Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II
Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)
Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles
First published 1918
In Book II of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's account of creation, the distinction of creatures, and the human soul. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XIII (1918). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.
Caput I: Continuatio sequentium ad praecedentia
Caput II: Quod consideratio creaturarum utilis est ad fidei instructionem
Caput III: Quod cognoscere naturam creaturarum valet ad destruendum errores qui sunt circa Deum
Caput IV: Quod aliter considerat de creaturis philosophus et theologus
Caput V: Ordo dicendorum
Caput VI: Quod Deo competit ut sit aliis principium essendi
Caput VII: Quod in Deo sit potentia activa
Caput VIII: Quod Dei potentia sit eius substantia
Second, it is shown what the active power of God is 1. And this by two conclusions 2.
The first is: The divine power is the substance of God.
It is proved first. Active power belongs to something insofar as it is in act. But God is not in act by an act distinct from himself, since in him there is no potentiality; rather he is act itself. Therefore he is his own power. Therefore etc.
Note that potential is one thing, and potentiality another. For active potential names the productive act of another, at least of motion and action. Potentiality, however, names the lack of some act which a thing is naturally fitted to receive, and therefore it always pertains to some mode of passive potency: for that in which there is potentiality, as such, insofar as it follows from its intelligible character, does not have the act itself, but can have it. Since, then, in God there is act, while nothing exists in Him that in itself actually lacks something and is naturally fitted to receive an act, therefore active potential may be attributed to Him, but not potentiality.
Second. Of God nothing can be said participatively. Therefore He is His own power. — The consequence is evident. For every agent who is not his own power is powerful by participation in the power of another: as was shown in the First 3 concerning the other perfections of things.
Third. God is his own esse; therefore also his own power. The consequence is proved: because every divine perfection is contained in his very esse and is identical with it, as was shown in the First Part.
Fourth. In God there cannot be any accident. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because in things whose powers are not their substance, those powers themselves are accidents: hence natural power is placed in the second species of quality.
Fifth. Power is that by which an agent acts. But God acts through his very essence, because he is an agent of himself, as the first agent, to which everything that acts through another is reduced; just as every imperfect thing is reduced to something perfect. Therefore, etc.