Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

After Saint Thomas determined concerning the power of God, he consequently determines concerning the divine relations to creatures ¹. Concerning this, however, he does three things: first, indeed, he treats of these relations themselves with respect to their predication; second, with respect to their esse, chapter XII; third, with respect to their multitude, chapter XIV ². I. With respect to the first, the conclusion is set down: Something is said of God relatively with respect to His effects, that is:

Some name importing a relation to creatures is fittingly attributed to God.

It is proved. First, because power belongs to God, as has been shown. Now power signifies the relation of a principle to what is principled. — Second, because creatures are said to be related to God. But something cannot be understood to be said relatively to another unless, conversely, that other is said relatively to it. — Third, because God acts in a manner like Himself. Now likeness is a relation. — Fourth, because He has knowledge of other things. Now knowledge is referred to the knowable. — Fifth, because He is mover and agent, which are said relatively to motion and to what is made. — Sixth, because He is the first and highest good. These terms signify a relation.

It must be noted that, although "first" is sometimes said negatively, as in Scripture where it is said of the firstborn before whom none is begotten ³; yet sometimes it is also said relatively, so that something is called first because it precedes all other things according to some order. In the second sense Saint Thomas takes "first" in this passage, but not in the first.

II. There arises, however, a doubt concerning this proposition assumed in the second argument: Nothing can be understood to be said relatively to another unless, conversely, that other is said relatively to it. For Saint Thomas seems to hold that in every term of a relation a relation must be posited; and thus there would also be in God a relation to the creature, because the creature terminates the relation. For it is argued against this in several ways ⁴.

First, because, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics V, the chapter on "to something" ⁵, relatives are said to be relative to something in a third way when one is referred to the other but not conversely. Now relations between God and creature belong to this third mode. Therefore, although the creature is referred to God, it is not necessary that God be referred to the creature, as though its relation were terminated by the creature.

Second. Act is prior to potency because potency is defined through act, as is said in Metaphysics IX ⁶ But act does not define potency except insofar as it is its terminus. Therefore, insofar as it is its terminus, it is prior to potency. But it is not prior as a correlative, but only as an absolute. Therefore it is not a terminus as a correlative, but as an absolute. Therefore, from the fact that something is a terminus, it does not follow that it must be said relatively.

Third. The relative, as relative, is first defined through a term. Therefore the term, as term, is prior in definition to the relative itself. The consequence is clear from Metaphysics VII ⁷, where substance is posited as prior in definition to accident because accident is defined through substance. Therefore relation is not required in the term as it is a term.

Fourth. With no intellect considering, science is referred to the knowable, and likewise the creature to God. But a relation of reason does not remain once the operation of the intellect is removed, since it has esse only in the intellect. Therefore a relation of reason in the knowable and in God was not the ground for terminating the relation of science and of the creature.

It would also be a matter of doubt how God is said to be similar to the creature in the third way. But enough has been said about this in the First Part, chapter 29.

III. For the clarification of this doubt, it must be considered that Scotus, in the First Book, distinction 30, question 1, on account of the arguments adduced, holds that because of the termination of the relations of creatures from time to God, there is no need to posit any relation in God, neither a new one nor an old one. The opposite of this, both here and elsewhere, seems to be held by Saint Thomas. ⁸

2. Some Thomists, however, holding that God must be said relatively if He is to terminate the relation of the creature, are divided into two opinions. For some hold that the terminus of a relation would never terminate it unless there belonged to it some relation of thing or of reason; but they say that a relation is not itself the formal ground of terminating, but that the absolute itself, by reason of its absoluteness, terminates.

3. Others, however, say two things ⁹. The first is that a term does not terminate by reason of the absolute, but by reason of relation: since it terminates as a correlative.

According to ¹⁰, in relatives of the first two modes ¹¹ the relation terminates the ratio of the relation existing in the subject itself; but in relatives of the third mode it terminates the ratio of the relation existing in the other extreme, by which the subject is extrinsically denominated in real relative esse.

They prove their position: first, because if the term of a relation were an absolute, the double would not be said of the half, nor the servant of the lord; and they say the expositors state the opposite. — Second, because in the definition of a creature God would have to fall under its proper absolute ratio. — Third, because a relative necessarily requires in its definition the correlative as that to which it is said. And thus there would be no reason why it should require an absolute. — Fourth, because in God the relations ad intra could not be saved unless one posited that the Persons are really distinguished according to absolutes.

IV. But it seems to me that the answer must be that the terminus of a relative can be considered in two ways: in one way, absolutely, as that to which the relative is said; in another way, as it is conceived by us after the manner of a term defining the relative. If it is considered in the first way, then in relatives of the first and second modes there must be a relation on the side of the terminus: because in the terminus there is the same ratio and cause of the relation as is found in the relative terminated to that terminus. In relatives of the third mode, however, there need not be a real relation on the side of the terminus: since in it there is no cause of any relation to the relative that is terminated to it. On account of which it is said in Metaphysics V ¹² that in this genus one extreme is said relatively, not because it is said of another, but because another is said of it. Hence in the one there is only a relation of reason, although in the other there is a real relation. Now it is clear that a relation of reason does not exist actually in the thing, with no intellect considering it: and yet, with no intellect considering it, that extreme is that to which another real relative is said. Therefore we must say that in such a case the terminus, in which there is no real relation, terminates by reason of something absolute only, and not by reason of any relation existing in it either according to the thing or according to reason.

But it is clear that this is the mind of St. Thomas, Potentia, q. 7, a. 10, ad 4, where he holds that, since the name "lord" imports three things—namely, the power of coercing subjects, an order to subjects, and the termination of the order of subjects to the lord—the signification of this name is found in God not as regards the order to subjects, but as regards the power of coercing and as regards the termination of the order of subjects to the lord. From this it appears that he wishes God to terminate the relation of the creature to himself without any order of himself to the creature. — Nor does it avail to say that he terminates only fundamentally, but not formally. For according to this consideration, to terminate formally is to be that to which a relative is said; but it is evident, according to these words of St. Thomas, that the creature is said to God even with no order of God to the creature posited, since this befits him even with no intellect considering it.

2. But if the term is considered in the second way, then relation must be posited in the term in every mode of relatives: in the first and second modes, indeed, a real relation; but in the third mode, a relation according to reason. For we cannot understand or conceive anything under the aspect of a term defining the relative unless we apprehend it together with a certain order toward that relative itself. And this is what St. Thomas understood in this passage when he said that something cannot be understood to be said relatively to another unless conversely that other be said relatively to it; and in 1 Sent., d. xxx, a. 3, when he said that our intellect cannot take something as said relatively to another unless it understands it under the opposite respect.

3. The arguments for the second opinion of the Thomists ¹³, except the fourth, prove this according to what was said above. But they do not prove anything against the first dictum, as is sufficiently clear. For the first proceeds concerning relatives of the first and second mode, in which we concede that relation is contained in the term. — To the second, however, the consequence is denied. For although God is an absolute term with respect to his absolute being, he does not define a relative except as it is conceived together with an opposite habitude. — To the third it is similarly said that it proves that a term, as a concept in the manner of a defining term, includes relation. This we certainly concede. — To the fourth, the consequence is denied. For when we say that a relative is terminated to something absolute, we understand this unless the relation itself is a subsisting supposit, as is the case in the divine personal relations. For then the relation and the one having the relation are the same. Therefore the term of the relative is formally relative.

V. It must be considered further that, according to what was said of the aforementioned opinion, ¹⁴ it in no way seems to be the mind of St. Thomas. For this opinion holds that God, with no intellect considering him, is said relatively by reason of a relation existing in the creature; and that it is proper to relatives of the third mode that something be said to be really relative on account of a relation existing really in the other extreme; and, since the terminus of a relative is its correlative, it holds that God is the terminus by reason of a relation existing in the creature. For against this St. Thomas expressly states below, chapter XIII, where he says that nothing is found to be denominated from a relation existing externally, but from one inhering: and he is speaking of those relations by which God is referred to creatures. — Nor does it avail to say that this is the mind of St. Thomas: namely, that something cannot be formally denominated from an extrinsic relation, so that by means of it something would be said to be formally relative, but that something can indeed be denominated really from it, so as to be relative secundum rem. For, according to the determination of the proponent of this opinion himself, the terminus of a relative must be relative not only materially but also formally; otherwise it would not answer to the purpose. But, with no intellect considering, God, according to him, terminates the creature's relation precisely as relative. Therefore, if he is not relative except through the creature's relation, he must hold that God is said relatively formally, and not merely really, from a relation existing externally. The opposite of this St. Thomas says, even according to his own exposition.

2. But the author of this opinion seems to have been deceived by a bad understanding of the words of St. Thomas in the First Part, in the place cited above ¹⁵, ad 4, where it is said that God is said relatively with respect to the creature because the creature is referred to him, just as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics V concerning the knowable with respect to knowledge. For he understands these words as if St. Thomas wished to say that the very relation of the creature to God, precisely taken, is the whole reason why God is said Lord of the creature or Creator relative really, so that nothing else is required on the part of the relation for God to be called Lord, although power to coerce is required on the part of God; when nevertheless he says in the same place that it is not unfitting for God to be denominated from relations existing really in the thing, yet according as the opposite relations in God are co-understood by our intellect. From which it is given to be understood that indeed the relations of creatures are the cause of the denomination, but that the denominating form is the relation of reason co-understood with the relation of the creature; and that, once the operation of the intellect by which the relation of reason is attributed to God is removed, God cannot be denominated formally relative by that relation of the creature.

I understand the words of St. Thomas, however, in this way: that God is said to be relative with respect to the creature because the creature is referred to him; that is, he has from the fact that he terminates the creature's relation to himself, so that he is conceived together with an opposite relation of reason to it, and thus is said to be relative. Not, however, that he is formally denominated by the relation of the creature: for the relation of the creature is the cause of denomination, yet not the form denominating proximately. Hence, with no intellect considering, God is not actually referred to the creature. He is nevertheless really Lord terminatively, though not relatively formally: for he terminates the real relation of servitude of the creature to himself. — That something cannot be said formally relative from a relation existing in the other correlative is manifestly evident from this: that the formal effect of a relation is to refer to another; but it is evident that one relative is not referred to another by a relation existing in its opposite, otherwise the subject and the term of the same relation would be identical.

That what we have said is the mind of St. Thomas is shown from what was adduced above ¹⁶ from the Questions on Power, where he says that this name "Lord" is said of God with respect to the power of coercing subjects and with respect to the termination of the order of subjects to the lord, but not with respect to an order toward the subjects. Behold: because he holds that God is said to be Lord really, with no intellect considering, by reason of power and by reason of the termination of the order of the creature to him, but not by reason of any real relation formally denominating him. Hence, since, with no intellect considering, there is in God no relation to creatures—neither, I say, according to the thing nor according to reason—it follows that then he is in no way said formally to be Lord relatively, neither really nor according to reason; rather he is said relatively only fundamentally and terminatively, namely because he terminates the relation of the creature to himself, and from this he has it that he can be understood with a relation opposed to the creature.

When, therefore, it is said by Saint Thomas that God is said relatively with respect to the creature because the creature is referred to Him, the meaning is: because He terminates the relation of the creature, and from this He is conceived together with a certain relation of reason and is formally said relatively; not, however, because through the creature's relation itself He is formally referred. For since in God there is no real order to the creature, the reason why He must be conceived with a relation of reason to it and be formally denominated by such a relation of reason is that the creature has an order to Him according to nature.

But if it be urged that St. Thomas, in the Third Part, q. 35, a. 5, says that God is called Lord really by reason of the real subjection of the creature to him; and that Christ is called really the son of the Virgin by reason of the real relation of maternity toward Christ — it is answered that the mind of St. Thomas is that from the real relation of the creature to God and to Christ they are said to be such really as from the cause why God is called Lord terminatively and fundamentally, and likewise Christ the son of the Virgin, as we have explained: but not that, once the relation of reason is removed, he is called relatively, formally and really, by a real relation of another. Hence a little above, before these words, he says of Christ that he is called relatively son by a relation which is co-understood with the relation of maternity toward Christ, just as God is called Lord by a relation which is co-understood with the real relation by which the creature is subjected to God.

It must therefore be said, according to the mind of St. Thomas, that from the creature's relation to God precisely taken, God is said to be Lord terminatively, as it were from a cause, really, but not formally relatively: just as from coercive power He is said to be Lord fundamentally, while from the co-understood relation itself, which is of reason, He is said to be Lord formally relatively. And so with other similar cases.

Thus also must be understood what is had from St. Thomas, I Sent., d. xl, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, where it is said that in relatives something is sometimes denominated from that which is only in the other, as in those cases in which in one there is a relation according to the thing and in the other only according to reason; and the example given is that of the knowable. For it is understood that such a thing is denominated causally from the relation existing in the other, inasmuch as, as was said, because something terminates the relation of another to itself, it has the property of being conceived together with the opposite relation: not, however, that anything is denominated formally and relatively by a relation existing in the other.

VI. To the arguments of Scotus ¹⁷, insofar as they can in some way be opposed to what has been determined, in answer to the first it is said: first, that the mind of Aristotle in Metaphysics V is that something is said relatively and with respect to another, not on account of any real relation existing in it, but on account of a real relation existing in the other, as from the cause why there is in it a relation of reason, by which it is formally said to be relative, and why it is called terminatively really relative and fundamentally so.

It is said second, that the term of a relative, as conceived by way of a defining term, is also said to be formally relative, not because it signifies a real relation, but because it has a relation of reason, and the name signifying it relatively includes in its concept an order to its correlative, whether the order be a real order or an order of reason. And thus in relatives of the third mode as well, relation is included in each of the extremes, as was explained above ¹⁸. For knowledge is referred to the knowable, and a creature to the Creator: but it is evident that the concepts imported by these names knowable and Creator are relative concepts; for the knowable is knowable by some knowledge, and a creature is the creature of some creator, insofar as these names are said relatively.

It is said thirdly that, although, with no intellect considering it, there is no real relation in the thing called knowable, there is nevertheless in it a relation of reason according to its proximate foundation, inasmuch as it actually terminates the relation of knowledge to itself. And so with the others. Hence what the first opinion says ¹⁹, that nothing can be the terminus of a relative unless it has in itself a relation to it, is understood as: either formally, or by way of proximate foundation. For what actually terminates the order of some relative to itself has in itself that by which it can be conceived in order to that relative, and thus can be called its correlative: just as, although privation is not formally in the subject of a real form, but only in the intellect, the subject is nevertheless said to be really deprived, because it lacks the real form which it is naturally apt to have.

Hence, to the argument, it is said that it proceeds from a false understanding of Aristotle's words—namely, as if he were saying that in relatives of the third mode there is no relation in one of the relatives, neither of the thing nor of reason, neither actual nor proximately fundamental: whereas he understands that in the one there is no real relation. Hence, taking Aristotle's meaning correctly, the consequence is denied.

2. To the second, the minor is denied. For act, as prior to potency, does not define potency as its terminus, as far as Aristotle's mind is concerned in that passage; rather it defines it insofar as each of them is considered according to its essential and absolute character, according to which the character of act is prior to that of potency, and act is placed in its definition as substance is in the definition of accident. For it is not unfitting that things which are denominated relatively should have among themselves an order of prior and posterior, and that one be placed in the definition of the other but not conversely, even though, as relatives, they are simultaneous in nature and in understanding, as is said in the First Part, above ²⁰.

3. To the third, the first consequence is denied. For although in absolutes the defining term is prior to the thing defined, as substance is prior to accident, yet in relatives this is not so: since relatives are simultaneous in nature and in cognition, if they are rightly assigned, and therefore they define one another mutually.

4. To the fourth it is said that, with no intellect considering, in the knowable and in God there is a relation of reason fundamentally and proximately, but not actually and completely. This, however, suffices for something to be said to be related to another by way of an absolute term. For from the fact that God has coercive power over subjects, and actually terminates the relation of subjects to himself, he is naturally understood, if conceived as terminating in such a way, with a habitude of dominion toward his subjects. Hence the argument is for the first part of the determination made ²¹.

It is said secondly that, even with no intellect actually considering it, the relation to knowledge is included in the ratio imported by this term as something knowable. For it is not required, in order that some concept be imported by a name, that it always be actually thought: it suffices that the name be imposed to signify the thing by means of such a concept. But in order that a term formally state a relation, it suffices that the concept imported by the name of the defining term, through which the name is imposed on the thing, import the relation.