, humanity in the singular, speaking vaguely and indistinctly, but not simply humanity. Hence the consequence adduced is false if the consequent is taken absolutely, namely, that one singular, speaking absolutely, cannot produce anything other than one singular. But it follows well that by this particular generation, as it is terminated to the product, it does not produce per se anything other than this designated singular. — To the proof it is said that the singular does not determine absolutely to itself the ratio of this designated singular, but the ratio of the singular vaguely and indistinctly: namely, because it does not produce formally and per se nature except in something. But well indeed, as generating by this designated generation, insofar as it is terminated to the generated, it determines to itself the ratio of this designated singular: and, as such, it cannot produce anything other than this designated one.

2. But an argument can be made from the statements of Scotus, in the place cited above ²¹, against the said proposition. If one angel, having being caused by God in its nature, were to produce another angel similar to itself, it would not produce the nature of that angel in any presupposed subject: since in the producing angel itself neither being nor nature is received in anything. Therefore it is not necessary that what has caused being according to some nature, if it causes that nature, cause it in this thing: but it can cause it as singular, not in anything. And thus it is clear that, although it would not cause the nature of the angel simply and absolutely, because it would pre-exist in the producing angel, not produced by that angel but by God, yet it would produce the singular nature itself of this angel by creation, producing not from any subject.

It is answered that certainly that conditional is true; but this one also is true: If an angel were to produce another angel like himself, he would produce a nature in some presupposed subject. For both consequents follow from that antecedent. For insofar as the nature of an angel is not received in any subject, it follows that it would not be produced in any presupposed subject. But insofar as the esse of an angel is caused esse, it follows that it would be produced in some presupposed subject. And therefore the antecedent is impossible, because the proposition from which contradictory propositions follow is impossible.

3. It must be noted, however, that Saint Thomas does not say absolutely "having some nature," but rather that a thing having esse caused according to its nature is not the cause of that nature simply. For if something had a nature not according to caused esse—as God has wisdom and the nature of being—it could nevertheless be the cause of that nature simply insofar as it is caused, and it would not be the cause of itself: because its nature would not have caused esse in it. But a thing having caused esse in its nature cannot be simply the cause of that nature as it is caused: for thus the cause would cause itself, since it also has the very nature caused.

XV. Eighth. Every finite agent presupposes for its action that by which its effect subsists individually. Therefore no such agent creates; only the infinite agent does, whose esse comprehends the likeness of every being. — The consequence is clear. — The antecedent, however, is proved. Whatever act is determined to a genus and to a species and to accident, its power must be determined to effects similar to the agent insofar as it is such, that is, with respect to the form by which it acts. But nothing having determinate esse can be similar to an effect of the same genus or species insofar as it is this something, but only according to the account of the genus or species. Therefore it cannot be, through its action, the cause of another with respect to what subsists distinct from other things, but only with respect to what has a genus or species. Therefore it presupposes for its action that by which its effect subsists individually. The major premise is proved: both because the mode of action follows the mode of the form by which the agent is in act, and because every agent acts so as to produce what is like itself. The minor premise is also proved: because each thing insofar as it is this something is distinct from other things.

2. But against this argument someone might say that the antecedent is false, and, in reply to the proof, deny the final consequence. For although the agent is not assimilated to its effect with respect to that by which it is this particular thing—since by that it does not agree with other things as an individual, but rather is distinguished from all others—the agent nevertheless does not presuppose anything prior to its action by which its effect would be individuated. First, because, according to Scotus ²², each thing is individuated by its own haecceity, which is not presupposed to the thing but is an intrinsic mode concomitant with the thing. — Second, because an immaterial thing is individual of itself, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas ²³. And thus nothing need be presupposed to its production by which it would be individuated.

3. For the clarification of this point, it must be considered that, just as among individuals of the same genus and species, between which there is causality according to nature—because in the account of genus and species they are not distinguished but are similar—one can be the cause of another according to the nature of genus and species, since agent and effect must be similar; so too, insofar as they are subsistent individuals, they are not one and similar but distinct, and therefore that by which one is distinguished from another individually and subsists in itself cannot be caused by the other. Otherwise, by that same thing it would agree formally with the other and be formally distinguished from it. For an effect must agree with its cause with respect to that by which it is caused. Hence, if it were also distinguished from it by that same thing, it would by that very thing both agree with it and be distinguished from it.

Therefore the first response, according to Scotus's mind, does not remove the efficacy of the argument. For if haecceity follows upon the thing, it causes every intrinsic mode of it. But through the thing as caused by another, the effect cannot in that respect be distinguished from that cause. Therefore through the haecceity itself the effect cannot be distinguished from the cause: rather it agrees with the cause, on account of the likeness that must exist between cause and effect. Therefore, if the effect, agreeing with the cause in the reason of genus or species, is to be distinguished from the cause individually, there must be something not caused by such a cause presupposed to the action, in which the nature of the genus and species is individuated, and in which the effect subsists individually and is distinguished from all things.

A second objection, drawn from the doctrine of Saint Thomas, also does not impede. For it is true that nothing determined to a genus and species can produce an effect except by means of some presupposition by which the nature of the genus and species is individuated; otherwise there would be nothing from which the effect could be distinguished from the cause under the same genus or the same species, as was argued against Scotus. But where a nature is of itself individual and this one, there cannot be several individuals of which one produces another: for an individual nature is not communicated to many. Therefore that objection is not against the proposition. But if one immaterial individual were posited to produce another individual of the species, it would be necessary to say that the nature itself was not of itself individual, but that there was something by which it would be individuated. Which indeed would necessarily have to be presupposed to the productive action of the other individual. From these things it follows that the said position of Saint Thomas confirms the proposition rather than destroys it. For if such a nature is of itself individual, and for this reason several individuals cannot exist in it, it is a sign that where one individual produces another individual of the same species, the nature must there not be of itself individual, but must be something else in which it is individuated, presupposed to the action of the producer like itself in species.

Ninth. When something comes to be from what is in no way a being, it comes to be through itself. Therefore it must be produced by that which is the cause of being through itself. Therefore God alone makes being out of what is not at all a being. Therefore creation belongs to Him alone.

To make the antecedent evident, Saint Thomas notes that, since everything that comes to be does so in order that it may be, if something comes to be that previously was, it is said to come to be not per se but per accidens; but if it previously was not, it is said to come to be per se. Thus, if white becomes black, it becomes black indeed per se, but colored per accidens, because it previously was. Similarly, if some being comes to be, say a man, it becomes a man indeed per se, because it comes from a non-man; but it becomes a being per accidens, for it does not come to be from non-being simply, but from non-being of this sort, namely from a non-man. And thus it is clear that only then does something come to be per se when it comes to be from entirely non-being.

The first consequence is proved. Because effects must be reduced to their causes proportionally. — The second is also proved. Because God alone is the cause of being insofar as it is being; other things are causes of being only per accidens.

2. But that argument, if it concludes anything, seems to prove only this: that God alone creates the whole multitude of beings, because He alone makes being when previously no created being at all existed. It does not, however, prove that God alone can create this particular thing, say, a fly. For it could be said that some creature, in producing Socrates, produces him with respect to all that he is, and thus produces this being from utter non-being, even though some other being preexists. For in order for something particular to be created, it is not necessary that being come to be such that no being at all preceded; it suffices that nothing of what comes to be has preceded. Hence one could deny that all things other than God are causes of esse only per accidens. Indeed, some cause is a cause of esse per se, because it makes a being that did not exist at all beforehand, even though some other being preexists: just as when this white thing comes to be from this black thing, this white thing is said to come to be per se, because this white thing that comes to be did not exist, even though some other white thing existed. And similarly we say that God creates this intellectual soul because it did not exist at all before, even though some other intellectual soul preexisted. Therefore either the argument does not conclude the proposed conclusion, or it assumes what is to be proved, namely, that nothing other than God produces any being from utter non-being—which is false.

3. For the evidence of this argument, it must be considered that, just as in generation, because it is a change, some subject is posited to which the negation of the thing to be produced is joined, so that the thing can be said to come to be and from such a subject as from matter, and from the negation as from the terminus a quo—for we say that Socrates is generated from menstrual blood as from matter, and from non-Socrates as from the terminus a quo—so, in the opposite way, in creation, because it is not a change, every subject must be removed from which what is created might be said to come to be as from matter. Hence it belongs to the very notion of creation, whether universal or particular, that what is created be previously altogether nonexistent, and consequently that it come to be from altogether non-being. And thus it is necessary that in every creation being per se comes to be: for a being comes to be which was previously altogether nonexistent; namely, since nothing of it at all existed from which that being was made, although perhaps some other being preceded it. Now no particular agent makes being per se, because no such agent makes a being as altogether previously nonexistent: for it does not make a being except with some being presupposed from which it makes another being. For just as, when white becomes black, because colored preexists in the white, colored does not come to be per se but only per accidens, insofar as it is joined to black, which comes to be per se and by primary intention; so too, when one being comes to be from another presupposed being, because the ratio of being preexists in that from which the thing is said to come to be, being does not come to be per se but only per accidens, insofar as the ratio of being is joined to the particular being that comes to be per se. For, as was said, what comes to be per se must not exist previously at all, neither as a subject nor as something joined to a subject, from which it is said to come to be.

It is therefore said that the argument of St. Thomas concludes not only concerning universal creation, but also concerning particular creation. And when it is objected that the argument assumes what is to be proved, this is denied. For St. Thomas does not wish to prove that nothing other than God produces being from wholly non-being; but having proved this in the preceding passages ²⁴ he wishes to show that the action of no creature is creation. For since creation is the production of being per se, and no creature produces being per se, since it produces whatever it produces from some being, as was shown above: it follows that no action of a creature is creation. And thus it belongs to God alone to create, whose it is to produce being per se, namely because his is to act from no presupposed being at all as from matter.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Genesis I, where it is said that all things were created by God. It is also confirmed by the authority of Damascene, in II Sententiarum ²⁵

Finally, by this it is shown that the error of Avicenna is excluded, Metaphysics IX, who held that a second separate substance is created from the first.