Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

The second distinction of creation from the action of creatures is that the action of creatures occurs with succession, whereas creation occurs without succession¹.

I. It is proved, first. Succession is proper to motion. But it was said that creation is neither motion nor change, which is the terminus of motion. Therefore, etc.

For the clarification of this argument, it must be considered that succession in some action can be understood in two ways. In one way, intrinsically and essentially: as in heating, which takes place successively and has parts succeeding one another. In another way, extrinsically and antecedently, namely because a successive change precedes the action itself: as in illumination, to which local motion is antecedent; and in substantial generation, to which alteration is antecedent. Therefore Saint Thomas's conclusion concerning succession must be understood in both ways: namely, that creation is without succession both intrinsically and extrinsically and antecedently. Hence in this argument he adds that creation is neither motion nor the terminus of motion: so that, by its not being motion, it may be held to be without intrinsic and essential succession; and by its not being the terminus of motion, it may be held to be without extrinsic and antecedent succession.

II. Second. Between esse and non-esse, which are as it were the extremes of creation, there cannot be any mean. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because in every successive motion there is some mean between its extremes, as is clear from the definition of the mean in Physics V. It must be noted that St. Thomas says that esse and non-esse are as it were the extremes of creation, but not absolutely its extremes: because, strictly speaking, creation does not have two terms between which it lies. For terms properly belong to an action that occurs with motion, since there something passes from a terminus a quo to a terminus ad quem. But in creation, since there is no motion, nothing passes subjectively from one term to another; rather there is only, as is said in Potentia, q. III, 1, ad 11, an efflux from the agent into the thing made. Yet because, according to our mode of understanding, we apprehend the creature as first not existing and afterwards having esse, therefore esse and non-esse can in some way be called terms, insofar as the non-existence of the thing produced and its existence, with no existing subject passing from non-being to being, are called the terms of the production in the manner stated.

2. But a doubt arises concerning the reason. If there is no succession in creation because between esse and non-esse no medium falls, then by the same reasoning in the generation of a thing—taking generation as also including motion toward the introduction of substantial form into matter—there will be no succession, since that too is between non-being and being. It is answered: and it is said first that creation and generation are not of the same kind. For in creation there is no subject that must be disposed for the reception of substantial form, as there is in generation; rather, immediately after non-being the created thing receives its whole esse at once: just as also, when matter has already been disposed by motion toward the form, immediately through generation, which is the terminus of the motion, the thing receives esse. — Likewise, creation is between non-being simply, which is in no way esse, and being simply, which is to be according to all its essential parts at once. Generation, however, is between not being this and being this—for instance, between not being a man and being a man—to which non-being is joined the esse of another form and its accidents, which must be cast off through motion so that the accidents befitting the form to be introduced may be introduced. Therefore, since between the accidents of the form to be cast off at such a degree and the accidents of the form to be induced there falls a medium, which is reached before the extremity is reached, therefore between the non-being and being that are the extremes of generation a medium can in some way be said to fall, though this is not properly said. For when fire is generated from air, and thus a passage is made from the non-being of fire to the being of fire, the accidents of air must first arrive at an attenuated esse, and the accidents of fire must be introduced in attenuated esse, before matter entirely loses the accidents of air and receives the form of fire with intensified accidents. Hence between the non-being of fire joined to the form and accidents of air, and the esse of fire itself, there falls a medium. But between the non-being and being that are in some way the extremes of creation no medium falls, since in it is considered non-being simply—that is, what is joined to no esse or form; and between such non-being and being no medium falls. It is said secondly that, taking generation as including motion, it is not precisely between esse and non-esse, but also between esse and esse—for instance, between the esse of air and the esse of fire.

III. Third. In creation, becoming cannot precede having been made. Therefore in it there is no succession. — The consequence is evident, because in every making in which there is succession, becoming is prior to having been made, as is stated in Physics VI. — But the antecedent is proved: because such a becoming of the creature would not be in the creature itself that is said to be becoming, since it is not prior to its having been made; nor in the maker himself, since to be moved is not an act of the mover, namely as subject, but of the thing moved; nor in any matter of the thing made preexisting beforehand, for this is against the very notion of creation. Therefore etc.

IV. Fourth. The substantial esse of a creature is not divisible according to intension and remission, since substance does not admit of more and less. Nor do dispositions precede the esse of the creature in creation, since matter does not pre-exist creation. Therefore there is no succession there. — The consequence is proved. Because, since every successive making occurs in time, time, motion, and that over which motion passes are divided together: for regularly, in half the time, motion traverses half the magnitude. Now division in forms, corresponding to the division of time, is observed either according to the intension and remission of the form itself which is the terminus of the motion, or of the dispositions toward such a form. Therefore, where esse admits no intension or remission, nor are there dispositions toward it capable of such division, there is no succession in the acquisition of such esse. Note that Saint Thomas said that regularly motion traverses the middle of the magnitude in half the time because, if something were moved irregularly—that is, if one part of the motion were more intense than another—this would not happen. As for the truth of this proposition, it was examined in Book I².

V. Fifth. In creation nothing is presupposed on the part of matter. Nor is anything lacking to the agent for acting, which would afterwards come to it through motion. Therefore creation occurs in an instant. — The consequence is proved. Because succession in the making of things arises from a defect of matter, which from the beginning is not sufficiently disposed for the reception of form. Hence, when it is disposed, it receives form in an instant: just as the diaphanous, because it is always in ultimate disposition to light, is illuminated immediately upon the presence of something luminous. And if motion is required, this is not on the part of what can be illuminated, but on the part of the illuminating, so that it may become present. Where, then, nothing is required on the part of matter, nor is anything acquirable through motion required on the part of the agent, there the making must be instantaneous. — From these things it is deduced that at the same time as something is created, it has been created: just as something is illuminated and is illuminated at the same time.

It must be known, however, that although to be created and to have been created, and to be illumined and to have been illumined, are simultaneous, they are nevertheless distinguished by reason. For to be created signifies the very esse of the creature together with the actual novelty of esse and the relation of actual dependence upon God; but to have been created signifies the total esse of the thing placed in act by God, and does not signify the relation of actual dependence together with such a novelty of esse.

It is confirmed lastly by the authority of Genesis 1. For where it is said, "In the beginning" — namely, of time, according to Basil — "God created heaven and earth," it is to be understood that creation was instantaneous: since the beginning of time is an instant.