Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

The second conclusion is ¹: The power of God is nothing other than His own action.

1. It is proved first. The divine power is the substance of God. And likewise the divine action, as was shown in the First Part concerning intellection; for the same account holds for the other actions, which are distinguished from intellection only in reason, such as willing and creating and the like. Therefore the divine action is the divine power. — The consequence is evident. Because things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as each other.

2. But it seems that the proposed conclusion does not follow from this proposition. For that proposition holds true only of things that are the same in reality and in reason, as is said in Prima, q. xxviii, a. 3, ad 1, concerning Aristotle's mind, Physics III ². Now, although power is really identical with the divine essence, it is nevertheless distinguished from it by reason. Similarly with action. Therefore from their being really identical with the essence it does not follow that they are really identical with one another: just as, although divine paternity and filiation are really identical with the essence, they are nevertheless really distinct from each other on account of their formal distinction from the essence.

It is answered that this proposition of the Philosopher is to be understood as follows. Whatever things are the same as one third thing are the same among themselves with respect to that in which they are identified in the middle term; but not with respect to that in which they are distinguished from the middle term, and which is not for them the ground of identification in the middle term. For thus, because action and passion, with respect to what is material in them, are identified with motion, but not with respect to the connotates, therefore they are the same among themselves materially, but not formally. From this follows the gloss of Saint Thomas adduced in the objection: that if certain things are to be said to be simply the same among themselves by reason of their union in a middle term, it is necessary that they be altogether the same as a third thing, namely not only according to the thing, but also according to the reason.

3. It must be noted, however, that some things can be distinguished by reason in two ways. In one way, from the operation of the intellect alone, which forms diverse conceptions of one and the same thing: as divine wisdom is distinguished from the essence. For if the essence were conceived as it is in itself, its concept would include the character of wisdom; but because our intellect cannot conceive it as it is in itself, it therefore forms one concept of the deity and another of divine wisdom. Similarly, if divine wisdom were conceived as it is in itself, it would include in its character both the essence and every perfection. — In the other way, on the part of the things themselves, which are such that, if they were conceived as they are in themselves, they would be conceived by diverse concepts: as is the case with action and motion. For they require of themselves that the intellect form a different concept of them, inasmuch as action connotes a respect in the agent which motion does not signify; for however perfectly motion be comprehended, still not everything belonging to the character of action is apprehended.

Since, therefore, St. Thomas says that that proposition does not hold in those things which are distinguished from a third by a distinction of reason, he is speaking of the distinction of reason arising from the side of the things themselves. For if it arose only from the side of the intellect, then the real union in the third would make for a real identity of the extremes, notwithstanding their distinction of reason from the third: as is the case with beginning and end as they are said of a point on a line. But such is the case at hand. For power and action are not distinguished by a reason from the divine essence on account of the condition of the things themselves, but only from the imperfection of our intellect: for if the deity were conceived in itself, there would be in its intellect active power and action, just as every other perfection; since it is infinite perfection and the fount of all perfection. Therefore, from the fact that they are really identical with the essence, it follows that they are really identical with one another: as also with the divine wisdom and justice.

4. It is not so, however, with paternity and filiation. For paternity, insofar as it is a relation, would not belong to the concept of the deity even if it were conceived as it is. For the concept of the deity includes only the notion of every perfection; but a relation, insofar as it is a relation, signifies nothing—not a perfection—but only an ordering toward another, as will be shown below ³. Therefore that it is distinguished by reason from the essence is due not only to the intellect, but also to the nature of the thing itself. On this account paternity and filiation need not be really the same as each other, even though they are really the same as the essence. For if real identity between them were to be concluded from their identity with the essence, each of them would have to be identical with the essence also according to its own concept, as far as the things themselves are concerned.

II. Second. The divine power is not completed by anything other than itself, since it is the divine essence itself. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Act is the complement of power. Therefore, if it is distinguished from the power, the power is perfected by something other than itself. This is opposed to the antecedent.

It must be noted that the complement of a potency is one thing in the case of an immanent action, and another in the case of a transient action. For an immanent action is the complement both by way of an end and by way of a form: for when a potency is joined to its immanent operation, it attains the end to which it is ordered, since such a potency exists on account of its operation; and because that operation remains within the potency itself, the potency is perfected by it as by a form, and thus its potentiality—by which it was receptive of its own action—is completed. A transient action, however, since it does not remain in the agent but is received in the patient, does not complete or perfect the agent by way of a form, but only by way of an end: for although in actions of this kind the thing done is the ultimate end, the operation itself is not outside the account of a proximate end, as is said in Book IX of the Metaphysics ⁴ Now God cannot be perfected by anything else, either by way of a form or by way of an end. Therefore none of his actions, whether conceived by way of an immanent act or signified by way of a transient one, can be distinguished from his potency. And this is the foundation of this argument.

III. Third. To act is divine for it, that is, its esse. But divine esse is the substance of God. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved: God's active power is his essence; therefore his acting too is his being.

Before the consequence is proved, note that some texts ⁵ read as follows, and wrongly: "As active power is something of an agent, so its essence is something of it." For the text should read as the corrected manuscripts have it: "As active power is something acting, so essence is something being," that is: as the act of a power is to act, since the power is that by which one acts, while the agent is an agent through its very act of acting; so the act of essence is esse, since everything that is a being is a being through esse itself. From this it is argued thus. As power is related to acting, so essence is related to esse. Therefore, as power is related to essence, so acting is related to esse. Therefore, if power is the same as essence, acting will be the same as esse. — And if it were said that the converted proportion holds only in numbers and magnitudes, as is said in Book III, d. 34, q. 2, a. 3 ⁶, and De Veritate, q. 29, 8 ⁷: — the answer is given that indeed it is true that the converted proportion regularly holds only in quantities, because in others it does not hold formally; yet in certain other cases it holds on account of the matter. And thus it holds in the case at hand. For if acting is the act of a power just as esse is the act of essence, then, if power is the same as essence, acting itself must also be the act of essence. But the act of essence is esse. Acting itself, therefore, will be esse itself.

Here it must be noted that acting is said to have the same relation to power as esse has to essence, because just as esse is the formal act by which a being has that it be a being, so acting is the formal act by which an agent has that it be an agent. There is, however, a difference in this: esse is intrinsic to the being, whereas acting, insofar as it is transient, is not intrinsic to the agent, but is an act actually dependent upon the agent. But since divine action ad extra is not distinguished from His immanent action, therefore, just as divine esse is intrinsic, so too is His acting. Now when certain things are really identical, it is necessary that the formal acts constituting them in their reason and species be really identical; for there are not several formal acts specifying one and the same thing really distinct from one another—although, just as the thing itself is distinguished by several reasons, so it can have several acts distinct in reason.

IV. Fourth. In God there cannot be anything in the manner of an accident. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because an action that is not the substance of a thing inheres in it as an accident in a subject: for action is reckoned among the nine genera of accidents.

Concerning that proposition, "In God there cannot be anything in the manner of an accident," it must be noted that the manner of an accident can be taken either on the side of the thing or on the side of the intellect. The manner holding on the side of the thing is to inhere really in another. The manner, however, holding on the side of the intellect is to be conceived as inhering and as existing outside the essence of the thing: namely, when the intellect forms diverse concepts of one substance, one of which is attributed to another, although in reality one does not inhere in the other, but is identical with it. The proposition of Saint Thomas, therefore, is understood of the manner holding on the side of the thing, not of the manner holding on the side of the one understanding. Indeed, on the side of the intellect we apprehend the divine attributes as superadded to the essence, although they are the same as the substance of the thing.

2. But concerning this argument a doubt arises. For it either proceeds about immanent action, or about transient action. If about the immanent, that proof—namely, that action is reckoned among the nine genera of accidents—is not to the point: for immanent action is not of the genus of action but of the genus of quality, as is said. — If, however, about the transient, the argument does not proceed. First because transient action is not posited in God, as will be shown below⁸ Then because it is false that it is in the agent as its accident, as was shown above in chapter one⁹

It is answered that it proceeds from action in the common sense of passing over, without descending to a determinate specification, neither to that which truly passes over nor to that which passes over only by way of similitude and according to efficacy.

When, however, it is urged in the first place that transitive action does not befit God: it is said that, although truly and properly transitive action does not befit him, yet action analogous to transitive action and in respect of efficacy does befit him, as will be shown below in chapter xvi ¹⁰

When it is objected secondly, because transient action is not in the agent: it is said that indeed an action that is truly transient is not in the agent with respect to the very entity of the action, which is motion; yet it is in the agent with respect to the relation connoted. But action that is transient only as to mode is, of course, in the agent: although it is reduced to the category of action by a certain likeness. And thus it follows, if such action were distinguished from the divine power, that there would be some accident in God. Therefore the argument of Saint Thomas proceeds most excellently.