Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

Having shown that the divine action is without pre-existing matter, and consequently that it is creation, it remains to show how creation itself is distinguished from the transient action of a creature ¹. And two conclusions are set forth ².

Regarding the first conclusion, Saint Thomas does two things: first, he states the conclusion with its proofs; second, he draws certain corollaries, in the following chapter.

I. The first conclusion, therefore, is: Creation is not motion nor change, properly speaking. But "properly speaking" is added so that it may be shown that improperly, and according to the mode of signifying, it is not unfitting for creation to be called a change.

The conclusion is proved. First, because motion and change are the act of a being in potency. But in creation nothing preexists in potency in which creation might be received.

Then, because the extremes of motion and change fall into the same order: for they are either of the same genus, as contraries; or they share in one potency, as privation and form. In creation, however, there is no preexisting potency, nor anything of the same genus presupposed to creation.

Then, because in creation, where the whole substance of a thing is produced, there is nothing that is the same thing existing differently now and before: for that would be something presupposed and not produced. In motion, however, there must be something that exists differently now than before: as the very name "change" shows.

Then, because motion or change precedes in duration that which comes to be: for having come to be is the terminus of motion and the beginning of rest; hence every change must be either a motion or the terminus of a motion, which is successive. And what is coming to be does not yet exist, which befits a thing as long as it is in motion. In creation, however, this is not so: for if it preceded, some subject would have to have been presupposed for it.

II. Concerning what is said in the second argument, namely that the extremes of motion fall into the same order, it must be noted that they are understood to fall into the same order because they are united in one thing to which they have an order: namely, either in one genus, as contraries in motion; or in one potency, as privation and form in change.

2. Concerning the third argument, where it was said that in creation there is nothing that stands now otherwise than before, a doubt is raised. For, when something is newly created, that which is created now exists in the nature of things, whereas previously it did not exist in the nature of things. Therefore there is something in creation that stands now otherwise than before.

It is answered that the phrase "in creation there is something that is disposed one way now and otherwise before" can be understood in two ways. In one way, properly, as a subject really preexisting in nature, which is transmuted from one terminus to another: thus, when a man is generated, matter preexists, which first is under one form together with the privation of the form of man, and afterward receives the form and esse of man. — In another way, improperly, as a terminus really produced by the very act of creation, which previously was not in act and afterward is in act. In this way, although the terminus is not a subject that is transmuted from non-being into being—since previously the terminus itself, say man, was not in nature, so that it could be said to be really under non-being—nevertheless the intellect, considering its non-being in one part of true or imaginary time, and its being in the other part of time, takes it after the manner of a subject existing now under non-being, now under being. And thus, according to the intellect, the terminus itself is in some way a subject differently disposed: for, having esse in the intellect, it is first considered under real non-being, and afterward under being.

Saint Thomas therefore understands it in the first way, not the second. For in creation no subject is presupposed which is otherwise disposed now and before, since creation is from nothing presupposed as matter. But a term is indeed brought forth in act which previously was not in act; and thus it is considered by the intellect as a subject passing from one term to another. — Although we may rather imagine time itself, whether real or imaginary, as the subject, one part of which is the non-being of the thing, while another is its being: as is said in Potentia, q. III, a. 2.

To the argument, therefore, it is said that it proceeds concerning what is otherwise disposed now and before, by way of a term according to the thing and of a subject according to the mode of understanding—which Saint Thomas does not deny is found in creation—but not concerning what is otherwise disposed as a preexisting subject in nature.

3. Concerning the last reason, it must be noted that the change which is the terminus of motion, such as generation and corruption, can be taken in two ways: in one way, per se precisely, as distinguished from motion as its terminus; in another way, as signifying at once both the motion to which it follows and the change itself, which is the terminus. Therefore, when St. Thomas says that motion and change must precede in time that which comes to be through change, change is not taken in the first way: because, since it is the terminus of motion and exists in an instant, it is simultaneous with the thing produced. Hence, taking generation in that way, a thing is generated and has been generated simultaneously, just as St. Thomas also says in Prima, q. 45, a. 2, ad 3, that something is illuminated and has been illuminated at once. — But change is taken in the second way. For thus change, by reason of the motion, precedes what is produced. For as long as the motion tends toward the instantaneous introduction of form into matter, disposing matter for the reception of form, the thing does not yet exist nor has it been begotten, but it comes to be and is being generated. At the terminus of the motion, however, it has been begotten. And therefore motion and change precede in time that which is produced through such a change, just as motion precedes the terminus of the motion and rest.

III. But against the aforesaid conclusion it seems to be the case, because Aristotle, Physics V, ³ proves that generation is a change, since through it that which does not exist comes to be. But far more through creation than through generation does that which does not exist come to be. Therefore creation is a change.

It also seems to be against this very position, because the Commentator, in Physics VII, commentary 20, holds that a real relation does not come to anything except through change. But it is clear that the relation of a creature to God comes to it through creation. Therefore, and so on.

2. To the first of these it is said that Aristotle's meaning is that what comes to be through generation is made from some presupposed matter out of what it was not. This, however, as has been shown, does not belong to creation.

To the second, it is said that the saying of the Commentator is understood of a relation that comes to a preexisting thing, either in act or in the potency of matter. But such is not the relation of a creature to God.