Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

The first book having been dispatched, in which Saint Thomas determined those things that befit God in Himself, we must proceed to the exposition of the second book, in which he treats of the procession of creatures from God ¹. It is divided, moreover, into two principal parts: namely, into a prologue and a treatise ².

As to the first, he does two things: first, he makes known his intention in general; second, in particular, by dividing the book ³ — As to the first, he does two things: first, he shows the necessity of this consideration; second, its usefulness ⁴

I. First, therefore, in this chapter, continuing this book to the preceding one, he sets down this conclusion: For the complete manifestation of divine truth, it is necessary in the second place to treat of the divine operation by which things are brought into being and preserved. And because this conclusion includes two parts, namely, that it is necessary to treat of this operation, and that this is in the second place, therefore he first proves the first part; secondly, the second ⁵.

The first part is therefore proved by the following argument. Perfect knowledge of a thing cannot be had unless its operation is known. Now there is a twofold divine operation: namely, the immanent; and the transient, by which things are brought into esse and governed. Therefore, in order to have perfect knowledge of God (that is, as much as can be had in this life), one must know both of his operations. Therefore, whoever wishes to make the manifestation of divine truth complete must treat not only of the first operation, but also of the second.

The minor is proved by distinguishing a twofold genus of operation, on the authority of the Philosopher, Metaphysics IX, text 16. For God understands, wills, rejoices, and loves, which pertain to the first genus of operation; He also brings things into being and governs them, which belongs to the second genus of operation. — The major, however, is proved as follows. From the mode and species of operation the measure and quality of the power are weighed and known. But power demonstrates the nature of a thing, since each thing is born to act according to the nature it has received. Therefore the operation of a thing also manifests its nature. Therefore knowledge of it is necessary for knowing the thing perfectly.

Concerning the conclusion, it should be noted that Saint Thomas does not say that, for the manifestation of the divine nature, but rather that, for the manifestation of divine truth, one must treat of the divine operation as it passes over into creatures: because, although the divine nature and divine truth are really the same, nevertheless in this book the divine nature is not determined except insofar as concerns the truth which the Catholic faith professes concerning it, as he himself said above in the first book, chapter two.

Concerning the major proposition, it must be considered that, since there is a twofold mode of cognition, namely a priori and a posteriori, the proposition of St. Thomas holds true in both modes of knowing. For operation is proportioned to the power and has an affinity with it; and the power is proportioned to the nature as its property. Therefore, if there is a priori knowledge of a thing, while its nature and substance are perfectly known, the power that inseparably and naturally follows such a nature is also known; and from the knowledge of the power it is likewise known to what operation the thing is ordered, since the power is that by which a thing is naturally apt to act. — But if perfect knowledge of the thing must be had a posteriori, since our cognition begins from things more known to us; and operation is more known to us than power; and power is more known than the substance of the thing: it is necessary that the proper operation of the thing be known, if the thing itself is to be known with complete knowledge. — Now St. Thomas takes this major proposition indistinctly, not determining himself to this or that mode of cognition, since it is true in both: although the divine nature cannot be known by us except through effects and operations.

II. Concerning that proposition assumed for the proof of the major, "From the mode and species of the operation are measured the measure and quality of the virtue," it must be noted that Saint Thomas attributes two things to operation, namely its mode and its species, to which he makes correspond the measure and the quality of the virtue: so that, namely, to the mode of the operation there should correspond the measure of the virtue, and to the species indeed the quality, that is, the species, of the virtue; for the quality of a thing is sometimes taken for the species of the thing, whence also the substantial difference is said to signify a certain quale ⁶.

He makes this coordination, however, because the species of the operation, by which it is an operation of such a nature, distinct from another operation by the reason of substance, is taken from the form by which the agent acts, as Saint Thomas says in many places, especially in the Prima Secundae, q. 1, a. 3 ⁷; but the mode of operation, which is intensification and remission, or perfection and imperfection, is referred to the perfection or imperfection of the very form of the agent. And since the power (virtus) of a thing is the very form by which the agent acts immediately and proximately—for power always names the principle of action, especially the power of a cause, as is said in IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, quaestio 2—therefore the species of the operation is referred to the quality and species of the power, and its mode to the measure, that is, to the perfectional quantity, of the power; for according as the power is perfect or imperfect in the agent, so is the operation perfect or imperfect.

And if Saint Thomas sometimes says that the operation takes its species from the object ⁸, this does not contradict what we have said, namely that it takes its species from the form of the agent. For both are true. Because the form of the thing generated, which is the object of generation, is conformal to the form of the generator; and universally the terminus and object of an action is conformal to the principle and power by which the agent acts. For we see that heat produced in wood by fire is assimilated to the heat of the fire; and the sensible and the intelligible have in sense and intellect their species, from which sensation and intellection proceed, as from a form of the agent and complement of the power. Therefore, since the species of the operation is referred to the quality or species of the power, and the mode to its measure, it is rightly said that from the mode and species of the operation are gauged the measure and quality of the power.

III. But he proves the second part of the conclusion ⁹ by first premising the difference between immanent and transient action. And he touches on a twofold difference. The first is that immanent action is a perfection of the agent himself, whereas transient action is a perfection of the thing made: whence one is called an operation and an action, while the other is called a making, and hence the products made through it are called manufactured things. — The second is that the first operation is naturally prior to the second. For according to the order of perfectible things there is an order of perfections. Now the agent is naturally prior to what is made, and is its cause. Therefore immanent action, which is the perfection of the agent, is naturally prior to transient action, which is the perfection of the thing made, and is its reason. This is confirmed exemplarily in building.

2. Concerning the first difference, it must first be considered that, since transitive action imports two things in its account, as St. Thomas holds at Prima, q. xli, a. 1, ad 2, and q. xlv, a. 2 ¹⁰ and 3, and Physics III¹¹, namely motion, and the origin of the motion from the agent: if action is considered with respect to the motion it imports, then it is the perfection of the thing done, for motion is in the mobile, as is said in Physics III¹²; but if it is considered with respect to the relation of origin, then it is the perfection of the agent, the relation being considered as an accident. In this place St. Thomas speaks of action in the first way, not in the second. Indeed, in Potentia, q. vii, a. 10 ¹³, it is said that action is a certain proper perfection of the agent ¹⁴.

Consider secondly that action is sometimes said to be the perfection of the thing done, and sometimes the perfection of the thing undergoing it. Both are true, but in different ways. It is the perfection of the patient as of a subject receiving the action and informed by it. But it is the perfection of the thing done if it is considered as formally distinct from the terminus of the action, as in some way the formal production of a form, and as the way by which one arrives at the perfection of the work: just as to heat is the formal production of heat, by which something is heated; and house-building is the production of the form by which there is a house. But if action is taken as it is identical with the formal terminus of the action materially, then it is the perfection of the thing done as form is the perfection of the composite, from which the composite has its species. In this way we say that light is the act and perfection of what is luminous, as constituted in its species by that very light: which is also called the perfection and act of the diaphanous, as of a subject receiving light.

In no way, however, does action, as action, signify the perfection of the agent in the manner of something inherent. For it is signified not as something existing in the agent, but as passing from the agent into another.

3. Concerning the second difference, insofar as it is proved by the argument that immanent action is naturally prior to transient action, a doubt arises. For the argument does not seem to conclude formally. For the relation of the agent to the thing acted upon is not naturally prior to the relation of the patient and of what is made to the agent, since relatives are simultaneous by nature ¹⁵; and yet the relation of the agent is a perfection of the agent, and the relation of the patient is a perfection of the patient. Therefore likewise it does not follow: Immanent action is a perfection of the agent, but transient action is a perfection of what is made; therefore immanent action is naturally prior to transient action, because the agent is naturally prior to what is made.

It is answered that an agent is in complete act in two ways: namely, first and absolutely; and secondly and relatively.

In first act it is when it has every form required on its own part for acting; in second act, however, when it is actually joined to action. And because an agent acting through intellect does nothing external except from a conception and intention of the thing to be produced, therefore it is constituted in the first act of an agent when it forms in itself such a conception, intending to act according to it; but it is in second act when it acts according to what it has conceived. The argument of St. Thomas therefore proceeds from the absolute perfection of the agent, by which it is constituted in the first act of an agent; not, however, from relative act, with second act concomitant or following, which is what the objection proceeds from. For it is universally true that, if something perfect by some perfection, as such, is naturally prior to another perfectible thing, then the perfection constituting it in such perfect esse must also be naturally prior to the perfection of the other. And if the perfect thing itself is the cause of another perfect thing, its perfection must be the cause of the other's perfection—by which perfection it is constituted in esse of this kind—since from that very perfection it has that it is an agent and perfect.

4. These differences among actions having been supposed, he proves the second part of the conclusion thus. Immanent action is prior to transient action; therefore it was first to be determined concerning it. — He does not, however, prove the consequence: for he supposes it evident, from the fact that determination belongs first to what is prior.

Here it should be noted that, although, according to the way of science acquired by discovery from the things themselves, what is posterior is sometimes known by us first, so that knowledge may be said to be taken from posterior things, the way of teaching—by which one hands down knowledge of things in writing—must proceed from prior things concerning the same subject; especially when the prior things can be made manifest without the posterior things that pertain to the subject of that science. And this is the case in our present undertaking: for God's immanent act can be made manifest without any manifestation of His transitive act. Therefore it was necessary to treat of the immanent act first.

Finally, the whole conclusion is proved by the authority of the Psalm, taken up at the beginning of the chapter: "I have meditated on all these things."

IV. Concerning what is said in this chapter, a doubt arises. For it seems that Saint Thomas here wishes the transient action to be subjectively in the patient, since he says that it is indeed the perfection of the thing made, while the immanent action is the perfection of the agent. Against this, however, it is argued from his words in several ways.

First ¹⁶, because in I Sent., d. xxxii, a. 1 ¹⁷, he says that action is signified as from the agent: and that it is in the agent, this happens to it insofar as it is an accident. He says the like in Potentia, q. vii, a. 9, ad 7.

Secondly ¹⁸, because in the Power questions, in the same question, article 10, reply to objection 1, he says that action is a certain proper perfection of the agent. He holds the same in Truth, question 4, article 2, reply to objection 7.

Third ¹⁹, because in I Sent., d. xl, a. 1 ²⁰, ad 1; and in de Pot., q. viii, a. 2; likewise in II Sent., d. xi, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1, he holds absolutely that action is in the agent.

4. Fourth ²¹, because in Prima, q. xxv, a. 1, ad 2, where it was argued that if there were power in God, something would be nobler than what exists in God, namely action: he says that where act is distinguished from power, the act must be nobler than the power; but the divine action is not other than his power, but both are the divine essence. He says the like in many other places. It is asked, therefore, whether action signifies something existing in the agent by its own account besides motion and relation? Or does it signify only motion and relation?

If first, the proposition is held, namely that action is in the agent.

If it is the second, the objection runs as follows. First. By reason of motion, action is not identified with the divine essence. This is so, first, because divine action is not accompanied by motion: as Saint Thomas says in I Sent., d. viii, q. iv, a. 3, ad 3, and II Sent., d. xvii, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4, and in very many other places. Then also because, even if it were accompanied by motion, it could not be identified with the divine substance: since motion signifies something imperfect. — Nor is action identified with the divine essence by reason of relation either. For the relation of God to creatures posits nothing in God except according to reason: as Saint Thomas says in almost countless places ²². — Therefore what Saint Thomas says will not be true, namely that the divine action going forth (for it is of this that he speaks there) is identified with his power.

Second, because it will not be true that act is nobler than potency. For none of those is nobler than the active potency of the mover of Saturn.

V. On this difficulty there are various opinions in the doctrine of Saint Thomas. Some hold, for the reasons we have adduced, that action is in the agent, if it be taken essentially. — Others, however, hold that it is in the patient.

I consider the first opinion to be Scotist rather than Thomistic.

Therefore, following the second opinion, I shall prove that, insofar as the absolute is imported by action, action exists in the patient; and this is the mind of St. Thomas, of the Commentator, and of Aristotle himself ²³.

1. That this is the mind of St. Thomas is proved first ²⁴, supposing that transitive action imports nothing besides motion, and the relation of the agent to the patient or to what has been done. This is the mind of St. Thomas in Prima, q. 41, a. 1, ad 2, and q. 45, a. 2, ad 2. Then thus: Action imports no absolute entity besides motion. But motion is in the mobile thing, not in the mover, as is said in Physics III ²⁵ and On the Soul III ²⁶. Therefore action is in the patient, not in the agent.

2. To the supposition of this argument there are two ways of answering. First, that it is to be understood of action insofar as it is action: but not insofar as it is an accident or a substance.

Second ²⁷, what is understood concerns action taken concomitantly, that is, the form produced by action in the patient; but not action taken essentially, which is the very emanation by which the form is introduced into the patient, and it is in this way that we speak of action here.

3. Against the first response it is argued, first. Either that entity which you posit beyond motion and relation is of the essence of action as action, or it is not. If not: therefore action taken formally and essentially posits nothing in the agent. But we are speaking of action taken essentially and formally. Therefore action posits nothing in the agent, and thus the point is established: even if something were posited that is beyond the account and essence of action and exists in the agent. — If it is of the essence of action, then it belongs to it insofar as it is action. Therefore action, insofar as it is action, signifies something beyond motion and relation. The opposite of this St. Thomas says. Therefore your response does not save the saying of St. Thomas. — If it be said that it is of the essence of action not as commonly accepted, but of predicamental action, which in its account includes accident: and therefore it belongs to it insofar as it is predicamental action, but not insofar as it is action absolutely: — against. Because St. Thomas also, in the same place, speaks of the essence of predicamental action, which includes motion, and he says that it imports nothing beyond motion and relation. Therefore the response is not according to his mind.

Second. When you say that action, insofar as it is action, specifies either the reason of transcendent action or of predicamental action. If of transcendent action, then it will be false that mutation belongs to the reason of action: for divine action is without motion and mutation, even according to Avicenna ²⁸. — If of predicamental action, then predicamental action says nothing existing in the agent that belongs to its very reason: since action, insofar as it is predicamental action, says nothing besides motion and relation, according to St. Thomas, as you expound, although it may say something else insofar as it is an accident.

Third, because in question 45, cited above, from the fact that action signifies only motion and relation, since creation is not a change, Saint Thomas concludes that there remain only diverse respects in the creator and the creature. But this would not be true if action, insofar as it is an accident, signified something beyond motion and relation: for it would then be said that, although creation is not a change, it nevertheless signifies some absolute entity existing in the creator; and thus creation would not be a mere relation.

4. Against the second response ²⁹ it is argued first, because St. Thomas in the First Part, question 41 ³⁰ says that action, according to the first imposition of the name, signifies the origin of motion; therefore, with motion removed, it signifies nothing other than the order of origin. But it is evident that the name of action was not first imposed on the form produced by the action, but on the very essence of the action itself; indeed, if a form produced can be called an action, this is secondarily and by a certain derivation. Therefore, etc.

Second, because in the same place Saint Thomas asks whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the Persons, and shows that they are, notwithstanding that, according to Augustine, everything said of God is said either according to substance or according to relation—because the acts themselves are the same as the relations. It is evident, however, that the question is not about the act itself with respect to the form produced, but with respect to its essence, according to which it is predicated of the Person formally and intrinsically. And the response tends to the same. Therefore etc.

Third, because question XLV ³¹, as Saint Thomas says, is treated in order to show that something can be made from nothing: namely, because creation is not a change, but a relation signified in the manner of a change. But this would not be shown if he were speaking of action as a form produced, when he says that action and passion agree in the substance of motion and differ according to their relations. For by this it is not established that, once motion is removed, there remains in the creator only a relation signified in the manner of a change, which would be creation. For Saint Thomas is speaking of creation itself taken formally, not of creation taken concomitantly: whatever that may import, it is not established that the creation by which God is said to create formally and intrinsically is only a relation signified in the manner of a change.

It is also strange that Saint Thomas, in those passages where he explains from a consideration of action what notional acts and what creation formally signify, made mention only of motion and of relation as concomitantly accompanying action taken essentially, making no mention of that absolute entity which you say essential action is and which exists in the agent: since it would have better suited his purpose to show what action formally and essentially signifies in creatures than what action taken concomitantly signifies.

VI. Second, it is shown principally that this is the mind of St. Thomas ³². For in the Prima, q. XXXVII, a. 2, and in De Potentia, q. VII, a. 10, ad 8, he says that something can be denominated from that which is not its form, just as an agent is denominated from the action proceeding from it. Therefore action is not the form of the agent. — Nor does it avail to say that as regards the mode of signifying, action is signified as from the agent, but as regards the thing signified it is in the agent. For in De Potentia, in the place cited above, St. Thomas says the opposite of this. For he wills there that action is really not the form of the agent which it denominates, although it is signified by way of form, speaking grammatically.

Third. In the First Part, q. XVIII, a. 3, ad 1, a distinction is drawn between immanent and transitive action, as also in this place, because transitive action is the perfection of what is moved, whereas immanent action is the perfection of the agent. Therefore etc. — Nor does it suffice to say that it is understood of that which is produced by the action. First, because when a formal distinction between actions is posited, there is no consideration of where the terms of those actions are found, but rather whose perfections those actions are. Second, because sensing, which is numbered among immanent actions, has no produced term at all, especially the sensing of an exterior sense: therefore immanent action does not differ from transitive action in that the term produced by the immanent action is in the agent, while the term of the transitive action is in the patient, or perfects the thing made.

Fourth. Because in the Prima, q. LIV, a. 1, ad ult., it is said that an action which passes into something external is really intermediate between agent and subject, but not an immanent one between agent and object. Therefore the same thing is not both agent and subject of the action. — It does not avail, however, to say that he is speaking of a form made. For that reply is given to the argument by which it is proved that the understanding of an angel is his substance. Now it is clear that there he is understood to speak of the very action of the intellect taken essentially, not of the term produced by the action: just as in the question about the very act of understanding itself it is inquired. Therefore the difference of a passing action from an essentially taken passing action must be taken: otherwise that difference would not be to the purpose.

Many other passages to this purpose could be brought forward from Saint Thomas, but let these suffice for now.

VII. That this is also the mind of Aristotle and of the Commentator ³³ is proved first, because in Physics III, text 18 ³⁴ he says that the action of the mover and of the moved is one and the same, just as the space between two things is one and the same, etc. — But at text 20 ³⁵ he says that it is not absurd for the act of one thing to be in another, as teaching is the act of the teacher, yet in a certain other thing, namely in the learner. Therefore etc. — The same point, and more clearly, is laid down in De Anima II, text 140 ³⁶, etc.

If it is said that it takes action not essentially but concomitantly, for the form produced, the contrary is argued from the Commentator, commentary 18, where he says, expounding the words of Aristotle: For the action of the mover, which is to move, is his not in that thing. And this is what Aristotle intended by "For the mover etc.": that is, for the action of the mover is to make motion in another. Therefore action is not taken for the form produced as distinguished from the action, but for the very production of the motion and the form.

Secondly. In Metaphysics IX, text 16 ³⁷, Aristotle says that where besides the operation there is some thing wrought, the operation is the act of the thing wrought: as building in what is built, and weaving in what is woven, and universally motion in what is moved. — Nor does it avail to say that he takes "action" concomitantly, namely for the effect of the action. For Saint Thomas, expounding Aristotle's meaning there, says that the reason for this saying is that when through the operation of a power some thing wrought is constituted, that operation perfects the thing wrought, and not the agent. But it is evident that a thing wrought does not perfect itself as something wrought. Therefore "action" is not taken for the thing wrought by the action when it is said to perfect the thing wrought, but for the very essence of the action. — It is also plainly clear there that he distinguishes action from the work wrought, if the words of Saint Thomas are carefully examined.

Furthermore, the Philosopher says ³⁸ that the difference among powers—since in some there is some work produced beyond the action, while in others there is not—does not make it the case that in some of these powers act is less the end of the power and in others more, because the action itself is in the thing made: as if to say,—Although where there is some work wrought beyond the action, that work itself is the end, yet by this it is not removed that the operation itself is also an end, since it is not separated from the work done but exists in it; therefore, if the work done is the end of the power, then the action existing in it must also be an end, namely as the perfection of the work done. Now it is clear that this argument would be null, and this explanation empty, if action were taken concomitantly for the form made, and not essentially for the very production of the form. For what could be said of the claim that by that difference among powers it does not come about that in these the action is less an end and in those more, if action were taken for the form made? For he had already said that the work done itself is the end. Therefore he takes action essentially, as distinguished from the work done.

VIII. I hold, therefore, that the mind of Saint Thomas and of the Philosopher is that action, taken essentially, is in the patient subjectively, although the relation it connotes is in the agent. For the agent, by its power brought near to a disposed patient, produces form proceeding from imperfect esse to perfect (speaking of an agent with motion); and this form existing under imperfect esse with a tendency toward perfection is called action, connoting the respect of the agent to what comes to be, which is signified when motion is said as from this; the same form, when it has complete esse, is called the form made. Therefore, just as the form made is in the patient, so too action must necessarily be in the patient. Nor need we call action some absolute form existing in the agent: otherwise the agent, insofar as it is an agent, would have to suffer, which is unfitting; for the same proximate total principle of action, say the heat of fire, in heating wood would produce the action in itself, and thus in acting it would suffer from itself.

IX. To the arguments on the opposite side, however, ³⁹ the reply is given. To the first it is said that St. Thomas says this because of immanent action. For action, taken absolutely, has that it is an action and that it is an accident by reason of something of its species. But to inhere in a subject does not belong to it universally, nor by the common account of action. For the account of action, as it is action, consists in being from another, not inhering in a subject; but if some action inheres in its agent, as immanent action does, this belongs to it insofar as it is an accident, just as St. Thomas also says of relation ⁴⁰. Therefore, if immanent action is found in the agent, this is not because of the common account of action, but because of the account of accident.

It must be noted, however, that when it is said that being in the agent belongs to immanent action insofar as it is an accident, [that] the ly insofar as does not specify the notion of accident in general, because through the common notion of accident no accident determines for itself this subject more than that one; rather, it specifies a species of accident. And the sense is: To the action that is in the agent, being in the agent belongs, not because it is contained under the common notion of action as its species, but insofar as it is a species of accident: for insofar as it is an accident proceeding from the agent as the end of the agent, and not, however, as that through which some product is brought forth, it has that it remains in the agent itself.

But it must be noted that there is no contradiction in the words of Saint Thomas when he says, in 1 Sent., where it is alleged that action is signified as from the agent, but is in the agent as an accident is; whereas in de Potentia, where it was cited above, ⁴¹ he says that action is not really a form of the agent, although it is signified after the manner of a form. For in the First Book of the Sentences he speaks of immanent action, whereas in de Potentia he speaks of transitive action.

2. To the second ⁴² it is said first that action is called the proper perfection of the agent, in the question on Power, not inhering but proceeding from the agent. It is called a perfection of the agent because through it some good accrues to the agent, namely while the esse of the species is preserved, or something of this kind, as is clear there ⁴³.

It is said second, that in De Veritate Saint Thomas speaks of immanent action.

3. To the third ⁴⁴ it is said that in those passages St. Thomas speaks of action with respect to the connoted relation: for the relation signified by the name action is in the agent, and the relation signified by the name passion is in the patient. And universally, wherever St. Thomas says that action is in the agent, this must be understood either of the relation signified by the action, or of immanent action.

X. To the fourth ⁴⁵ it is said first that transitive action signifies nothing essentially beyond motion and the relation of the agent. But these are found in God only according to the mode of signifying and according to efficacy, as will be shown below ⁴⁶ for the divine action toward what is outside is His willing and His understanding.

2. It is said secondly, in reply to the first objection ⁴⁷, that Saint Thomas posits the divine operation and action by which a thing is produced in esse to be identified with his substance, not because something is imported to it and identified with it by a transient action, as the argument supposes, but because he does not act in things except through his immanent operation, which is identified with his substance and his power.

But if it be pressed further, since in the First Part, where above ⁴⁸, ad 4, he says that active power can be understood to be in God in two ways: namely, so that it be something distinct in reason from knowledge and will, by way of an executing principle, so that knowledge, will, and power are three formally distinct things, though really identified; and so that it be the very knowledge and will of God as it is an effective principle. And thus, according to the first mode, one must posit a transient action in God. And consequently one need not have recourse to immanent action: —

It is answered first, that in the true exemplars only the first response is set down; the second, however, is not of the text, as I have seen in many ancient exemplars ⁴⁹.

It is answered, secondly, even granting those two replies, that those two ways of speaking are distinguished because in the first way those three are considered as having disparate notions [a] conceived by us, of which, namely, one does not include another, just as mercy and justice are distinguished in God; but in the second way they are considered not as having altogether distinct notions, but as one including the notion of another and adding something to it; for thus power includes the notion of intellect and will, and adds the notion of a productive principle. Yet because of this one should not posit in God an operation properly passing over: rather, the same action corresponds to all these according to different notions. And this is indeed really immanent; but insofar as it is referred to intellect and will, namely, as he is said to will and to understand, it is not only immanent according to reality, but also according to the mode of conceiving; but insofar as it is referred to power, namely, as he is said to produce or to create, although it is immanent according to reality, nevertheless according to the mode of conceiving it is passing over; for it is conceived as the making of another, which is the notion fitting for passing-over action. But this is from the imperfection of our intellect, which is not able to apprehend the divine action according to what it is in itself, but conceives it distinctly as it has the perfection of immanent operation, and as it has the perfection of passing-over operation, although in itself it contains these perfections indistinctly.

3. To the second objection ⁵⁰ it is said that, although motion is not nobler than the active power of the mover of Saturn insofar as that is absolutely intellect or will, it is nevertheless nobler than it as bearing the character of a motive power: for, as such, it is ordered to motion as to its end.