Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

After St. Thomas has shown what the condition of the bodies of the Blessed will be in the resurrection ¹, he subsequently explains what the condition of the bodies of the damned will be. And he lays down six conclusions.

I. The first is: The bodies of the damned, as to that which belongs to nature, will be restored whole: namely, at a perfect age, without any diminution of members, and without any defect and corruption that an error of nature or infirmity has brought in. It is proved thus. The souls of the wicked have a good nature, inasmuch as it was created by God. Therefore, etc. The consequence is proved: because those bodies must be proportioned to the souls of the damned.

It should be noted that St. Thomas said that the bodies of the damned are to be restored without the defect which an error of nature or infirmity brought in, in order to give to understand that whatever defect was from the corruption or weakness of nature or of natural principles is entirely to be removed in the resurrection, such as fever, blear-eyedness, and the like; but not those defects which naturally follow from natural principles in the human body, such as heaviness and the like.

It is confirmed through the Apostle saying, I Cor. 15, that the dead shall rise incorrupt.

The second is: Such bodies will not be spiritual, as though entirely subject to the spirit, but rather their soul will be carnal through affect: that is, the spirit will be drawn more to the obedience of the flesh through affect than the body is subject to the spirit. It is proved: because their soul too will be turned away from God according to the will, and destitute of its proper end.

The third is: Bodies of this kind will not be agile, as though obedient to the soul without difficulty: but rather they will be ponderous and heavy, and in a certain way unbearable to the soul. It is proved: because their souls too are turned away from God through disobedience.

The fourth is: These bodies will remain passible just as now, or even more so: yet in such a way that they will indeed suffer affliction from sensible things, but not corruption. It is proved: because their souls too will be tormented, being totally frustrated of the natural desire for beatitude. Understand this of the desire for beatitude according to the common notion of beatitude and of the highest good, because this is natural; but not according to the particular notion of beatitude, which is the vision of the divine essence. For the soul does not absolutely and naturally desire this under the notion of the highest good and of final beatitude, but only on the supposition of this cognition had through revelation, that the very vision of the divine essence is the highest good and the total beatitude of an intellectual nature.

The fifth is: These bodies will be opaque and dark. It is proved: because their souls will be alienated from the light of divine cognition.

The aforesaid conclusions are confirmed through that saying of the Apostle in I Cor. 15: We shall all rise again, but we shall not all be changed.

II. If it is objected against the fourth conclusion that the bodies of the wicked will not be able to be impassible and incorruptible, because every passion, when increased, casts out from substance, as is evident through experience: it is said, first, that that is true on the supposition of the transmutability of matter from form to form. But this will not be after the resurrection in the bodies of either the good or the wicked, because in both they will be totally perfected by the soul as to natural being, divine power totally subjecting the body to the soul.

It is said, secondly, that the potency which is in prime matter for every form will remain in a certain way bound in the human body, so that it cannot be reduced to the act of another form. — Note that it is said in a certain way: because it is a metaphorical expression to say that the potency of matter is bound.

It is said, thirdly, that because the bodies of the damned will not be totally subject to the soul as to some conditions, namely, as to actions and passions, they will be afflicted according to sense by the contrariety of sensibles: for instance, by corporeal fire, inasmuch as heat, on account of its excellence, is contrary to the equality of the complexion and harmony that is connatural to sense, although it cannot dissolve it.

It is said, fourthly, that such affliction will not be able to separate the soul from the body, since it is always necessary for the body to remain under the same form.

III. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that, since pain and affliction imply a sense of injury, in order to see how the damned suffer affliction and pain from sensible things, it must be seen how they can be injured by them. Since, therefore, a twofold action can proceed from sensible things: one, namely, natural, by which a form is imprinted by them into the patient according to its material being, as when fire by its heat makes wood hot; the other, however, spiritual, by which it imprints its intention and likeness into the sense, as when heat imprints its likeness into the sense of touch: the bodies of the damned cannot be injured by sensibles acting upon them with a natural action; because, as is said in Quodl. VIII, q. 8, ² fire and water, and by the same reason other sensibles, will not act upon the bodies of the damned with an action of nature. Therefore it remains that they are injured by them inasmuch as they act with a spiritual action through the immutation of the senses.

It must be considered, secondly, that this injury which occurs through spiritual immutation can be understood in two ways. In one way, because through such an immutation some form naturally suited to the body is cast out from it. And in this way injury cannot be understood in the damned: because the soul, as is said here, perfectly dominates matter as to natural being; hence it is also said here that, although the quality of fire is contrary to the quality of the complexion and harmony that is connatural to sense, it nevertheless cannot dissolve it. — In another way, because through the immutation itself an intentional form disproportionate and unsuitable to the sense organ is caused in it. Hence St. Thomas says in the Fourth Book, d. 44, q. 3, a. 1, ³ that a sensible is naturally suited not only to delight or afflict sense according as it acts with an action of nature by strengthening or corrupting the organ, but also according as it acts upon the sense with a spiritual action, according as it is in due proportion to the sentient subject, or in superabundance and defect. And in this way is injury from sensible things to be understood in the damned.

IV. But then a twofold doubt arises. The first is, how affliction and pain can be caused by an intentional form, since they are real effects. The second is, why the Blessed will not be able to be afflicted by sensibles of this kind just like the damned, since an excellent sensible is just as disproportionate to the sense of the Blessed as to the sense of the damned.

2. To the first, it is answered that the sensible likeness is not said to have intentional being in sense as intentional being is distinguished from real being, in the way that beings of reason are said to have intentional being (for it has real being, and really informs the sense), but as it is distinguished from the natural and material being of the same form. For the sensible is in the sense without matter, and in a certain immaterial mode: hence it does not denominate it hot or cold, as is evident in II De Anima. ⁴ But for a thing having such intentional and spiritual being, it is not unsuitable that it cause pain or some other real effect by virtue of the extrinsic form by which it is caused.

But against this response a doubt still occurs. For St. Thomas holds, Prima, q. 67, a. 3, and II Sent., d. 13, a. 3, that the intention of color in the air, and similarly other intentions of sensibles, do not cause a natural transmutation, and yet they have some real being there. Therefore, by the same reason, the intentions that are in the sense cannot induce a real effect.

It is answered by denying the consequence. For although they could not cause any transmutation, concerning which it was spoken above, ⁵ it does not follow that they cannot cause pain in the damned. For that causing of pain is not through any natural transmutation, since the bodies of the damned are not transmutable by a natural mutation, just as neither are the bodies of the Blessed, but solely through the disproportion of the object to the sense organ.

3. To the second, it could be answered in two ways. First, that although some sensibles are disproportionate to the senses of the Blessed if they are considered only in themselves, they are nevertheless not disproportionate to them as they are subject to the glorified soul and possess the dowry of impassibility: for by this the senses and their organs are rendered proportionate to the whole range of their proper sensible, by the proportion of a passive subject to a connatural agent. In the damned, however, the body is not perfectly subject to the soul as to all actions and passions, nor is there in them the dowry of impassibility, through which the sense organs might be elevated and perfected.

It could be answered, secondly, that indeed some excellences of sensibles will also be disproportionate to the senses of the Blessed, but yet they will not be able to act upon the sense itself after the manner of something injurious. Because either they will not act upon it, the dowry of impassibility preventing it, or, if they do act by imprinting their likeness, that action will nevertheless not have the character of something injurious: inasmuch as it will cause no sensible pain or interior sorrow, the soul preventing this from its full dominion over the body and over all its actions and passions, and the dowry of impassibility impeding it.

4. If, however, it is asked concerning the bodies of infants dying with original sin alone, in whom, according to St. Thomas, ⁶ there will be no punishment of sense, how they will be impassible, since they will not have the dowry of impassibility: — it is said, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, II Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, ad 5, that they will not suffer with a corruptive passion, because, the movement of the heaven ceasing, there will be no corruptive or alterative agent. Nor will they suffer with an afflictive passion through spiritual immutation from sensibles, divine justice preventing this passion, as being in no way due to them.

For the rest that pertain to this matter, see Capreolus in the Fourth Book, d. 44, q. 4.

V. The sixth conclusion is: The lowest, and dark, and penal place will be assigned to the bodies of the damned. It is proved: because, on the contrary, the bodies of the Blessed, on account of the renewal of glory, will be elevated above celestial bodies. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm: Let death come, etc. And in Apoc. 20 it is said that the devil who seduced, etc.