Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

After St. Thomas has shown that the will of all souls, after they have been separated from the body, is immobile; because this was said to arise from an immobile adhesion to the end, he consequently intends to show how the immobility of the will follows from the end ¹. Now regarding this he does three things: first, he shows what is proposed; second, he manifests the difference in this between men and angels ²; third, he removes a certain doubt ³.

I. As to the first, he sets down three conclusions. The first is: The will of the separated soul is immobile with respect to the desire of the ultimate end.

Now for the declaration of this, he premises first, that, since the end stands in appetitive matters just as first principles do in speculative matters, just as those principles are known naturally, and an error occurring about them would arise from a corruption of nature; and a change from a true acceptance of them into a false one, or vice versa, could not occur except through a change of nature, because there is nothing more certain or more manifest than them by which a man could either be recalled from error or seduced: so too everyone naturally has the desire of the ultimate end. For it follows upon rational nature in universal that it seeks beatitude: but that it desires this or that in particular under the aspect of beatitude and the ultimate end happens from some special disposition of nature; whence the Philosopher also says that as each one is, such does the end seem to him. And if this disposition cannot be removed from anyone, his will cannot be changed with respect to the desire of that end.

He premises secondly, that dispositions of this kind can be removed from us as long as the soul is joined to the body. For sometimes that disposition is some passion: which, because it passes quickly, the desire of the end easily passes away, as is apparent in the continent. But sometimes it is a habit: which, because it is not easily removed, the desire of the end indeed remains more strongly, as is apparent in the temperate; but nevertheless in this life it can be taken away, just as the habit can.

These things being posited, he argues thus. The soul is not in a state changeable from the disposition possessed after it has been separated from the body. Therefore, when it is separated from the body, it will not be in a state to be moved to the end, but always to rest in the end attained ⁴. Therefore it will be immutable with respect to the desire of the ultimate end. — The first consequence is proved. Because, while the disposition remains by which something is desired as the ultimate end, the desire of that end cannot be removed: since it cannot be recalled from it by anything more desirable. — But the antecedent is proved, because the disposition of the soul is moved per accidens according to some motion of the body naturally given to it, so that, existing in it, it may be perfected as if moved toward perfection.

2. The second conclusion is: The will of the separated soul is not changeable from good to evil⁵. It is proved. Because the whole goodness or malice of the will depends on the ultimate end. For whatever good things someone wills in order to a good end, he wills well; but evilly whatever things he wills in order to an evil end⁶.

3. The third conclusion is: Such immobility of the will is not repugnant to free choice⁷. It is proved first. The act of free choice is to choose. But this remains, while such immutability stands. Therefore etc. — The minor is proved. Choice is of those things which are for the sake of the end. But with that immutability regarding the end there stands the changeability of the will from one willed thing to another, yet in order to the same end. Therefore etc.

Secondly. It is not repugnant to free choice that with an immobile will we desire beatitude and flee misery in common. Therefore neither is it that the will is borne toward something determinate as toward the ultimate end. — The consequence is proved. Because just as the common nature adheres to us now, through which we seek beatitude in common; so also then that special disposition through which this or that is desired as the ultimate end will remain immobily.

II. For the evidence of the first conclusion, it must be considered that by the disposition through which something is desired as the ultimate end, we can understand three things. First, the actual apprehension itself and the very judgment of the intellect by which it apprehends something as the supreme good and the ultimate end: upon which judgment follows the actual desire of the will for it. — Second, the actual desire itself and the actual affection toward something as toward the ultimate end, by which the will is bound so that it cannot be inclined toward another thing as toward the ultimate end. — Third, some disposition by way of first act, caused both in the intellect and in the will from the act of sin and from the inductive cause to sin, through which both the intellect is disposed to judge something as the supreme good and the ultimate end, and the will is inclined to love and desire that as the ultimate.

Now it does not seem that such a disposition can be taken in the first or second way: because the actual operation of the intellect and the actual movement of the will are not necessarily continued so as to remain after death; rather, it seems necessary that it be interrupted, at least when someone approaches death, on account of the alteration of the body by which the use of the senses is impeded, and consequently the act of the intellective part. Therefore it seems that it must be taken in the third way. For from that which induces the intellect to a false judgment concerning the end, and the appetite to an evil inclination, and also from the act of both the intellect and the will, there is left behind in both some disposition inducing to similar acts; which indeed would have been present even if, while the soul was joined to the body, it had not been converted into a habit. Yet, once separated from the body, it is converted into a habit and as it were into a nature, because the soul is then reduced to a state of immutability, and therefore there remains both a similar judgment of the intellect concerning the end, and a similar affection toward it, just as it was before separation.

2. It must be considered secondly, as St. Thomas gives to be understood in the things he premised⁸, that the intellect can be recalled and removed from the opinion it holds in two ways: either, namely, from the removal of the disposition by which it was inclined to that opinion; or from something more certain or more manifest, by which it appears to the intellect that what it previously considered true is not true, because it does not agree with that which is more certain or more manifest. But the revocation of the intellect concerning the estimation of principles cannot be through anything more certain or more evident: because nothing is either more certain or more evident or more manifest than the truth of first principles. Therefore it is necessary that it come about through a change of that disposition through which the intellect had such an estimation concerning the principles. Whence, since it is nature that induces to the true estimation of principles, one cannot fall from it into a false estimation except through some corruption of nature; but from a false estimation one cannot be brought back to a true one except through a healing of nature. Regarding conclusions, however, the intellect can be changed from propositions that are either more certain or more manifest. For, if the judgment was true, it can be changed into a false one because some proposition occurs to it which, although it is false, is nevertheless more manifestly true to it; but if it was false, it can be changed into a true one from the knowledge of some principle having certain truth, with which it sees the conclusion itself to be repugnant.

What we say of the intellect must be said in its own way of the appetite. For when it is inclined toward something as toward the ultimate end, it cannot be removed from that inclination by anything more desirable: since it belongs to the notion of the ultimate end to be loved supremely. Therefore, if such an inclination and desire must be removed, this must be through a change of that disposition by which the intellect judges that to be the ultimate end and supreme good, and through a change of that disposition by which the will itself was induced toward that as toward the ultimate end. Whence, while the same disposition regarding the end remains, the inclination and appetite for the end cannot be removed. But the appetite for those things which are for the sake of the end can be removed, from the fact that something is more desirable than them, namely the end; for when something is judged either contrary or unsuitable to the desired end, the desire for it ceases. For this reason St. Thomas well proved that, while the disposition remains by which something is desired as the ultimate end, the desire for that end cannot be removed, because nothing is more desirable than the ultimate end.

III. Concerning that proposition, The disposition of the soul is moved per accidens according to some motion of the body⁹, it must be considered that it is understood in this sense, that if some disposition of the soul which is borne toward something as toward a good is removed, this cannot happen except through some transmutation made in the body, in so far, namely, as it depends on some disposition of the body. For since the soul is in the body to acquire its perfection, and consequently is moved in it toward the end, it must be disposed in different ways according to the disposition of the body and be moved toward the end. For we see that, while some passion of concupiscence stands, the soul judges something good and desires it, but when that passion ceases, it no longer judges it good nor desires it any longer. Therefore, when the soul is separated from the body, it is no longer moved to acquire any disposition or any end, but rests in the disposition possessed and in the end attained.

IV. Concerning the proof of the second¹⁰ conclusion, it must be noted first, as is according to the mind of St. Thomas in I-II, q. 19, a. 2¹¹, that since the end is compared to the will as an object, but not to the other powers, the goodness which is from the object and the goodness which is from the end do not differ in the will itself; except perhaps per accidens, just as an end depends on an end, and a will on a will. And therefore, since the goodness of an act depends on the object, it is clear that the goodness of the interior act of the will depends on the end: and similarly it is concerning malice. And because, as is said in I-II, q. 18, a. 6, that which is on the part of the will stands as formal to that which is on the part of the exterior act, therefore the species of a human act is considered formally, that is completively, according to the end; but materially according to the object. For this reason it is well said here that the whole goodness or malice of the will depends on the ultimate end, that is, both of the interior elicited act and of the act commanded by it.

It must be considered secondly, that St. Thomas did not say absolutely that whatever things someone wills in order to a good end he wills well, but he said whatever good things. Because the order to a good end is not sufficient for the goodness of an act, for he who wills to steal in order to give alms is not said to have a simpliciter good will; but there is also required goodness from the object and other circumstances.

V. Concerning the third conclusion, it must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in De Malo, in the place cited¹², that to be changed from good to evil, or vice versa, does not belong to the notion of free choice, but belongs to it only in so far as it is in a nature able to fail: whence this is not found in God, in whom we nevertheless posit free choice. But it belongs per se to free choice that it can choose diverse things in order to the end: and thus it is also posited in God, who can choose diverse things in which He may manifest His goodness. For this reason St. Thomas well proves that the freedom of choice stands with the immutability of the will regarding the ultimate end, because with it there stand choice and the change from one willed thing to another willed thing.

VI. But against the aforesaid things certain doubts occur. For Scotus argues, in the Second Book, dist. 7¹³, that a habituated will does not necessarily have an evil act. First, because no habit is for a power a principle of acting in a manner opposed to the proper manner of that power: since a second cause, in so far as it is a second cause, does not determine the manner of acting of the first cause. But the non-habituated will, out of its freedom, can not-will. Therefore etc.

2. Secondly, because everything that inclines the will to sin, or to the act of sin, inclines to some act one in species¹⁴. Now it is not unfitting that the will can have an act other in species from that one, and then not have that one: since it cannot have several acts at the same time. And consequently it is not unfitting that it have a good act. And thus it does not follow that from the disposition acquired in life and remaining in the separated soul, the will has a will immutable in evil.

3. He also argues¹⁵ that the soul does not render itself obstinate from an immobile apprehension. Because this is not while it is in the body: since it then has a mobile apprehension. Nor while it is outside the body: because in the instant of separation it is obstinate and damned, and yet it does not then have an immobile apprehension, since in that instant it understands nothing. Therefore etc.

4. It can also be argued against the second conclusion, and its proof, from the sayings of Durandus¹⁶. Because it is not necessary that the will of the damned adhering to an evil end deduce everything it does from that end: since the damned does not see all things in the evil end, just as the Blessed see all things in their end. But from a will adhering to a perverse end a good work can proceed, if it is not deduced from that end. Therefore, etc.

VII. To the first argument of Scotus, it is said first that, although the will is free with respect to those things which are for the sake of the end and is not borne into them necessarily, yet with respect to the ultimate end and supreme good it has necessity. And therefore, if any disposition or habit inclines it to something under the aspect of the ultimate end and supreme good, it is necessarily borne to that. And then that habit is not for the will a principle of acting contrary to its proper manner, but according to its proper inclination toward the end.

It is said secondly, that not only the habit or disposition of the will or intellect constitutes the will immobile, but also the state of the soul: because, namely, it is outside the way and the state of change, in which every moral habit and every disposition inclining to evil could be removed from it. There also concurs to this the divine justice, through which the soul is justly and entirely destitute of divine grace, which is necessary in order that a man return from evil to good, as is clear from the above¹⁷.

2. To the second, it is said that, although the habit or disposition remaining in the soul inclines it to one act in species, because it inclines it to the desire of some perverse end; yet it is not necessary that it have another act with that one utterly set aside to which it is inclined from the habit; rather, it is always in the appetite for that perverse end, and orders to it every other act that it elicits. Now it is not unfitting that several acts be in the will at the same time, of which one has order to and dependence upon the other. — And if it be said that it is not always in the actual consideration of that perverse end: yet it must be said that at least virtually the appetite for that perverse end remains in whatever other act. For just as in this life each thing is desired in so far as there is in it some participation in beatitude, which everyone naturally desires; so in the state of the damned each thing is desired in so far as there is in it in some way a participation in that which is desired as the ultimate end.

3. To the third, it is said first that indeed from the immutable apprehension by which something is apprehended by the soul under the aspect of the ultimate end, there follows obstinacy, by which the will adheres immobily to that end, and cannot depart from that end.

It is said secondly, that such obstinacy is caused inchoatively, not by the immobile apprehension, but absolutely by the apprehension of such an end in the way: because from the fact that in the way there was such a judgment by which the intellect judged that to be the supreme good and ultimate end which is not truly the supreme good, and there was also the inclination of the will toward it as toward the ultimate end, there follows in the separated soul obstinacy in evil. But completively and perfectively it is from the immobile apprehension existing in the soul while it is separated. For because with such an apprehension and disposition, in the manner explained above¹⁸, when the soul is separated from the body, it arrives at that state in which it cannot be changed from the disposition which it brought with it, its apprehension has become immutable, and from it complete obstinacy has been brought about.

Now when it is urged against this, because in the instant in which the soul is separated from the body, there is no such apprehension, because the soul then understands nothing: — it is said first, that it is false that the soul then understands nothing. For since in the same instant it is being separated, and is separated, in that instant it is fitting that it have some apprehension concerning that to which, existing in the body, it was affected, and for which it then first begins to be punished.

It is said secondly that, since the obstinacy of the will names its immobile adhesion to evil; but the adhesion of the will to something is not without the apprehension of it: the will cannot in any instant first be obstinate in which there is not an immobile apprehension through the intellect. And therefore in whatever instant, whether it be the first instant of separation from the body or another instant, the will is posited as obstinate, in that instant one must posit an immobile apprehension of the intellect.

It should be observed, however, that although the soul has an immobile apprehension in the instant of separation, and then first begins to be obstinate; yet in it it does not have demerit, as some say, because merit and demerit belong not to the soul alone, but to the composite, namely man; but in that instant man is not, but it is the first instant of his non-being, and the first instant in which the soul is first punished and is obstinate. For in that instant the soul remains, wherefore it is not repugnant to it to have some operation; but man does not remain, so as to be able to merit.

4. From these things it is also clear that the objection of Durandus does not proceed. — For it is said first, that the will of the damned must will all things that it wills in order to the perverse end to which it adheres: because it is always either in the actual or in the virtual desire of that end, as having been made connatural to it. And therefore it can will nothing well: since an act ordered to an undue end cannot be good.

It is said secondly that even if the damned do not see all things at once in the perverse end to which they adhere, yet each thing that they choose particularly, they order to the perverse end.

VIII. As to the second¹⁹, St. Thomas shows the difference between men and angels as to the immobility of the will from the end. And he sets down this conclusion: Angels, immediately upon adhering to the due or undue end, remained immobily in it. It is proved. Because they are closer, according to the nature in which they are created, to ultimate perfection than souls: because, namely, they do not need to acquire knowledge from the senses, nor to arrive by reasoning from principles at a conclusion, as souls do; but through innate species they can immediately arrive at the contemplation of truth.

2. It must be noted first, concerning this conclusion, that through it St. Thomas intends to posit a difference between the immobility of men and of angels. Because immobility does not belong to man immediately after the choice of a due or undue end, but as long as man remains in this life, his will can be changed and removed from that to which it adheres as to an end; but immobility belongs to him only after the separation of the soul from the body. But an angel, after the first choice, or adhesion to the end, immediately has an immobile will, so that it can no longer depart from that end.

3. It must be noted secondly, that the cause of the difference assigned here between men and angels is to be understood in such a way that, since the ultimate perfection of an intellectual nature is the actual contemplation of truth, an angel is very close to this: because of all things which it is naturally born to understand, it has from the principle of its being habitual knowledge. For it has the species of things connatural to it; and by a simple intuition it is born to contemplate conclusions in principles; but it does not need to receive intellectual species from the senses, or to arrive at the knowledge of truth by reasoning. Therefore, as soon as it wills, it can contemplate truth. But the rational soul is further removed from this perfection: because it is created without intelligible forms, and it must receive them from the senses. Likewise, it does not immediately intuit conclusions in principles, but it is necessary that it arrive at their knowledge by reasoning. Therefore it cannot immediately contemplate truth, but it is necessary that it first receive habitual knowledge of those things which it is naturally born to know.

4. It must be noted thirdly, from the teaching of St. Thomas in De Malo, q. 16, a. 5, that since change belongs only to that which exists in potency, the intellect cannot be changed from one cognition into its opposite unless it is in potency to both: for we see that our intellect cannot be changed from a true cognition of first principles into a false one, so long as the perfection of nature stands, because it is not in potency to it, but has it habitually instilled in itself by nature. Therefore, since the angel is not in potency to the cognition of those things which it is naturally born to know, but has habitual knowledge of all things in act, and does not need to arrive from things naturally known at certain things unknown to it; whereas the rational soul is in potency with respect to the conclusion, but in act with respect to first principles, and on that account needs to arrive from naturally known principles at unknown conclusions by reasoning: the angel has an immobile apprehension regarding things naturally known, just as we have knowledge of first principles; the soul, however, has a mobile apprehension regarding conclusions. And because, as St. Thomas deduces in the same place ²⁰, whatever comes to something comes to it according to the mode of its nature, the angel also has an immobile apprehension with respect to the supernatural good, while the soul has a mobile one. From this it further follows that, since the will is proportioned to the intellect, the angel also has an immobile choice, while the soul has a mobile one: namely, because the former perseveres immobily in that which it has once chosen, while the soul can be turned away from that which it has chosen.

It must be noted, however, when we say that the angel's first choice and its first apprehension are immobile, that we are speaking of a perfect and complete choice, and similarly of a perfect and complete apprehension, namely that which conveys a complete judgment of the intellect: not, however, of an imperfect choice and an imperfect apprehension. Which I say because the demon seems at times to have changed judgment and choice: as when he first incited the Jews to kill Christ, and afterwards wished to hinder the passion of Christ itself through the wife of Pilate ²¹. But this was because he did not have a perfect judgment concerning the things that pertained to Christ, but a doubtful and uncertain one: and therefore at one moment he judged one thing good, at another moment another.

IX. But against the aforesaid things there is doubt. For Scotus argues ²², first, against that which was said, that the obstinacy of the angel arises from the immobility of its apprehension. Because, since the angelic intellect was upright in apprehending before sin, it follows that it never could have sinned.

He argues secondly, that it was not made impeccable through the first choice. Because, since the will, as it is naturally prior to its volition, is not disposed otherwise through the fact that it is under the act of willing than before, it follows that through that act of willing it is not disposed otherwise in causing. And consequently, if it freely elicits the first act of willing, it will also elicit the second freely.

He argues thirdly, that lacking discourse is not the reason for immutability in the angel. Because the intellect of man adheres as immobily to that to which it discourses as does the angel apprehending that without discourse: for it holds the conclusion with certainty and without doubt just as the angel holds it by seeing it in the principles without discourse.

It is confirmed through Aureoli ²³. Because in a false principle one can apprehend a false conclusion. Nor yet is he immobilized in it.

X. To the first of these it is said that we can speak in two ways about free apprehension and choice: namely, either of that which is imperfectly and incompletely free; or of that which is completely and perfectly free. When, therefore, we say that the apprehension and choice of the angel are immobile, we understand this of that which is completely and perfectly free, because this is properly its act: not, however, of that which is incompletely free. Now, we say that the first choice and first apprehension of the angel, although it was free and meritorious, was not nonetheless completely free. Whence it does not follow that it was immobile. And consequently it does not follow that, if the first apprehension of the angel was upright, it could not have sinned in the following instant.

Where it must be noted that, just as our will is necessarily inclined to happiness in general, so that it cannot will misery; so the will of the angel in the first instant of its creation was determined to the good, so that it could not will evilly. In the second instant, however, it could be inclined both to the good and to evil. Whence, even if in the first instant the angel could have a free act as to the exercise of the act, because it could elicit or not elicit the act, that act was not nonetheless perfectly free: because as to specification, it was determined to one, since it could not be terminated except to the good. In the second instant, however, it could have a perfectly free act: namely, because it was in its power to elicit or not elicit the act, and to choose well and evilly. Whence after the choice had in the second instant, the will of the angel was immobilized.

2. From this is removed the objection that is made against St. Thomas, while, in the First Part, q. 63, a. 5 ²⁴ and 6, he holds that all the angels had a free and meritorious act in the first instant; but in article 6, to 3, he says that the angel has free choice inflexible after election. For it seems to follow from these things that no angel sinned. — But it is said that this does not follow. Because when it is said that the angel has free choice inflexible after election, it is understood, as we have said, of completely free choice, namely that which could be elicited both well and evilly. In this way, however, not all angels had a free act in the first instant: but free only as to the exercise of the act, and as to choosing this good or that, but determined to the good. Whence it does not follow that, after that merit which they had in the first instant, they could not have sinned in the second instant, in which they had all-embracing freedom, even toward good and evil: but that after the choice had in the second instant, neither can the evil will well, nor the good evilly.

3. But the response which Capreolus gives, in II, dist. 4 ²⁵, concl. 5, namely that the saying of St. Thomas, namely that the angel has free choice inflexible after election, is understood of election elicited from pure natural powers, and according to the inclination of nature alone, but not of election elicited by God moving the angel's will through grace to supernatural things, of which sort was the election had in the first instant: does not seem to me to be according to the mind of St. Thomas. For in De Malo, q. 16, a. 5, from the fact that the will of the angels is naturally immutable concerning those things which belong to the order of nature; and everything that comes to something comes to it according to the mode of its nature; he concludes that they immobily persevere in aversion or in conversion with respect to the supernatural good. For from these things it is clear that not only is the choice elicited according to natural inclination immobile in them, but also that which is produced with God moving its will through grace to supernatural things.

Nor does it stand in the way that he says in the First Part, q. 63, a. 1; and II Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, that no creature can be made that is impeccable by nature; and De Veritate, q. 24, a. 7, that no creature can exist whose free choice is naturally confirmed in the good. — For that is understood in the sense that to no creature can it belong that it can never sin, but to every creature it belongs from its nature that it can at some time sin: not, however, that to some creature it could not belong from its nature that, after a free good choice, it can no longer be bent toward evil.

Therefore I think it should better be said, according to the aforesaid things²⁶, that that saying must be understood of choice, elicited both from grace and from natural powers, which is purely free, namely which is elicited by the angel for that measure in which it is not determined to the good, but has freedom toward willing well or evilly. Which certainly belongs to the angel in the second instant of its being, but not in the first. — Moreover, just as we say concerning choice, so must it be said concerning the apprehension of the angel.

XI. To the second²⁷, it is denied that the will, as prior to some volition of its own to be elicited, is not otherwise disposed as it is under some act of willing than before. Rather, it is otherwise disposed: because before it was under a perfectly free act of willing, it was undetermined to other acts; and in itself it was determined to no object in the second instant of its being; but once placed under the first perfectly free act, it is necessitated to the object of that act, and to its mode, so that it cannot go into the opposite. It is also determined and necessitated to this, that all other acts which it will elicit are elicited conformably to this first choice. Whence the will itself, existing under that first act, is both disposed otherwise in itself, and otherwise in causing.

2. To the third²⁸ it is said first, that to lack actual discourse in some particular is not the reason for the immobility of the angels: but to lack discourse universally, both in act and in potency. So that, because the angel is of such a nature that it apprehends both principle and conclusion at once, and can receive nothing with discourse, it has no way of revocation from that which it has once judged and chosen to be good, as we have said above²⁹.

It is said secondly, that the human intellect, although it holds some practical conclusion with certainty as true for now, nevertheless does not hold it absolutely immobily as true: because it can, either from passion, or from another occurring reason more manifest and more probable to it, or in another way, be led into an opposite judgment. Which cannot be in the angel, in whom passion has no place, and to whom a reason leading to the opposite cannot occur, since it does not arrive at the consideration of truth through reasoning.

3. To the confirmation³⁰ it is said that a man seeing a false conclusion in a false principle, and thinking both to be true, is not immobilized in it: because he can through reason and discourse be led to the opposite of the conclusion seen in the false principle, and also to the opposite of the principle. The angel, however, as was said, cannot discourse. Therefore the reason is not similar.

XII. As for the third point³¹, St. Thomas removes a certain tacit objection. For because it was said that the soul separated from the body is immutable, because it adheres immobily to the end to which, existing in the body, it had adhered; someone could argue that, if this immutability belongs to it while it is separated, it will not belong to it when it will be reunited to the body. — But St. Thomas removes this, saying that souls, even in the resurrection, after they will reassume their bodies, will not lose the immobility of the will: because then bodies will be disposed according to the requirement of the soul, not however conversely.

It must be noted first, that this must be understood of souls which, while they are separated from the body, are placed totally outside the state of the way, and which will assume bodies in the universal resurrection: not, however, of those which are separated for a short time, to return again to the body through divine disposition, as was the case with the soul of Lazarus³². For such souls are not placed entirely outside the state of the way. And therefore, while they are reunited to the body, they again receive a mutable will.

It must be noted secondly that, although matter is on account of form, and therefore it is fitting that it be disposed according to the requirement of the form; nevertheless, the requirement of the soul at the beginning of its being is one thing, and the requirement in the resurrection is another. For at the beginning of its being, there is a requirement only according to the condition of nature: whence, in order that through it it may be able to receive knowledge by way of the senses, it naturally requires a body composed of contraries, which according to its nature is corruptible. In the resurrection, however, there will be a requirement not only according to the condition of nature, but also according to the condition divinely given to it, by which it may be able fully to dominate the body as to esse: whence, according as it itself will be immortal and incorruptible, so also will it reassume an incorruptible body. That, therefore, which is said here, that bodies in the resurrection will be disposed according to the requirement of the soul, is understood of the requirement of the soul perfected by divine power and disposition: not, however, of the requirement according to its natural condition alone.

See the remaining things that pertain to this matter in Capreolus, II Sent., dist. 7.