Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

Having shown that it is necessary to determine the matter of God's transient action, Saint Thomas shows in the second place that the very consideration of creatures is useful¹: for to have perfect knowledge of what is made, one must also know the things made. In this he does two things. First, he establishes the usefulness of that consideration; second, he shows the difference between the Theologian and the Philosopher in the consideration of creatures, in chapter iv.

As to the first, he posits a twofold utility. And thus he proves two conclusions: the first in this chapter, the other in the following one.

I. The conclusion of this chapter is: The meditation on divine works is necessary, that is, useful, for instructing human faith. It is proved. To human faith it belongs to consider divine wisdom; and to admire the most lofty power of God, and consequently to fear and revere God; to love divine goodness; to arrive at the likeness of God. But this consideration bestows all these things. Therefore it is useful for instructing faith.

He proves the minor, as far as its first part, thus. The works of art are representative of the art. But God produced things by His wisdom: in the Psalm, You have made all things in wisdom; and Ecclesiasticus 1, He poured her out upon all His works. Therefore from a consideration of things made we can gather the divine wisdom, as impressed upon created things through a certain communication of its likeness. — This is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm: How great are your works, O Lord; my soul knows it exceedingly well.

As to the second part, it is argued first that they lead us into admiration of God's most exalted power: for the power of the maker is more eminent than the things made, as is intimated in Wisdom 13 and Romans 1. — That fear and reverence are caused by this, however, is proved by the authority of Jeremiah 10: "Great is your name" etc.

As to the third part, it is proved. The goodness of creatures, their beauty and sweetness, allure the souls of men to love. Therefore divine goodness itself, which is the fountain of goodness, when compared attentively with the rivulets of goodnesses found in individual things, will draw souls wholly inflamed to itself. — The consequence is evident, because whatever of goodness and perfection is distributed particularly among diverse creatures is united in him universally as a whole, as in the fountain of all goodness. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm, You have delighted me, O Lord etc.; and elsewhere, They shall be inebriated etc.; and Wisdom xiii, From the things that are seen etc.

As to the fourth part, it is proved because, since the Christian faith principally instructs man about God and, through the light of divine revelation, makes him a knower of creatures, there arises in man a certain likeness of divine wisdom: for God, in knowing Himself, beholds all things in Himself. — It is confirmed by the Apostle, II Cor. iii: But we all, with unveiled face etc.

The principal conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Ecclesiasticus 42, "I will remember" etc.

II. Concerning the conclusion of this chapter, it should be noted that its meaning is not that the consideration of creatures causes Christian faith: for faith is not caused in us by creatures, but by the light of divine revelation; although creatures themselves also lead us by the hand into the knowledge of God. But the meaning is that the consideration of creatures is useful for that instruction which Christian faith provides, since by this consideration we are helped toward those things to which faith directs us. For through faith we are instructed first about the things to be believed, secondarily about the things to be done. For according to the teaching of Saint Thomas, II[a] II[ae], q. iv, 2, ad 3, faith is in the speculative intellect as in its subject, but extensively it is also in the practical intellect; and it works through love (Galat. v²), insofar as it is the beginning and a certain, as it were, foundation of the whole spiritual life, as is said in Verit., q. XIV, 2, ad 1. Hence Christian faith is not taken here as it is the theological virtue distinct from hope and charity, but as including all things pertaining to the Christian life.

III. A doubt is raised concerning the first part of the minor premise. For wonder, as is clear from the Philosopher, Metaphysics I **³, belongs to one who is ignorant. Therefore what leads to knowledge and consideration of divine wisdom does not lead to wonder at it. It is therefore contradictory to say that consideration of creatures makes us both wonder at and consider divine wisdom. It is answered that wonder is a species of fear consequent upon the apprehension of some thing exceeding our capacity: as is clear from I-II, q. 41, a. 4; and II-II, q. 180, a. 3, ad 3; and De Veritate, q. 26, 4, ad 7. Hence, when some knowable thing is apprehended as altogether surpassing our knowledge, wonder is caused. An effect, then, can lead to knowledge of its cause in two ways: namely, either perfect or imperfect. If it leads to perfect knowledge, as happens with univocal effects, it does not cause wonder. But if it leads to imperfect knowledge, as with equivocal effects, it can cause wonder because of the magnitude of the cause's perfection, which surpasses our knowledge. Since, therefore, creatures lead to an imperfect knowledge of divine wisdom (which St. Thomas gives us to understand when he says that from the consideration of things made we can in some way consider divine wisdom), it is not unfitting that both wonder and knowledge be caused in us by them.

2. But a doubt still remains. If admiration is a species of fear, since fear concerns a future evil, admiration too will concern a future evil, whose outcome one cannot consider⁴. But divine wisdom is not an evil; rather, it is the highest good. Therefore admiration does not occur with respect to it. It is answered that, although divine wisdom is the highest good, nevertheless its consideration can be apprehended as superfluous and as harmful, as is said in Truth, where above⁵, when it is considered as altogether surpassing our knowledge. Hence the admirer refrains in the present from giving judgment about what he wonders at, fearing to fail in that very judgment⁶.

IV. Concerning the second part of the same minor premise, where it is said, The virtue of the maker is more eminent than the things made, it must be noted that this is understood of those things that are produced by art. For it is evident that the virtue of an artisan is superior to the things he has fashioned. And the nobler the artifacts are, the more we admire the virtue and ingenuity of the artisan, inasmuch as it exceeds that knowledge which we can have of it through the artifact itself: for from the work we discover that there is in the artisan a virtue out of the ordinary, capable also of accomplishing greater things. So too, when God is compared with all created things as an artisan with his artifacts, his virtue is more eminent than created things, and from creatures we admire his virtue, as surpassing our knowledge.

2. Concerning what Saint Thomas says, since from admiration of the divine power proceed fear and reverence, it must be noted that, since fear is twofold—namely servile and chaste or filial—each regards a twofold object: namely, the evil which one flees; and him from whom, or in comparison with whom, evil can come. In the second way God can be feared, but not in the first: as is held in IIª IIae, q. 19, a. 1. Both fears, moreover, arise from consideration of an outstanding power: namely, when someone is judged able to inflict harm on account of his dignity and excellence of power; or, on account of his dignity and excellence, one would not wish to offend him or be separated from him. And thus from consideration of the outstanding divine power is caused servile fear of God, insofar as God, by reason of his power, can inflict harm; and filial fear, insofar as someone, having considered the magnitude and excellence of the divine power, is inflamed with love of God and flees offending him. It must be considered secondly that reverence, which is in some way an act of fear and in some way an act of latria, always regards an excellent person by reason of that excellence. Therefore, from consideration of the excellence of the divine power there is caused reverence toward God himself. Therefore, when it is said that from admiration of God's most lofty power are caused fear and reverence, we may understand servile and filial fear, which is in some way the same as reverence. We may also understand filial fear with respect to its act, which is to fear separation from God; and with respect to its other act, which is reverence and subjection to God. For these two acts are attributed to filial fear in Iª IIae, q. 67, a. 4, ad 2.

V. As to the third part, where it is said that all the goods of creatures are universally united in God, understand this not by way of heaping together, but by way of the most simple unity, and of the universality of actual perfection, as was declared in Book One⁷. Concerning the last part, where it is said that the Christian faith makes man a knower of creatures, it must be noted that this is understood not with respect to their natures and properties, but insofar as they have dependence upon God: as Saint Thomas says in the fourth chapter.