Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

The second conclusion is ¹: The aforesaid relations are not existent externally, as if they were certain things outside God. Concerning this, Saint Thomas does three things: first, he proves the conclusion; second, he infers two corollaries, both from this conclusion itself and from the preceding one ²; third, he removes a certain doubt ³.

I. It is proved, therefore, first. Because otherwise real relations in God to something extrinsic would have to proceed to infinity. — The consequence is proved. Because God is the first being and the highest good with respect to all extrinsic entity. If, therefore, the relations by which He is referred to other things as first being and highest good are things existing outside God, it is necessary that by other relations He be referred to those extrinsic relations: and so on to infinity.

To this argument someone might reply that, although God is referred to things by some relation, still no other relation is referred to that relation itself.

But this is nothing to say. For if real relations are posited outside God as having esse, as though they were beings distinct from God, then with respect to those relations He is the first being and the highest good just as with respect to other things. Therefore it is necessary that He be referred to them by other real extrinsic relations, if to other things, as the first being and the highest good, He is referred by such relations. For when the relation by which something is referred to another is intrinsic to that thing, that thing is not referred to the relation by another relation; but it is indeed so referred if the relation is posited as extrinsic, in the manner stated, because an extrinsic relation toward God has a comparison with other beings similar to itself; for the comparison of the first being and the highest good is the same toward all things extrinsic to God.

II. Second. From a relation it is not found that anything is denominated by an extrinsic denomination, but only by an intrinsic one: for no one is a father by paternity existing in another; and so with the rest. Therefore, etc.

It must be noted that the antecedent of this argument can be understood in two ways. First, of the relation imported by the name by which something is denominatively predicated relatively. For thus it is evident that, when we say that someone is a father, the paternity imported by the name "father" is in him who is called father; and when someone is called lord, the relation imported by this name "lord" is in him, and not in another. And it is universally true that nothing is denominatively predicated relatively by a relation imported by the name by which it is denominated, existing in another. This meaning Saint Thomas seems to intend, if his words are carefully considered.

Second, it can be understood universally and absolutely that nothing is denominated extrinsically by any relation, whatever name it is imported under. And then it is understood that by an extrinsic relation alone no formally relative denomination occurs. Yet something can indeed be denominated causally by it, with the opposite relation co-understood in the thing denominated, from which the denomination is made formally: as was said in the preceding discussion ⁴ concerning the mind of St. Thomas. For if the extrinsic relation alone is considered, nothing is said of something by it formally relative, although something can be said of it terminatively real by the relation: just as from a real coercive power existing in someone, someone is said to be really lord fundamentally, but not formally relative.

III. As to the second point ⁵, two corollaries are set down. The first is: Relations of this kind are attributed to God according to reason. It is proved: they are not really in God, nor really outside God; therefore they are attributed to him according to reason. This, however, occurs when the intellect, in understanding one thing as referred to another, co-understands that thing's relation to it, even though in reality it may sometimes not be so referred. Enough has been said about these matters in the preceding ⁶.

The second way: the aforesaid relations are said of God in one manner, and other things predicated of God in another. This is evident, because the others, such as wisdom, will, and the like, express His essence; but these do not, since they are attributed to Him only through the intellect — understand this with respect to the relations imported, as St. Thomas explains in the Prima, q. XIII, a. 7, ad 1.

IV. As to the third ⁷, the doubt is removed. For someone might press the point: These relations are not something in God. And yet the intellect attributes them to itself. Therefore it is false.

It is answered that the intellect is not on this account false: because, from the fact that it understands the relations of the divine effects to be terminated in God himself, it predicates something of him relatively, just as it does of the knowable.

The sense of this reply is that the intellect does not attribute these respects to God as if it judged or said that they exist outside the intellect (for in that case it would undoubtedly be false, since it would understand a thing to be otherwise than it is); but because, from apprehending that God terminates the relation of things to himself, it forms some concept of him in order to creatures, and attributes that concept to God. Now this can happen without falsity. For things that are absolute, the intellect can compare to other things and thus conceive relatively: just as, when it compares the nature of animal to the species of animals, it attributes to it the intention of genus; and similarly with other things. For thus it apprehends an absolute nature, but with a certain order to another thing: which is to conceive an absolute thing relatively.

⁸ V. In the third place, the question concerns the multitude of relations. And this conclusion is put forward: The divine simplicity is not derogated from if many relations are said of God, even though they do not signify his essence, because they follow the mode of understanding.

Note that it has been added, although they do not signify his essence on account of the divine attributes, whose multiplicity was said in the First Book ⁹ not to detract from the divine simplicity, because they posit no composition in God, since they all signify the divine essence. For from the fact that these relations are not the divine essence itself, someone might judge that their multitude detracts from the divine simplicity. Therefore, removing this, Saint Thomas added that, although the relative names do not signify the divine essence, still their multitude said of God does not detract from the divine simplicity: because these relations posit nothing in God such as to make composition in him, but they follow upon a mode of understanding.

From this he argues to the conclusion. Nothing prevents our intellect from understanding many things as multiply referred to that which is in itself simple. Therefore a plurality of relations consequent upon the mode of understanding, such as the said relations are, does not detract from simplicity. — The consequence is proved. Because, in understanding thus, our intellect considers the simple being itself even under a multiple relation. For when it apprehends some simple thing as terminating the relation of many, it apprehends the simple thing together with opposite relations: for it was said above ¹⁰ that the terminus of a relation must have in itself an opposite relation, either really or according to reason.

For the manifestation of the antecedent, it is noted that, * the more simple a thing is, the greater its power, and the principle of more things, and hence it is understood as related to more things*. But this is true either simply, or within its own genus. For the point has greater power only among those things that pertain to quantity, and is the principle of many things, in the way in which power can exist in quantity, taking power in a broad sense, according as mathematicians imagine that the point by its flow causes the line, and so successively with the other quantities. But it is not of greater power than a man is, although it is simpler than a man. Therefore the proposition of St. Thomas is to be understood thus: the more simple a thing is in some genus, the more powerful it is among all things of that order, because all things are contained virtually in its principles. And so, since God is the simplest among beings, He is of the greatest power among all things and the principle of infinite things.

From these things he concludes that not only does it not detract from the divine simplicity that many things are said of God relatively; rather, it bears witness to his supreme simplicity.