Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

I. In the third place it must be shown how active power is in God¹. And Saint Thomas sets down two conclusions, and two corollaries.

I. The first conclusion is: In God there is no power as a principle of action, except according to our way of understanding. The first part is proved. Nothing is the principle of itself in truth. But divine action is nothing other than His power. Therefore the power of God is not the principle of divine action. — Saint Thomas declares the second part, saying that there is there a power with respect to action as regards our mode of understanding, insofar as our intellect considers both the divine power and the action under distinct conceptions.

For the declaration of the first part, it must be noted that truth is taken there not as signifying something existing in the intellect, but as signifying the truth of a thing, which is its very esse. And the sense is that there is no potency there with respect to action according to esse, that is, as if potency were really the productive principle of action.

To make the second part evident, it must be considered that, since every perfection of a creature is in God, though without imperfection; and since potency and action both signify some perfection: it is necessary that both be found in God. Therefore our intellect apprehends in the divine nature both the aspect of potency and the aspect of action. And because it belongs to the aspect of action in creatures that it proceed from a principle, as is said in Potentia, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, therefore, when the intellect conceives something in God by way of action, it conceives it as proceeding from a principle: yet this relation is not in reality, but only in thought. Hence there is not in the thing itself a relation of action to potency as to its principle, but this exists only in our manner of conceiving. Nor is the intellect false in thus understanding: for it does not apprehend that it is so in reality that the divine action is produced from potency, but this holds only on the side of the mode of understanding, just as when it apprehends one thing in relation to another between which nevertheless there is no relation on the side of the thing itself, as when it compares the same thing to itself; which happens when the intellect forms diverse concepts of one and the same thing.

2. But a doubt arises against the first part of the conclusion. For Saint Thomas seems to say the opposite of it in I Sent., d. XLII, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2. There he says that the divine essence, insofar as it is the principle of operation, is called power. Therefore there is in God a power with respect to operation, the opposite of which the conclusion states.

It is answered that St. Thomas speaks of a principle not according to esse, but according to reason and mode of understanding. For as is said in Potentia, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, although the divine essence has no principle either in reality or in reason, nevertheless the divine operation has some principle in reason. II. The second conclusion is: In God there is power in the truth of reality with respect to things made. — It is proved. In God there is power in the truth of reality. But power imports a relation to another under the aspect of principle: as is clear from the definition of active power in Book IX of the Metaphysics ². Therefore in God power signifies the aspect of principle with respect to things made, since it does not signify it with respect to operation: for it is the productive principle of created things.

III. The first corollary is: With respect to immanent actions, no potency is posited in God according to the truth of the thing, but only according to the mode of understanding. It is clear from what has been said. For potency names a really productive principle. But it was said that potency does not have the character of a principle with respect to operation according to the truth of the thing, but only according to the mode of understanding. Therefore etc. — From this it follows further that will and intellect in God are not potencies, but actions only.

2. But there seems to be an implication of contradiction in the words of St. Thomas. For either he understands the will and the intellect to be in God as truly and really actions, or only according to reason. If according to the thing itself, then there must be a real power with respect to them, because it belongs to the nature of operation to have a principle, as was brought forward ³ from the question on the Power of God. — If only according to reason, then one must posit there an intellect and will as powers according to reason. It is answered that he understands these to be truly and really actions, and not merely according to reason. But it must be noted that, since the perfections of creatures are found in God as regards what is of perfection, but not as regards the imperfection which they include, the immanent actions, which are understanding and willing, must be in God by reason of their perfection, but not by reason of their imperfection. Now in these actions what is of perfection is that they are the ultimate complement, awaiting no other perfection; for immanent operation is the ultimate complement of the power. And in this respect such actions are posited in God: for understanding itself and willing are understood as the ultimate act, awaiting no further act. But to proceed from a principle really distinct from them in esse is of imperfection. Therefore in this respect they are not posited in God. Since, then, it is argued that it belongs to the nature of action to have a productive principle according to the thing itself: it is said that this is false as regards what is of perfection in the action, and in the case of a subsistent action, such as the divine operation; but it is quite true of an action that is an accident distinct from that power itself. And universally, it belongs to the nature of action to have a productive principle either according to the thing itself, or according to a mode of understanding holding on the part of the intellect.

IV. The following corollary follows from what has been said: The multitude of actions attributed to God are not diverse things. — It is proved: because all of them are the divine esse itself, which is one. Note that Saint Thomas counts the production of things among the divine actions as distinct from understanding and willing, not because it is formally distinct from them altogether, but because it adds to them a relation of principle to creatures by way of execution. For as was said in the first chapter of this second book ⁴, power is not distinguished from intellect and will in God except because over and above them it adds a relation of executive principle. Hence what Saint Thomas says, since intellect and will in God are not as powers, they are understood insofar as intellect and will exist, namely insofar as they regard immanent actions taken absolutely. But when with these there is co-understood the relation of productive principle to creatures, they are in him as powers. Finally, because someone might say that this multiplicity of divine operations according to reason is repugnant to the unity and simplicity of God, he answers that from what was shown in the first book it is evident that the multiplicity of signification of one thing, that is, that one thing is signified by many names and consequently conceived under diverse rationes, does no prejudice to unity.⁵