Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

Since it has been shown that something relative to creatures is said of God, there remains to inquire what esse such relations said of God have ¹. On this point Saint Thomas sets down two conclusions: the first in the present chapter; the second in the following one.

I. The first conclusion is: The relations of God to his effects cannot really exist in God. It is proved first. They cannot exist in him as accidents, since in him there is no accident. — Nor as the substance of God. For the substance of God would be said to be this very thing that is toward another, as is clear from Aristotle's Categories. And thus it would depend on something extrinsic. For what is said to be this very thing that is toward another depends on it, since it can neither be nor be understood without it. And consequently it would not be a being of necessary esse.

But this argument seems not to conclude. For by it one would likewise prove that no personal relation in God is really identical with the divine essence. Because, since the esse of a relation is to be ordered toward another, if the relation were identical with the essence, God would have to be, in respect of that by which he is ordered toward another. And thus he would not be a being whose esse is necessary of itself.

It is answered that the argument would not proceed in the same way concerning the personal relations as it proceeds concerning relations to creatures. For in these latter, the relation is terminated at something altogether extraneous to the divine nature. Therefore, if the divine essence were such a relation, it would depend upon something extraneous, and thus would not be God of necessary being through himself; for that which is of itself necessary being does not depend in its existence upon anything extraneous. But the personal relations are not terminated at something extrinsic to the divine essence, but at a person who is identical with the divine essence, which is also the essence of another person. Now it does not conflict with that which is necessary being through itself to be referred to something which is identical with it in substance, and thus to depend upon it in such a way that it could not be without it. For God cannot be without the persons, nor can one person be without another.

II. Second. As the knowable is related to our knowledge, so is God to created things: for, just as the knowable is the measure of knowledge, so God is the measure of all beings, as was shown in the First Part. But the knowable is not referred to knowledge by a real relation existing in it, as is clear in Book V of the Metaphysics. Therefore neither is God referred to the creature.

How what is knowable is referred, and concerning other things in which the real relation exists in only one extreme, was determined in the preceding chapter ² And it was shown how the words of Aristotle are to be understood.

Third ³. Relations of this kind are said to hold not only with respect to things that are in act, but also with respect to things that are in potency: for He has knowledge even of things that are in potency, and with respect to them He is the first being and the highest good. But there is no real relation from what is in act to what is in potency: otherwise infinitely many relations would be in act in the same thing; for two is prior to infinitely many numbers greater than itself, which are in potency. Therefore God is not referred to creatures that are in act by any real relation. — The consequence is proved: because God is not referred to things that are in act any differently than to things that are in potency.

III. Concerning this proposition, There is no real relation from what is in act to what is in potency, it must be noted, according to the teaching of St. Thomas in Potentia, q. VII, a. 11, that a real relation is an order of a thing to a thing outside the intellect, such that, with no intellect considering them, those things have such an order among themselves. But for certain things to have such an order among themselves, it is necessary that each be a being in act. For just as other accidental forms do not belong in act except to existing things, so the order intermediate between certain things does not belong to them really unless they exist. For what is really referred is really referred because it has some real form in itself to which such an order follows; and likewise what terminates an order of this kind terminates it by reason of some real form inhering in it, as is evident by running through all the modes of relatives. Therefore, since a being in potency does not have existence in act, there is no real relation from a being in act to a being in potency.

2. But if it is objected that something is really an image of a non-existent thing, and a memory, and productive, and the like, which are said relatively to non-being, as Gregory argues in Book I of the Sentences, at Capreolus, distinction 30 ⁴: — the answer is given, and stated first, that something is said to be really productive of something, or its image or memory, not on account of a real relation existing in them, but on account of their real entity relatively conceived. For names importing relation are very often predicated according to reason of things existing outside the soul, because they signify an absolute thing by means of a relative concept. Nor is it unfitting that something absolute in itself be conceived by the intellect in reference to another and understood comparatively, and thus, by means of such a concept, be signified by some relative name.

It is said secondly that, if one were to argue thus: Image belongs to something really. And it is a relative. Therefore it is relative really, the fallacy of composition and division is committed. For being relative does not determine this thing that is belonging really, nor conversely, so as to allow one to infer the conjoined from the divided terms: for belonging really to something is not attributed to image insofar as it is relative, but insofar as it imports something absolute and real, even though under a relative concept it signifies that.

IV. Concerning that proposition, God is not related differently to things that are in act than to things that are in potency, it must be considered that the reason why something was previously related only according to a relation of reason, but afterward also really, is that some change occurs in the thing, by which another mode of relation becomes fitting to it: thus Socrates, insofar as he was generative of Plato, was related by a relation of reason to Plato not yet existing; but after he begot him, he is related to him really, because he has been changed from an agent in potency to an agent in act. But if no change had occurred in Socrates, at least from rest to work, there would have been no change in the mode of the relation. For a new relation can come to something in some way without its being changed, as is said in Book V of the Physics ⁵. Yet the same thing cannot first be referred to the same thing by a relation of reason and afterward by a real relation unless from something coming to it that was not previously present in it. Now God is in no way changed, even from rest to operation: for his operation is his substance. Therefore he is not related differently to things while they are in act than he was related while they were in potency. Hence Saint Thomas adduces as the reason for the said proposition: because he is not changed by the fact that he produces something.

V. Concerning that consequence, if what is in act is referred really to what is in potency, there would be infinite relations in act in the same thing, as in the number two with respect to numbers, a doubt is raised. For according to Saint Thomas, Third Part, question 35, article 5, and Book III of the Sentences, distinction 8, article 5, the unity and plurality of a relation is not considered according to the terms, but according to the cause and the subject. Therefore, however infinite may be the numbers to which two is prior, it is not necessary that there be infinite relations in it, but by a single real relation it could be referred to all of them: just as one who teaches philosophy is related by a single relation to all whom he teaches philosophy.

It is answered that the unity and plurality of a relation is indeed not considered according to the unity or plurality of the material terms, but it is well considered according to the unity and plurality of the formal, to which the unity or plurality of the foundation corresponds. Hence, in the places cited above, St. Thomas holds that if the same teacher teaches some grammar and others philosophy, he is referred by one relation to all his students of grammar, and by another to the students of philosophy: for there is there a twofold formal term, inasmuch as those are students of grammar, and these of philosophy. Therefore in the case at hand, since the number two is referred to all other numbers as to formal terms, but not as to material ones—since one number is double the number two, another triple, another quadruple, and so on to infinity—and consequently the number two is prior to that number as its half, to that other as its third, and so is referred by one and another ratio of proportion to different numbers, and there are in it diverse foundations formally: if all these were real relations, there would have to be infinitely many real relations actually in the number two.

2. But if it were further urged that this is not absurd for those who hold that a relation is not really distinct from its foundation—for they would say that, just as it is not absurd for one and the same whiteness to be a likeness with respect to another white thing and an unlikeness with respect to something black, so it is not absurd for one binary to contain infinitely many real relations distinct only according to reason; for thus infinity in act according to number is not posited, since there are not there many really distinct things, but only one entity, ordered of itself toward infinite terms and distinct according to reason: — those holding that opinion would perhaps answer that for Saint Thomas it is absurd that in one being there should be infinitely many specific relations distinguished by reason alone, while nevertheless possessing outside the intellect whatever pertains to the reason and essence of each relation; for it is proper to the divine essence to contain infinitely many things in this way within one simple essence.

3. From these points the solution of a certain doubt in the doctrine of St. Thomas becomes clear: namely, how the son is referred to the father and mother by a single relation, while they are referred to him by two really distinct relations specifically, namely paternity and maternity—since, according to St. Thomas in Prima, q. 32, a. 2, a single relation cannot correspond to two relations specifically distinct. — For it is said, in accordance with what has been stated above, that in the son there is one relation materially, just as the foundation of filiation in him is materially one; but there are two relations formally, just as the foundations too are formally several. For as the father and the mother are the principle of the generation of the son by different rationes, so also the son receives nature from the father by one ratio and from the mother by another. And therefore, although by one name, namely filiation, both the relation of the son to the father and his relation to the mother are signified, yet there are several filiations in the ratio of relation, though they are one in the ratio of the thing. Hence what St. Thomas says—that to two relations specifically distinct a single relation cannot correspond ex opposito—is understood of the formal unity of the relation, or of its unity in the ratio of relation; not however of its material unity, or unity in the ratio of the thing. That this is indeed the mind of St. Thomas is clear from what he says in the place cited from the Third Part, in reply to the last argument.

VI. Fourth ⁶. If they were really in God, God would have to be changed, either per se or per accidens. But the opposite of this was shown in the First. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because certain relations come to him anew. But whatever comes to anything anew must be changed, either per se or per accidens.

But the proof of this consequence does not seem to be effective. For if the major is taken universally, so that "something" extends to the absolute and the relative, it is false. For, as is said in Physics V ⁷, a relation comes to someone anew not through a change of the subject, but through a change of another: just as, without my being changed, I begin to be similar to someone because of his change, by which he acquires the same quality that I have. — But if it is taken in absolutes, it is indeed true, yet then the fallacy of figure of speech is committed, by arguing thus: Whatever has something happen to it anew is changed; but some relation comes to God anew; therefore He is changed: for the relative is subsumed under the absolute.

It is answered that the major proposition is universally true. And it is understood that whatever comes to something really, whether according to entity, changes it. For since to be changed is nothing other than to be otherwise now than before; and that to which something real arrives anew is otherwise than before: necessarily, that to which something real arrives anew is changed.

When it is urged that, according to the Philosopher, a relation comes to something without any change in it, and he is speaking of a real relation — the reply is given that he speaks of a real relation with respect to the completion of its intelligible character, but not with respect to its entity. For it sometimes happens that a relation is in something as regards its entity, yet does not have the complete character of a relation, because its term does not co-exist; but once the term comes into being, it begins to have the complete character of a relation, and this occurs without any change in the thing to which it thus comes. But a relation that newly comes to God, if it were real, would come to him as regards its entity: for in an eternal thing there is nothing real from eternity by which it would be ordered to a temporal thing and depend on it of itself. — Thus, I think, would those reply who hold that the relation is not distinct from its foundation.

But according to those who hold that it is distinguished from its foundation, it would be said that a relation does not come to be entirely and by reason of the foundation anew without a change in the subject; rather, when the foundation preexists, it can indeed come to be completively without a change in the subject, through a certain natural resultant. But if the relations that come to be anew in God were real, they would have to come to be anew not only completively but entirely and as regards the foundation: for where the foundation of a real relation exists without the relation, it seems to possess a certain imperfection, because something real is naturally meant to emanate from it intrinsically, which does not emanate on account of the lack of a formal term; and in an eternal reality there cannot be anything of this sort involving imperfection. Therefore, through the advent of a new relation some change would have to occur in God.