Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

After considering the utility that Christian faith derives from the consideration of creatures, since the philosopher also treats of those same creatures, it remains to show what difference there is between the theologian and the philosopher in their consideration of creatures¹. On this point Saint Thomas does two things. First, he shows the difference between them with respect to those things which each considers; second, with respect to the considerations and sciences themselves².

I. As to the first point, two conclusions are proposed. The first is: Creatures are subject to the doctrine of the Christian faith (or theology, which is the same thing) in one way, and to human philosophy in another. It is proved: because they are subject to theology insofar as a divine likeness shines forth in them and they are in some way ordered to God himself, as is had from Ecclesiasticus, chapter 42; but they are subject to human philosophy insofar as such things are of this kind, as fire, water, heaven, and the like; hence also according to the different genera of things different parts of philosophy are found. Therefore, etc.

It must be known that, since there is a twofold formal ratio of the subject of a science—one that belongs to a thing as it is a thing, to which the science is terminated first and per se, and which is assumed as the middle for demonstrating the passions of the subject; and another that belongs to it as contained under that genus which I call knowable, according to which the subject is denominated from the middle of knowing—here Saint Thomas speaks of the formal ratio of the subject as it is a thing, not of that which belongs to it as knowable.

But it must be considered further that the account of a subject, insofar as it is a thing, is twofold: one is adequate, under which or in relation to which all things are considered by a science; the other is inadequate, and these are the particular accounts contained under the adequate account; just as the adequate account of the subject of natural philosophy is the account of mobile being, while the account of this or that mobile being is inadequate. Therefore the account of creatures, which is their likeness to God, or any other relation to Him in accordance with which they are considered by the theologian, is not the primary and adequate account of the subject of theology — for not all things considered by the theologian are considered as like God, since the theologian also considers God Himself — but it is a secondary and inadequate account. For the account of deity is an adequate account: because all things are considered in it either as participating in the account of deity, or as having order and attribution to God, as is stated in Prima, q. 1³. But likeness, or any other attribution to God, is a secondary and particular account: just as the account of this or that mobile being is a secondary and particular account in natural philosophy, contained under mobile being.

When, therefore, it is said that the theologian considers the creature as representing the divine height, but the philosopher insofar as it is a thing of this kind, then the “insofar as” does not specify the adequate formal ratio of the object of a science, but a particular and inadequate one, which is related to the adequate one as the material is to the formal.

2. Concerning that proposition, Whence, according to the diverse genera of things, the diverse parts of philosophy are found, it must be noted that the genera of things themselves, according to their rationes, can be considered in two ways: in one way, absolutely, for instance being precisely as being, and quantity as quantity, and so with the others; in another way, as some intelligible ratio answers to a ratio holding on the side of the thing, insofar as it is intelligible. The proposition of Saint Thomas is therefore to be understood in the second way, not the first. For the sciences are not to be distinguished according to the diverse genera of things taken absolutely, because then there would be as many genera of sciences as there are genera of things; rather they are distinguished according to the genera of things as contained under diverse rationes of the intelligible. For all things contained under one ratio of the intelligible belong to one science: just as all natural things belong to natural philosophy, because in this ratio they agree in being knowable through a medium concerning matter both in esse and in ratio. But those things which are contained under diverse rationes of the intelligible, insofar as they are intelligible, belong to diverse sciences. — In the same way is to be understood what is said in III de Anima ⁴: that the sciences are divided just as things are. — Wherefore Saint Thomas says elsewhere ⁵ that the sciences are distinguished according to the formal distinction of their objects, and not according to their material distinction, and according to the distinction of objects as objects: calling material distinction that which is according to the proper and specific rationes of things, but formal that which is according to the diverse rationes of the intelligible insofar as it is intelligible.

II. The second conclusion, following from what was premised (⁶), is: The Philosopher considers one thing about creatures, and the Faithful another; and if anything is considered in common by both, it is handed down through different and distinct principles.

Saint Thomas proves the first part, because the Philosopher considers those things that belong to things according to their proper nature, as that fire is borne upward; but the Faithful consider those things that belong to them insofar as they are related to God, namely that they are created by God, subject to God, and so forth. From this it also follows that Christian doctrine is not imperfect if it omits many properties of things, since it does not have to treat of all of them: just as Natural Philosophy does not consider all the affections of a line, but only those that belong to it insofar as it is the terminus of a natural body.

He shows the second part, because the Philosopher proves these things from the proper causes of things, while the believer does so from the first cause.

From which corollary it follows that Christian doctrine is wisdom in the highest degree, because it always considers the highest cause: as is gathered from Deuteronomy iv, where it is said, "This is your wisdom," etc. ⁷

2. Concerning the first part of this conclusion, it must be considered that, since the ratio considered as it stands on the side of the thing is the principle and medium from which the passions and properties of the thing originally depend—and otherwise different ratios are followed by different passions, just as the passions of man are different insofar as he is an animal and different insofar as he is rational—it is necessary that, where the same subject is considered by different sciences under different rationes, different passions of it are also considered by those sciences; just as, because the mathematician and the natural philosopher consider the line under different rationes, the mathematician considers certain passions of it and the natural philosopher others. From this foundation, then, the first part of the conclusion holds. For since the Philosopher and the Believer consider creatures under different rationes as these stand on the side of the thing, it is necessary that they consider different predicates of them: just as the properties that befit a thing according to its own proper ratio are one thing, and those that befit it insofar as it has a relation to God are another.

3. Concerning the second part, it must be noted that, although diverse properties follow upon diverse rationes of a thing when those rationes are considered in themselves, it is nevertheless not unfitting that one and the same property of a thing depend for its being knowable upon diverse rationes of the thing, insofar as those rationes subsist under diverse rationes of the knowable, yet inadequate to the thing. For the same thing can be known in diverse ways: just as the roundness of the earth can be known by the astronomer and by the natural philosopher, because the being knowable through a medium drawn from matter and the being knowable through a medium abstracted from matter according to its ratio can both belong to the earth with respect to its roundness, neither of which rationes is adequate to the earth. Hence, just as the earth, considered by the mathematician and the natural philosopher with respect to its roundness, has the ratio of two formal knowables, inasmuch as under diverse rationes of object, as object, it can be contained, and thus pertain to diverse sciences; so the roundness itself has the ratio of a twofold property in the ratio of the knowable, inasmuch as it can be known through diverse formal media, taken according to a diverse ratio of the knowable. From this it is evident that the Philosopher and the Believer can know the same things about creatures, but through diverse media, as Saint Thomas said, yet inasmuch as they are referred to diverse rationes of the knowable: for instance, that the earth is incorruptible and stands forever, the Philosopher proves through some medium drawn from matter and motion; but the Believer through a medium drawn from divine revelation, for instance, because it redounds to the glory of God, which is made manifest from the Scriptures.

4. Concerning the corollary of this part, it must be noted that theology differs from metaphysics, because metaphysics indeed considers God and separate substances, yet not all the things considered by the metaphysician are proved through the first cause itself; theology, however, considers the first cause in such a way that it also resolves its consideration of creatures into that first cause itself, and it determines concerning that cause even those things that are known to God alone concerning Himself, as they are known through revelation, as is said in the First Part, q. 1, a. 6. Hence the consideration of the first cause is more universal in theology than in metaphysics. On this account it is more worthy of the name of wisdom, to which it belongs to consider the highest cause.

III. As to the second point ⁸, a twofold conclusion follows from what has been said. The first is: Human philosophy serves this science as its handmaid. It is proved by a comparison: for even First Philosophy makes use of the teachings of all the sciences for its own purpose. — It must be noted, however, from the teaching of St. Thomas, Prima, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2, that although theology receives something from the other sciences, this is not on account of any defect or insufficiency in itself, but on account of the defect of our intellect, which is not able of itself to understand things that are above reason; and it is more easily led into theology by means of those things that are known by natural reason.

The second conclusion is: The philosopher and the theologian do not treat of God and creatures in the same order. It is proved. Because the philosopher first determines about creatures, since it is from them that he takes his knowledge of God, and afterwards about God; but in the doctrine of faith it is the reverse, for he does not determine about creatures except in relation to God. From which it follows that this order is more like the divine cognition: for God also, while knowing himself as the first object, knows other things as secondary objects.

2. From these things it is concluded lastly that, after those things which belong to God in himself, concerning which determination was made in the first book, there must be determined the things that proceed from him.

But the opposite conclusion can be urged. For the first consideration in Sacred Scripture does not seem to be of God, but of creatures. For it begins with the creation of things, as is clear from Genesis 1.

It is answered that Moses did not hand down his teaching in a scientific manner, but as befitted those to whom he was speaking. For since the people of the Jews were untrained and could not grasp intelligible things in themselves, nor divine things, he therefore began from sensible things, under which the intelligible things were also veiled—things that could be investigated by the more learned. Saint Thomas, however, speaks of the doctrine of faith as handed down in a scientific manner, as he himself intends to do in this work.