Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV
Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)
Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles
First published 1918
In Book IV of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) examines Aquinas's treatment of revealed mysteries: the Trinity, the Incarnation, the sacraments, and the resurrection. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XV (1930). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.
Prooemium
Caput I: Quod sit generatio, paternitas et filiatio in divinis
Caput II: Quod filius Dei sit Deus
Caput III: Quid opinatus sit Photinus de filio Dei, et eius improbatio
Caput IV: Opinio Sabellii de filio Dei, et eius improbatio
Caput V: De opinione Arii circa filium Dei
Caput VI: Improbatio opinionis Arii de filio Dei
Caput VII: Solutio ad auctoritates quas Arius pro se inducebat
Caput VIII: Solutio ad auctoritates Photini et Sabellii
Caput IX: Rationes contra generationem et processionem divinam
Caput X: Quomodo accipienda sit generatio in divinis, et quae de filio Dei dicuntur in Scripturis
Caput XI: Quomodo filius Dei dicatur Dei sapientia
Caput XII: Quod non est nisi unus filius in divinis
Caput XIII: Solutio ad rationes supra inductas contra generationem divinam
Caput XIV: De spiritu sancto, quod sit in divinis
Caput XV: Rationes ex quibus aliqui spiritum sanctum existimaverunt esse creaturam
Caput XVI: Quod spiritus sanctus sit verus Deus
Caput XVII: Quod spiritus sanctus sit subsistens persona
Caput XVIII: Quomodo intelligenda sunt quae de spiritu sancto dicuntur
Caput XIX: De effectibus attributis spiritui sancto in Scripturis respectu totius creaturae
Caput XX: De effectibus attributis spiritui sancto in sacra Scriptura respectu rationalis creaturae, quantum ad ea quae Deus nobis largitur
Caput XXI: De effectibus attributis spiritui sancto secundum quod movet creaturam in Deum
Caput XXII: Solutio rationum supra inductarum contra divinitatem spiritus sancti
Caput XXIII: Quod spiritus sanctus procedat a filio
Caput XXIV: Rationes ostendere volentium quod spiritus sanctus non procedat a filio, et solutio ipsarum
Caput XXV: Quod non sunt nisi tres personae in divinis pater, filius et spiritus sanctus
Caput XXVI: De incarnatione verbi secundum traditionem sacrae Scripturae
Caput XXVII: De errore Photini circa incarnationem
Caput XXVIII: De errore Manichaeorum circa incarnationem
Caput XXIX: De errore Valentini circa incarnationem
Caput XXX: De errore Apollinaris circa corpus Christi
Caput XXXI: De errore Arii et Apollinaris circa animam Christi
Caput XXXII: De errore Apollinaris dicentis animam rationalem non fuisse in Christo, et de errore Origenis dicentis animam Christi ante mundum fuisse creatam
Caput XXXIII: De errore Theodori Mopsuesteni et Nestorii circa unionem verbi ad hominem
Caput XXXIV: Contra errorem Eutychetis
Caput XXXV: De errore Macarii Antiocheni ponentis unam tantum voluntatem in Christo
Caput XXXVI: Contra eos qui dixerunt ex anima et corpore non esse aliquid unum constitutum in Christo
Caput XXXVII: Contra eos qui ponunt duo supposita vel duas hypostases in una persona Christi
Caput XXXVIII: Quid Catholica fides sentiat de incarnatione Christi
Caput XXXIX: Obiectiones contra fidem incarnationis
Caput XL: Quomodo oporteat intelligere incarnationem filii Dei
Caput XLI: Quod assumptio humanae naturae maxime competebat verbo Dei
Caput XLII: Quod humana natura assumpta a verbo non praeextitit assumptioni, sed in ipsa conceptione fuit assumpta
Caput XLIII: Quod natura assumpta a verbo in ipsa conceptione fuit perfecta quantum ad animam et corpus
Caput XLIV: Quod Christum decuit nasci ex virgine
Caput XLV: Quod Christus natus est de spiritu sancto
Caput XLVI: Quod Christus non fuit filius spiritus sancti secundum carnem
Caput XLVII: Quod non sit dicendum Christum esse creaturam
Caput XLVIII: Solutio rationum contra incarnationem superius positarum
Caput XLIX: Quod peccatum originale traducatur a primo parente in posteros
Caput L: Obiectiones contra peccatum originale
Caput LI: Solutio obiectionum positarum
Caput LII: Rationes quibus videtur probari quod non fuit conveniens Deum incarnari
Caput LIII: Quod conveniens fuit Deum incarnari
Caput LIV: Solutio rationum supra positarum contra convenientiam incarnationis
Caput LV: De necessitate sacramentorum
Caput LVI: De distinctione sacramentorum veteris et novae legis
Caput LVII: De numero sacramentorum novae legis
Caput LVIII: De Baptismo
Caput LIX: De confirmatione
Caput LX: De Eucharistia
Caput LXI: De errore infidelium circa sacramentum Eucharistiae
Caput LXII: Solutio praemissarum difficultatum, et primo quoad conversionem panis in corpus Christi
Caput LXIII: Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ex parte loci
Caput LXIV: Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ex parte accidentium
Caput LXV: Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ex parte actionis et passionis
Caput LXVI: Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ex parte fractionis
Caput LXVII: Solutio auctoritatis inductae
Caput LXVIII: Ex quali pane et vino debet confici hoc sacramentum
Caput LXIX: De sacramento poenitentiae. Et primo, quod homines post gratiam sacramentalem acceptam peccare possunt
Caput LXX: Quod homo peccans post sacramentorum gratiam potest converti per gratiam
Caput LXXI: De necessitate poenitentiae et partium eius
Caput LXXII: De sacramento extremae unctionis
Caput LXXIII: De sacramento ordinis
Caput LXXIV: De distinctione ordinum
Caput LXXV: De episcopali potestate: et quod in ea unus sit summus
Caput LXXVI: Quod per malos ministros sacramenta dispensari possunt
Caput LXXVII: De sacramento matrimonii
Caput LXXVIII: Quod per Christum resurrectio corporum sit futura
Caput LXXIX: Obiectiones contra resurrectionem
Caput LXXX: Solutio praemissarum obiectionum
Caput LXXXI: Quod homines resurgent immortales
Caput LXXXII: Quod in resurgentibus non erit usus ciborum neque venereorum
Caput LXXXIII: Quod corpora resurgentium erunt eiusdem naturae
Caput LXXXIV: Quod corpora resurgentium erunt alterius dispositionis
Caput LXXXV: De qualitate corporum glorificatorum
Caput LXXXVI: De loco corporum glorificatorum
After St. Thomas determined concerning the dowries of the bodies of the Blessed 1, he subsequently determines concerning their place.
I. And he posits this conclusion: The bodies of the Blessed will have a place in the heavens, or rather above the heavens. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he proves the conclusion; second, he removes certain objections 2.
As to the first, the first part of the disjunctive is proved thus: Bodies of this kind will attain the property of heavenly bodies. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because a place ought to be proportioned to what is located.
The second part, in turn, is proved. It is fitting that the bodies of the blessed be together with Christ: because by his power they will be brought to this glory. But he himself is above all the heavens, as is said in Ephes. IV. Therefore etc.
It should be noted that, although St. Thomas speaks under a disjunction, saying that the bodies of the Blessed have a place in heaven or above all the heavens, he nevertheless seems rather to lean toward their being above all the heavens, in III Part, q. LVII, a. 4 3; Quodlib. VI, a. 3; and also here, when he says that they rather have a place above all the heavens.
II. As to the second, he removes two objections. The first is that, since the body of man is earthly, and has the lowest place according to its nature, it does not seem that it can be elevated above the light elements.
The second is that heavenly bodies cannot be broken, so that glorified bodies may be elevated above them.
But to the first he answers that it is frivolous. Because just as the body is now held together by the power of the soul, as long as we live, lest it be dissolved by the contrariety of the elements; and is elevated on high by its motive power, and so much the more as the motive power is stronger: so because the soul will then be of perfect power, when it is joined to God through the vision, by its power the body will be able to be preserved immune from all corruption, and to be elevated above whatever bodies.
To the second, however, he says that by divine power it will be brought about that glorified bodies can be together with other bodies. A sign of which is that Christ entered to the disciples the doors being closed.
It should be observed that St. Thomas said for this reason that glorified bodies can be together with other bodies by divine power, and not absolutely that they can be together with others, lest anyone should think that they have it from some inherent property, namely from the dowry of subtlety, that they can be together with other bodies. For he proves in IV Sent. 4 that this cannot be through the dowry of subtlety, but only by divine power.
III. But there are two things that create a difficulty in this second response.
The first is that it is said that it can be brought about by divine power that two bodies are together. For against this Durandus argues 5 thus. The parts of the same body are so necessarily distinguished in site that it is impossible for them to be together, with a simultaneity opposed to this distinction. Both because this seems to belong to the intrinsic notion of quantity, that it have part outside part. And because otherwise the parts of the same quantity could then be replicated so much that the whole replication would be made upon one minimal part: and then a maximum body could be contained by a minimal place. — Therefore, much more so, must two bodies be distinguished in site and position.
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On the contrary, however, Scotus argues in the Fourth, d. XLIX, q. XVI 6, that it is not by the power of God alone that two bodies can be together. Both because, if the principles of those bodies remain as they are distinct in the same place, God alone does not conserve them, because he does this with secondary causes concurring: if, however, such principles do not remain, he no longer conserves them together in being. — And because, if site is the formal and essential distinctive of quantity, without it God will not be able to conserve quantity distinct. If, however, it is an accidental or casual distinction, they will be able to be conserved distinct according to their prior causes, without that which is the accidental notion of distinction. And because it is not impossible for two extrinsic respects to be in diverse things with respect to the same term. But the respect of where is an extrinsically incoming respect.
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The second thing that creates a difficulty is that the sign that is adduced concerning Christ entering, the doors being closed, does not seem sufficient to show that two bodies were together. For it is not said in the Gospel that Christ entered through the closed doors, but that he entered the doors being closed. This, however, could have been with him entering through windows, either visibly or invisibly 7.
IV. For the evidence of these things, it must be considered first, that site can be taken in two ways. In one way, as it is a predicament per se, which is also called position, and it expresses the order of parts in a place, namely the order of diverse parts of the located thing to diverse parts of the place. In another way, as it is a difference of quantity, and signifies the order of parts in the whole: not indeed that one is outside another according to place, but that one is after another, and one is really distinct from another according to quantity. Site taken in the first way does not belong to the notion of a quantified thing as such, but is outside its notion: but site taken in the second way does indeed belong to the notion of a quantum as it is a quantum. Likewise, taken in the first way, it is a secondary effect of dimension caused in a quantified body: but taken in the second way, it is the primary effect of dimension. For from the fact that matter is under determinate dimensions, a body has first the order of parts in itself: second, it also has a determinate order of parts in place. And therefore, from the diversity of matter under diverse dimensions, there follows not only a diversity of the order of parts in the whole, but there also follows a diversity of bodies according to place: since dimensioned matters themselves are not naturally distinct unless they are in diverse sites.
It must be considered secondly that, although neither of these effects can be impeded by a natural cause from proceeding from distinct dimensions, because the distinction of each site naturally follows from the distinction of dimensions, and one dimension naturally expels another from the place that it enters: nevertheless, by divine power the secondary formal effect of dimensions can be suspended; and the action by which one dimension expels another from the same place can be suspended. Therefore, by the power of nature it cannot indeed be brought about that two bodies are in the same place: but by divine power, which can suspend every effect of an agent cause and the secondary and extrinsic effect of a formal cause, it can well be brought about.
V. To the first of Durandus, therefore, the assumption is denied. For just as two entirely distinct bodies can be in the same place, with divine power operating, so also can two parts of the same body.
To his first proof, it is said that it is not of the notion of quantity that it have part outside part according to place, each of which would have a place distinct from the place of the other part. For, if there were a body outside the universe, it is clear that it would not have parts distinguished by site of this kind, but that it would have parts distinguished according to a real distinction: that is, that it would have several parts of which one is not the other, and one is after another in the whole.
To the second proof, it is said that there is no absurdity in a replication of parts being made upon a minimal part by divine power; and a maximum body, reduced through the sub-entrance of parts to a minimal extension, being contained by a minimal place; as that a camel should pass through the eye of a needle 8.
VI. To the first of Scotus, however, it is said that the essential principles of the real distinction of bodies existing together in the same place by divine power certainly remain, by which, local distinction being removed, they are really distinguished: for their proper forms, proper matters, and proper dimensions remain. — To the disproof of this, it is said that we do not say that two bodies can remain distinct in the same place by divine power alone in such a way as if no other things concurred for their distinction: but because those essential principles alone which caused their distinction in diverse sites and places cannot cause that distinction in the same site, unless a particular divine causality concurs besides the common influx; and no natural cause can impede the local distinction that is naturally apt to follow from the quantitative distinction of diverse bodies, but only the divine power.
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To the second, it is said that diversity of site is not in itself the cause of the distinction of bodies, but a sign of such distinction: as St. Thomas says on Boethius's De Trinitate 9: and it is an effect proceeding from the same cause from which the distinction of bodies itself proceeds, from which cause it cannot naturally be separated. For just as from the diversity of dimensions, or of matter under diverse dimensions, the numerical diversity of bodies proceeds, so also does the diversity of sites. Therefore this consequence is not valid: Site is not the formal and essential distinctive principle of quantity. Therefore, without diversity of site, the distinction of quantities can be conserved per se through other prior causes, without diversity of sites. For although it is not the formal principle of the distinction of quantity, it is nevertheless its natural effect, following upon the diversity of quantities, without which a distinction of quantities cannot naturally exist. Just as this is not valid: Hotness and coldness are not essential principles of the distinction of fire and earth. Therefore fire and earth can naturally be distinct, without diversity of hotness and coldness.
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To the third, the assumption is denied. For two respects cannot naturally look to the same adequate term. But the respect of where looks to place as to an adequate term: since place must be equated to the located thing, if it is its proper place.
VII. To the second doubt, concerning the sign adduced by St. Thomas 10, it is said that, although it is not expressly had from the text of the Gospel that Christ entered to the disciples through the closed doors, and he could have entered from elsewhere with the doors closed: it is nevertheless had from the interpretation of the holy Doctors, especially Augustine 11. Whence the holy Doctors also hold that in Christ's ascension his body was together with the heavenly body, without any breaking of the heavenly body: although God by his power could have parted the heaven, so that it would yield to Christ ascending. But this is no less impossible to God, among the philosophers, than for two bodies to be together.