Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

From the preceding conclusion there follows as a corollary that the arguments of those who attack creation from the nature of motion and change are vain ¹. The truth of the corollary, however, is shown by the solution of the arguments.

I. For their first foundation was that some subject must be assigned to creation, as to other motions and changes; and that it must not be changed into esse, that is, something changed from non-being into being. From which it followed that creation could not be from no subject.

To this, however, the foundation is answered first, that creation is not a change, but is a dependence of the esse of the created thing upon the principle by which it is instituted. And thus it is a relation. And therefore it is as in a subject in the very term itself, which is the created thing: not, however, in some preexisting subject, as motion and change are.

It is said second, that creation is a change according to the mode of understanding only: insofar as the intellect receives one and the same thing as not existing before and existing afterward. And thus there is there some subject according to the mode of understanding only, but not one existing in the nature of things.

It must be noted that passive creation is said to be the relation of dependence of the creature upon God: because, as is taught by the doctrine of Saint Thomas in the Prima, q. xlv, a. 3, since action and passion in creatures signify motion together with a relation, when motion is removed nothing remains of the notion of action and passion except a certain relation in the agent and a certain one in the patient. Therefore creation, since, as was shown ², it is not a change, if taken actively, as something distinct from God, signifies only the habit of the agent in God toward the creature. But if it is taken passively, it signifies the relation of the creature to God as to the principle of its whole esse.

II. According to their foundation, it was argued that if there is creation, there must be some thing. It is therefore either uncreated or created. If uncreated, then it is God. If created, then it is created by another creation. And thus there will be a regress to infinity in creations.

Saint Thomas responds that it is a thing, since the created effect really depends on the Creator; and the created thing; but not by another creation. This is shown from two considerations. First, because accidents and forms, just as they do not exist of themselves, so neither are they created of themselves: but, just as they exist with other things, so they are created together with other things. Therefore creation need not be created by another creation: but it is created by the same creation by which the first creature itself is said to be created through it. — Second, because creation is a relation. Now a relation is not referred by another relation, but by itself: since it is essentially a relation. And thus there is no need to proceed to infinity.

III. Concerning that argument, that creation is some thing because the created effect really depends on the Creator, it is doubted ³. For by the same reasoning it would follow that active creation, which is the relation of God to the creature, is also a certain thing. For just as the created effect really depends on the Creator, so the Creator really creates and produces the creature.

2. Concerning the other proposition, namely that creation is not created by another creation, but by the same one by which the first creature is created, a doubt is raised ⁴. For since by it the first creature is created, it follows that it is for itself the cause of being (essendi). For through creation something takes on esse. If therefore creation creates itself, it will receive esse from itself.

3. Concerning the reason why it is not created by another creation, namely because accidents and forms are not created per se, from which St. Thomas seems to hold that creation is an accident (as is said more explicitly in the Prima Pars, cited above, ad 3; and in De Potentia, cited above ⁵, a. 3, ad 3; and Quodlibet VII, a. 10 ⁶, ad 4), a doubt is raised on the authority of Scotus, in II Sent., d. 1, q. 3 and 4 ⁷. For he proves there that creation is a relation which is really identical with its foundation: and thus it will not be an accident, since its foundation is substance. He proves this: First, because a creature cannot be without such a relation. But what cannot be without something else without contradiction is identical with it, when that thing is not prior to it, nor simultaneous with it in nature, nor is there an essential order between them. This occurs in this relation with respect to created substance. — Second, because it belongs uniformly to every creature with respect to God. But nothing of this sort happens to any creature accidentally. — Third, because the stone would be prior in duration to its dependence upon God. And thus it would exist without depending on God. For substance, according to Metaphysics VII ⁸, is prior to accident in time.

4. Concerning the other proposition, namely that a relation is not referred by another relation, because it is essentially a relation, a doubt is raised ⁹. Because Saint Thomas argued above ¹⁰ that if God were referred to creatures by a relation existing outside himself, it would be necessary that another relation be referred to that relation itself, and thus one would proceed to infinity in relations. Therefore in him it is not unfitting for another relation to be referred to a relation: and so, consequently, that one relation conversely be referred by another relation to something else. For let the relation by which God is referred to a creature C be A. But let the relation by which he is referred to that relation be B. It follows that, just as God is referred to C through B, so conversely C would be referred to God through the relation opposed to B itself. For there is no greater reason that God should be referred to one relation by means of another relation than that that relation should be referred to God by another relation.

IV. To the first doubt it is answered that, speaking formally, it is one thing for a creature to depend really upon the Creator, and another for the creature itself to be really produced by God. For to be really produced by God signifies having real esse from God; but to depend upon God signifies that the thing produced, from the real esse received, has within itself an order fundamentally directed to God, and is the cause of a real relation. And therefore the relation of dependence of the creature upon God must be some thing: for a relation having a real foundation and cause is real. And I understand by a real foundation something really existing in reality, from which the thing is ordered to another even when every act of the intellect is removed; but I do not take "real foundation" materially, namely as the real thing from which the intellect conceives something relatively.

When, therefore, it is urged that by the same reasoning the relation of God to the creature will be a real relation, the consequence is denied. In proof of this, it is said that the case is not similar. For although God really creates, just as the creature is really created, still, from real creation—which, as regards the entity it signifies, is the divine essence itself—God does not depend on the creature, as if, with no intellect considering it, there were necessarily born from the divine action and the divine essence itself an order to the creature. But in the creature, from the real production by which it is produced from God, there is an entity from which, of itself, an order to God as to its principle is necessarily born. The reason for the diversity is that the creature receives perfection and esse from God, whereas God receives no perfection from the creature.

V. To the second doubt ¹¹ it is answered: and it is said that creation, insofar as it is signified in the manner of a mutation and of a way, is not, strictly speaking, that which is created, but that by which something is created. Now it is not unfitting that something should not be through another but through itself, as that by which something is, having esse from its cause by simple emanation. Hence in this way creation does not stand as that which is created, but as that by which another thing is created: just as alteration is not, as such, that which is altered, but that by which another thing is altered. Therefore, just as one need not ask by what alteration is altered in its own manner, that is, by what it is that by which another thing is altered, since it is such of itself; so one need not ask by what creation is created in this manner, since it is such of itself. The argument, however, supposes that creation itself, signified in the manner of a mutation, stands as that which is created. Which is false.

It is said second, that creation, insofar as it is truly a relation and a creature, is not created by another creation: because to be created in this way is nothing other than to have esse universally from another, and to be referred to that other as to the principle of one's esse; but a relation is not referred by another relation, but by itself. The deception that occurs among some arises because they imagine creation to be a true transitive action, really intermediate between God and the creature, and that it is itself the cause of the creature's having esse. But they are deceived. For, just as active creation does not signify something proceeding from God that is received in the creature, but only the divine willing together with the relation of one actually producing to the thing produced universally; so passive creation does not signify any true passion received from God in the creature, but in the creature itself receiving esse from God it signifies only a relation to God giving it esse universally. Hence for the creature to be created is not to be transmuted into esse by any passion: but it is for it to have esse universally from God by a simple efflux; and consequently to be referred to Him as to the universal principle of having esse. Therefore, for the relation to be created is nothing other than for it itself to receive esse from God with newness of esse: which is to be referred to Him as to the principle of its esse. And for this reason, just as it is not unfitting for a relation to refer itself, so it is not unfitting that it be created by itself. Nor does it follow that it is the cause of its own esse: because it itself is not the cause of the esse of the thing principally created, but the divine willing itself is the cause of the creature's esse; the relation, however, existing in it is that by which the creature is formally referred to God.

VI. For the clarification of the third doubt ¹², it must be considered that it cannot be denied, in the doctrine of Saint Thomas, that creation is an accident, since he expressly states this in the passages cited above. Nevertheless, those who hold that a relation is not really distinct from its foundation would say that such a relation is called an accident, not because it is truly an accident distinct from substance, but because its intelligible character lies outside the intelligible character of substance, and is understood to accrue to the intelligible character of substance. Those, however, who hold that a relation is really distinct from its foundation say that it is truly an accident really distinct from substance. But, whatever may be said of other relations, I hold that it is the mind of Saint Thomas that the relation of the creature to God, which, when co-understood with the newness of esse, is called creation, is an accident really distinct from the creature that is referred. Nor can it be glossed that he means it to be an accident because, considered according to its formal character, it lies outside the character of substance: for De Potentia, where above ¹³, ad 3, he says that that relation is an accident; and considered according to its esse, insofar as it inheres in a subject, it is posterior to the created thing, just as an accident is posterior to its subject in intellect and in nature; although, according to its character, insofar as it is born from the action of the agent, it is in a certain way prior to its subject.

2. Hence, in reply to Scotus's first argument, that greatest maxim of his, which he uses over and over again, is denied, namely: That which properly inheres in something and without which the latter cannot be apart from contradiction is really identical with it. For this maxim is false, as is clear from a subject and its proper passion, if we suppose that the passion cannot be separated from the subject even by divine power. For wherever there is a necessary connection of one thing to another and a necessary consequence, there one cannot be without the other. So it is in the case at hand. For since, as is said in the First Part, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1, every being other than God is a being by participation, it follows that it is caused by another. Therefore it cannot be without dependence on its cause: just as man cannot be without being capable of laughter.

It is said second, that a contradiction stated of certain things according to being and not-being does not entail a real distinction between them. For of one of those things that are really the same it can be said that it is, and of the other that it is not, insofar as that thing completely has the character of one, but does not completely have the character of the other: just as we say that the divine willing and active creation are really the same, and yet, before things were created, it was true to say, The divine willing is, but not, Creation is, because that entity had completely the character of willing, but not the character of creation, on account of the lack of its term, namely the creature. Nor does the impossibility of receiving such contradictories entail real identity: as was said concerning the subject and its proper passion.

It is said thirdly that a creature can be taken in two ways: in one way, absolutely, according to its entity; in another way, as it has esse through the divine action and is preserved by it. In the first way, the relation is posterior to the creature, like an accident of it. In the second way, it is prior to it, namely, as belonging to its very reason insofar as it depends on God. For just as whiteness belongs to the reason of white, insofar as it is such, so a relation of dependence on God belongs to the reason of a creature, insofar as it depends on the divine action. And since a creature existing in nature cannot be deprived of dependence on the divine action without ceasing to be such, therefore such a relation of dependence cannot be separated from it.

3. To the second, it is denied that dependence belongs uniformly to relation and to the others. For other things, which are absolute, are not referred by themselves, because they are not essentially relation. But relation itself is referred by itself: because it is in its essence order and relation.

4. To the third it is said that it is not Aristotle's view that every substance is prior in time to any accident whatever: for there is some substance that cannot be separated from an accident, and consequently is not prior in time to every accident. But the claim is true in two ways. First, according to the Commentator, on VII Metaphysics, commentary 4, of corruptible substance, by reason of the matter from which it is made. For since the matter from which a corruptible body is made precedes in time what is made from it, it will also precede every accident that follows upon it. — Second, that some substance precedes every accident in time without repugnance. For no accident can exist without a substance; but some substance can well exist without an accident, its nature being considered, as God or the intelligences, even according to the Commentator, on XII Metaphysics, commentary 25. For although it were posited that God of necessity produced the heavens from eternity, and consequently that the accidents of the heavens are eternal, and thus that God does not in actual fact precede in time every accident; nevertheless, that the divine substance, considered in itself, should exist while the accidents do not exist involves no repugnance, since no accident follows upon it intrinsically.

VII. To the final doubt ¹⁴ it is answered that what was said above does not contradict what is said here, for both are true. For if God is referred to other things by a relation distinct from and separate from himself, that very relation will be in the same order as the other things. For God is prior to all things, not only to absolute things but also to relative ones, and in comparison with all things he is the highest good. Therefore, if he is referred to other things by a relation distinct from himself as the highest good and first being, then other things would also be referred to that very relation by another relation distinct from itself; for it is not unfitting that something be referred to a relation as to the term of a relation. Nor does it conflict with this that a relation is not referred by another relation. Nor does it follow from the fact that God would be referred to a relation by another relation, that the relation itself would be referred to God by another relation. For the relation itself is essentially a relation, and therefore it refers by itself; but God is not essentially a relation, so as to refer to creatures by himself.