Caput I: Continuatio sequentium ad praecedentia

The first book having been dispatched, in which Saint Thomas determined those things that befit God in Himself, we must proceed to the exposition of the second book, in which he treats of the procession of creatures from God ¹. It is divided, moreover, into two principal parts: namely, into a prologue and a treatise ².

As to the first, he does two things: first, he makes known his intention in general; second, in particular, by dividing the book ³ — As to the first, he does two things: first, he shows the necessity of this consideration; second, its usefulness ⁴

I. First, therefore, in this chapter, continuing this book to the preceding one, he sets down this conclusion: For the complete manifestation of divine truth, it is necessary in the second place to treat of the divine operation by which things are brought into being and preserved. And because this conclusion includes two parts, namely, that it is necessary to treat of this operation, and that this is in the second place, therefore he first proves the first part; secondly, the second ⁵.

The first part is therefore proved by the following argument. Perfect knowledge of a thing cannot be had unless its operation is known. Now there is a twofold divine operation: namely, the immanent; and the transient, by which things are brought into esse and governed. Therefore, in order to have perfect knowledge of God (that is, as much as can be had in this life), one must know both of his operations. Therefore, whoever wishes to make the manifestation of divine truth complete must treat not only of the first operation, but also of the second.

The minor is proved by distinguishing a twofold genus of operation, on the authority of the Philosopher, Metaphysics IX, text 16. For God understands, wills, rejoices, and loves, which pertain to the first genus of operation; He also brings things into being and governs them, which belongs to the second genus of operation. — The major, however, is proved as follows. From the mode and species of operation the measure and quality of the power are weighed and known. But power demonstrates the nature of a thing, since each thing is born to act according to the nature it has received. Therefore the operation of a thing also manifests its nature. Therefore knowledge of it is necessary for knowing the thing perfectly.

Concerning the conclusion, it should be noted that Saint Thomas does not say that, for the manifestation of the divine nature, but rather that, for the manifestation of divine truth, one must treat of the divine operation as it passes over into creatures: because, although the divine nature and divine truth are really the same, nevertheless in this book the divine nature is not determined except insofar as concerns the truth which the Catholic faith professes concerning it, as he himself said above in the first book, chapter two.

Concerning the major proposition, it must be considered that, since there is a twofold mode of cognition, namely a priori and a posteriori, the proposition of St. Thomas holds true in both modes of knowing. For operation is proportioned to the power and has an affinity with it; and the power is proportioned to the nature as its property. Therefore, if there is a priori knowledge of a thing, while its nature and substance are perfectly known, the power that inseparably and naturally follows such a nature is also known; and from the knowledge of the power it is likewise known to what operation the thing is ordered, since the power is that by which a thing is naturally apt to act. — But if perfect knowledge of the thing must be had a posteriori, since our cognition begins from things more known to us; and operation is more known to us than power; and power is more known than the substance of the thing: it is necessary that the proper operation of the thing be known, if the thing itself is to be known with complete knowledge. — Now St. Thomas takes this major proposition indistinctly, not determining himself to this or that mode of cognition, since it is true in both: although the divine nature cannot be known by us except through effects and operations.

II. Concerning that proposition assumed for the proof of the major, "From the mode and species of the operation are measured the measure and quality of the virtue," it must be noted that Saint Thomas attributes two things to operation, namely its mode and its species, to which he makes correspond the measure and the quality of the virtue: so that, namely, to the mode of the operation there should correspond the measure of the virtue, and to the species indeed the quality, that is, the species, of the virtue; for the quality of a thing is sometimes taken for the species of the thing, whence also the substantial difference is said to signify a certain quale ⁶.

He makes this coordination, however, because the species of the operation, by which it is an operation of such a nature, distinct from another operation by the reason of substance, is taken from the form by which the agent acts, as Saint Thomas says in many places, especially in the Prima Secundae, q. 1, a. 3 ⁷; but the mode of operation, which is intensification and remission, or perfection and imperfection, is referred to the perfection or imperfection of the very form of the agent. And since the power (virtus) of a thing is the very form by which the agent acts immediately and proximately—for power always names the principle of action, especially the power of a cause, as is said in IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, quaestio 2—therefore the species of the operation is referred to the quality and species of the power, and its mode to the measure, that is, to the perfectional quantity, of the power; for according as the power is perfect or imperfect in the agent, so is the operation perfect or imperfect.

And if Saint Thomas sometimes says that the operation takes its species from the object ⁸, this does not contradict what we have said, namely that it takes its species from the form of the agent. For both are true. Because the form of the thing generated, which is the object of generation, is conformal to the form of the generator; and universally the terminus and object of an action is conformal to the principle and power by which the agent acts. For we see that heat produced in wood by fire is assimilated to the heat of the fire; and the sensible and the intelligible have in sense and intellect their species, from which sensation and intellection proceed, as from a form of the agent and complement of the power. Therefore, since the species of the operation is referred to the quality or species of the power, and the mode to its measure, it is rightly said that from the mode and species of the operation are gauged the measure and quality of the power.

III. But he proves the second part of the conclusion ⁹ by first premising the difference between immanent and transient action. And he touches on a twofold difference. The first is that immanent action is a perfection of the agent himself, whereas transient action is a perfection of the thing made: whence one is called an operation and an action, while the other is called a making, and hence the products made through it are called manufactured things. — The second is that the first operation is naturally prior to the second. For according to the order of perfectible things there is an order of perfections. Now the agent is naturally prior to what is made, and is its cause. Therefore immanent action, which is the perfection of the agent, is naturally prior to transient action, which is the perfection of the thing made, and is its reason. This is confirmed exemplarily in building.

Concerning the first difference, it must first be considered that, since transitive action imports two things in its account, as St. Thomas holds at Prima, q. xli, a. 1, ad 2, and q. xlv, a. 2 ¹⁰ and 3, and Physics III¹¹, namely motion, and the origin of the motion from the agent: if action is considered with respect to the motion it imports, then it is the perfection of the thing done, for motion is in the mobile, as is said in Physics III¹²; but if it is considered with respect to the relation of origin, then it is the perfection of the agent, the relation being considered as an accident. In this place St. Thomas speaks of action in the first way, not in the second. Indeed, in Potentia, q. vii, a. 10 ¹³, it is said that action is a certain proper perfection of the agent ¹⁴.

Consider secondly that action is sometimes said to be the perfection of the thing done, and sometimes the perfection of the thing undergoing it. Both are true, but in different ways. It is the perfection of the patient as of a subject receiving the action and informed by it. But it is the perfection of the thing done if it is considered as formally distinct from the terminus of the action, as in some way the formal production of a form, and as the way by which one arrives at the perfection of the work: just as to heat is the formal production of heat, by which something is heated; and house-building is the production of the form by which there is a house. But if action is taken as it is identical with the formal terminus of the action materially, then it is the perfection of the thing done as form is the perfection of the composite, from which the composite has its species. In this way we say that light is the act and perfection of what is luminous, as constituted in its species by that very light: which is also called the perfection and act of the diaphanous, as of a subject receiving light.

In no way, however, does action, as action, signify the perfection of the agent in the manner of something inherent. For it is signified not as something existing in the agent, but as passing from the agent into another.

Concerning the second difference, insofar as it is proved by the argument that immanent action is naturally prior to transient action, a doubt arises. For the argument does not seem to conclude formally. For the relation of the agent to the thing acted upon is not naturally prior to the relation of the patient and of what is made to the agent, since relatives are simultaneous by nature ¹⁵; and yet the relation of the agent is a perfection of the agent, and the relation of the patient is a perfection of the patient. Therefore likewise it does not follow: Immanent action is a perfection of the agent, but transient action is a perfection of what is made; therefore immanent action is naturally prior to transient action, because the agent is naturally prior to what is made.

It is answered that an agent is in complete act in two ways: namely, first and absolutely; and secondly and relatively.

In first act it is when it has every form required on its own part for acting; in second act, however, when it is actually joined to action. And because an agent acting through intellect does nothing external except from a conception and intention of the thing to be produced, therefore it is constituted in the first act of an agent when it forms in itself such a conception, intending to act according to it; but it is in second act when it acts according to what it has conceived. The argument of St. Thomas therefore proceeds from the absolute perfection of the agent, by which it is constituted in the first act of an agent; not, however, from relative act, with second act concomitant or following, which is what the objection proceeds from. For it is universally true that, if something perfect by some perfection, as such, is naturally prior to another perfectible thing, then the perfection constituting it in such perfect esse must also be naturally prior to the perfection of the other. And if the perfect thing itself is the cause of another perfect thing, its perfection must be the cause of the other's perfection—by which perfection it is constituted in esse of this kind—since from that very perfection it has that it is an agent and perfect.

These differences among actions having been supposed, he proves the second part of the conclusion thus. Immanent action is prior to transient action; therefore it was first to be determined concerning it. — He does not, however, prove the consequence: for he supposes it evident, from the fact that determination belongs first to what is prior.

Here it should be noted that, although, according to the way of science acquired by discovery from the things themselves, what is posterior is sometimes known by us first, so that knowledge may be said to be taken from posterior things, the way of teaching—by which one hands down knowledge of things in writing—must proceed from prior things concerning the same subject; especially when the prior things can be made manifest without the posterior things that pertain to the subject of that science. And this is the case in our present undertaking: for God's immanent act can be made manifest without any manifestation of His transitive act. Therefore it was necessary to treat of the immanent act first.

Finally, the whole conclusion is proved by the authority of the Psalm, taken up at the beginning of the chapter: "I have meditated on all these things."

IV. Concerning what is said in this chapter, a doubt arises. For it seems that Saint Thomas here wishes the transient action to be subjectively in the patient, since he says that it is indeed the perfection of the thing made, while the immanent action is the perfection of the agent. Against this, however, it is argued from his words in several ways.

First ¹⁶, because in I Sent., d. xxxii, a. 1 ¹⁷, he says that action is signified as from the agent: and that it is in the agent, this happens to it insofar as it is an accident. He says the like in Potentia, q. vii, a. 9, ad 7.

Secondly ¹⁸, because in the Power questions, in the same question, article 10, reply to objection 1, he says that action is a certain proper perfection of the agent. He holds the same in Truth, question 4, article 2, reply to objection 7.

Third ¹⁹, because in I Sent., d. xl, a. 1 ²⁰, ad 1; and in de Pot., q. viii, a. 2; likewise in II Sent., d. xi, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1, he holds absolutely that action is in the agent.

Fourth ²¹, because in Prima, q. xxv, a. 1, ad 2, where it was argued that if there were power in God, something would be nobler than what exists in God, namely action: he says that where act is distinguished from power, the act must be nobler than the power; but the divine action is not other than his power, but both are the divine essence. He says the like in many other places. It is asked, therefore, whether action signifies something existing in the agent by its own account besides motion and relation? Or does it signify only motion and relation?

If first, the proposition is held, namely that action is in the agent.

If it is the second, the objection runs as follows. First. By reason of motion, action is not identified with the divine essence. This is so, first, because divine action is not accompanied by motion: as Saint Thomas says in I Sent., d. viii, q. iv, a. 3, ad 3, and II Sent., d. xvii, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4, and in very many other places. Then also because, even if it were accompanied by motion, it could not be identified with the divine substance: since motion signifies something imperfect. — Nor is action identified with the divine essence by reason of relation either. For the relation of God to creatures posits nothing in God except according to reason: as Saint Thomas says in almost countless places ²². — Therefore what Saint Thomas says will not be true, namely that the divine action going forth (for it is of this that he speaks there) is identified with his power.

Second, because it will not be true that act is nobler than potency. For none of those is nobler than the active potency of the mover of Saturn.

V. On this difficulty there are various opinions in the doctrine of Saint Thomas. Some hold, for the reasons we have adduced, that action is in the agent, if it be taken essentially. — Others, however, hold that it is in the patient.

I consider the first opinion to be Scotist rather than Thomistic.

Therefore, following the second opinion, I shall prove that, insofar as the absolute is imported by action, action exists in the patient; and this is the mind of St. Thomas, of the Commentator, and of Aristotle himself ²³.

That this is the mind of St. Thomas is proved first ²⁴, supposing that transitive action imports nothing besides motion, and the relation of the agent to the patient or to what has been done. This is the mind of St. Thomas in Prima, q. 41, a. 1, ad 2, and q. 45, a. 2, ad 2. Then thus: Action imports no absolute entity besides motion. But motion is in the mobile thing, not in the mover, as is said in Physics III ²⁵ and On the Soul III ²⁶. Therefore action is in the patient, not in the agent.
To the supposition of this argument there are two ways of answering. First, that it is to be understood of action insofar as it is action: but not insofar as it is an accident or a substance.

Second ²⁷, what is understood concerns action taken concomitantly, that is, the form produced by action in the patient; but not action taken essentially, which is the very emanation by which the form is introduced into the patient, and it is in this way that we speak of action here.

Against the first response it is argued, first. Either that entity which you posit beyond motion and relation is of the essence of action as action, or it is not. If not: therefore action taken formally and essentially posits nothing in the agent. But we are speaking of action taken essentially and formally. Therefore action posits nothing in the agent, and thus the point is established: even if something were posited that is beyond the account and essence of action and exists in the agent. — If it is of the essence of action, then it belongs to it insofar as it is action. Therefore action, insofar as it is action, signifies something beyond motion and relation. The opposite of this St. Thomas says. Therefore your response does not save the saying of St. Thomas. — If it be said that it is of the essence of action not as commonly accepted, but of predicamental action, which in its account includes accident: and therefore it belongs to it insofar as it is predicamental action, but not insofar as it is action absolutely: — against. Because St. Thomas also, in the same place, speaks of the essence of predicamental action, which includes motion, and he says that it imports nothing beyond motion and relation. Therefore the response is not according to his mind.

Second. When you say that action, insofar as it is action, specifies either the reason of transcendent action or of predicamental action. If of transcendent action, then it will be false that mutation belongs to the reason of action: for divine action is without motion and mutation, even according to Avicenna ²⁸. — If of predicamental action, then predicamental action says nothing existing in the agent that belongs to its very reason: since action, insofar as it is predicamental action, says nothing besides motion and relation, according to St. Thomas, as you expound, although it may say something else insofar as it is an accident.

Third, because in question 45, cited above, from the fact that action signifies only motion and relation, since creation is not a change, Saint Thomas concludes that there remain only diverse respects in the creator and the creature. But this would not be true if action, insofar as it is an accident, signified something beyond motion and relation: for it would then be said that, although creation is not a change, it nevertheless signifies some absolute entity existing in the creator; and thus creation would not be a mere relation.

Against the second response ²⁹ it is argued first, because St. Thomas in the First Part, question 41 ³⁰ says that action, according to the first imposition of the name, signifies the origin of motion; therefore, with motion removed, it signifies nothing other than the order of origin. But it is evident that the name of action was not first imposed on the form produced by the action, but on the very essence of the action itself; indeed, if a form produced can be called an action, this is secondarily and by a certain derivation. Therefore, etc.

Second, because in the same place Saint Thomas asks whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the Persons, and shows that they are, notwithstanding that, according to Augustine, everything said of God is said either according to substance or according to relation—because the acts themselves are the same as the relations. It is evident, however, that the question is not about the act itself with respect to the form produced, but with respect to its essence, according to which it is predicated of the Person formally and intrinsically. And the response tends to the same. Therefore etc.

Third, because question XLV ³¹, as Saint Thomas says, is treated in order to show that something can be made from nothing: namely, because creation is not a change, but a relation signified in the manner of a change. But this would not be shown if he were speaking of action as a form produced, when he says that action and passion agree in the substance of motion and differ according to their relations. For by this it is not established that, once motion is removed, there remains in the creator only a relation signified in the manner of a change, which would be creation. For Saint Thomas is speaking of creation itself taken formally, not of creation taken concomitantly: whatever that may import, it is not established that the creation by which God is said to create formally and intrinsically is only a relation signified in the manner of a change.

It is also strange that Saint Thomas, in those passages where he explains from a consideration of action what notional acts and what creation formally signify, made mention only of motion and of relation as concomitantly accompanying action taken essentially, making no mention of that absolute entity which you say essential action is and which exists in the agent: since it would have better suited his purpose to show what action formally and essentially signifies in creatures than what action taken concomitantly signifies.

VI. Second, it is shown principally that this is the mind of St. Thomas ³². For in the Prima, q. XXXVII, a. 2, and in De Potentia, q. VII, a. 10, ad 8, he says that something can be denominated from that which is not its form, just as an agent is denominated from the action proceeding from it. Therefore action is not the form of the agent. — Nor does it avail to say that as regards the mode of signifying, action is signified as from the agent, but as regards the thing signified it is in the agent. For in De Potentia, in the place cited above, St. Thomas says the opposite of this. For he wills there that action is really not the form of the agent which it denominates, although it is signified by way of form, speaking grammatically.

Third. In the First Part, q. XVIII, a. 3, ad 1, a distinction is drawn between immanent and transitive action, as also in this place, because transitive action is the perfection of what is moved, whereas immanent action is the perfection of the agent. Therefore etc. — Nor does it suffice to say that it is understood of that which is produced by the action. First, because when a formal distinction between actions is posited, there is no consideration of where the terms of those actions are found, but rather whose perfections those actions are. Second, because sensing, which is numbered among immanent actions, has no produced term at all, especially the sensing of an exterior sense: therefore immanent action does not differ from transitive action in that the term produced by the immanent action is in the agent, while the term of the transitive action is in the patient, or perfects the thing made.

Fourth. Because in the Prima, q. LIV, a. 1, ad ult., it is said that an action which passes into something external is really intermediate between agent and subject, but not an immanent one between agent and object. Therefore the same thing is not both agent and subject of the action. — It does not avail, however, to say that he is speaking of a form made. For that reply is given to the argument by which it is proved that the understanding of an angel is his substance. Now it is clear that there he is understood to speak of the very action of the intellect taken essentially, not of the term produced by the action: just as in the question about the very act of understanding itself it is inquired. Therefore the difference of a passing action from an essentially taken passing action must be taken: otherwise that difference would not be to the purpose.

Many other passages to this purpose could be brought forward from Saint Thomas, but let these suffice for now.

VII. That this is also the mind of Aristotle and of the Commentator ³³ is proved first, because in Physics III, text 18 ³⁴ he says that the action of the mover and of the moved is one and the same, just as the space between two things is one and the same, etc. — But at text 20 ³⁵ he says that it is not absurd for the act of one thing to be in another, as teaching is the act of the teacher, yet in a certain other thing, namely in the learner. Therefore etc. — The same point, and more clearly, is laid down in De Anima II, text 140 ³⁶, etc.

If it is said that it takes action not essentially but concomitantly, for the form produced, the contrary is argued from the Commentator, commentary 18, where he says, expounding the words of Aristotle: For the action of the mover, which is to move, is his not in that thing. And this is what Aristotle intended by "For the mover etc.": that is, for the action of the mover is to make motion in another. Therefore action is not taken for the form produced as distinguished from the action, but for the very production of the motion and the form.

Secondly. In Metaphysics IX, text 16 ³⁷, Aristotle says that where besides the operation there is some thing wrought, the operation is the act of the thing wrought: as building in what is built, and weaving in what is woven, and universally motion in what is moved. — Nor does it avail to say that he takes "action" concomitantly, namely for the effect of the action. For Saint Thomas, expounding Aristotle's meaning there, says that the reason for this saying is that when through the operation of a power some thing wrought is constituted, that operation perfects the thing wrought, and not the agent. But it is evident that a thing wrought does not perfect itself as something wrought. Therefore "action" is not taken for the thing wrought by the action when it is said to perfect the thing wrought, but for the very essence of the action. — It is also plainly clear there that he distinguishes action from the work wrought, if the words of Saint Thomas are carefully examined.

Furthermore, the Philosopher says ³⁸ that the difference among powers—since in some there is some work produced beyond the action, while in others there is not—does not make it the case that in some of these powers act is less the end of the power and in others more, because the action itself is in the thing made: as if to say,—Although where there is some work wrought beyond the action, that work itself is the end, yet by this it is not removed that the operation itself is also an end, since it is not separated from the work done but exists in it; therefore, if the work done is the end of the power, then the action existing in it must also be an end, namely as the perfection of the work done. Now it is clear that this argument would be null, and this explanation empty, if action were taken concomitantly for the form made, and not essentially for the very production of the form. For what could be said of the claim that by that difference among powers it does not come about that in these the action is less an end and in those more, if action were taken for the form made? For he had already said that the work done itself is the end. Therefore he takes action essentially, as distinguished from the work done.

VIII. I hold, therefore, that the mind of Saint Thomas and of the Philosopher is that action, taken essentially, is in the patient subjectively, although the relation it connotes is in the agent. For the agent, by its power brought near to a disposed patient, produces form proceeding from imperfect esse to perfect (speaking of an agent with motion); and this form existing under imperfect esse with a tendency toward perfection is called action, connoting the respect of the agent to what comes to be, which is signified when motion is said as from this; the same form, when it has complete esse, is called the form made. Therefore, just as the form made is in the patient, so too action must necessarily be in the patient. Nor need we call action some absolute form existing in the agent: otherwise the agent, insofar as it is an agent, would have to suffer, which is unfitting; for the same proximate total principle of action, say the heat of fire, in heating wood would produce the action in itself, and thus in acting it would suffer from itself.

IX. To the arguments on the opposite side, however, ³⁹ the reply is given. To the first it is said that St. Thomas says this because of immanent action. For action, taken absolutely, has that it is an action and that it is an accident by reason of something of its species. But to inhere in a subject does not belong to it universally, nor by the common account of action. For the account of action, as it is action, consists in being from another, not inhering in a subject; but if some action inheres in its agent, as immanent action does, this belongs to it insofar as it is an accident, just as St. Thomas also says of relation ⁴⁰. Therefore, if immanent action is found in the agent, this is not because of the common account of action, but because of the account of accident.

It must be noted, however, that when it is said that being in the agent belongs to immanent action insofar as it is an accident, [that] the ly insofar as does not specify the notion of accident in general, because through the common notion of accident no accident determines for itself this subject more than that one; rather, it specifies a species of accident. And the sense is: To the action that is in the agent, being in the agent belongs, not because it is contained under the common notion of action as its species, but insofar as it is a species of accident: for insofar as it is an accident proceeding from the agent as the end of the agent, and not, however, as that through which some product is brought forth, it has that it remains in the agent itself.

But it must be noted that there is no contradiction in the words of Saint Thomas when he says, in 1 Sent., where it is alleged that action is signified as from the agent, but is in the agent as an accident is; whereas in de Potentia, where it was cited above, ⁴¹ he says that action is not really a form of the agent, although it is signified after the manner of a form. For in the First Book of the Sentences he speaks of immanent action, whereas in de Potentia he speaks of transitive action.

To the second ⁴² it is said first that action is called the proper perfection of the agent, in the question on Power, not inhering but proceeding from the agent. It is called a perfection of the agent because through it some good accrues to the agent, namely while the esse of the species is preserved, or something of this kind, as is clear there ⁴³.

It is said second, that in De Veritate Saint Thomas speaks of immanent action.

To the third ⁴⁴ it is said that in those passages St. Thomas speaks of action with respect to the connoted relation: for the relation signified by the name action is in the agent, and the relation signified by the name passion is in the patient. And universally, wherever St. Thomas says that action is in the agent, this must be understood either of the relation signified by the action, or of immanent action.

X. To the fourth ⁴⁵ it is said first that transitive action signifies nothing essentially beyond motion and the relation of the agent. But these are found in God only according to the mode of signifying and according to efficacy, as will be shown below ⁴⁶ for the divine action toward what is outside is His willing and His understanding.

It is said secondly, in reply to the first objection ⁴⁷, that Saint Thomas posits the divine operation and action by which a thing is produced in esse to be identified with his substance, not because something is imported to it and identified with it by a transient action, as the argument supposes, but because he does not act in things except through his immanent operation, which is identified with his substance and his power.

But if it be pressed further, since in the First Part, where above ⁴⁸, ad 4, he says that active power can be understood to be in God in two ways: namely, so that it be something distinct in reason from knowledge and will, by way of an executing principle, so that knowledge, will, and power are three formally distinct things, though really identified; and so that it be the very knowledge and will of God as it is an effective principle. And thus, according to the first mode, one must posit a transient action in God. And consequently one need not have recourse to immanent action: —

It is answered first, that in the true exemplars only the first response is set down; the second, however, is not of the text, as I have seen in many ancient exemplars ⁴⁹.

It is answered, secondly, even granting those two replies, that those two ways of speaking are distinguished because in the first way those three are considered as having disparate notions [a] conceived by us, of which, namely, one does not include another, just as mercy and justice are distinguished in God; but in the second way they are considered not as having altogether distinct notions, but as one including the notion of another and adding something to it; for thus power includes the notion of intellect and will, and adds the notion of a productive principle. Yet because of this one should not posit in God an operation properly passing over: rather, the same action corresponds to all these according to different notions. And this is indeed really immanent; but insofar as it is referred to intellect and will, namely, as he is said to will and to understand, it is not only immanent according to reality, but also according to the mode of conceiving; but insofar as it is referred to power, namely, as he is said to produce or to create, although it is immanent according to reality, nevertheless according to the mode of conceiving it is passing over; for it is conceived as the making of another, which is the notion fitting for passing-over action. But this is from the imperfection of our intellect, which is not able to apprehend the divine action according to what it is in itself, but conceives it distinctly as it has the perfection of immanent operation, and as it has the perfection of passing-over operation, although in itself it contains these perfections indistinctly.

To the second objection ⁵⁰ it is said that, although motion is not nobler than the active power of the mover of Saturn insofar as that is absolutely intellect or will, it is nevertheless nobler than it as bearing the character of a motive power: for, as such, it is ordered to motion as to its end.

Caput II: Quod consideratio creaturarum utilis est ad fidei instructionem

Having shown that it is necessary to determine the matter of God's transient action, Saint Thomas shows in the second place that the very consideration of creatures is useful¹: for to have perfect knowledge of what is made, one must also know the things made. In this he does two things. First, he establishes the usefulness of that consideration; second, he shows the difference between the Theologian and the Philosopher in the consideration of creatures, in chapter iv.

As to the first, he posits a twofold utility. And thus he proves two conclusions: the first in this chapter, the other in the following one.

I. The conclusion of this chapter is: The meditation on divine works is necessary, that is, useful, for instructing human faith. It is proved. To human faith it belongs to consider divine wisdom; and to admire the most lofty power of God, and consequently to fear and revere God; to love divine goodness; to arrive at the likeness of God. But this consideration bestows all these things. Therefore it is useful for instructing faith.

He proves the minor, as far as its first part, thus. The works of art are representative of the art. But God produced things by His wisdom: in the Psalm, You have made all things in wisdom; and Ecclesiasticus 1, He poured her out upon all His works. Therefore from a consideration of things made we can gather the divine wisdom, as impressed upon created things through a certain communication of its likeness. — This is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm: How great are your works, O Lord; my soul knows it exceedingly well.

As to the second part, it is argued first that they lead us into admiration of God's most exalted power: for the power of the maker is more eminent than the things made, as is intimated in Wisdom 13 and Romans 1. — That fear and reverence are caused by this, however, is proved by the authority of Jeremiah 10: "Great is your name" etc.

As to the third part, it is proved. The goodness of creatures, their beauty and sweetness, allure the souls of men to love. Therefore divine goodness itself, which is the fountain of goodness, when compared attentively with the rivulets of goodnesses found in individual things, will draw souls wholly inflamed to itself. — The consequence is evident, because whatever of goodness and perfection is distributed particularly among diverse creatures is united in him universally as a whole, as in the fountain of all goodness. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm, You have delighted me, O Lord etc.; and elsewhere, They shall be inebriated etc.; and Wisdom xiii, From the things that are seen etc.

As to the fourth part, it is proved because, since the Christian faith principally instructs man about God and, through the light of divine revelation, makes him a knower of creatures, there arises in man a certain likeness of divine wisdom: for God, in knowing Himself, beholds all things in Himself. — It is confirmed by the Apostle, II Cor. iii: But we all, with unveiled face etc.

The principal conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Ecclesiasticus 42, "I will remember" etc.

II. Concerning the conclusion of this chapter, it should be noted that its meaning is not that the consideration of creatures causes Christian faith: for faith is not caused in us by creatures, but by the light of divine revelation; although creatures themselves also lead us by the hand into the knowledge of God. But the meaning is that the consideration of creatures is useful for that instruction which Christian faith provides, since by this consideration we are helped toward those things to which faith directs us. For through faith we are instructed first about the things to be believed, secondarily about the things to be done. For according to the teaching of Saint Thomas, II[a] II[ae], q. iv, 2, ad 3, faith is in the speculative intellect as in its subject, but extensively it is also in the practical intellect; and it works through love (Galat. v²), insofar as it is the beginning and a certain, as it were, foundation of the whole spiritual life, as is said in Verit., q. XIV, 2, ad 1. Hence Christian faith is not taken here as it is the theological virtue distinct from hope and charity, but as including all things pertaining to the Christian life.

III. A doubt is raised concerning the first part of the minor premise. For wonder, as is clear from the Philosopher, Metaphysics I **³, belongs to one who is ignorant. Therefore what leads to knowledge and consideration of divine wisdom does not lead to wonder at it. It is therefore contradictory to say that consideration of creatures makes us both wonder at and consider divine wisdom. It is answered that wonder is a species of fear consequent upon the apprehension of some thing exceeding our capacity: as is clear from I-II, q. 41, a. 4; and II-II, q. 180, a. 3, ad 3; and De Veritate, q. 26, 4, ad 7. Hence, when some knowable thing is apprehended as altogether surpassing our knowledge, wonder is caused. An effect, then, can lead to knowledge of its cause in two ways: namely, either perfect or imperfect. If it leads to perfect knowledge, as happens with univocal effects, it does not cause wonder. But if it leads to imperfect knowledge, as with equivocal effects, it can cause wonder because of the magnitude of the cause's perfection, which surpasses our knowledge. Since, therefore, creatures lead to an imperfect knowledge of divine wisdom (which St. Thomas gives us to understand when he says that from the consideration of things made we can in some way consider divine wisdom), it is not unfitting that both wonder and knowledge be caused in us by them.

But a doubt still remains. If admiration is a species of fear, since fear concerns a future evil, admiration too will concern a future evil, whose outcome one cannot consider⁴. But divine wisdom is not an evil; rather, it is the highest good. Therefore admiration does not occur with respect to it. It is answered that, although divine wisdom is the highest good, nevertheless its consideration can be apprehended as superfluous and as harmful, as is said in Truth, where above⁵, when it is considered as altogether surpassing our knowledge. Hence the admirer refrains in the present from giving judgment about what he wonders at, fearing to fail in that very judgment⁶.

IV. Concerning the second part of the same minor premise, where it is said, The virtue of the maker is more eminent than the things made, it must be noted that this is understood of those things that are produced by art. For it is evident that the virtue of an artisan is superior to the things he has fashioned. And the nobler the artifacts are, the more we admire the virtue and ingenuity of the artisan, inasmuch as it exceeds that knowledge which we can have of it through the artifact itself: for from the work we discover that there is in the artisan a virtue out of the ordinary, capable also of accomplishing greater things. So too, when God is compared with all created things as an artisan with his artifacts, his virtue is more eminent than created things, and from creatures we admire his virtue, as surpassing our knowledge.

Concerning what Saint Thomas says, since from admiration of the divine power proceed fear and reverence, it must be noted that, since fear is twofold—namely servile and chaste or filial—each regards a twofold object: namely, the evil which one flees; and him from whom, or in comparison with whom, evil can come. In the second way God can be feared, but not in the first: as is held in IIª IIae, q. 19, a. 1. Both fears, moreover, arise from consideration of an outstanding power: namely, when someone is judged able to inflict harm on account of his dignity and excellence of power; or, on account of his dignity and excellence, one would not wish to offend him or be separated from him. And thus from consideration of the outstanding divine power is caused servile fear of God, insofar as God, by reason of his power, can inflict harm; and filial fear, insofar as someone, having considered the magnitude and excellence of the divine power, is inflamed with love of God and flees offending him. It must be considered secondly that reverence, which is in some way an act of fear and in some way an act of latria, always regards an excellent person by reason of that excellence. Therefore, from consideration of the excellence of the divine power there is caused reverence toward God himself. Therefore, when it is said that from admiration of God's most lofty power are caused fear and reverence, we may understand servile and filial fear, which is in some way the same as reverence. We may also understand filial fear with respect to its act, which is to fear separation from God; and with respect to its other act, which is reverence and subjection to God. For these two acts are attributed to filial fear in Iª IIae, q. 67, a. 4, ad 2.

V. As to the third part, where it is said that all the goods of creatures are universally united in God, understand this not by way of heaping together, but by way of the most simple unity, and of the universality of actual perfection, as was declared in Book One⁷. Concerning the last part, where it is said that the Christian faith makes man a knower of creatures, it must be noted that this is understood not with respect to their natures and properties, but insofar as they have dependence upon God: as Saint Thomas says in the fourth chapter.

Caput III: Quod cognoscere naturam creaturarum valet ad destruendum errores qui sunt circa Deum

The second conclusion is ¹: To know the natures of creatures, in the manner expounded in the preceding chapter ², serves to destroy the errors that concern God.

It is proved. Errors that concern the creature sometimes lead away from the truth of faith, insofar as they are repugnant to true knowledge of God. Therefore knowledge of the creature itself is useful for destroying errors concerning God. — The consequence is evident from itself. — The antecedent, however, is proved by an enumeration of the errors arising from ignorance of the nature of creatures.

The first are those who, believing nothing to exist above a corporeal creature, said that some creature is the first cause and God: such as those who posited that any body whatsoever is God. Of these mention is made Wisdom xiii, "But who by fire," etc.

The second is that of those who attribute to creatures things that belong to God alone, such as creating, knowing the future, working miracles, and the like. That this arises from ignorance of the creature is evident: because what the nature of a thing cannot bear is attributed to it only because its nature is unknown; but what belongs to God alone is something the nature of a creature cannot bear. Against this error there is Wisdom xiv: "The incommunicable name," etc.

The third are those who detract something from the divine power operating in creatures: such as those who posit two first principles of things, and those who assert that things proceed from God by the necessity of nature; likewise those who deny divine providence and that God can act beyond the ordinary course of nature. Against them is Job 22, "As if He were nothing," etc.; and Wisdom 12, "Your power," etc.

The fourth are those who, out of ignorance of the degree of their order in the universe, think that man is subject to things to which he is superior: such as those who subject the wills of men to the stars, against whom is Jeremiah 10, "Be not dismayed at the signs of the heavens," etc.; and those who make angels the creators of souls; or who hold the souls themselves to be mortal; and any others who detract from the dignity of man. This error, however, leads one away from God. For since faith leads man to God as to his ultimate end and first cause, this error removes man from that ultimate end itself, as though he could not move himself toward God as toward an end, but were of necessity subject to other causes.

From this the error is refuted of those who say it makes no difference to the truth of faith what one thinks about creatures, provided one's judgment concerning God is correct: as Augustine relates in the book On the Origin of the Soul. For error concerning creatures redounds to a false knowledge of God. Hence Scripture threatens those who err concerning creatures with punishments as it does unbelievers, in the Psalm and Wisdom 2.

A particular consideration of these errors will be given below. Therefore it is not necessary to dwell on them now.

Caput IV: Quod aliter considerat de creaturis philosophus et theologus

After considering the utility that Christian faith derives from the consideration of creatures, since the philosopher also treats of those same creatures, it remains to show what difference there is between the theologian and the philosopher in their consideration of creatures¹. On this point Saint Thomas does two things. First, he shows the difference between them with respect to those things which each considers; second, with respect to the considerations and sciences themselves².

I. As to the first point, two conclusions are proposed. The first is: Creatures are subject to the doctrine of the Christian faith (or theology, which is the same thing) in one way, and to human philosophy in another. It is proved: because they are subject to theology insofar as a divine likeness shines forth in them and they are in some way ordered to God himself, as is had from Ecclesiasticus, chapter 42; but they are subject to human philosophy insofar as such things are of this kind, as fire, water, heaven, and the like; hence also according to the different genera of things different parts of philosophy are found. Therefore, etc.

It must be known that, since there is a twofold formal ratio of the subject of a science—one that belongs to a thing as it is a thing, to which the science is terminated first and per se, and which is assumed as the middle for demonstrating the passions of the subject; and another that belongs to it as contained under that genus which I call knowable, according to which the subject is denominated from the middle of knowing—here Saint Thomas speaks of the formal ratio of the subject as it is a thing, not of that which belongs to it as knowable.

But it must be considered further that the account of a subject, insofar as it is a thing, is twofold: one is adequate, under which or in relation to which all things are considered by a science; the other is inadequate, and these are the particular accounts contained under the adequate account; just as the adequate account of the subject of natural philosophy is the account of mobile being, while the account of this or that mobile being is inadequate. Therefore the account of creatures, which is their likeness to God, or any other relation to Him in accordance with which they are considered by the theologian, is not the primary and adequate account of the subject of theology — for not all things considered by the theologian are considered as like God, since the theologian also considers God Himself — but it is a secondary and inadequate account. For the account of deity is an adequate account: because all things are considered in it either as participating in the account of deity, or as having order and attribution to God, as is stated in Prima, q. 1³. But likeness, or any other attribution to God, is a secondary and particular account: just as the account of this or that mobile being is a secondary and particular account in natural philosophy, contained under mobile being.

When, therefore, it is said that the theologian considers the creature as representing the divine height, but the philosopher insofar as it is a thing of this kind, then the “insofar as” does not specify the adequate formal ratio of the object of a science, but a particular and inadequate one, which is related to the adequate one as the material is to the formal.

Concerning that proposition, Whence, according to the diverse genera of things, the diverse parts of philosophy are found, it must be noted that the genera of things themselves, according to their rationes, can be considered in two ways: in one way, absolutely, for instance being precisely as being, and quantity as quantity, and so with the others; in another way, as some intelligible ratio answers to a ratio holding on the side of the thing, insofar as it is intelligible. The proposition of Saint Thomas is therefore to be understood in the second way, not the first. For the sciences are not to be distinguished according to the diverse genera of things taken absolutely, because then there would be as many genera of sciences as there are genera of things; rather they are distinguished according to the genera of things as contained under diverse rationes of the intelligible. For all things contained under one ratio of the intelligible belong to one science: just as all natural things belong to natural philosophy, because in this ratio they agree in being knowable through a medium concerning matter both in esse and in ratio. But those things which are contained under diverse rationes of the intelligible, insofar as they are intelligible, belong to diverse sciences. — In the same way is to be understood what is said in III de Anima ⁴: that the sciences are divided just as things are. — Wherefore Saint Thomas says elsewhere ⁵ that the sciences are distinguished according to the formal distinction of their objects, and not according to their material distinction, and according to the distinction of objects as objects: calling material distinction that which is according to the proper and specific rationes of things, but formal that which is according to the diverse rationes of the intelligible insofar as it is intelligible.

II. The second conclusion, following from what was premised (⁶), is: The Philosopher considers one thing about creatures, and the Faithful another; and if anything is considered in common by both, it is handed down through different and distinct principles.

Saint Thomas proves the first part, because the Philosopher considers those things that belong to things according to their proper nature, as that fire is borne upward; but the Faithful consider those things that belong to them insofar as they are related to God, namely that they are created by God, subject to God, and so forth. From this it also follows that Christian doctrine is not imperfect if it omits many properties of things, since it does not have to treat of all of them: just as Natural Philosophy does not consider all the affections of a line, but only those that belong to it insofar as it is the terminus of a natural body.

He shows the second part, because the Philosopher proves these things from the proper causes of things, while the believer does so from the first cause.

From which corollary it follows that Christian doctrine is wisdom in the highest degree, because it always considers the highest cause: as is gathered from Deuteronomy iv, where it is said, "This is your wisdom," etc. ⁷

Concerning the first part of this conclusion, it must be considered that, since the ratio considered as it stands on the side of the thing is the principle and medium from which the passions and properties of the thing originally depend—and otherwise different ratios are followed by different passions, just as the passions of man are different insofar as he is an animal and different insofar as he is rational—it is necessary that, where the same subject is considered by different sciences under different rationes, different passions of it are also considered by those sciences; just as, because the mathematician and the natural philosopher consider the line under different rationes, the mathematician considers certain passions of it and the natural philosopher others. From this foundation, then, the first part of the conclusion holds. For since the Philosopher and the Believer consider creatures under different rationes as these stand on the side of the thing, it is necessary that they consider different predicates of them: just as the properties that befit a thing according to its own proper ratio are one thing, and those that befit it insofar as it has a relation to God are another.
Concerning the second part, it must be noted that, although diverse properties follow upon diverse rationes of a thing when those rationes are considered in themselves, it is nevertheless not unfitting that one and the same property of a thing depend for its being knowable upon diverse rationes of the thing, insofar as those rationes subsist under diverse rationes of the knowable, yet inadequate to the thing. For the same thing can be known in diverse ways: just as the roundness of the earth can be known by the astronomer and by the natural philosopher, because the being knowable through a medium drawn from matter and the being knowable through a medium abstracted from matter according to its ratio can both belong to the earth with respect to its roundness, neither of which rationes is adequate to the earth. Hence, just as the earth, considered by the mathematician and the natural philosopher with respect to its roundness, has the ratio of two formal knowables, inasmuch as under diverse rationes of object, as object, it can be contained, and thus pertain to diverse sciences; so the roundness itself has the ratio of a twofold property in the ratio of the knowable, inasmuch as it can be known through diverse formal media, taken according to a diverse ratio of the knowable. From this it is evident that the Philosopher and the Believer can know the same things about creatures, but through diverse media, as Saint Thomas said, yet inasmuch as they are referred to diverse rationes of the knowable: for instance, that the earth is incorruptible and stands forever, the Philosopher proves through some medium drawn from matter and motion; but the Believer through a medium drawn from divine revelation, for instance, because it redounds to the glory of God, which is made manifest from the Scriptures.
Concerning the corollary of this part, it must be noted that theology differs from metaphysics, because metaphysics indeed considers God and separate substances, yet not all the things considered by the metaphysician are proved through the first cause itself; theology, however, considers the first cause in such a way that it also resolves its consideration of creatures into that first cause itself, and it determines concerning that cause even those things that are known to God alone concerning Himself, as they are known through revelation, as is said in the First Part, q. 1, a. 6. Hence the consideration of the first cause is more universal in theology than in metaphysics. On this account it is more worthy of the name of wisdom, to which it belongs to consider the highest cause.

III. As to the second point ⁸, a twofold conclusion follows from what has been said. The first is: Human philosophy serves this science as its handmaid. It is proved by a comparison: for even First Philosophy makes use of the teachings of all the sciences for its own purpose. — It must be noted, however, from the teaching of St. Thomas, Prima, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2, that although theology receives something from the other sciences, this is not on account of any defect or insufficiency in itself, but on account of the defect of our intellect, which is not able of itself to understand things that are above reason; and it is more easily led into theology by means of those things that are known by natural reason.

The second conclusion is: The philosopher and the theologian do not treat of God and creatures in the same order. It is proved. Because the philosopher first determines about creatures, since it is from them that he takes his knowledge of God, and afterwards about God; but in the doctrine of faith it is the reverse, for he does not determine about creatures except in relation to God. From which it follows that this order is more like the divine cognition: for God also, while knowing himself as the first object, knows other things as secondary objects.

From these things it is concluded lastly that, after those things which belong to God in himself, concerning which determination was made in the first book, there must be determined the things that proceed from him.

But the opposite conclusion can be urged. For the first consideration in Sacred Scripture does not seem to be of God, but of creatures. For it begins with the creation of things, as is clear from Genesis 1.

It is answered that Moses did not hand down his teaching in a scientific manner, but as befitted those to whom he was speaking. For since the people of the Jews were untrained and could not grasp intelligible things in themselves, nor divine things, he therefore began from sensible things, under which the intelligible things were also veiled—things that could be investigated by the more learned. Saint Thomas, however, speaks of the doctrine of faith as handed down in a scientific manner, as he himself intends to do in this work.

Caput VI: Quod Deo competit ut sit aliis principium essendi

The prooemium having been dispatched, and the division of the book having been set forth, Saint Thomas begins, according to the order of the division, to treat of the production of things ¹.

On this matter, however, he does two things: first, he treats of the very production of things with respect to the species and substance of that production; second, with respect to its quality, chapter XXII.

As to the first: since every production proceeds from some principle and terminates in something, he first treats of the principle of production; second, of the terminus, in chapter XV; third, of the production itself, in chapter XVI.

As to the first point: since "principle" signifies a relation to that which is from the principle, he does two things here as well. First, he determines concerning the principle itself; second, concerning God's relations to creatures, in chapter 11.

Because, however, power belongs only to those things that are principles of being, therefore, before he determines concerning power itself, which is the formal principle of production, he shows in this chapter that God is the principle of being for other things; but in the following chapter he begins to determine concerning power itself.

I. As far as the present chapter is concerned, then, this conclusion is laid down: It belongs to God to be the principle of esse and the cause for others.

Note, however, that there is added and cause, so that Saint Thomas may explain what he had said: principle of being. For form is a principle of being; yet it is not the productive cause of that of which it is the form, but is a formal principle. God, however, is a principle of being by way of an agent cause. And it is of such a principle that we speak here.

The conclusion, however, is proved from what was shown in the first book.

II. First. It was shown above, according to the mind of Aristotle, that there is some first agent cause, which is God. Now an efficient cause conduces its effects to esse. Therefore etc.

It must be noted that, although we say that forms concur so as to give esse, we do not use this manner of speaking of a form, as though the effect concurred toward esse. For this properly expresses the causality of the efficient cause, whose role is to reduce the effect from potency to act by producing the form from which the thing formally has esse. Now a form does not concur toward esse in an effect as though the esse of the form were something wholly extrinsic to the form, just as it is extrinsic to the agent qua agent; rather, esse is joined to the form itself as its formal effect, emanating from it through a certain natural resultant. The efficient cause, therefore, is said to concur with the effect toward esse because it gives to the effect, previously distant from esse, the form through which it exists in the nature of things.

Second. The first mover in any order of motions (namely, the essential order) is the cause of all the motions of that order. But many things are brought into being by the motions of the heavens. It was shown in the First Book that God is the first mover of that order of motions. Therefore God will be the cause of being for at least many things.

III. Third. God is a being in act. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. To that which exists in act it belongs per se to produce some effect. Therefore every being in act is naturally apt to produce something existing in act. Therefore, etc. — The first consequence is evident: because what belongs per se to something is naturally present in it. — The antecedent is also manifest: because each agent acts insofar as it is in act.²**

Doubt is raised concerning the proposition immediately assumed: for it does not seem to establish the proposed conclusion. For although in order that something act, it is necessary that it be in act, it does not seem to follow from this that everything which is in act acts of itself and naturally: just as, although in order that something be capable of laughter, it must be an animal, it does not follow that everything which is an animal is capable of laughter. Therefore, although each thing acts insofar as it is in act, it does not follow that everything existing in act is active.

It is answered that, when it is said, Each thing acts according as it is in act, the according as specifies the account of acting: for just as heat is the form by which fire heats and is for itself the reason of heating, so universally form and act is for an agent the reason of acting, since every agent in acting makes something be in act. Now it is universally true that where there is the formal reason of something, that thing must be, and where that thing is, the formal reason must be: just as in whatever has heat, it must be capable of heating; and in everything capable of heating it is necessary that heat be present, either formally or virtually. If therefore being in act is for each agent the reason of its acting, it follows that every agent must be in act, and everything that is in act must be naturally active. Hence Saint Thomas said that being active with respect to an effect belongs to what exists of itself in act — that is, it belongs to a thing through its proper form by which it is in act; and consequently it belongs to it naturally, for those things that follow upon the form of a thing are natural.

To this objection it is answered that, although the esse of being risible belongs to nothing except what is an animal, still the esse of animal is not the reason why something is risible. For we do not say that something is risible insofar as it is an animal, but insofar as it is rational.

IV. Fourth. God is the most perfect being. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because a sign of perfection is found in lower things, as is said in Book IV of the Meteorology, namely that they can produce things like themselves. But God is ipsum esse in act. Therefore, etc.

It must be noted that, although creatures cannot be made like God according to one specific notion, they can nevertheless be made like him in the most common of all perfections, which is esse. Therefore Saint Thomas, from the fact that God can make something like himself, concludes that he can make something a being in act, just as he himself is act.

Fifth. God wills that his esse be communicated to others by way of likeness. Therefore he is the cause of being for others. — The antecedent was shown above in the First Book. — The consequence is proved, supposing that it belongs to the perfection of the will to be a principle of action and motion, as is said in III de Anima. The divine will is perfect. Therefore there is not lacking to it the power of communicating esse by way of likeness, if it wills to communicate it.

Note that Saint Thomas does not say absolutely that God wills to communicate His esse to others, but added, by way of likeness: so as to show that the mode of communication in creatures differs from the mode by which one divine Person communicates its esse to another Person. For there the same esse is communicated according to number; here, however, what is communicated is not the divine esse itself in itself, but a certain likeness of the divine esse, inasmuch as the esse of a creature is a certain participated likeness of it.

V. Finally. By the act that is in us, we can act not only in immanent actions, but also in transitive actions, by which we produce certain effects. Therefore, much more can God do this. Therefore He can be the cause of being to others. — The inference is proved: because the more perfect the principle of an action is, the further it can extend its action into more things and toward more remote ends. Therefore, if the act existing in us, which is mixed with potency, can act not only in an immanent action but also in one that passes outward into external things, much more will the act with which no potency is mixed be able to do so, as is God.

It must first be noted that no act existing in a creature is one that is not compared to esse as potency to act, since esse is the actuality of all things. On account of this Saint Thomas says that act in us is mixed with potency.

It must be noted, secondly, that a twofold act is attributed to the intellect and the will: one immanent, namely understanding and willing absolutely; the other transient, which is to move, whether by way of a commanding power or by way of a power that immediately elicits the motion; for it makes no difference, as far as the matter at hand is concerned, which of these we say. Therefore, when Saint Thomas says that by the act existing in us we can act in an immanent and a transient action, by the name act existing in us we can understand the will and the intellect: so that there may be a correspondence and likeness between us and God, though an imperfect one; for in us and in God both of these acts are attributed to the will and the intellect. We can also understand the soul itself, which by its diverse powers can exercise these diverse operations. The second seems better: because Saint Thomas is not speaking here of the act of moving the conjoined body locally, but of the act of some extrinsic producer, which is certainly exercised by some bodily member. But then, although there is some likeness between us and God with respect to these acts, there is nevertheless a dissimilitude in this, that we elicit these actions through diverse proximate principles, whereas God does so through a single principle, which is his will. This happens on account of his very perfection, from which it follows that what exists in creatures as distinct, he himself possesses unitedly and indivisibly.

This conclusion is finally confirmed by the authority of Job, chapter 5: "Who does great things."

Caput IX: Quod Dei potentia sit eius actio

The second conclusion is ¹: The power of God is nothing other than His own action.

It is proved first. The divine power is the substance of God. And likewise the divine action, as was shown in the First Part concerning intellection; for the same account holds for the other actions, which are distinguished from intellection only in reason, such as willing and creating and the like. Therefore the divine action is the divine power. — The consequence is evident. Because things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as each other.
But it seems that the proposed conclusion does not follow from this proposition. For that proposition holds true only of things that are the same in reality and in reason, as is said in Prima, q. xxviii, a. 3, ad 1, concerning Aristotle's mind, Physics III ². Now, although power is really identical with the divine essence, it is nevertheless distinguished from it by reason. Similarly with action. Therefore from their being really identical with the essence it does not follow that they are really identical with one another: just as, although divine paternity and filiation are really identical with the essence, they are nevertheless really distinct from each other on account of their formal distinction from the essence.

It is answered that this proposition of the Philosopher is to be understood as follows. Whatever things are the same as one third thing are the same among themselves with respect to that in which they are identified in the middle term; but not with respect to that in which they are distinguished from the middle term, and which is not for them the ground of identification in the middle term. For thus, because action and passion, with respect to what is material in them, are identified with motion, but not with respect to the connotates, therefore they are the same among themselves materially, but not formally. From this follows the gloss of Saint Thomas adduced in the objection: that if certain things are to be said to be simply the same among themselves by reason of their union in a middle term, it is necessary that they be altogether the same as a third thing, namely not only according to the thing, but also according to the reason.

It must be noted, however, that some things can be distinguished by reason in two ways. In one way, from the operation of the intellect alone, which forms diverse conceptions of one and the same thing: as divine wisdom is distinguished from the essence. For if the essence were conceived as it is in itself, its concept would include the character of wisdom; but because our intellect cannot conceive it as it is in itself, it therefore forms one concept of the deity and another of divine wisdom. Similarly, if divine wisdom were conceived as it is in itself, it would include in its character both the essence and every perfection. — In the other way, on the part of the things themselves, which are such that, if they were conceived as they are in themselves, they would be conceived by diverse concepts: as is the case with action and motion. For they require of themselves that the intellect form a different concept of them, inasmuch as action connotes a respect in the agent which motion does not signify; for however perfectly motion be comprehended, still not everything belonging to the character of action is apprehended.

Since, therefore, St. Thomas says that that proposition does not hold in those things which are distinguished from a third by a distinction of reason, he is speaking of the distinction of reason arising from the side of the things themselves. For if it arose only from the side of the intellect, then the real union in the third would make for a real identity of the extremes, notwithstanding their distinction of reason from the third: as is the case with beginning and end as they are said of a point on a line. But such is the case at hand. For power and action are not distinguished by a reason from the divine essence on account of the condition of the things themselves, but only from the imperfection of our intellect: for if the deity were conceived in itself, there would be in its intellect active power and action, just as every other perfection; since it is infinite perfection and the fount of all perfection. Therefore, from the fact that they are really identical with the essence, it follows that they are really identical with one another: as also with the divine wisdom and justice.

It is not so, however, with paternity and filiation. For paternity, insofar as it is a relation, would not belong to the concept of the deity even if it were conceived as it is. For the concept of the deity includes only the notion of every perfection; but a relation, insofar as it is a relation, signifies nothing—not a perfection—but only an ordering toward another, as will be shown below ³. Therefore that it is distinguished by reason from the essence is due not only to the intellect, but also to the nature of the thing itself. On this account paternity and filiation need not be really the same as each other, even though they are really the same as the essence. For if real identity between them were to be concluded from their identity with the essence, each of them would have to be identical with the essence also according to its own concept, as far as the things themselves are concerned.

II. Second. The divine power is not completed by anything other than itself, since it is the divine essence itself. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Act is the complement of power. Therefore, if it is distinguished from the power, the power is perfected by something other than itself. This is opposed to the antecedent.

It must be noted that the complement of a potency is one thing in the case of an immanent action, and another in the case of a transient action. For an immanent action is the complement both by way of an end and by way of a form: for when a potency is joined to its immanent operation, it attains the end to which it is ordered, since such a potency exists on account of its operation; and because that operation remains within the potency itself, the potency is perfected by it as by a form, and thus its potentiality—by which it was receptive of its own action—is completed. A transient action, however, since it does not remain in the agent but is received in the patient, does not complete or perfect the agent by way of a form, but only by way of an end: for although in actions of this kind the thing done is the ultimate end, the operation itself is not outside the account of a proximate end, as is said in Book IX of the Metaphysics ⁴ Now God cannot be perfected by anything else, either by way of a form or by way of an end. Therefore none of his actions, whether conceived by way of an immanent act or signified by way of a transient one, can be distinguished from his potency. And this is the foundation of this argument.

III. Third. To act is divine for it, that is, its esse. But divine esse is the substance of God. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved: God's active power is his essence; therefore his acting too is his being.

Before the consequence is proved, note that some texts ⁵ read as follows, and wrongly: "As active power is something of an agent, so its essence is something of it." For the text should read as the corrected manuscripts have it: "As active power is something acting, so essence is something being," that is: as the act of a power is to act, since the power is that by which one acts, while the agent is an agent through its very act of acting; so the act of essence is esse, since everything that is a being is a being through esse itself. From this it is argued thus. As power is related to acting, so essence is related to esse. Therefore, as power is related to essence, so acting is related to esse. Therefore, if power is the same as essence, acting will be the same as esse. — And if it were said that the converted proportion holds only in numbers and magnitudes, as is said in Book III, d. 34, q. 2, a. 3 ⁶, and De Veritate, q. 29, 8 ⁷: — the answer is given that indeed it is true that the converted proportion regularly holds only in quantities, because in others it does not hold formally; yet in certain other cases it holds on account of the matter. And thus it holds in the case at hand. For if acting is the act of a power just as esse is the act of essence, then, if power is the same as essence, acting itself must also be the act of essence. But the act of essence is esse. Acting itself, therefore, will be esse itself.

Here it must be noted that acting is said to have the same relation to power as esse has to essence, because just as esse is the formal act by which a being has that it be a being, so acting is the formal act by which an agent has that it be an agent. There is, however, a difference in this: esse is intrinsic to the being, whereas acting, insofar as it is transient, is not intrinsic to the agent, but is an act actually dependent upon the agent. But since divine action ad extra is not distinguished from His immanent action, therefore, just as divine esse is intrinsic, so too is His acting. Now when certain things are really identical, it is necessary that the formal acts constituting them in their reason and species be really identical; for there are not several formal acts specifying one and the same thing really distinct from one another—although, just as the thing itself is distinguished by several reasons, so it can have several acts distinct in reason.

IV. Fourth. In God there cannot be anything in the manner of an accident. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because an action that is not the substance of a thing inheres in it as an accident in a subject: for action is reckoned among the nine genera of accidents.

Concerning that proposition, "In God there cannot be anything in the manner of an accident," it must be noted that the manner of an accident can be taken either on the side of the thing or on the side of the intellect. The manner holding on the side of the thing is to inhere really in another. The manner, however, holding on the side of the intellect is to be conceived as inhering and as existing outside the essence of the thing: namely, when the intellect forms diverse concepts of one substance, one of which is attributed to another, although in reality one does not inhere in the other, but is identical with it. The proposition of Saint Thomas, therefore, is understood of the manner holding on the side of the thing, not of the manner holding on the side of the one understanding. Indeed, on the side of the intellect we apprehend the divine attributes as superadded to the essence, although they are the same as the substance of the thing.

But concerning this argument a doubt arises. For it either proceeds about immanent action, or about transient action. If about the immanent, that proof—namely, that action is reckoned among the nine genera of accidents—is not to the point: for immanent action is not of the genus of action but of the genus of quality, as is said. — If, however, about the transient, the argument does not proceed. First because transient action is not posited in God, as will be shown below⁸ Then because it is false that it is in the agent as its accident, as was shown above in chapter one⁹

It is answered that it proceeds from action in the common sense of passing over, without descending to a determinate specification, neither to that which truly passes over nor to that which passes over only by way of similitude and according to efficacy.

When, however, it is urged in the first place that transitive action does not befit God: it is said that, although truly and properly transitive action does not befit him, yet action analogous to transitive action and in respect of efficacy does befit him, as will be shown below in chapter xvi ¹⁰

When it is objected secondly, because transient action is not in the agent: it is said that indeed an action that is truly transient is not in the agent with respect to the very entity of the action, which is motion; yet it is in the agent with respect to the relation connoted. But action that is transient only as to mode is, of course, in the agent: although it is reduced to the category of action by a certain likeness. And thus it follows, if such action were distinguished from the divine power, that there would be some accident in God. Therefore the argument of Saint Thomas proceeds most excellently.

Caput X: Qualiter potentia in Deo dicatur

I. In the third place it must be shown how active power is in God¹. And Saint Thomas sets down two conclusions, and two corollaries.

I. The first conclusion is: In God there is no power as a principle of action, except according to our way of understanding. The first part is proved. Nothing is the principle of itself in truth. But divine action is nothing other than His power. Therefore the power of God is not the principle of divine action. — Saint Thomas declares the second part, saying that there is there a power with respect to action as regards our mode of understanding, insofar as our intellect considers both the divine power and the action under distinct conceptions.

For the declaration of the first part, it must be noted that truth is taken there not as signifying something existing in the intellect, but as signifying the truth of a thing, which is its very esse. And the sense is that there is no potency there with respect to action according to esse, that is, as if potency were really the productive principle of action.

To make the second part evident, it must be considered that, since every perfection of a creature is in God, though without imperfection; and since potency and action both signify some perfection: it is necessary that both be found in God. Therefore our intellect apprehends in the divine nature both the aspect of potency and the aspect of action. And because it belongs to the aspect of action in creatures that it proceed from a principle, as is said in Potentia, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, therefore, when the intellect conceives something in God by way of action, it conceives it as proceeding from a principle: yet this relation is not in reality, but only in thought. Hence there is not in the thing itself a relation of action to potency as to its principle, but this exists only in our manner of conceiving. Nor is the intellect false in thus understanding: for it does not apprehend that it is so in reality that the divine action is produced from potency, but this holds only on the side of the mode of understanding, just as when it apprehends one thing in relation to another between which nevertheless there is no relation on the side of the thing itself, as when it compares the same thing to itself; which happens when the intellect forms diverse concepts of one and the same thing.

But a doubt arises against the first part of the conclusion. For Saint Thomas seems to say the opposite of it in I Sent., d. XLII, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2. There he says that the divine essence, insofar as it is the principle of operation, is called power. Therefore there is in God a power with respect to operation, the opposite of which the conclusion states.

It is answered that St. Thomas speaks of a principle not according to esse, but according to reason and mode of understanding. For as is said in Potentia, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, although the divine essence has no principle either in reality or in reason, nevertheless the divine operation has some principle in reason. II. The second conclusion is: In God there is power in the truth of reality with respect to things made. — It is proved. In God there is power in the truth of reality. But power imports a relation to another under the aspect of principle: as is clear from the definition of active power in Book IX of the Metaphysics ². Therefore in God power signifies the aspect of principle with respect to things made, since it does not signify it with respect to operation: for it is the productive principle of created things.

III. The first corollary is: With respect to immanent actions, no potency is posited in God according to the truth of the thing, but only according to the mode of understanding. It is clear from what has been said. For potency names a really productive principle. But it was said that potency does not have the character of a principle with respect to operation according to the truth of the thing, but only according to the mode of understanding. Therefore etc. — From this it follows further that will and intellect in God are not potencies, but actions only.

But there seems to be an implication of contradiction in the words of St. Thomas. For either he understands the will and the intellect to be in God as truly and really actions, or only according to reason. If according to the thing itself, then there must be a real power with respect to them, because it belongs to the nature of operation to have a principle, as was brought forward ³ from the question on the Power of God. — If only according to reason, then one must posit there an intellect and will as powers according to reason. It is answered that he understands these to be truly and really actions, and not merely according to reason. But it must be noted that, since the perfections of creatures are found in God as regards what is of perfection, but not as regards the imperfection which they include, the immanent actions, which are understanding and willing, must be in God by reason of their perfection, but not by reason of their imperfection. Now in these actions what is of perfection is that they are the ultimate complement, awaiting no other perfection; for immanent operation is the ultimate complement of the power. And in this respect such actions are posited in God: for understanding itself and willing are understood as the ultimate act, awaiting no further act. But to proceed from a principle really distinct from them in esse is of imperfection. Therefore in this respect they are not posited in God. Since, then, it is argued that it belongs to the nature of action to have a productive principle according to the thing itself: it is said that this is false as regards what is of perfection in the action, and in the case of a subsistent action, such as the divine operation; but it is quite true of an action that is an accident distinct from that power itself. And universally, it belongs to the nature of action to have a productive principle either according to the thing itself, or according to a mode of understanding holding on the part of the intellect.

IV. The following corollary follows from what has been said: The multitude of actions attributed to God are not diverse things. — It is proved: because all of them are the divine esse itself, which is one. Note that Saint Thomas counts the production of things among the divine actions as distinct from understanding and willing, not because it is formally distinct from them altogether, but because it adds to them a relation of principle to creatures by way of execution. For as was said in the first chapter of this second book ⁴, power is not distinguished from intellect and will in God except because over and above them it adds a relation of executive principle. Hence what Saint Thomas says, since intellect and will in God are not as powers, they are understood insofar as intellect and will exist, namely insofar as they regard immanent actions taken absolutely. But when with these there is co-understood the relation of productive principle to creatures, they are in him as powers. Finally, because someone might say that this multiplicity of divine operations according to reason is repugnant to the unity and simplicity of God, he answers that from what was shown in the first book it is evident that the multiplicity of signification of one thing, that is, that one thing is signified by many names and consequently conceived under diverse rationes, does no prejudice to unity.⁵

Caput XI: Quod de Deo dicitur aliquid relative ad creaturas

After Saint Thomas determined concerning the power of God, he consequently determines concerning the divine relations to creatures ¹. Concerning this, however, he does three things: first, indeed, he treats of these relations themselves with respect to their predication; second, with respect to their esse, chapter XII; third, with respect to their multitude, chapter XIV ². I. With respect to the first, the conclusion is set down: Something is said of God relatively with respect to His effects, that is:

Some name importing a relation to creatures is fittingly attributed to God.

It is proved. First, because power belongs to God, as has been shown. Now power signifies the relation of a principle to what is principled. — Second, because creatures are said to be related to God. But something cannot be understood to be said relatively to another unless, conversely, that other is said relatively to it. — Third, because God acts in a manner like Himself. Now likeness is a relation. — Fourth, because He has knowledge of other things. Now knowledge is referred to the knowable. — Fifth, because He is mover and agent, which are said relatively to motion and to what is made. — Sixth, because He is the first and highest good. These terms signify a relation.

It must be noted that, although "first" is sometimes said negatively, as in Scripture where it is said of the firstborn before whom none is begotten ³; yet sometimes it is also said relatively, so that something is called first because it precedes all other things according to some order. In the second sense Saint Thomas takes "first" in this passage, but not in the first.

II. There arises, however, a doubt concerning this proposition assumed in the second argument: Nothing can be understood to be said relatively to another unless, conversely, that other is said relatively to it. For Saint Thomas seems to hold that in every term of a relation a relation must be posited; and thus there would also be in God a relation to the creature, because the creature terminates the relation. For it is argued against this in several ways ⁴.

First, because, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics V, the chapter on "to something" ⁵, relatives are said to be relative to something in a third way when one is referred to the other but not conversely. Now relations between God and creature belong to this third mode. Therefore, although the creature is referred to God, it is not necessary that God be referred to the creature, as though its relation were terminated by the creature.

Second. Act is prior to potency because potency is defined through act, as is said in Metaphysics IX ⁶ But act does not define potency except insofar as it is its terminus. Therefore, insofar as it is its terminus, it is prior to potency. But it is not prior as a correlative, but only as an absolute. Therefore it is not a terminus as a correlative, but as an absolute. Therefore, from the fact that something is a terminus, it does not follow that it must be said relatively.

Third. The relative, as relative, is first defined through a term. Therefore the term, as term, is prior in definition to the relative itself. The consequence is clear from Metaphysics VII ⁷, where substance is posited as prior in definition to accident because accident is defined through substance. Therefore relation is not required in the term as it is a term.

Fourth. With no intellect considering, science is referred to the knowable, and likewise the creature to God. But a relation of reason does not remain once the operation of the intellect is removed, since it has esse only in the intellect. Therefore a relation of reason in the knowable and in God was not the ground for terminating the relation of science and of the creature.

It would also be a matter of doubt how God is said to be similar to the creature in the third way. But enough has been said about this in the First Part, chapter 29.

III. For the clarification of this doubt, it must be considered that Scotus, in the First Book, distinction 30, question 1, on account of the arguments adduced, holds that because of the termination of the relations of creatures from time to God, there is no need to posit any relation in God, neither a new one nor an old one. The opposite of this, both here and elsewhere, seems to be held by Saint Thomas. ⁸

Some Thomists, however, holding that God must be said relatively if He is to terminate the relation of the creature, are divided into two opinions. For some hold that the terminus of a relation would never terminate it unless there belonged to it some relation of thing or of reason; but they say that a relation is not itself the formal ground of terminating, but that the absolute itself, by reason of its absoluteness, terminates.
Others, however, say two things ⁹. The first is that a term does not terminate by reason of the absolute, but by reason of relation: since it terminates as a correlative.

According to ¹⁰, in relatives of the first two modes ¹¹ the relation terminates the ratio of the relation existing in the subject itself; but in relatives of the third mode it terminates the ratio of the relation existing in the other extreme, by which the subject is extrinsically denominated in real relative esse.

They prove their position: first, because if the term of a relation were an absolute, the double would not be said of the half, nor the servant of the lord; and they say the expositors state the opposite. — Second, because in the definition of a creature God would have to fall under its proper absolute ratio. — Third, because a relative necessarily requires in its definition the correlative as that to which it is said. And thus there would be no reason why it should require an absolute. — Fourth, because in God the relations ad intra could not be saved unless one posited that the Persons are really distinguished according to absolutes.

IV. But it seems to me that the answer must be that the terminus of a relative can be considered in two ways: in one way, absolutely, as that to which the relative is said; in another way, as it is conceived by us after the manner of a term defining the relative. If it is considered in the first way, then in relatives of the first and second modes there must be a relation on the side of the terminus: because in the terminus there is the same ratio and cause of the relation as is found in the relative terminated to that terminus. In relatives of the third mode, however, there need not be a real relation on the side of the terminus: since in it there is no cause of any relation to the relative that is terminated to it. On account of which it is said in Metaphysics V ¹² that in this genus one extreme is said relatively, not because it is said of another, but because another is said of it. Hence in the one there is only a relation of reason, although in the other there is a real relation. Now it is clear that a relation of reason does not exist actually in the thing, with no intellect considering it: and yet, with no intellect considering it, that extreme is that to which another real relative is said. Therefore we must say that in such a case the terminus, in which there is no real relation, terminates by reason of something absolute only, and not by reason of any relation existing in it either according to the thing or according to reason.

But it is clear that this is the mind of St. Thomas, Potentia, q. 7, a. 10, ad 4, where he holds that, since the name "lord" imports three things—namely, the power of coercing subjects, an order to subjects, and the termination of the order of subjects to the lord—the signification of this name is found in God not as regards the order to subjects, but as regards the power of coercing and as regards the termination of the order of subjects to the lord. From this it appears that he wishes God to terminate the relation of the creature to himself without any order of himself to the creature. — Nor does it avail to say that he terminates only fundamentally, but not formally. For according to this consideration, to terminate formally is to be that to which a relative is said; but it is evident, according to these words of St. Thomas, that the creature is said to God even with no order of God to the creature posited, since this befits him even with no intellect considering it.

But if the term is considered in the second way, then relation must be posited in the term in every mode of relatives: in the first and second modes, indeed, a real relation; but in the third mode, a relation according to reason. For we cannot understand or conceive anything under the aspect of a term defining the relative unless we apprehend it together with a certain order toward that relative itself. And this is what St. Thomas understood in this passage when he said that something cannot be understood to be said relatively to another unless conversely that other be said relatively to it; and in 1 Sent., d. xxx, a. 3, when he said that our intellect cannot take something as said relatively to another unless it understands it under the opposite respect.
The arguments for the second opinion of the Thomists ¹³, except the fourth, prove this according to what was said above. But they do not prove anything against the first dictum, as is sufficiently clear. For the first proceeds concerning relatives of the first and second mode, in which we concede that relation is contained in the term. — To the second, however, the consequence is denied. For although God is an absolute term with respect to his absolute being, he does not define a relative except as it is conceived together with an opposite habitude. — To the third it is similarly said that it proves that a term, as a concept in the manner of a defining term, includes relation. This we certainly concede. — To the fourth, the consequence is denied. For when we say that a relative is terminated to something absolute, we understand this unless the relation itself is a subsisting supposit, as is the case in the divine personal relations. For then the relation and the one having the relation are the same. Therefore the term of the relative is formally relative.

V. It must be considered further that, according to what was said of the aforementioned opinion, ¹⁴ it in no way seems to be the mind of St. Thomas. For this opinion holds that God, with no intellect considering him, is said relatively by reason of a relation existing in the creature; and that it is proper to relatives of the third mode that something be said to be really relative on account of a relation existing really in the other extreme; and, since the terminus of a relative is its correlative, it holds that God is the terminus by reason of a relation existing in the creature. For against this St. Thomas expressly states below, chapter XIII, where he says that nothing is found to be denominated from a relation existing externally, but from one inhering: and he is speaking of those relations by which God is referred to creatures. — Nor does it avail to say that this is the mind of St. Thomas: namely, that something cannot be formally denominated from an extrinsic relation, so that by means of it something would be said to be formally relative, but that something can indeed be denominated really from it, so as to be relative secundum rem. For, according to the determination of the proponent of this opinion himself, the terminus of a relative must be relative not only materially but also formally; otherwise it would not answer to the purpose. But, with no intellect considering, God, according to him, terminates the creature's relation precisely as relative. Therefore, if he is not relative except through the creature's relation, he must hold that God is said relatively formally, and not merely really, from a relation existing externally. The opposite of this St. Thomas says, even according to his own exposition.

But the author of this opinion seems to have been deceived by a bad understanding of the words of St. Thomas in the First Part, in the place cited above ¹⁵, ad 4, where it is said that God is said relatively with respect to the creature because the creature is referred to him, just as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics V concerning the knowable with respect to knowledge. For he understands these words as if St. Thomas wished to say that the very relation of the creature to God, precisely taken, is the whole reason why God is said Lord of the creature or Creator relative really, so that nothing else is required on the part of the relation for God to be called Lord, although power to coerce is required on the part of God; when nevertheless he says in the same place that it is not unfitting for God to be denominated from relations existing really in the thing, yet according as the opposite relations in God are co-understood by our intellect. From which it is given to be understood that indeed the relations of creatures are the cause of the denomination, but that the denominating form is the relation of reason co-understood with the relation of the creature; and that, once the operation of the intellect by which the relation of reason is attributed to God is removed, God cannot be denominated formally relative by that relation of the creature.

I understand the words of St. Thomas, however, in this way: that God is said to be relative with respect to the creature because the creature is referred to him; that is, he has from the fact that he terminates the creature's relation to himself, so that he is conceived together with an opposite relation of reason to it, and thus is said to be relative. Not, however, that he is formally denominated by the relation of the creature: for the relation of the creature is the cause of denomination, yet not the form denominating proximately. Hence, with no intellect considering, God is not actually referred to the creature. He is nevertheless really Lord terminatively, though not relatively formally: for he terminates the real relation of servitude of the creature to himself. — That something cannot be said formally relative from a relation existing in the other correlative is manifestly evident from this: that the formal effect of a relation is to refer to another; but it is evident that one relative is not referred to another by a relation existing in its opposite, otherwise the subject and the term of the same relation would be identical.

That what we have said is the mind of St. Thomas is shown from what was adduced above ¹⁶ from the Questions on Power, where he says that this name "Lord" is said of God with respect to the power of coercing subjects and with respect to the termination of the order of subjects to the lord, but not with respect to an order toward the subjects. Behold: because he holds that God is said to be Lord really, with no intellect considering, by reason of power and by reason of the termination of the order of the creature to him, but not by reason of any real relation formally denominating him. Hence, since, with no intellect considering, there is in God no relation to creatures—neither, I say, according to the thing nor according to reason—it follows that then he is in no way said formally to be Lord relatively, neither really nor according to reason; rather he is said relatively only fundamentally and terminatively, namely because he terminates the relation of the creature to himself, and from this he has it that he can be understood with a relation opposed to the creature.

When, therefore, it is said by Saint Thomas that God is said relatively with respect to the creature because the creature is referred to Him, the meaning is: because He terminates the relation of the creature, and from this He is conceived together with a certain relation of reason and is formally said relatively; not, however, because through the creature's relation itself He is formally referred. For since in God there is no real order to the creature, the reason why He must be conceived with a relation of reason to it and be formally denominated by such a relation of reason is that the creature has an order to Him according to nature.

But if it be urged that St. Thomas, in the Third Part, q. 35, a. 5, says that God is called Lord really by reason of the real subjection of the creature to him; and that Christ is called really the son of the Virgin by reason of the real relation of maternity toward Christ — it is answered that the mind of St. Thomas is that from the real relation of the creature to God and to Christ they are said to be such really as from the cause why God is called Lord terminatively and fundamentally, and likewise Christ the son of the Virgin, as we have explained: but not that, once the relation of reason is removed, he is called relatively, formally and really, by a real relation of another. Hence a little above, before these words, he says of Christ that he is called relatively son by a relation which is co-understood with the relation of maternity toward Christ, just as God is called Lord by a relation which is co-understood with the real relation by which the creature is subjected to God.

It must therefore be said, according to the mind of St. Thomas, that from the creature's relation to God precisely taken, God is said to be Lord terminatively, as it were from a cause, really, but not formally relatively: just as from coercive power He is said to be Lord fundamentally, while from the co-understood relation itself, which is of reason, He is said to be Lord formally relatively. And so with other similar cases.

Thus also must be understood what is had from St. Thomas, I Sent., d. xl, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, where it is said that in relatives something is sometimes denominated from that which is only in the other, as in those cases in which in one there is a relation according to the thing and in the other only according to reason; and the example given is that of the knowable. For it is understood that such a thing is denominated causally from the relation existing in the other, inasmuch as, as was said, because something terminates the relation of another to itself, it has the property of being conceived together with the opposite relation: not, however, that anything is denominated formally and relatively by a relation existing in the other.

VI. To the arguments of Scotus ¹⁷, insofar as they can in some way be opposed to what has been determined, in answer to the first it is said: first, that the mind of Aristotle in Metaphysics V is that something is said relatively and with respect to another, not on account of any real relation existing in it, but on account of a real relation existing in the other, as from the cause why there is in it a relation of reason, by which it is formally said to be relative, and why it is called terminatively really relative and fundamentally so.

It is said second, that the term of a relative, as conceived by way of a defining term, is also said to be formally relative, not because it signifies a real relation, but because it has a relation of reason, and the name signifying it relatively includes in its concept an order to its correlative, whether the order be a real order or an order of reason. And thus in relatives of the third mode as well, relation is included in each of the extremes, as was explained above ¹⁸. For knowledge is referred to the knowable, and a creature to the Creator: but it is evident that the concepts imported by these names knowable and Creator are relative concepts; for the knowable is knowable by some knowledge, and a creature is the creature of some creator, insofar as these names are said relatively.

It is said thirdly that, although, with no intellect considering it, there is no real relation in the thing called knowable, there is nevertheless in it a relation of reason according to its proximate foundation, inasmuch as it actually terminates the relation of knowledge to itself. And so with the others. Hence what the first opinion says ¹⁹, that nothing can be the terminus of a relative unless it has in itself a relation to it, is understood as: either formally, or by way of proximate foundation. For what actually terminates the order of some relative to itself has in itself that by which it can be conceived in order to that relative, and thus can be called its correlative: just as, although privation is not formally in the subject of a real form, but only in the intellect, the subject is nevertheless said to be really deprived, because it lacks the real form which it is naturally apt to have.

Hence, to the argument, it is said that it proceeds from a false understanding of Aristotle's words—namely, as if he were saying that in relatives of the third mode there is no relation in one of the relatives, neither of the thing nor of reason, neither actual nor proximately fundamental: whereas he understands that in the one there is no real relation. Hence, taking Aristotle's meaning correctly, the consequence is denied.

To the second, the minor is denied. For act, as prior to potency, does not define potency as its terminus, as far as Aristotle's mind is concerned in that passage; rather it defines it insofar as each of them is considered according to its essential and absolute character, according to which the character of act is prior to that of potency, and act is placed in its definition as substance is in the definition of accident. For it is not unfitting that things which are denominated relatively should have among themselves an order of prior and posterior, and that one be placed in the definition of the other but not conversely, even though, as relatives, they are simultaneous in nature and in understanding, as is said in the First Part, above ²⁰.
To the third, the first consequence is denied. For although in absolutes the defining term is prior to the thing defined, as substance is prior to accident, yet in relatives this is not so: since relatives are simultaneous in nature and in cognition, if they are rightly assigned, and therefore they define one another mutually.
To the fourth it is said that, with no intellect considering, in the knowable and in God there is a relation of reason fundamentally and proximately, but not actually and completely. This, however, suffices for something to be said to be related to another by way of an absolute term. For from the fact that God has coercive power over subjects, and actually terminates the relation of subjects to himself, he is naturally understood, if conceived as terminating in such a way, with a habitude of dominion toward his subjects. Hence the argument is for the first part of the determination made ²¹.

It is said secondly that, even with no intellect actually considering it, the relation to knowledge is included in the ratio imported by this term as something knowable. For it is not required, in order that some concept be imported by a name, that it always be actually thought: it suffices that the name be imposed to signify the thing by means of such a concept. But in order that a term formally state a relation, it suffices that the concept imported by the name of the defining term, through which the name is imposed on the thing, import the relation.

Caput XII: Quod relationes dictae de Deo ad creaturas non sunt realiter in Deo

Since it has been shown that something relative to creatures is said of God, there remains to inquire what esse such relations said of God have ¹. On this point Saint Thomas sets down two conclusions: the first in the present chapter; the second in the following one.

I. The first conclusion is: The relations of God to his effects cannot really exist in God. It is proved first. They cannot exist in him as accidents, since in him there is no accident. — Nor as the substance of God. For the substance of God would be said to be this very thing that is toward another, as is clear from Aristotle's Categories. And thus it would depend on something extrinsic. For what is said to be this very thing that is toward another depends on it, since it can neither be nor be understood without it. And consequently it would not be a being of necessary esse.

But this argument seems not to conclude. For by it one would likewise prove that no personal relation in God is really identical with the divine essence. Because, since the esse of a relation is to be ordered toward another, if the relation were identical with the essence, God would have to be, in respect of that by which he is ordered toward another. And thus he would not be a being whose esse is necessary of itself.

It is answered that the argument would not proceed in the same way concerning the personal relations as it proceeds concerning relations to creatures. For in these latter, the relation is terminated at something altogether extraneous to the divine nature. Therefore, if the divine essence were such a relation, it would depend upon something extraneous, and thus would not be God of necessary being through himself; for that which is of itself necessary being does not depend in its existence upon anything extraneous. But the personal relations are not terminated at something extrinsic to the divine essence, but at a person who is identical with the divine essence, which is also the essence of another person. Now it does not conflict with that which is necessary being through itself to be referred to something which is identical with it in substance, and thus to depend upon it in such a way that it could not be without it. For God cannot be without the persons, nor can one person be without another.

II. Second. As the knowable is related to our knowledge, so is God to created things: for, just as the knowable is the measure of knowledge, so God is the measure of all beings, as was shown in the First Part. But the knowable is not referred to knowledge by a real relation existing in it, as is clear in Book V of the Metaphysics. Therefore neither is God referred to the creature.

How what is knowable is referred, and concerning other things in which the real relation exists in only one extreme, was determined in the preceding chapter ² And it was shown how the words of Aristotle are to be understood.

Third ³. Relations of this kind are said to hold not only with respect to things that are in act, but also with respect to things that are in potency: for He has knowledge even of things that are in potency, and with respect to them He is the first being and the highest good. But there is no real relation from what is in act to what is in potency: otherwise infinitely many relations would be in act in the same thing; for two is prior to infinitely many numbers greater than itself, which are in potency. Therefore God is not referred to creatures that are in act by any real relation. — The consequence is proved: because God is not referred to things that are in act any differently than to things that are in potency.

III. Concerning this proposition, There is no real relation from what is in act to what is in potency, it must be noted, according to the teaching of St. Thomas in Potentia, q. VII, a. 11, that a real relation is an order of a thing to a thing outside the intellect, such that, with no intellect considering them, those things have such an order among themselves. But for certain things to have such an order among themselves, it is necessary that each be a being in act. For just as other accidental forms do not belong in act except to existing things, so the order intermediate between certain things does not belong to them really unless they exist. For what is really referred is really referred because it has some real form in itself to which such an order follows; and likewise what terminates an order of this kind terminates it by reason of some real form inhering in it, as is evident by running through all the modes of relatives. Therefore, since a being in potency does not have existence in act, there is no real relation from a being in act to a being in potency.

But if it is objected that something is really an image of a non-existent thing, and a memory, and productive, and the like, which are said relatively to non-being, as Gregory argues in Book I of the Sentences, at Capreolus, distinction 30 ⁴: — the answer is given, and stated first, that something is said to be really productive of something, or its image or memory, not on account of a real relation existing in them, but on account of their real entity relatively conceived. For names importing relation are very often predicated according to reason of things existing outside the soul, because they signify an absolute thing by means of a relative concept. Nor is it unfitting that something absolute in itself be conceived by the intellect in reference to another and understood comparatively, and thus, by means of such a concept, be signified by some relative name.

It is said secondly that, if one were to argue thus: Image belongs to something really. And it is a relative. Therefore it is relative really, the fallacy of composition and division is committed. For being relative does not determine this thing that is belonging really, nor conversely, so as to allow one to infer the conjoined from the divided terms: for belonging really to something is not attributed to image insofar as it is relative, but insofar as it imports something absolute and real, even though under a relative concept it signifies that.

IV. Concerning that proposition, God is not related differently to things that are in act than to things that are in potency, it must be considered that the reason why something was previously related only according to a relation of reason, but afterward also really, is that some change occurs in the thing, by which another mode of relation becomes fitting to it: thus Socrates, insofar as he was generative of Plato, was related by a relation of reason to Plato not yet existing; but after he begot him, he is related to him really, because he has been changed from an agent in potency to an agent in act. But if no change had occurred in Socrates, at least from rest to work, there would have been no change in the mode of the relation. For a new relation can come to something in some way without its being changed, as is said in Book V of the Physics ⁵. Yet the same thing cannot first be referred to the same thing by a relation of reason and afterward by a real relation unless from something coming to it that was not previously present in it. Now God is in no way changed, even from rest to operation: for his operation is his substance. Therefore he is not related differently to things while they are in act than he was related while they were in potency. Hence Saint Thomas adduces as the reason for the said proposition: because he is not changed by the fact that he produces something.

V. Concerning that consequence, if what is in act is referred really to what is in potency, there would be infinite relations in act in the same thing, as in the number two with respect to numbers, a doubt is raised. For according to Saint Thomas, Third Part, question 35, article 5, and Book III of the Sentences, distinction 8, article 5, the unity and plurality of a relation is not considered according to the terms, but according to the cause and the subject. Therefore, however infinite may be the numbers to which two is prior, it is not necessary that there be infinite relations in it, but by a single real relation it could be referred to all of them: just as one who teaches philosophy is related by a single relation to all whom he teaches philosophy.

It is answered that the unity and plurality of a relation is indeed not considered according to the unity or plurality of the material terms, but it is well considered according to the unity and plurality of the formal, to which the unity or plurality of the foundation corresponds. Hence, in the places cited above, St. Thomas holds that if the same teacher teaches some grammar and others philosophy, he is referred by one relation to all his students of grammar, and by another to the students of philosophy: for there is there a twofold formal term, inasmuch as those are students of grammar, and these of philosophy. Therefore in the case at hand, since the number two is referred to all other numbers as to formal terms, but not as to material ones—since one number is double the number two, another triple, another quadruple, and so on to infinity—and consequently the number two is prior to that number as its half, to that other as its third, and so is referred by one and another ratio of proportion to different numbers, and there are in it diverse foundations formally: if all these were real relations, there would have to be infinitely many real relations actually in the number two.

But if it were further urged that this is not absurd for those who hold that a relation is not really distinct from its foundation—for they would say that, just as it is not absurd for one and the same whiteness to be a likeness with respect to another white thing and an unlikeness with respect to something black, so it is not absurd for one binary to contain infinitely many real relations distinct only according to reason; for thus infinity in act according to number is not posited, since there are not there many really distinct things, but only one entity, ordered of itself toward infinite terms and distinct according to reason: — those holding that opinion would perhaps answer that for Saint Thomas it is absurd that in one being there should be infinitely many specific relations distinguished by reason alone, while nevertheless possessing outside the intellect whatever pertains to the reason and essence of each relation; for it is proper to the divine essence to contain infinitely many things in this way within one simple essence.
From these points the solution of a certain doubt in the doctrine of St. Thomas becomes clear: namely, how the son is referred to the father and mother by a single relation, while they are referred to him by two really distinct relations specifically, namely paternity and maternity—since, according to St. Thomas in Prima, q. 32, a. 2, a single relation cannot correspond to two relations specifically distinct. — For it is said, in accordance with what has been stated above, that in the son there is one relation materially, just as the foundation of filiation in him is materially one; but there are two relations formally, just as the foundations too are formally several. For as the father and the mother are the principle of the generation of the son by different rationes, so also the son receives nature from the father by one ratio and from the mother by another. And therefore, although by one name, namely filiation, both the relation of the son to the father and his relation to the mother are signified, yet there are several filiations in the ratio of relation, though they are one in the ratio of the thing. Hence what St. Thomas says—that to two relations specifically distinct a single relation cannot correspond ex opposito—is understood of the formal unity of the relation, or of its unity in the ratio of relation; not however of its material unity, or unity in the ratio of the thing. That this is indeed the mind of St. Thomas is clear from what he says in the place cited from the Third Part, in reply to the last argument.

VI. Fourth ⁶. If they were really in God, God would have to be changed, either per se or per accidens. But the opposite of this was shown in the First. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because certain relations come to him anew. But whatever comes to anything anew must be changed, either per se or per accidens.

But the proof of this consequence does not seem to be effective. For if the major is taken universally, so that "something" extends to the absolute and the relative, it is false. For, as is said in Physics V ⁷, a relation comes to someone anew not through a change of the subject, but through a change of another: just as, without my being changed, I begin to be similar to someone because of his change, by which he acquires the same quality that I have. — But if it is taken in absolutes, it is indeed true, yet then the fallacy of figure of speech is committed, by arguing thus: Whatever has something happen to it anew is changed; but some relation comes to God anew; therefore He is changed: for the relative is subsumed under the absolute.

It is answered that the major proposition is universally true. And it is understood that whatever comes to something really, whether according to entity, changes it. For since to be changed is nothing other than to be otherwise now than before; and that to which something real arrives anew is otherwise than before: necessarily, that to which something real arrives anew is changed.

When it is urged that, according to the Philosopher, a relation comes to something without any change in it, and he is speaking of a real relation — the reply is given that he speaks of a real relation with respect to the completion of its intelligible character, but not with respect to its entity. For it sometimes happens that a relation is in something as regards its entity, yet does not have the complete character of a relation, because its term does not co-exist; but once the term comes into being, it begins to have the complete character of a relation, and this occurs without any change in the thing to which it thus comes. But a relation that newly comes to God, if it were real, would come to him as regards its entity: for in an eternal thing there is nothing real from eternity by which it would be ordered to a temporal thing and depend on it of itself. — Thus, I think, would those reply who hold that the relation is not distinct from its foundation.

But according to those who hold that it is distinguished from its foundation, it would be said that a relation does not come to be entirely and by reason of the foundation anew without a change in the subject; rather, when the foundation preexists, it can indeed come to be completively without a change in the subject, through a certain natural resultant. But if the relations that come to be anew in God were real, they would have to come to be anew not only completively but entirely and as regards the foundation: for where the foundation of a real relation exists without the relation, it seems to possess a certain imperfection, because something real is naturally meant to emanate from it intrinsically, which does not emanate on account of the lack of a formal term; and in an eternal reality there cannot be anything of this sort involving imperfection. Therefore, through the advent of a new relation some change would have to occur in God.

Caput I: Continuatio sequentium ad praecedentia

Caput II: Quod consideratio creaturarum utilis est ad fidei instructionem

Caput III: Quod cognoscere naturam creaturarum valet ad destruendum errores qui sunt circa Deum

Caput IV: Quod aliter considerat de creaturis philosophus et theologus

Caput V: Ordo dicendorum

Caput VI: Quod Deo competit ut sit aliis principium essendi

Caput VII: Quod in Deo sit potentia activa

Caput VIII: Quod Dei potentia sit eius substantia

Caput IX: Quod Dei potentia sit eius actio

Caput X: Qualiter potentia in Deo dicatur

Caput XI: Quod de Deo dicitur aliquid relative ad creaturas

Caput XII: Quod relationes dictae de Deo ad creaturas non sunt realiter in Deo

Caput XIII: Quomodo praedictae relationes de Deo dicantur

Caput XIV: Quod Deus sit omnibus causa essendi

Caput XV: Quod Deus ex nihilo produxit res in esse

Caput XVI: Quod creatio non est motus neque mutatio

Caput XVII: Quomodo solvantur ea quae contra creationem obiiciuntur

Caput XVIII: Quod in creatione non sit successio

Caput XIX: Quod nullum corpus potest creare

Caput XX: Quod solius Dei est creare

Caput XXI: Quod Deus omnia possit

Caput XXII: Quod Deus non agat ex necessitate naturae

Caput XXIII: Quod Deus agit secundum suam sapientiam

Caput XXIV: Qualiter omnipotens dicatur quaedam non posse

Caput XXV: Quod divinus intellectus non coartatur ad determinatos effectus

Caput XXVI: Quod divina voluntas ad determinatos effectus non artatur

Caput XXVII: Qualiter in rerum productione debitum inveniatur

Caput XXVIII: Qualiter in rebus creatis esse potest necessitas absoluta

Caput XXIX: Quod non est necessarium creaturas semper fuisse

Caput XXX: Rationes volentium probare aeternitatem mundi ex parte Dei acceptae

Caput XXXI: Rationes volentium probare aeternitatem mundi sumptae ex parte creaturarum

Caput XXXII: Rationes ad probandum aeternitatem mundi ex parte factionis

Caput XXXIII: Solutio rationum supra positarum et primo earum quae sumebantur ex parte Dei

Caput XXXIV: Solutio rationum quae sumuntur ex parte rerum factarum

Caput XXXV: Solutio rationum quae sumebantur ex parte factionis rerum

Caput XXXVI: Rationes quibus quidam conantur ostendere mundum non esse aeternum

Caput XXXVII: Quod distinctio rerum non est a casu

Caput XXXVIII: Quod materia non est prima causa distinctionis rerum

Caput XXXIX: Quod distinctio rerum non est propter contrarietatem agentium

Caput XL: Quod causa prima distinctionis rerum non est secundorum agentium ordo

Caput XLI: Quod rerum distinctio non est per aliquem de secundis agentibus inducentem in materiam diversas formas

Caput XLII: Quod distinctio rerum non processit ex meritorum vel demeritorum diversitate

Caput XLIII: Quae sit prima causa distinctionis rerum secundum veritatem

Caput XLIV: Quod oportuit ad perfectionem universi aliquas creaturas intellectuales esse

Caput XLV: Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt volentes

Caput XLVI: Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt liberi arbitrii in agendo

Caput XLVII: Quod substantia intellectualis non sit corpus

Caput XLVIII: Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt immateriales

Caput XLIX: Quod substantia intellectualis non sit forma materialis

Caput L: Quod in substantiis intellectualibus creatis differt esse et quod est

Caput LI: Quod in substantiis intellectualibus creatis est actus et potentia

Caput LII: Quod non est idem componi ex substantia et esse, et materia et forma

Caput LIII: Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt incorruptibiles

Caput LIV: Per quem modum substantia intellectualis possit corpori uniri

Caput LV: Positio Platonis de unione animae intellectualis ad corpus

Caput LVI: Quod nutritiva, sensitiva et intellectiva non sunt in homine tres animae

Caput LVII: Quod intellectus possibilis hominis non est substantia separata

Caput LVIII: Quod homo non sortitur speciem per intellectum passivum, sed per intellectum possibilem

Caput LIX: Quod praedicta positio est contra sententiam Aristotelis

Caput LX: Contra opinionem Alexandri de intellectu possibili

Caput LXI: Quod anima non sit complexio, ut posuit Galenus

Caput LXII: Quod anima non sit corpus

Caput LXIII: Contra ponentes intellectum et sensum esse idem

Caput LXIV: Contra ponentes intellectum possibilem esse imaginationem

Caput LXV: Qualiter substantia intellectualis possit esse forma corporis

Caput LXVI: Solutio rationum quibus supra probatur quod substantia intellectualis non potest uniri corpori ut forma

Caput LXVII: Quod secundum dicta Aristotelis oportet ponere intellectum uniri corpori ut formam

Caput LXVIII: Quod anima immediate unitur corpori

Caput LXIX: Quod anima sit tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte

Caput LXX: Quod intellectus possibilis non est unus in omnibus hominibus

Caput LXXI: De opinione Avicennae, qui posuit formas intelligibiles non conservari in intellectu possibili

Caput LXXII: Solutio rationum quibus videtur probari unitas intellectus possibilis

Caput LXXIII: Quod intellectus agens non sit substantia separata, sed aliquid animae

Caput LXXIV: Quod non est impossibile intellectum possibilem et agentem in una substantia animae convenire

Caput LXXV: Quod non fuit sententia Aristotelis de intellectu agente quod sit substantia separata, sed magis quod sit aliquid animae

Caput LXXVI: Quod anima humana, corrupto corpore, non corrumpitur

Caput LXXVII: Rationes probantes animam corrumpi corrupto corpore (et solutio ipsarum)

Caput LXXVIII: Quod animae brutorum animalium non sunt immortales

Caput LXXIX: Quod anima humana incipiat cum corpore

Caput LXXX: Solutio rationum praemissarum