Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

After the principle of the production of creatures has been settled, Saint Thomas determines, in the second place, concerning the term of that production ¹: so that, once the principle and the term are known, the production itself may be more easily understood.

I. And he posits this conclusion: Nothing besides God is except from him: that is, Nothing exists in the nature of things that was not produced by God.

It is proved first ². It is impossible that there be two things of which neither has a cause of its being: but it must be that either both of them are through a cause, or one is the cause of the other's being. Therefore, from that to which nothing is the cause of being, everything whatsoever exists in whatever way it exists. Therefore all things have their esse from God.

The first antecedent is proved. It is impossible for anything that is one of two things to be predicated in such a way that it is said of neither by reason of a cause: for either the one must be the cause of the other, as fire is the cause of heat in a mixed body; or some third thing must be the cause for both, as fire is the cause of shining for two candles. But esse is said of everything that is. Therefore, and so on. The major premise is proved. It is impossible for something to belong to two things according to what it itself is: because what belongs to something according to what it itself is does not exceed it, since it belongs to it convertibly ³; just as having three sides does not exceed triangle. Therefore, what belongs to many things cannot belong to neither of them by reason of a cause. The consequence is evident: because what belongs to something not according to what it itself is, belongs to it by some cause; for the opposite of the predicate entails the opposite of the subject; for what has no cause is first and immediate, and thus is per se and according to what it itself is.

The first consequence is evident. For from the opposite of the consequent the opposite of the antecedent is inferred. For it follows: Not everything that is from him is from that to which nothing is the cause of being; therefore there can be some two things of which neither has a cause of being: for since it and that other thing do not have a common cause of being, nor is one the cause of the other, each will be without a cause.

The second consequence is also manifest, since it was shown above that God is a being to which nothing is the cause of its esse.

This argument seems to be Plato's, as is said in Potentia, q. III, a. 5, for he held that before all multiplicity there was some unity.

2. But to this argument one might perhaps object that being is not said univocally. For from this it would seem that the subsumption in the argument is faulty. For when it was said, It is impossible for any one thing to be predicated of two things such that it is said of neither on account of a cause, this has truth only of a predicate taken univocally. Hence, if the subsumption is made, Esse is predicated of all things, it is said that esse is not predicated univocally. – But St. Thomas replies that, although it is not an univocal predicate, nevertheless it is not equivocal, but analogical: and for this reason, namely, a reduction to one must be made. For just as in univocal predicates per se in the second mode, all things of which that predicate is affirmed must be reduced to one thing to which it belongs first and through which it belongs to the others, so also in analogical predicates. For the first among analogates is that to which the analogue belongs first and through which it belongs to the others. Hence the major premise is true not only of an univocal predicate, but also of an analogical one.

3. It must be noted concerning the force of this argument that, although St. Thomas intends to prove that all things are effectively from God, from this argument it does not seem to follow that he is the effective cause of all things. For from the fact that something is such according to him—which is the foundation of this argument—it does not follow that he is the effective cause of other things being such. For it suffices that he be their formal cause: just as a triangle is the formal cause of why an isosceles triangle has three sides. But although it is not explicitly established that he is the effective cause, it is nevertheless established implicitly. For what belongs to some thing not according to itself must either have it effectively from that which has it according to itself, or from something that contains both eminently. Now what belongs to a thing by actual esse, distinct from its essence and not according to itself, must necessarily receive it from some cause. But esse is distinguished from the essence of a creature; nor can there be any higher cause for God, since he is the first cause and being of himself necessarily existing. Therefore it is necessary that other things have their esse from God himself even effectively.

II. For the clarification of that proposition, That which belongs to something not in virtue of itself belongs to it through some cause, it must be considered that, since certain predicates are essential, namely those of the first mode of per se predication ⁴, while others are not essential but pertain to the second mode of per se predication: in virtue of itself and not in virtue of itself are considered in both kinds of predicates. And it is universally true that whatever belongs to something not by its proper difference belongs to it formally through another cause distinct from the subject, whether it is distinguished from it really or according to reason. For if it belongs through some other subject to which it belongs first, standing to the former as an essential superior or inferior, then that cause is distinguished from the subject only by reason: as when we say that having three angles belongs to the isosceles and to the figure by reason of triangle. But if that to which it first belongs does not stand as superior or inferior to the subject, then such a cause is distinguished from the subject really: as when we say that heat belongs to all hot things through fire; for fire is really distinguished from them in its substance, although there is in them a certain participation of it, through which they participate in the property of fire. That proposition, then, is to be understood thus: What belongs to something not in virtue of itself belongs to it through some cause distinct from it either really or according to reason, according as the first subject is variously compared to the second.

2. Concerning that proposition, that what has no cause is first and immediate, it must be noted that the predicate "having no cause" is called first, because no other predicate prior to it belongs to the subject as its cause so as to be predicated of it. It is also called, for the same reason, immediate, because nothing mediates between it and the subject through which it would inhere in the subject.

3. Concerning the other proposition, That what is said of something in respect of itself does not exceed it, and is convertible with it ⁵, there is doubt. For in the proposition, esse belongs to God in respect of what He Himself is, and yet it exceeds Him, since it belongs also to other things that are not God. Therefore the proposition is false. And it seems that St. Thomas implies a contradiction in the argument.

It is answered that the predicate's not exceeding the subject can be understood in two ways. In the first way, the subject is taken formally and according to its proper account: just as having three sides is convertible with triangle and does not exceed it, because it belongs per se to nothing to which the account of triangle does not belong. — In the second way, the subject is taken either formally according to its proper account, or according to some participation of it. And thus esse does not exceed God: for everything to which esse belongs is either God or participates in His likeness; and esse belongs to no creature except insofar as it participates in some divine likeness.

Saint Thomas therefore understood in this second way that something belongs to a thing according as it does not exceed its subject: namely, because it belongs to no one unless it belongs to that subject either according to its proper ratio, or according to some participated likeness of it. For this reason he added that even in analogates there must be a reduction to one, namely, to that to which the thing belongs first and per se, and by whose participation the others are said to be such.

4. It must also be noted that some take from this passage that, according to St. Thomas, the mind of Aristotle in I Posteriorum ⁶ is not that per se and secundum quod ipsum are the same, but that they are related to each other as lower and higher: since he seems to wish that something could belong to several things per se, but not secundum quod ipsum. But, as we said in our annotations on I Posteriorum, even if it were granted that this is the mind of St. Thomas in this passage (which, however, is not established), per se and secundum quod ipsum are understood one way here and another way in I Posteriorum. For here a predicate is said to belong secundum quod ipsum when it belongs to a subject according to its proper and adequate reason, by which it differs from all other things, which is the differential reason: and this is the same as what belongs first. For thus secundum quod ipsum is lower than per se: for everything that belongs secundum quod ipsum belongs per se, but not conversely; just as risible belongs per se to Socrates, but not first, or not secundum quod ipsum. — There, however, according to the mind of Aristotle, as St. Thomas explains following his text, a predicate belonging secundum quod ipsum is taken for what belongs to something from some cause existing in the essence of the subject. For thus secundum quod ipsum is not the same as first, but is convertible with per se: for there too a predicate is said to be per se which has its cause in the subject, even though that cause is not the total and adequate reason of the subject.

III. Second, ⁷. God is being in the highest degree. Therefore He is the cause of all things of which being is predicated. — The antecedent was shown in the First Part. — The consequence is proved as follows: that thing is the cause of all things in a given genus to which the predication of that genus applies most fully; just as what is hottest is the cause of heat in all hot things, and what is most luminous is the cause of all luminous things.

He proves this proposition as follows. What belongs to something by its own nature cannot be diminished and deficient in it. Therefore what belongs to something less than to others does not belong to it by its own nature alone, but by another cause. Hence that to which it belongs most will be the cause of all things of that kind. — The antecedent is proved: because, if anything essential is subtracted from a nature or added to it, it will already be another nature, as is evident in numbers. — The first consequence is clear: because one argues from the opposite of the predicate to the opposite of the subject. — But the second consequence is manifest. Because what belongs deficiently to certain things, since it does not belong to them by nature alone but by another cause, cannot come to them from any other cause than from that in which it is found most and most perfectly, since every imperfect thing is reduced to the perfect.

To make evident that proposition, that what belongs to something from its nature and not from some cause cannot be diminished in it or deficient, we must attend to the fact that something is said to belong to something from its nature in two ways: either because it is the essence or a part of the essence; or because it follows upon the essential principles. At first sight Saint Thomas seems to take it in the first way: when he proves that proposition by the fact that, if anything is subtracted from a nature or added to it, there will already be another nature. But if one considers the end for which the said proposition is assumed, it will appear that it must also be taken in the second way. For not only what is essential, but also what follows precisely upon the nature of a thing and not from any other cause, cannot be deficient and diminished. And both follow from that proof of his. For if an essential predicate is at issue, it is certain that it can neither be increased nor diminished. And therefore if anything is found deficient or exceeding the essence of some thing, it will no longer be that essence. Likewise, if there is an accident falling short of what follows upon the essence of some thing, then that thing will no longer be the essence from which it flows completely, but another: because, once the total and complete cause is posited, the effect must necessarily be posited; especially when it results through a certain simple emanation. And so a defect of this kind results not from any defect of the essence of the thing, since that cannot be deficient, but from another extrinsic cause, by whose removal it is diminished. And therefore, since nothing can be added to or subtracted from an essence, if something belongs to another deficiently, it depends not on the essence of the thing precisely, but on another cause as well. For if it depended on the essence alone, its defect would result in a defect of the essence, which, as has been said, cannot be. Just as, if to be hot belongs to something deficiently, being hot is attributed not only to the essence of the thing, but also to fire, through whose participation it is hot: and because it participates little of the nature of fire, therefore it has little heat.

It must be noted, however, that Saint Thomas fittingly adds the exclusive term when he concludes: "Therefore, what belongs to one thing less than to others does not belong to it from its nature alone." For he does not wish to deny that something deficient and diminished can follow upon a nature: for some mixture may, from its own nature, possess but little heat. Rather, he wishes that in such a case another cause besides the nature itself must be found, by whose removal that quality is diminished; just as, beyond the nature of a mixture possessing little heat, we say that fire is the cause of that heat, which because the mixture participates in only slightly, it must have little heat.

IV. Third. Esse is common to all things. Therefore above all causes there is some first cause whose it is to give esse. But God is the first cause. Therefore, etc. The first consequence is proved: because causes must be proportioned to their effects, so that the causes of particular things are particular, while the causes of common things are common and universal causes. This is illustrated by an example concerning the sun and a king.

Enough has been said on the subject matter of this argument in Book One, Chapter V. ^[] Only one doubt arises, which must be resolved. For there are many particular effects that are reduced to a cause only in a universal way: as many things are produced by the sun alone; and many particular things by God alone, such as the intellectual soul, such as grace, and the like. Therefore effects need not be proportionate to their causes, in the manner stated.

It is answered that it is not the mind of St. Thomas, nor of Aristotle, from whom the said proposition is taken, that a particular effect cannot be produced immediately by a universal cause; for there are many particular effects, as was argued, which are produced by the universal cause alone. Rather, the point is that where, among particular effects produced by a particular and a universal cause, something is found proper to that effect and something common to it and to others, what is proper is referred to its own proper and particular cause, while what is common is referred to the common cause; and thus effects are proportioned to their causes.

It is said second, that even where a particular effect is produced by a universal cause, there is a proportion between cause and effect: inasmuch as the universal cause produces such an effect by a power contained in itself which is adequate to that effect, although that power is identified in it with the power of another productive thing. For we can distinguish in such a universal cause various powers according to reason, productive of different effects.

V. Fourth. God is a being through his essence, while other things are so through participation: because God is ipsum esse. But such a thing is one only, as was shown in the First Book. Therefore etc. — The consequence is evident. For what is such through its essence is the cause of all things that are said to be such through participation.

The foundation of this argument was seen in the First Part, Chapter II.^[] Here it must only be noted that esse per essentiam is taken in this place for that which is esse wholly identical with the essence and entity of the predicate; whereas esse per participationem is to have the predicate in oneself in some way, but not to be its essence wholly, indeed rather to have something else by which one is limited. It is not taken, however, insofar as being ens per essentiam is the same as being most perfect and infinite: as Scotus takes it, dist. VIII of the First Book, q. 1, part 2, ad 2 ⁸ where he says that something is said to be by participation because it is a part with respect to that which is naturally infinite, just as everything lesser is said to be a part.

Fifth. Every possible being must ultimately be reduced, as to its cause, to something that is necessary. And every necessary being that has a cause must necessarily be reduced to some necessary being that does not have a cause of its necessity. But this is God alone. Therefore, etc. — Saint Thomas touched upon this argument also in the First Book of the Summa contra Gentiles, chapter 15. See there.

Sixth. God is virtually all things. Therefore He is the maker of all things. Therefore He is the cause of all things. — The antecedent is proved: because He is the maker of things insofar as He is in act. But in His actuality He contains the perfections of all things. Therefore, etc. — The first inference is evident. — The second, however, is proved: because if anything were of itself apt to be and not from God Himself, He would not be the maker of all things. For it cannot be said that something is apt to be from another, and thus that God is said to be productive of its esse, and yet also apt to be not from another. For if something is apt to be not from another, it is of itself necessary being. But such a thing cannot be from another. Therefore the same thing cannot be apt to be from another and apt to be not from another. And thus it follows that these do not stand together: that anything can be not from God, and that God is the maker of all things.

To make this proposition evident, If anything is by nature not from another in its being, it is of itself necessary in esse, it must be noted that that is said to be necessary in esse through itself which needs nothing else in order to be. But this belongs to what is by nature such as to be not from another: for if it can be, and not from another, then in order to be it does not need another. Therefore everything of this kind is necessary in esse through itself.

Seventh. God is the most perfect being and the highest good. Therefore He is the cause of being for all things, especially since such a being cannot be other than one. — The consequence is proved. Because imperfect things take their origin from perfect ones, as seed from an animal.

Note that this is why Saint Thomas added, especially since such a being cannot be other than one: because if there were several most perfect beings, supremely good, someone could say that one of them need not be the cause of all, but it would suffice for those supremely good beings to be the cause of esse in others. But if we posit only one as supremely good, this cavil will have no place.

Concerning that proposition, Imperfect things take their origin from perfect things, it must be noted that it holds true according to the order of the efficient cause, and in this sense Saint Thomas understands it. According to the order of the material cause and of the way of generation, however, it is the reverse: for everything that proceeds from potency to act arrives first at imperfect esse before arriving at perfect esse.

The conclusion is finally confirmed by the authority of the Psalm, "Who made heaven and earth," etc.; and John I, "All things through him," etc.; and Romans XI, "From whom are all things," etc.

By this are excluded the errors of those who say that certain bodies have no cause of their esse, and of those who say that God is not the cause of the substance of the heavens, but only of their motion.

VI. Concerning the last error, passing over the many arguments by which it is proved, according to the correct understanding of the mind of Aristotle and of the Commentator, that heaven in its substance was produced by the first cause, there arises for the confirmation of that error a doubt from Book I of the Heavens ⁹. For from Aristotle's argument there it follows that everything generated is corruptible and can not-be. But nothing perpetual and incorruptible can not-be. Therefore nothing perpetual and incorruptible is generated. Heaven is of this kind. Therefore etc.

If it is said that what is perpetual cannot not-be by an intrinsic power, but can well be so by an extrinsic power: against this. For Aristotle's proposition, taken as the minor, is universally true in his own view. This is evident from the fact that he posits being always and not being always as contradictorily opposed; and that it cannot belong to the same thing to have the possibility of being always and the possibility of not being always, that is, the possibility of at some time not being, which is the same thing. But what is perpetual has the possibility of being always. Therefore it can in no way belong to it that it might at some time not be. Therefore, in no way, according to Aristotle, is the heaven generated or made.

It is confirmed. For the Commentator, in the same place, in commentary 124, says that it is known per se that that which is possible from without is possible of itself. Therefore, if what is everlasting can not-be by an extrinsic power, it will be able not to be also by an intrinsic power. You say Aristotle intends the opposite of this.

VII. The first reply is that Aristotle's argument was directed to proving that the perpetual is not generated in time. Saint Thomas, however, does not say here that the heavens were made in time, but that they were made absolutely, whether they were made in time or from eternity.

It is said secondly that the response given, as is well proved, is not to the mind of Aristotle according to those who hold that his mind was that God acts by necessity of nature. For, since he holds God to act by necessity of nature, those things which are perpetually produced by God from eternity cannot cease to be through the withdrawal of the divine influx: for just as God could not fail to produce them, so he cannot withdraw his influx. To the greater argument, therefore, it is answered that Aristotle's mind is that everything generated and made in time is corruptible both from without and of itself: for this he said against Plato, who held that the heavenly bodies are corruptible of themselves but incorruptible from without ¹⁰; and he spoke of what is made and generated through transmutation. Hence, granting the lesser proposition in this sense, namely, that nothing perpetual can cease to be through transmutation, it is conceded that nothing perpetual is made through transmutation, nor is made in time, nor even the heaven. But this intention of Aristotle does not oppose the conclusion of Saint Thomas. For we do not hold that the heaven was made through transmutation of some matter, but through simple emanation. Nor does Saint Thomas intend in this place to prove that all things are from God in time: but absolutely that all things have esse from him.

In confirmation from the words of the Commentator, it is said in the same way.

VIII. But it seems that this reply does not satisfy. For Aristotle takes "generated" and "corruptible" insofar as they are opposed to "ungenerated" and "incorruptible," which he says are mutually convertible. Now it is clear that, according to him, the ungenerated is said to be what has in no way begun to be, and of which it cannot be said that it now is and previously was not; while the incorruptible is said to be what can in no way cease to be, and of which it cannot be said that it now is and will not be hereafter. Therefore, according to him, the generated likewise is said to be what begins to be, however it may have begun; and the corruptible, what will at some time cease to be, however this may come about.

It is answered that these terms are certainly to be understood in the sense of Aristotle. Yet, because the ancient theologizing poets, against whom he was arguing, and Plato, whose words he seemed to be citing in the Timaeus ¹¹, while wishing that the order of the universe had been made from unordered elements, posited only production and cessation of the kind that occurs through transmutation; therefore for them it was one and the same thing in no way to begin to be, and not to begin to be through transmutation; and likewise, to begin to be absolutely, and to begin to be through transmutation; and in the same way concerning cessation. Hence the Philosopher argues against them that nothing generated can be incorruptible; because, according to their position, everything generated must be corruptible through transmutation, just as it begins to be through transmutation; and if it does not begin to be through generation, then in no way does it begin to be. But according to the truth, and according to the opinion of Aristotle himself, something can be made by simple emanation and be incorruptible from within, as having no principle of corruption in itself: as is clear in the case of the intellective soul and the intelligences, if they are held, in the sense of Aristotle, to be produced by God effectively. — This is as regards the mind of Aristotle, of which there will also be discussion below, chapter LXXXI.

IX. As for the propositions in themselves, it is said to the major premise that, if the terms are taken proportionally, it is true. For if "generated" or "made" is taken as that which is produced by transmutation, and likewise "corruptible" and "able not to be" by transmutation, then everything made is able not to be. Likewise, if "made" is taken as made by simple emanation, and "able not to be" likewise as able not to be through simple action or through the subtraction of a conserving action, then everything made is able not to be. But if "made" is taken as made by simple emanation, and "able not to be" as able not to be by transmutation or by an intrinsic potency, the proposition is false.

Likewise, to the minor it is said that nothing perpetual can cease to be through an intrinsic power or through transmutation. But something can indeed cease to be through an extrinsic power and a simple action annihilating it, or through the withdrawal of the conserving action.

But when it is argued that the same thing cannot be both possible always to be and possible at some time not to be, the reply is that this is true in the same respect. Yet that something be possible always to be by an intrinsic power, and possible at some time not to be by an extrinsic power, is not inconsistent.

See the rest in Capreolus, II Sent., d. 1, q. 11; and from others on Metaphysics XII.