Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

After St. Thomas showed what sort the bodies of those rising will be, he subsequently explains ¹ what sort their souls will be before the resurrection. And first, with respect to punishment and reward; secondly, with respect to the will, in ch. XCII.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows the soul's capacity for punishment and reward; secondly, he shows that these are given to it immediately after separation, in the following chapter.

With respect to the first, taking for granted ² from the third book that souls are capable of reward, namely of the divine vision: because someone could, from what has been said about the bodies of the damned suffering from corporeal fire, take occasion to doubt how the devil, who is incorporeal, and the souls of the damned before the resurrection can suffer from bodily fire, by which the bodies of the damned will suffer, just as the Lord also says in Matt. 25, Depart, you cursed, etc.; St. Thomas wishes to explain this difficulty. And first, he removes certain false modes; secondly, he explains the truth ³.

I. With respect to the first, he says first that this is not to be understood as if their nature were corrupted by fire, or altered, or in any other way transmuted, as our corruptible bodies now suffer from fire: because incorporeal substances have neither a corporeal nature ⁴, so as to be able to be changed by corporeal things; nor are they receptive of sensible forms except intelligibly, which reception is not penal (namely, in itself), but rather perfective and delightful.

He says secondly that this is also not to be understood as if they suffered affliction from the fire by reason of some contrariety, as bodies will suffer after the resurrection: because they do not have sense organs, nor do they use sensitive potencies.

Note that St. Thomas excludes two modes of passion of a separated substance from fire, according to which our bodies suffer from it. One is according as existing in the state of corruption they suffer through real change and alteration from fire and other sensible things. The other is according as existing in the state of incorruption they suffer through a spiritual change of the sense of touch from the fire, causing affliction by reason of contrariety to the equality of the complexion and harmony of the sense.

II. With respect to the second, two conclusions are laid down. The first is: Substances of this kind suffer from corporeal fire by way of a kind of binding. Moreover, the possibility of this binding by God is explained thus. Spirits can be bound to bodies either by way of form, as the soul to the human body, so that it gives life to it; or even without being its form, as necromancers, by the power of demons, bind spirits to images or things of this kind. Therefore, much more by divine power can the spirits to be damned be bound to corporeal fire. — That they suffer affliction from this binding is proved, because they know that they are bound to the lowest things for punishment.

2. For the evidence of these things, it must be considered first, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. XLIV, a. ult. ⁵, qu. 3; De Anima, a. 1; and Quodlib. II, a. 13, that in many ways a spiritual substance can be united to a body: namely, as form to matter, in the way the human soul is united to the body; as a mover to the thing moved according to place, in the way an angel is united to the sphere that it moves; and as the located to place, according to the mode in which spiritual things are in place, in which way a spiritual substance is said to be definitively in a place. When, therefore, it is said here that damned spirits are bound to corporeal fire by divine power, it is understood not according to the union of form to matter, since they do not vivify the fire; nor according to the union of mover to moved, because it does not appear by what local motion they would have to move the fire; but according to the union of the located to place: for they are united to the fire as to a place assigned to them by divine justice.

It must be considered secondly that this binding does not denote the mere union of the spirit to the fire: but it denotes a violent union and its detention by the fire, which namely is against the spirit's will and inclination; just as those who are detained in a prison against their will are also said to be bound to it.

It must be considered thirdly that the affliction and sorrow existing in damned spirits through this kind of binding has a twofold cause on the part of the fire: namely, one remote, the other proximate. The remote cause is the violent binding itself of the spirit to the fire, so that it is detained by it in such a way that it cannot be in another place. But the proximate cause is the cognition of this kind of binding. For unless the spirit knew itself to be bound to the fire, it would not be afflicted by such a binding: just as a stone is not afflicted by the fact that it is violently detained above. But because it knows that it is bound to the lowest body, namely an elementary one, and is detained by it lest it be elsewhere, although according to its nature it is nobler and more excellent than all bodies, even the highest, from this it is afflicted and sorrows exceedingly, not indeed with sensible sorrow, since that cannot be in separated substances, but with the sorrow and torment of the will. St. Thomas touches on the first cause of sorrow when he says spirits of this kind are bound to corporeal fire by divine power: but the second when he says they know that they are bound to the lowest things for punishment.

III. The second conclusion is: It is fitting that damned spirits be punished with bodily punishments: — understand, not bodily on the part of the one suffering the punishment, as if the spirits themselves had a body in which they suffer; but on the part of the one inflicting the punishment; for the sense is, that it is fitting that some body inflict punishment on them.

It is proved first. A rational creature sins by the fact that in not obeying it is not subjected to God. Therefore its fitting punishment is that, being in a certain way bound, it be subjected to lower things, that is, corporeal things. — The consequence is proved. Because punishment ought proportionally to correspond to sin, so that the will through punishment is punished in the contrary of that which it sinned in loving.

It must be noted first that to be bound properly belongs to bodies, not however to a spiritual substance. But nonetheless this is also said of it metaphorically, inasmuch as it is detained by corporeal fire against its will. On that account St. Thomas said that it is in a certain way bound, but not bound absolutely.

It must be noted secondly that we can interpret this proportion of punishment to guilt so that we say that, just as the spiritual substance by sinning withdrew itself from subjection to its superior, namely God, so it is fitting that it be punished through subjection to lower things: for thus the will is punished in the contrary of that which it sinned in loving, for it sinned from the fact that it willed and loved not to be subjected to the superior, but it is punished from the fact that against its inclination it is subjected to the lower.

2. Secondly. The punishment of sense corresponds to guilt with respect to the inordinate turning to a mutable good, just as the punishment of loss corresponds to it with respect to the turning away from the immutable good. Therefore it is fitting that it be afflicted by corporeal things. — The consequence is proved. Because the rational creature, especially the human soul, sins by turning itself inordinately to corporeal things.

It must be noted that this reason properly proceeds concerning the punishment of the rational soul, because, as St. Thomas intimates, separated substances did not sin through the turning of the affect to corporeal things, but to spiritual things; namely, either by desiring their own natural good as an ultimate end; or by desiring true beatitude, but in an undue manner, as was shown ⁶ above.

3. Thirdly. An afflictive punishment, which we call the punishment of sense, ought to proceed from that which can inflict affliction. Therefore it is fitting that a spiritual substance be punished by corporeal things. — The consequence is proved. Because nothing inflicts affliction except insofar as it is contrary to the will. But it is contrary to the natural will of a spiritual substance to be subjected to a body, from which according to the order of its nature it ought to be free, not however, that it be conjoined to a spiritual substance: on the contrary, this is delightful to it, and pertains to its perfection, since it is a conjoining of like to like, and of intelligible to intelligible.

It must be noted, when it is said that a spiritual nature according to the order of nature ought to be free from a body, that this is to be understood universally with respect to spiritual substances that are complete in species: but with respect to the intellective soul, which receives the complement of its perfection in the body, it is to be understood with this exception, unless it be united to it as form.

IV. But because someone could say that those things that are said concerning the bodily punishment of the damned are to be understood spiritually, just as also those things that are read concerning the rewards of the Blessed, St. Thomas removes this, saying that, although those are understood spiritually, nonetheless certain corporeal things that Scripture threatens to sinners for punishment are to be understood corporally, and as it were properly spoken. Because it is not fitting that a higher nature be rewarded through the use of a lower, but rather through the fact that it is conjoined to a higher: yet it is fittingly punished through the fact that it is assigned with lower things.

2. Someone could also object that, if certain of the things said are to be understood corporally, by the same reason all are. — But St. Thomas answers that this is not necessary: because certain things of this kind are to be understood spiritually, and as spoken by way of similitude, just as in the last chapter of Isaiah it is said that their worm shall not die: for it is evident that this cannot be understood as if a corporeal worm were to corrode a spiritual substance, or the bodies of the damned, which will be incorruptible; but by the worm the remorse of conscience can be understood, with which the wicked also will be tortured. — It is also evident that weeping and gnashing of teeth in spiritual substances cannot be understood except metaphorically: although nothing prevents these from being understood corporally in the bodies of the damned; yet in such a way that by weeping is understood, not the shedding of tears, but only sorrow of heart and the disturbance of the eyes and head, as is wont to be ⁷ in those who weep.

3. Concerning the worm, which is said to be the remorse of conscience in the damned, it must be noted that the worm is not so to be understood to be in the damned as if the damned repented of the sins that they committed in themselves, and insofar as they are evil: but because they continually grieve over them by reason of the punishment that they continually suffer for them, as St. Thomas says in the Fourth Book, d. L, q. II, a. 1 ⁸.

4. Concerning the weeping of the damned, however, which is said to be with respect to sorrow of heart and with respect to disturbance of the head and eyes, a doubt arises. That disturbance of the head and eyes does not seem to be able to exist except through the body being transmuted from its natural disposition. But after the resurrection this cannot be in bodies: as was shown ⁹ above. Therefore. — And if perchance it should be said, as seems to be held by St. Thomas, IV Sent., the cited distinction ¹⁰, that although they cannot be transmuted from their natural disposition from without, they will nonetheless be able to be transmuted from within, according as the body is transmuted at the passion of the soul: this does not seem to be according to his mind, because he in the Fourth Book, d. XLIV, q. III, a. 1, qu. 3, ad 4, holds that not even from within can there be such a transmutation in the body. — If it should also be said that there will be no transmutation on this account, because that disturbance will be in the head and in the eyes from the beginning of the union of the soul to the body, and will persevere forever: this also does not seem to be according to the mind of St. Thomas, because in the preceding chapter he said that in the bodies of the damned there will be no defect, and no corruption, which an error of nature or infirmity brought in.

It is said first, that certainly this disturbance will not be through any alteration of the body from its natural and fitting quality. For St. Thomas expressly holds this in the places cited before.

It is said secondly, that such a disturbance will be a certain disposition of the body, by which the body, when the soul sorrows, will be disposed, as is said in Quodlib. VII, a. 13. For just as is said in the Fourth Book, d. L ¹¹, the bodies of the damned will not only be afflicted from without, but also from within, according as the body is changed at the passion of the soul into good or evil.

It is said thirdly, that such a change of the head and eyes proceeding from sorrow can be understood either according to local motion only of the spirits or of some humors, from whose motion a certain confusion remains in the head and in the eyes: or, along with this, also according to a spiritual change proceeding from spirits and humors of this kind moved without a fitting order. And this seems to me to be more according to the mind of St. Thomas, who, assigning ¹² the reason how this commotion and perturbation can be in the damned, says that this is inasmuch as the bodies of the damned will be afflicted from within, just as also from without. But it is evident from what was said above ¹³ that the bodies of the damned will be afflicted from without through a spiritual change.

Moreover, St. Thomas adds in the Quodlibet that if anyone wished to hold that weeping of this kind is through the dissolution of tears, he could say that by divine power that loss of tears would be restored ¹⁴.

V. Concerning the soul's suffering from fire, inasmuch as it is bound to it by divine power, and by the same power is detained by it lest it be able to be in another place, it is doubted by Durand, in Capreolus, Fourth Book, d. XLIV, q. IV ¹⁵, first because, if there is no other punishment of the soul and the demon proceeding from the fire than that they are detained by it lest they move to another place to which they would wish, then an equal punishment would be theirs if they were detained in the same way in a beautiful chamber. But this is not accounted so penal and grievous as we preach the punishment of damned men and demons to be grievous. Therefore etc.

Secondly, because then the souls of those departing with only original sin would be just as afflicted as the souls of the damned: since they too are detained in limbo.

VI. For the evidence of this kind of matter, it must be considered first, as is clear from the above ¹⁶, that although a spiritual substance can be according to its essence in a corporeal place, not indeed circumscriptively, as if it were contained and surrounded by it, but definitively, inasmuch as it is in one place in such a way that not in another, according to the contact of its power, as was shown ¹⁷ in the above; yet it, according to its nature, is free and unbound from all obligation to place: because place properly belongs to bodies, but it transcends the whole order of corporeal things.

It must be considered secondly, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Qu. de Anima, the cited place ¹⁸, that harm is not inflicted on anything according as it receives that which is perfected, but according as it is hindered by its contrary. But since a thing is hindered by its contrary both with respect to being, through alteration and corruption, as wood is burned by fire; and with respect to its inclination, as a stone is violently detained above: it is clear that the soul cannot suffer harm from the fire in such a way that it is hindered by it in the first mode, but only because it is hindered in the second mode; while namely against its natural inclination and against its nature, by which it transcends the whole order of bodies and is free from all determination to place and to a body of which it is not the form, it is bound to the fire by divine power, and is detained by it of necessity.

It must be considered thirdly that this harm, although in those lacking cognition it does not cause affliction, because there cannot be affliction where there cannot be sorrow and sadness, but these follow upon the cognition of harm, yet in those having cognition it causes affliction, according as it is apprehended as contrary to the will and natural inclination; and sometimes it afflicts more than sensible harm, for someone would rather be beaten, and be afflicted according to sense, than be reviled, or sustain something of this kind that is against his will, especially if he be of great mind and proud. Because therefore the spiritual substance, which is proud and exalted over its nobility, is bound to fire, and is detained by it against its natural inclination lest it be able to move to other places; and it knows most perfectly that this is inflicted on it by divine power and justice against its will; it sorrows and grieves exceedingly, considering that it, which was born to be elevated to divine fruition, is bound to the lowest things. For as is said in the Fourth Book, d. XXI ¹⁹, a. 1, qu. 3 ²⁰, although the soul is less passive than the body, it is nonetheless more cognitive of passion. But where there is greater cognition of passion, there is greater sorrow, even if there is less passion: whence in the most sensitive places injuries cause the greatest sorrow.

2. To the first argument of Durand ²¹, therefore, it is said that the spiritual substance would also be afflicted if it were detained in a beautiful chamber, and deprived of its liberty. But it is so much the more afflicted from detention in fire than from detention in a beautiful chamber, as it knows that this is inflicted on it for greater ignominy, that it is bound to drossy fire, and not to some adorned place: just as an emperor would indeed be afflicted if he were detained by some prince in a beautiful and adorned place by violence, but he would be more saddened if he were detained by a peasant in an unclean and fetid place.

To the second it is said that the case is not the same with children who are detained in limbo and with the damned: because they voluntarily endure that prison, considering that it is owed to them from justice; for their will is just, as is clear from the teaching of St. Thomas in II Sent., d. XXXIII, q. II ²². But the will of the damned is always contrary to divine justice, and they are detained by corporeal fire against their will.

Concerning this passibility of the soul from fire, see St. Thomas in the places cited before, where he treats this matter diffusely.