Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

After St. Thomas has determined concerning creation in itself, he now determines concerning it with respect to the creating supposit ¹. And he lays down two conclusions ². The first of which is: No body can produce anything by way of creation.

I. It is proved first ³. Whatever is done through a body is done successively. But creation admits no succession. Therefore, etc. — The major is proved: no body acts unless it is moved; therefore it does not act except in time; therefore it acts successively. The first inference is evident, because everything that is moved is moved in time. The antecedent, however, is proved thus: agent and patient, or maker and thing made, must be simultaneous; but things are simultaneous that are in the same place, as in V Physics; and a body does not acquire place except through motion.

II. Concerning this proposition, No body acts unless it is moved, a doubt arises. For according to Saint Thomas, Prima, q. LXVI, a. 3, ad 2; and Quodlibet VI, a. 19 ⁴; the empyrean heaven influences lower bodies. And yet according to him ⁵ that heaven is immobile. Therefore it is not universally true that a body does not act unless it is moved.

Furthermore. If burning coals remain unmoved, and some heatable body is placed near them, that body will be heated. Therefore, for this action, which is heating, it is not required that the heating body be moved.

III. To make this evident, it must be noted that in this place it does not suffice to gloss the proposition of Saint Thomas concerning purely local motion, namely, that no body moves anything purely locally unless it too is moved: as we expounded it in the first book ⁶, as that passage required. For it is manifestly clear that here he speaks of productive action bringing a thing into being, not of local motion.

It is not sufficient even to gloss this by saying that a body does not act unless it is moved in act or in potency. For from the proof adduced here, and from the following argument, it is clear that the intention of St. Thomas is that a body does not act unless it is moved in act.

Nor is it sufficient to say that what is meant is that no body acts unless it is moved, that is, unless it depends on another in acting, as a secondary cause depends on the first. For it is sufficiently clear that in this place it must be understood to be moved locally, as its proof makes evident.

Finally, it does not suffice to gloss, according to the distinction laid down concerning the twofold action of a body in Qu. Pot., q. 5, a. 8, that the argument holds true of the action proper to a body insofar as it is a body, namely that which is transmutative of matter; but not of the action proper to a body insofar as it attains to the order of separate substances, namely that which is toward a certain diffusion of the likeness of its form in a somewhat spiritual manner, as is the action of color causing its species in the medium. For the reason adduced here concludes about one action just as about the other. For it is proved by this argument: because mover and moved, agent and patient, maker and made must be together and in the same place. But it is evident that in every genus of action it must be true that agent and patient, maker and made be together, speaking of the proximate and immediate agent and maker. Hence Aristotle declares this to be true in the motion of alteration, from the action of the sensible upon the sense, in VII Physics, text. 12 ⁷. Therefore etc.

2. Therefore it seems to me that one must say, with due deference always to the better judgment, that this proposition has truth, according to the mind of St. Thomas, in every genus of actions by which something is produced anew, whether by a new action of a body—two conditions nevertheless being observed. The first is that the body acting upon something anew not be intrinsically transmuted: that is, that it not be otherwise disposed with respect to the power by which it acts than it was before. The second is that likewise no transmutation at all have occurred on the part of the thing acted upon, but that it be disposed in the same way as before. For thus understood, the truth of this proposition is manifest from St. Thomas's proof. For if an agent, say a heating agent, is to heat some heatable thing anew which it did not heat before, this cannot happen except because either the power of the heating agent has been increased, or the heatable thing is more disposed than before; or because the heating agent has been brought near to the heatable thing, by its own motion toward the heatable thing, or by the motion of the heatable thing toward it. If, therefore, the increase of power be removed from the heating agent, and we suppose its power to be disposed in the same way as before; and if also we remove from the patient every mutation, and suppose it to be no more disposed than before, and not to have been brought nearer to the heating agent than before by its own motion: there remains only that the new heating of this heatable thing by this heating agent proceeds from nothing other than this, that the heating agent has been brought nearer to the heatable thing than before, by its local motion, through which it came to be together with it.

3. That this exposition is in accord with the mind of St. Thomas is evident from two considerations. First, from the fact that he intends to prove by this proposition that no body can create, namely, produce something anew according to its whole substance. For proving this, it suffices that no body can act so as to produce something anew, those two conditions being observed, unless it be moved. For it is clear that a body having creative power, if any such were posited, cannot by that very creative power be increased, so as to be able now to create and not before: since, if such a power is posited in anything, it is itself a stable and immutable power; moreover, all creatable things require the same power, because the creative power is productive of the whole entity of the thing, and therefore there is no greater indisposition in one creatable thing than in another. It is also clear that the creatable cannot, before it is created, be altered either according to a greater disposition of itself or according to a closer approach to the creator through its own motion: since the creatable is nothing in the nature of things before it is created. It follows, then, that there is no reason why a body should create something anew except that by its local motion it arrives at the place where something is to be created, so that maker and made exist simultaneously.

Second, the same is evident because otherwise the argument of St. Thomas would be null. For unless that proposition be understood together with those conditions, it does not follow—because agent and patient must be simultaneous—that the agent must be moved locally in order to be simultaneous with the patient; for it would be said that it suffices for the patient to be moved toward the agent, so as to be simultaneous with it and to receive its action.

4. To the first, therefore, the opposite is argued ⁸ that that action by which the empyrean heaven influences lower bodies is not a new action, but coeval with the empyrean heaven itself. Hence Saint Thomas, in the passage cited from the First Part, says that it imprints on the first heaven which is moved, not something passing and arriving through motion, but something fixed and stable, namely a power of containing and causing: now it is evident that this power of containing and causing is coeval with the heaven.

To the second it is said that it is not against the sense of the proposition. For then the second condition fails: for a change is posited on the side of the combustible, when it is posited that coals are newly added.

IV. But against this interpretation there is a twofold doubt. First, because from it itself it seems to follow that local motion is not required for the action of a body except so that the agent be present to the patient and simultaneous with it. This, however, seems to be against the doctrine of St. Thomas, Potentia, q. v, a. 8; Prima, q. cxv, a. 3; and II Sent., d. ii, q. ii, a. 3, and d. xv, q. i, a. 2; who holds that the local motion of the heavens is required for acting also as the reason of acting, and as the cause of other motions. On account of which he holds that, it ceasing, every natural transmutation will cease.

Second, because from this interpretation it does not follow that whatever is brought about through the action of a body is brought about successively, but only that a successive motion precedes the action itself. This, however, is not the mind of St. Thomas, who infers from the fact that no body acts except through motion that everything brought about through the action of a body is brought about successively. Therefore, and so on.

2. To the first of these it is said first that it is not the mind of St. Thomas that local motion, inherent in any acting body, should be for it the reason of its acting, since, as has been shown ⁹, some body can act even if it is not moved locally, if, I say, the patient is moved toward it; but it is required only that the agent be simultaneous with the patient and the maker with what is made, those conditions said above existing, as has been shown above ¹⁰.

It is said second, that since with this the local motion of the celestial body stands as in some way giving a reason for itself to these lower things that it alters; and the local motion of the heavens is the cause of all lower motions, as is held in Book VIII of the Physics ¹¹ And therefore this interpretation in no way contradicts the doctrine of Saint Thomas.

To the second it is said, according to the distinction made in the preceding chapter ¹², for the first reason, that from this interpretation it follows that everything that comes to be comes to be successively extrinsically and antecedently, although it does not follow that everything of this sort comes to be successively intrinsically. This, however, suffices for the purpose of St. Thomas: because creation is in neither way successive, since it is neither motion nor the terminus of motion, as was shown above ¹³.

V. Second ¹⁴. Nothing is produced by the action of a body except through motion or change of what is made. But creation is neither motion nor change. Therefore, etc. — The major is proved. No body moves except by being moved. Therefore, etc. The consequence is proved: because every agent that acts insofar as it is moved necessarily moves that upon which it acts. For since what is made and what is acted upon follow upon the disposition of the agent and maker, it must be that if an agent acts not while remaining in the same disposition but as it is continually varied through motion, then in the patient and in what is made there also occurs a certain renewal of dispositions: which cannot be without motion.

VI. Third. No body acts with its whole substance, even if it acts as a whole. Therefore it cannot produce the whole substance of a thing. Therefore it cannot create. — The last consequence is evident from the notion of creation. — The antecedent, however, is proved: for if it acted with its whole substance, the whole would be form, since every agent acts through a form. But this is false, since it also has matter.

The first consequence is also proved. For that which does not act with its whole substance cannot be productive of the whole substance of the thing made. — This is proved as follows. First, because agent and thing made must be alike: namely, with respect to that which the agent acts. And therefore, if it acts only through a part of its substance, the thing made will not be assimilated to it except with respect to that part of the substance. And thus only a part of the substance of the thing made will be produced: for, if we say that something material acts through its form, by which it is in act, but not through its matter, it will produce in the effect a likeness of its form only, and not of its matter. And thus the matter of the thing made will not be produced by it. — Second, from the argument of Aristotle in Metaphysics VII, who argues the contrary: that a form without matter, which acts with its whole self, cannot be the proximate cause of generation, in which alone the form is brought into act.

It must be noted that Saint Thomas adds to the preceding text, even though it acts as a whole: for it is one thing for some whole to act, and another for it to act by its entire substance. In the first is signified that the agent itself, complete, acts; in the second, however, that every part of its substance (if it has parts) is for it the reason of acting. The first befits a body: for the body itself as a whole, that is, complete and perfect, is the supposit which acts. But the second does not befit it: because not every part of its substance is for it the reason of acting. — Concerning the foundation of this argument enough has been said in what precedes ¹⁵.

VII. Fourth argument. To create is proper only to infinite power. But no body is of infinite power. Therefore, etc. — The minor premise is from the Philosopher, Physics VIII. — The major is proved as follows. An agent is of greater power insofar as it can reduce a potency more distant from act into act: as one who can produce fire from water has greater power than one who can produce it from air. But where all preexisting potency is removed, every proportion of determinate distance is exceeded. Therefore the power of an agent that establishes something without any preexisting potency exceeds every proportion that could be considered between it and the power of one making something out of matter. Therefore, etc.

2. Concerning the proof of what Saint Thomas assumes, namely that to create belongs only to infinite power, a doubt is raised in Scotus, Book IV of the Sentences ¹⁶ For he says that although the distance of no power from act has no proportion to that which belongs to some power from act, it does not follow that there must be no proportion between the power of an agent acting from no power and the power of an agent acting from some power. For those distances are disproportionate because one is negative and the other positive: there is indeed no proportion of a positive to a negative. But a positive is not disproportionate to another positive except on account of infinity in one of them. Hence one of those distances is not proportionable to the other: because the other has no quantity according to which it could be proportioned; just as a point is disproportionate to a line because it is not quantified.

But if the words of Saint Thomas in this argument are considered carefully, that reply is no reply at all. For some potency and no potency can be compared in two ways. In one way, absolutely and in themselves; and thus there is neither proportion between them, nor do they belong to the genus of things between which proportion is naturally suited to exist, just as neither between a point and a line. — In another way, according to distance and removal from act; and thus between some potency and no potency there is indeed no proportion, yet they belong to the genus of things between which proportion is naturally suited to exist. For between one removal from act and another removal there can be a proportion: for the potency under the form of earth is removed further from the form of fire than the potency under the form of air; just as, although an infinite line has no proportion to a finite line, they nevertheless belong to the genus of things between which proportion is naturally suited to exist, because other lines are found having proportion among themselves. Saint Thomas therefore compares some potency and no potency in this second way: since no potency has no proportion to some potency if both are considered as removed from act—because the distance of no potency exceeds infinitely the distance of some potency from act, just as an infinite line exceeds a finite line disproportionately.

That Saint Thomas intends this meaning is clear from his words, when he says: Where all preexisting potency is removed, the proportion of any determinate distance is exceeded. Here he takes the disproportion of one thing to another insofar as one exceeds the other disproportionately, or infinitely; not however as things are said to be disproportionate which belong to a genus among which no proportion is naturally capable of existing. Now to such disproportion according to excess there follows a disproportion of active powers according to excess: because, as was assumed in the argument, an agent is of greater power the more it can reduce to act a potency more distant from act. — On this argument there has been fuller discussion in the first book, chapter XLIII ¹⁷ Therefore let these things suffice for now.

VIII. Fifth. Mover and moved, maker and made, must exist simultaneously, as is shown in Physics VII. But an acting body cannot be present to its effect—that is, cannot exist simultaneously with it—except by contact. Therefore, in order to act, it must touch. Therefore there must be something else preexisting. Therefore it cannot create.—The second inference is proved: because the touching of anything is toward another; that is, whatever touches touches something other than itself.

From this the error of those who say that the heavens are the cause of the matter of the elements is evident. For matter can be produced only through creation, since it is the first subject.