Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

After Saint Thomas had determined the principle and the term of the divine action, he now determines the action itself ¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, indeed, he treats of the action itself absolutely; second, in comparison with the supposit that acts, in chapter XX.

On the first point he does two things: first, he treats of the species of the action; second, he excludes certain things from the reason of that action, in chapter seventeen.

I. As to the first, he posits this conclusion: God produced things into esse from nothing preexisting as from matter. And it is the same to say that God produced things by creation: for to create is to produce something from no subject.

It is proved first. Either something preexists for God's effect, or it does not. If not, the point is established. — If so, since one must not proceed to infinity in material causes ², as is said in Metaphysics II, one will arrive at some first subject that presupposes nothing else, and it is produced by God, as is clear from the preceding chapter. Therefore God, in producing His effect, does not require matter lying ready at hand out of which He works.

Note that it is not the same thing to produce something in matter and to produce something from matter. For God produces certain things in preexisting matter, such as the intellectual soul in disposed matter; yet He does not produce it from that very matter, as though preexisting matter were required for its production. For it is not educed from the potency of matter, even though it is produced in matter.

II. Second. An agent that of necessity requires pre-existing matter out of which to operate is a particular agent. But God is the universal cause of being (essendi). Therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved: because to operate from pre-existing matter is to act toward a determinate species, since all matter, through a form superinduced upon it, is contracted to some species. But to act in this way belongs to a particular agent, since causes are proportional to their effects. Therefore, etc.

2. But concerning that proposition, "An agent acting toward a determinate species is a particular agent," a doubt arises. For God, in producing man, acts toward a determinate species. And it is universally true that whatever acts, acts toward some determinate species, since there is nothing in the nature of things which is not toward some determinate species. God, however, is a universal agent, as is assumed in the argument. Therefore that proposition is false.

It is answered that to act toward a determinate species can happen in two ways: namely, materially, and formally. To act formally is for the account of that species to be the formal account according to which something is produced by the agent: as to act toward the species of man formally is for the account of man to be the formal account according to which something is produced by the agent—namely, that this be produced by that agent insofar as it is a man, not insofar as it is something else. — To act materially, however, is to produce something of a determinate species, yet not insofar as such a species is such, but insofar as it has some other account: as we say the sun is productive of man materially, but not formally, because although it produces a man, it does not produce him insofar as he is a man, so that the account of man would be the formal account according to which he is produced by the sun, but rather insofar as he is a body or an animate thing; for the account of man is not an adequate account of what can be produced by the sun.

In the matter at hand, therefore, "to act" is taken formally, not materially, with respect to a determinate species. For such is the manner of a particular agent. Indeed, if the formal ratio of the object of an agent's power is particular and determinate, then the agent itself, as such, must be particular and limited: for it is called a particular and limited agent because it cannot act upon every being, but only upon something determinate. Thus also it is true that every agent acts from pre-existing matter toward a determinate species of being: because matter is always determined to some species through the reception of form. — Here, however, "species" is not taken for the most special species, but for everything that imports a determinate grade of being. In this way, the heaven, although it is a universal agent by comparison with other inferior agents, is nevertheless absolutely a particular agent, since it acts only upon what is determined to the ratio of body.

God, however, acts materially toward a determinate species, but not formally: for the reason according to which something is produced by God is not the reason of corporeity or any other particular reason of being, but the very absolute reason of being; for something is produced by God insofar as it is a being, not insofar as it is this being or that one—although he produces both this and that, and universally every particular being. Hence, if we wish to observe the manner of speaking, it will indeed be said that God acts on what is determinate to some species, but not that he acts toward a determinate species. For the former seems to import the thing produced materially, while the latter imports it formally: for that proposition seems, from its manner of speaking, to import an order of the agent toward its formal object.

III. Third. That which does not bring things into esse except from pre-existing matter acts only by moving and transmuting. But God does not act only by moving and transmuting. Therefore He does not of necessity produce from pre-existing matter. The major is proved: because to make something out of matter is through motion or change. The minor is also proved: being is more universal than being moved; for there are certain beings that are immobile, even according to the philosophers, such as stones and the like, say metals. Therefore above a cause that does not act except through motion there is a cause that is the first principle of esse, which can clearly act without motion and change. The consequence is evident: because the more universal an effect is, the higher is its proper cause; since the higher a cause is, the more widely does its power extend.

Note that when it is said that stones are not moved, this must be understood of themselves, as living things. For that they can be moved by another, both by natural motion and by violent motion, is sufficiently manifest.

2. But then the example does not seem to be to the point. For the intention of the text is that esse is more universal than being moved, whether by oneself or by another, and that there are some beings which are moved neither by themselves nor by another, so that there may also be some cause higher than that which acts through motion.

It is answered that Saint Thomas does not consider things here according to their very genera, but according to degrees of being, insofar as to be, to live, to sense, to understand, and to be moved locally are different degrees of being. For thus, since being is a more common degree of being than the degree of living—which degree Saint Thomas here calls being moved, because living things move themselves—it is necessary that being itself be reduced to a higher cause than that which acts by moving and transmuting, so that the degrees of agents correspond to the degrees of beings in acting. For just as there are two common degrees of beings, namely to be and to live—although living comprehends several degrees—so there will be two degrees of agents as they are agents, namely to act with motion and to act without motion; so that the agent with motion corresponds to the degree of those that move themselves, while the agent without motion corresponds to the degree of beings only. Yet by this it is not excluded that the agent with motion does not extend itself to the degree of those which are beings only, for the sun is the cause of the being of non-living things. But it is true that it cannot reach those things that pertain to the degree of being except inasmuch as they communicate with the degree of living things with respect to being moved, although they are moved from without. It suffices therefore for the purpose at hand that stones are immobile beings, namely not moving themselves: for thus they pertain to the degree of being simply, which degree, as such, requires a higher cause than that which acts by moving, as is clear from the argument.

3. Note that Saint Thomas adds an exclusive statement, saying that God does not act only by moving and transmuting. For he does not deny that God can move and transmute something (for He formed the body of Adam and Eve from matter); rather, that He does not of necessity act through the transmutation of matter. For He could have produced the body of Adam and Eve without the transmutation of preexisting matter, producing the matter itself at the same time as well.

IV. Fourth. God is the universal principle of being (essendi). Therefore he does not act only through motion or change. Therefore he has no need of pre-existing matter. — The second consequence is evident. — The first, however, is proved: because that which acts through motion is not the universal cause of being, since through motion and change there is not made being from non-being simply, but this being from non-being of this kind.

2. But against this last proposition an objection can be raised: for in Book V of the Physics, text 7 ³, it is said that in generation simply so called, which is a change into substance, a being simply so called comes to be from a non-being simply so called.

To make this evident, it must be considered that being simpliciter can be taken in three ways. In one way, as distinguished from being secundum quid; and then substance is said to be being simpliciter, because esse belongs to it as to that which properly has esse. In another way, as distinguished from contracted and limited being; and then being under the absolute ratio of being is said to be being simpliciter. In a third way, as distinguished from partial being; and then being composed of all its parts is said to be being simpliciter.

In all these ways creation is of being simply, and is from non-being simply. For what is properly created is that which subsists in its esse, as is said in the Prima, q. 45 ⁴. Being also, under the common ratio of being, is the formal term per se of creation: for each thing is created from that by which it is being, just as each thing is seen insofar as it is colored. And thus being simply comes to be from non-being simply in the second way: namely, because previously there was no ratio of being in anything from which what is created might be made. Likewise, being totally, that is, with respect to all things that belong to its ratio, is produced through creation. And thus being simply comes to be from non-being simply in the third way: because it comes to be with no part of it preexisting.

By generation, however, a being in the third sense does not come to be from non-being simply: for matter does not come to be. — Nor does a being in the second sense come to be: for being absolutely is not the formal terminus of generation, but some determinate species of being. — But a being in the first sense does come to be: for substance comes to be from non-substance.

Saint Thomas, therefore, takes being simpliciter in this passage in both of the ultimate ways. The Philosopher, however, takes it only in the first way where it is cited. Hence there is no contradiction.

V. To the fifth. Every agent that requires matter in acting produces only a form in matter. But God does not produce only a form in matter, but the whole subsisting thing. Therefore etc. The consequence is evident, with the major premise. The minor is proved: God is being in act not through an inherent form, but through his whole substance. Therefore etc. The consequence is proved: because each thing acts so as to produce what is like itself, since it acts insofar as it is in act. Hence in Metaphysics VII it is proved that material things having forms in matter are generated by material agents, and not by separate forms.

2. But this argument seems not to conclude. For if, because God acts in a manner like himself, and since he is entirely in act, he must produce the whole substance of the thing, then by the same reasoning every thing produced by him would have to be altogether simple, just as he himself is most simple. And so with the other divine perfections.

It will also follow that he does not produce matter: because matter is not a being in act, as God is.

3. For the understanding of this, it must be considered that an agent can be considered in two ways: namely, materially, and formally. Materially indeed, insofar as this or that nature is considered in it, for example man, horse, and the like. Formally, however, when it is considered in relation to the action from which it is denominated an agent. — Similarly, an effect is considered materially as it is this thing; formally, however, as it is an effect and a thing produced.

In both ways the agent must produce something like itself, but in different manners. For if the agent is considered materially, then the agent produces what is like itself insofar as the effect produced, according to its form, is contained by some likeness in the agent. The effect need not, however, be assimilated to the agent in all respects; it suffices that it have some likeness of itself in the agent: just as, although God is intellectual, the stone produced by him is not intellectual, yet it is like God insofar as it is a being and a substance, and as the form of the stone is contained virtually, with respect to every perfection of itself, in God. But if the agent is considered formally, as an agent is an agent, there must be a likeness between agent and effect with respect to the mode of action by which the agent acts, and of passive production by which the effect is produced. Therefore, if the mode of the agent in acting is such that it acts through only a part of itself, the mode of the effect produced will be such that it is produced according to only a part. If, however, the mode of the agent is such that it acts according to its whole substance, the mode of the effect will be such that it is produced according to its whole substance. Between agent and effect, therefore, taken formally, there must be a likeness in its own way, just as there must be between them if they are taken materially.

To the first argument, therefore, it is clear that the consequence is invalid: for there is a transition from agent and effect taken formally to them as considered materially. It is said, however, that even if they are taken materially, it does not follow: The agent acts in a manner like itself; Therefore what is produced by God is altogether simple, just as it does not follow: God is intellectual; Therefore the stone produced by him is intellectual: because an agent, in producing some effect, need not produce it as like itself with respect to all things that are in it, but only with respect to that form by which it is productive of that effect as such; but God is productive of one effect insofar as he contains its perfection in himself, and he is also productive of another insofar as he contains that one's perfection. But this does hold: It is a being in act according to its whole substance; Therefore he produces the whole substance: because esse in act is the ground of the agent's acting, but not esse as supremely simple as such.

To the second, the consequence is likewise denied. For although matter is not like God in that it is being in act of itself, it is nevertheless assimilated to him insofar as it participates in some way in the ratio of being.

VI. Sixth. God does not act by an action that would necessarily need to be received in some patient, since His action is His substance. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because matter is required by any agent in order that it receive that agent's action, since action is the act of the agent received in the patient. For action is the act of the agent ⁵ and of the form, that is, an act from the agent and a form produced by the agent, or some inchoation of the form in it, that is, an inchoation of the agent's form in the patient, while the form itself, which is produced in the patient, is still in fieri, not yet having complete esse. For by either way of speaking it is signified that the action is received in the patient.

Note here that Saint Thomas holds that transitive action is not in the agent but in the patient ⁶. And that he is not speaking of action taken consequentially, that is, of the effect produced through the action, is evident from the fact that he denies that divine action requires matter, because it is God's substance. For it is clear that, if he were taking action for the effect of the action and not essentially for the action itself, then God's action would not be his essence.

2. But a doubt arises concerning the premises of this argument. First. Transient action, taken materially, is nothing other than the very form produced insofar as it is in becoming, or insofar as it is motion. But it is not unfitting that the produced form should need matter from God in which it be received: for that is not the divine essence. Therefore etc.

Second. Above, in chapter one, where Saint Thomas distinguished two kinds of action, namely immanent and transitive action, he said that both actions—immanent and transitive—befit God. But it belongs to the definition of transitive action that it be received in the patient: for there it is said to be the perfection of the thing acted upon. Therefore some action of God, being transitive, is received in a patient. And thus He needs matter.

3. For the evidence of this, it must be understood that we can speak of transitive action in two ways: either, I say, according to the thing itself and its proper rationale; or according to the mode of signifying and a certain likeness. If it is considered according to its proper rationale, then action is essentially motion, and it connotes a respect in the agent: for motion, insofar as it is from this agent, is action, as is said in Physics III ⁷ -- But if it is considered only according to a certain likeness and mode of signifying, then it is not essentially motion, but signifies something remaining in the agent, which is signified as passing into another, insofar as through it something distinct from the agent is brought into being. For thus, if our willing were of itself productive of things, so that willing itself would be producing itself, to produce things would be in the truth of the thing an immanent action, because it would be entirely identical with willing, yet it would be signified after the manner of something passing into another.

The divine action, therefore, by which things are produced into being, since it is nothing other than the divine willing itself and the very substance of God, which is entirely separate from the genus of motion, is not a transient action according to the truth of the thing, but an immanent action which is willing and understanding: for as God understands and wills, so do things proceed into being, without any other mediating action or motion. But it is true that it has some likeness to transient action, insofar as through it some effect is left in creatures. And therefore it is signified by us after the manner of a transient action into another when we say that God produces or creates things. Hence it can be called a transient action productively, because it has an extrinsic terminus, the thing produced: but not subjectively, which is properly what it is to be a transient action, because it is not received in any extrinsic subject, but remains in the agent. Such, then, is the mind of Saint Thomas at this place: that God does not act by an action which is truly and according to its proper character transient. Therefore he does not act by an action that must be received in a patient.

4. To the first, the opposite is said: that the antecedent is true of an action which is truly transient. But the divine action, as we have said, is not truly transient, but only according to similitude and mode of signifying.

But if it is pressed further that, although the divine action by which God produces things in esse by a simple operation is not truly transient, nevertheless the action by which He locally moves or alters some body is truly transient—because in other movers and alterers nothing else is their transient action than the very motion as it is from the mover—and thus a transient action would truly be attributed to God. — Again, since transient action, by its very notion, signifies something going forth from the agent and received in the patient, why is it not conceded that God has an action passing forth from Himself, just as He has another thing produced from Himself? —

To the first it is answered that in created agents and movers, because they are not pure act, their action must be distinguished from their power, as actuality from that of which it is the actuality. Hence it is no wonder if motion is the action of such agents. In God, however, it is not possible to hold that his action is distinguished from his power; otherwise he would be constituted in act by something distinct from himself, and thus there would be something potential in him. And therefore the motion of a body moved by him cannot be his action, but is the effect and terminus of his action, which is his willing.

To the other point it is said that action names the complement of a power and is the perfection of the agent, at least by way of the end toward which, as was said above ⁸. But the effect is not the complement of a power nor the perfection of the agent; rather, through its agent it acquires its esse and its own perfection—although it can be called the end of the agent insofar as it holds from the action passing over into it. Now nothing extrinsic to God can be the complement of the divine power or a perfection of God; but it can well receive from God the complement of its esse and of its perfection.

5. To the second principal argument ⁹ it is said that Saint Thomas above took transitive action similitudinarily and according to the mode of signifying, but not properly. For the divine willing, insofar as an extrinsic effect follows from it externally, has a likeness to transitive action; and as such it is distinguished from immanent action by reason, inasmuch as through the immanent action, precisely as immanent, no extrinsic effect is produced.

VII. Seventh. No matter is proportionate to the divine action. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because every agent that in acting requires pre-existing matter has matter proportionate to its action, so that whatever is in the power of the agent may be entirely in the potency of the matter; otherwise that power would be in vain, since the agent could not produce whatever is in its power. — But the antecedent is proved: because divine power is simple and infinite. Now matter cannot receive any quantity whatsoever, as is said in Physics III; for it is not receptive of a greater quantity than the quantity of the heavens, whereas God can always produce a quantity infinitely greater, as will perhaps be shown below.

2. But this argument does not seem to conclude. For someone might say that an agent which requires matter need not have matter proportionate to itself, and yet the agent's power would not on that account be in vain. For as Saint Thomas says, I Sentences, d. XLIII ¹⁰, a. 1, ad 3, and On the Power of God, q. I, 2, ad 1, although no passive power adequately corresponding to the divine power exists, still the divine power is not said to be in vain.

To understand this, it must be considered that it is one thing with the power of agents that require pre-existing matter, and another with a power that does not presuppose matter. For agents that presuppose matter and can act only from matter lying ready to hand have their power ordered toward perfecting matter. Hence the perfection of matter is the end, at least the proximate end, of such an agent. And because what is ordered to an end in vain is that which does not attain it ¹¹, therefore, if matter were not receptive of the whole power of such an agent, that power would be in vain and empty, since the agent could not bring into act all that lies within its active power. But an agent that can act without presupposed matter is not, of itself, ordered to the perfecting of matter as to its end. Therefore, even if no matter is found receptive of the whole of its power, its power will not on that account be in vain. If, then, no proportionate matter corresponded to an agent acting upon presupposed matter, the power of that agent would be in vain. But God's power is not in vain, even though no adequate passive potency corresponds to it: because divine power does not act from pre-existing matter by necessity, but can produce each and every thing without any subject-matter pre-existing.

It must also be noted that Saint Thomas, from the fact that matter is not in potency to any quantity whatsoever, argues that matter has no proportion of adequation to God. For from the fact that matter is not naturally receptive of any quantity whatever, although quantity is an accident consequent upon matter, it can be held all the more that it is not in potency to other forms producible by divine power which cannot be received in matter, such as the intelligences.

VIII. Eighth: and it is a confirmation of the preceding argument. Things that are diverse have diverse matters. Therefore there is no matter that proportionally corresponds to the divine power. — The consequence is evident. For God is the universal cause of all esse. Therefore, if there is not one matter receptive of all esse, no matter is adequate to the divine power. — The antecedent, however, is proved. For it is clear that the matter of corporeal things and of spiritual things is not the same, nor that of heavenly bodies and corruptible ones: since to receive, which is proper to matter, is not of one and the same character in all.

It must be noted that under the name of matter there is not understood here prime matter, which is an essential part of material things, but everything receptive. For since it is proper to prime matter to be receptive of substantial form, therefore everything receptive of another form, as such, has the character of matter, taking matter in a broad sense. And because the things that receive are of diverse characters, just as receiving is diversified according to character, since it is one thing to receive an immaterial form and another to receive a substantial form, and the heavenly bodies receive a renewal of position but not a renewal of being; therefore matter is said to be of different kinds for different things.

It should also be noted that when he says the matter of the heavens does not receive an innovation of being but only an innovation of position, he is speaking of matter already existing. For thus, although according to faith the matter of the heavens received esse anew, because it was produced together with the form of the heavens, nevertheless, once it was brought into esse, it is not receptive of another esse, so that it could be said to receive an innovation of substantial being. But it does indeed receive an innovation of position according to the very parts of the heavens.

IX. Ninth, it is argued, even granting that there might be some matter proportionate to the divine action. If some matter is found to be proportionate to the divine action, God is the cause of that matter. Therefore etc. — The consequence is evident: because in producing that matter he has no need of matter. — But the antecedent is proved as follows. For among things between which there is any proportion and any order, either one of them is from the other, or both are from some third thing: for order must be established in one thing by its correspondence to another; otherwise that order and proportion would be a matter of chance, which cannot befit the first principles. Now God is neither from matter nor from any other cause, since he is the first being. Therefore etc.

It must be noted that those things are said to happen by chance which happen apart from the intention of some agent; therefore, if a proportion between certain things is not to be by chance, it must be intended by some cause. Now this cannot be unless either one causes the other, intending to produce for itself something proportionate to itself, or each is produced by some intending cause that intends to cause two things proportionate to one another. And Saint Thomas intimated this when he said that order in one must be constituted through correspondence to another: that is, order must be established per se by someone intending the proportion and order of one thing to another.

X. Tenth. Matter is being in potency. And God is the first and pure act ¹² Therefore He is simply prior to matter. Therefore God is the cause of matter. Therefore matter is not presupposed to His action by necessity. — The first consequence is proved: because act is prior not only to potency in nature, but also in time, speaking simply, since matter is not reduced to act except by a being in act. — The second is also proved: because what is first among beings is the cause of those things that are; otherwise they would not be ordered by Him among themselves, as was shown in the First Book ¹³

Eleventh. God is the cause of all things that are. Prime matter in some way is: for it is a being in potency. Therefore it has a cause of prime matter. Therefore the divine action does not of necessity require preexistent matter.

XI. It must be noted that Saint Thomas, wishing to prove that God produced things from no pre-existing matter, concludes in nearly all his arguments that his action does not require pre-existing matter as a matter of necessity: for the whole ground of the difficulty among the ancient philosophers was that they believed nothing could come to be except from pre-existing matter. Therefore, if it is shown that the divine action has no need of pre-existing matter, the point is sufficiently established, since that all things were produced by God was already proved ¹⁴, and hence that they were produced from no matter.

Finally, the conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Gen. 1: "In the beginning God created," etc.

Finally, from this it is shown that the opinion of the ancient philosophers is excluded, who, considering only particular agents, whose actions seemed always to have something pre-existing, judged that matter has no cause at all, and consequently that nothing comes from nothing. But this is not necessary in the universal cause of being.