Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

After St. Thomas determined concerning the state of souls after death with respect to their punishment or reward, he consequently determines concerning their state with respect to the immutability of the will¹. Now regarding this he does two things: first, he determines concerning their immutability according to the will; second, concerning the cause of this immutability, in chapter xcv. Regarding the first he does three things: first, he treats of the immutability of the saints; second, of the immutability of the damned, in the following chapter; third, of the immutability of those who are in purgatory, in chapter xciv.

I. As to the first, this conclusion is posited: The will of no blessed person can be changed into evil.

It is proved first by a reason common to the good and the bad, thus. When the soul is separated from the body, it is immediately outside the state of warfare or combat, and in the state of receiving punishment or reward for what it has fought lawfully or unlawfully, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore it cannot further be changed according to the will either from good to evil, or from evil to good. — The consequence is proved. Because as long as the soul can be changed, it is in the state of combat and warfare: since it behoves it to resist evil solicitously lest it be overcome by it, or to strive to be freed from it.

Second. Beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, is perpetual, as was shown in the third book. Therefore the rectitude in a blessed soul is also perpetual. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because a soul cannot be blessed if its will is not upright, since a soul ceases to be upright by turning away from the end, but becomes upright by the fruition of the end². But it cannot be at the same time that it turns away from the end and enjoys the end.

Third. The blessed apprehend that in which true beatitude consists under the aspect of beatitude and of the ultimate end: otherwise their appetite would not rest, and consequently they would not be blessed. Therefore they cannot deflect their will from that in which true beatitude is. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because the rational creature naturally appetites to be blessed, and cannot will not to be blessed: although through the will it can be deflected from that in which true beatitude consists, because this is not apprehended under the aspect of beatitude, but something else is, toward which the will is deflected as toward an end.

It should be noted that the foundation of this reason is that, since the will is naturally and necessarily borne toward beatitude under the universal aspect of beatitude and of the highest good, with respect to the specification of the act, namely inasmuch as it cannot will misery or the opposite of beatitude; if something is apprehended under the aspect of the highest good and of true beatitude, the will is related to it just as to the aspect of the highest good; and therefore, just as the will cannot turn away from the highest good so as to will its opposite, as was shown in the third book³, so it cannot turn away from that which it apprehends to be the highest good and true beatitude. Since therefore the blessed apprehend God as that in which the true aspect of beatitude and of the highest good is, they cannot turn away from Him by the will; and consequently they cannot have a perverse will.

II. Fourth. That in which true beatitude is suffices for every blessed person: otherwise his desire would not be fulfilled. Therefore he seeks nothing else that does not pertain to that in which true beatitude consists. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because for whomever that which he has suffices, he does not seek anything else outside it. — But the second is proved because no one has a perverse will except because he wills something repugnant to that in which true beatitude consists.

Concerning that proposition, For whomever that which he has suffices, he does not seek anything else⁴ outside it, it should be noted that it is understood of full and all-embracing sufficiency: but not only with respect to something. For no one seeks what he does not have except on account of some lack. Therefore, if in no way does he lack anything, in no way does he seek it: and if he has something that satisfies every lack and appetite of his, he seeks nothing outside it. Likewise it is understood, not that he wills nothing else besides it, but that whatever he wills, he wills in order to that sufficient good.

Fifth. A soul that is truly blessed can in no way be ignorant: since in God it sees all things that pertain to its perfection. Therefore in no way can it have an evil will: especially since that vision of God is always in act. — The consequence is proved. Because sin does not happen in the will without some ignorance: whence it is said in Proverbs xiv, They err etc.; and in Ethics III, every evil man is ignorant.

It should be noted that error does not happen in the intellect except inasmuch as it is in potency: just as in natural things a defect does not happen except by reason of potentiality. Wherefore, if any intellect is posited as always in act, error cannot happen in it. Therefore St. Thomas added in the consequent, especially since that vision of God is always in act, in order to exclude the answer that someone could give, by saying that, although the blessed soul sees all things in God, and for that time is not ignorant; nevertheless at some time it ceases from that vision, and then it can be ignorant. For this answer is excluded by this, that the vision of the blessed is said to be always in act.

Sixth. Our intellect can err concerning some conclusions before the resolution into first principles is made; but, once the resolution into them has been made, knowledge concerning the conclusions is already possessed, which cannot be false. Therefore also, as long as our will does not attain the ultimate end, it can be perverted: but not after it has arrived at the fruition of the ultimate end, desirable per se. — The consequence is proved. Because as the principle of demonstration is related in speculative matters, so the end is related in appetitive matters.

It should be noted first, that from this comparison of the first principle and the ultimate end, it is had not only that the will necessarily appetites the ultimate end itself, just as the intellect necessarily adheres to first principles; but also that concerning those things that are for the end, having a necessary and manifest dependence on the end, there cannot be perversity in the appetite, so long as its rectitude concerning the ultimate end remains; just as neither can there be error concerning conclusions if it is evident that they depend necessarily on first principles. Whence St. Thomas says in the First Part, q. lxxxii, a. 2, that there are certain goods necessary for beatitude, namely those by which the will adheres to God, but before the necessity of this connection is demonstrated through the certitude of the divine vision, the will adheres necessarily neither to God nor to those things that are of God; but the will of one seeing God adheres to them of necessity.

It should be noted secondly, that that comparison between the end and the principle, which is the Philosopher's⁵ in Physics II and Ethics VI and VII, although it can be taken in manifold ways, in the present context is nevertheless taken as to this: to move necessarily. But enough has been said about this in the preceding parts⁶.

III. Seventh. A blessed rational substance, seeing God, apprehends Him as the best. Therefore it loves Him supremely. Therefore the wills of the blessed are supremely conformed to God. Therefore they cannot become perverse. — The first consequence is proved. Because, since good inasmuch as it is such is lovable, what is apprehended as best is supremely lovable. — The second, because the nature of love has this, that the wills of those who love one another are conformed. — But the third, because, since the divine will is the first rule of wills, it is God who⁷ makes the rectitude of the will.

It should be noted that God is said to make the rectitude of the will not only effectively, but also formally and objectively: because namely the will is upright to the extent that it adheres to God as to an object; and inasmuch as it is conformed to the divine will as to its rule.

Eighth. If a blessed soul could be transmuted from good to evil, it would not yet be in the ultimate end. But this is against the notion of beatitude. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because as long as something is naturally suited to be moved to another, it does not yet have the ultimate end.

IV. Concerning this conclusion, it should be noted from the doctrine of St. Thomas, de Verit., q. xxiv, a. 7 and 8, that although the free choice of a creature cannot naturally be confirmed in good, so as namely never to be able to be bent toward evil; nevertheless it can be confirmed in good through divine grace. Therefore, when we say that a blessed soul cannot be changed from good to evil, this is not to be understood as if this belongs to it naturally, but because it has this from divine grace, through which it is elevated to the vision of God: although the angels also have from their proper nature that, after the first good choice, they cannot be changed into evil, as will be explained below in chapter xcv.

It must be considered nevertheless that, although that is not natural to the soul absolutely inasmuch as it is a rational soul, it is nevertheless in some way natural to it inasmuch as it is blessed, and in some way inasmuch as it is a rational soul. For inasmuch as it is blessed, it belongs to it from the nature of beatitude to love God supremely, and that its desire be filled from every part, for he is blessed who has whatever he wills and wills nothing evil, as Augustine says⁸: from which it follows necessarily that its will can in no way be deflected into evil. But inasmuch as it is a rational soul, it belongs to it to be borne naturally toward beatitude under the universal aspect of beatitude, and consequently to be borne naturally toward that which it apprehends under the aspect of the highest good and of true beatitude: from which it follows that it cannot be deflected from it by the will. Therefore that immutability of the blessed from good to evil originally and primordially in some way depends on the nature of the soul: but formally and completively it proceeds from the very vision of God, and from divine grace.

The remaining things that can introduce difficulty concerning this conclusion were shown above in the third book⁹.