Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

After St. Thomas showed the common condition of all resurrected bodies, he consequently shows the condition of both kinds of bodies individually¹. And first, of glorified bodies; second, of the damned bodies, chap. 89.

Concerning the first he does three things: first, he shows the condition of glorified bodies with respect to corporeal qualities, which are called its dowries; second, with respect to place, in the following chapter; third, with respect to sex and age, chap. 88.

I. With respect to the first, he sets down four conclusions. The first of these is: The bodies of the blessed will have clarity.

But before this conclusion is proved, it is premised first that, although by the merit of Christ the defect of nature will be commonly removed from all in the resurrection, a difference will nevertheless remain between the good and the wicked with respect to those things that belong to each personally.

It is premised secondly that it belongs to the nature of the human soul that it be the form of the body, vivifying it and preserving it in being. From human acts, however, the soul deserves either to be elevated into the glory of the divine vision, or to be excluded from the order of such ² glory on account of guilt. Therefore the body of all will be commonly disposed according to fittingness with the soul, namely, so that it bestows incorruptible being upon the body, matter being wholly subjected to the soul by divine power; but from the clarity and power of the soul elevated to the divine vision, the body united to it will obtain this further: that, by the working of divine power, it is subject to it not only as to being, but also as to actions and passions and motions and corporeal qualities.

These things having been premised, the conclusion is proved thus. The soul enjoying the divine vision will be filled with a certain spiritual quality. Therefore the body also will in its own way be clothed with the glory of clarity. — The consequence is proved. Because it will come upon the body from the soul through a certain redundancy.

It is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 15, It is sown etc. Likewise, Matt. 13, They will shine etc.

2. It should be noted that the clarity of the soul seeing God is not to be understood as overflowing into the body as if the clarity of the soul and the clarity of the glorious body were one and the same, or of the same definition: but because from the very clarity of the soul there results and flows into the body a certain clarity which is a corporeal quality. Hence it is said here that the body itself in its own way, that is, corporally, but not spiritually, will be clothed with the glory of clarity. Now St. Thomas seems to hold this in the Fourth Book, d. 44, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 2, ad 1, where he says that the clarity of glory will be of another genus than the clarity of nature with respect to cause, but not with respect to species. For if this clarity of the glorious body is of the same species with the clarity of nature, it is manifest that it is not of the same definition with the soul's clarity: because the clarity of corporeal nature and the clarity of the spiritual soul, especially the clarity of grace, are of a different definition and of a different genus.

II. The second conclusion is: Bodies of this kind will be agile. It is proved. The soul joined to the ultimate end will in all things experience its desire fulfilled. Therefore the body will entirely obey the spirit with respect to motion³. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because the body is moved from the desire of the soul.

Concerning this proof of the consequence, it should be noted that St. Thomas wishes to show that from the opposite of the consequent the opposite of the antecedent is inferred. For if the body does not entirely obey the spirit with respect to motion, it follows that the desire of the soul, from which the body is moved, will not be fulfilled in all things.

It is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle saying that it will rise in power. And Wis. 3, it is said that they will run about like sparks among reeds: not indeed as if motion were in them on account of necessity, but for the demonstration of power.

2. Concerning the agility itself of glorified bodies, two things must be observed, from the teaching of St. Thomas, IV Sent., in the question cited, a. 3⁴.

The first is that this agility includes three things. The first is the perfection of the soul itself, according to which it will perfectly dominate the body; the negation of resistance to the will and desire of the soul; and a certain perfection flowing from the glorified soul into the body, through which it is rendered apt and ready to obey the soul insofar as it is the mover of the body.

The second is that through agility of this kind the glorious body is rendered apt and ready to obey the soul, not only as to local motion, but also as to all operations of the soul which are exercised through the body, such as the operations of the senses.

3. Concerning what is said, that motion is not in the blessed on account of necessity, it must be noted, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the place cited above⁵, that this is to be understood with respect to need simpliciter: which occurs when someone needs something without which he cannot be preserved in being, or in his perfection. But motion will indeed be on account of some necessity and need secundum quid: which occurs when someone needs that without which he cannot have the intended end, or not so well, or not in such a manner. For they will not be able to manifest the motive power existing in them by experience unless they are moved. And this is what St. Thomas signified when he said that motion will be in them for the demonstration of power.

III. The third conclusion is: The bodies of the blessed will be impassible. It is proved. A body of this kind will be immune from all evil: both with respect to act, because in them there will be no corruption, no deformity, no defect; and with respect to potency, because they will not be able to suffer anything that is distressing to them. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. The soul enjoying God will have its desire fulfilled with respect to the removal of all evil: because evil has no place with the highest good. Therefore the body perfected by the soul, proportionally to the soul, will be immune from all evil: both with respect to act, because in it there will be no defect; and with respect to potency, because it will be able to suffer nothing distressing. Therefore etc.

Now St. Thomas explains the conclusion, saying that this impassibility does not exclude from these bodies the passion that belongs to the nature of sense: because they will use the senses for pleasure according to those things that are not repugnant to the state of incorruption.

It is confirmed from what is said by the Apostle, It is sown in corruption, it will rise in incorruption.

Concerning the first consequent, it should be noted that the phrase proportionally to the soul can be explained in two ways. In one way, so that it qualifies the word perfected, and the sense will be that the body which in the resurrection is perfected according to conformity to the soul, namely insofar as it has incorruptible being, just as the soul is incorruptible, will be immune from all evil. — In another way, so that it qualifies the phrase will be immune, and the sense will be that the body perfected by the soul enjoying God will be immune from all evil in proportion to the soul itself, namely insofar as, just as in such a soul there is no evil of fault, neither in act, because through consummate grace all sin is excluded, nor in potency, because it cannot sin, from the fact that it is confirmed in the good; so also in the body perfected by that soul there will be no evil, neither in act nor in potency. — Both expositions can be conveniently adapted to the text; the second, however, pleases me more.

Concerning the explanation of the conclusion, it must be observed that St. Thomas, after saying that the blessed will use the senses for pleasure, added according to those things that are not repugnant to the state of incorruption in order to exclude the use of the senses regarding the taking of corporeal food and regarding venereal acts, concerning which it was shown ⁶ that they are repugnant to the state of incorruption, as pertaining only to the state of corruption.

It must be observed further that the passion that belongs to the nature of the senses differs in two ways from other corporeal passions, which are called passions of nature. First, because the passion of the senses is through the reception of a sensible form according to a spiritual and immaterial mode; but the passion of nature is through the reception of a form according to its material being. — Second, because the passion of sense is perfective: for sense, from the reception of the sensible form, becomes in act so that it can elicit its proper operation. But the passion of nature, if properly taken, is corruptive, or afflictive, or cast-off: because it is a motion contrary to nature. Therefore, because cast-off and afflictive passion is removed from the blessed, but not perfective passion, it is no wonder if the passion of sense is found in the blessed, but not the passion of nature.

IV. But a doubt occurs concerning what St. Thomas says, that the blessed will use the senses on account of pleasure. For this seems to conflict with what was said by him above ⁷, where he attacked the opinion of those who said that in the resurrection there would be the use of food and venereal acts on account of pleasure alone, for this reason: because those pleasures are not the ends of actions, but conversely.

2. For the evidence of this, it must be considered first, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. 49, q. 3, a. 5 ⁸, that one must speak in one way concerning the pleasures of touch, which consist in the use of food and venereal acts, and in another way concerning the pleasures of the other senses. For the pleasures of touch are maximally material and maximally vehement, from the fact that the tangible object causing the pleasure of touch is really joined to us. And they are also maximally bestial: for brutes take pleasure in the other senses only in relation to touch, as is said in Ethics III ⁹, and they pursue the pleasures of touch above all. But the pleasures of the other senses are more spiritual, because those senses receive their objects more spiritually: for their objects are not joined to us according to material being, but only according to their intentions. Hence although pleasures of this kind are corporeal, insofar as they are motions of the sensitive appetite following the apprehension of sense, which is exercised through the body, they nevertheless approach spiritual pleasures and in a certain way fall into their genus, insofar as they follow the spiritual union of the sensible object with the one sensing, but not a real and natural union. Therefore it is not unfitting if the aforesaid pleasures of touch are not found in the blessed, who will live a spiritual life, while the pleasures of the other senses are found in them; and even pleasures of touch that follow only the spiritual conjunction of the tangible object, such as the pleasure following a spiritual immutation only from a proportionate hot or cold object.

It must be considered secondly, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the place cited above, and I-II, q. 31, aa. 5 and 6, that the pleasure of sense can be twofold: one regarding the sensible object itself spiritually joined; the other regarding the very knowledge of the sensible object. The first is that according to which someone is pleased by the thing known and apprehended through sense, such as by a color, or by a harmony and melody of voices. The other is that by which someone is pleased by the very knowledge of color, harmony, and the like. The first is in brutes, but not the second; but both are found in human beings, and also in the blessed. The first indeed follows the conjunction of the sensible with sense; but the second follows the apprehension of the knowledge itself as a proper perfection, which apprehension is indeed through the interior powers, or even through the intellect.

It must be considered thirdly that the senses are loved on account of two things: namely on account of knowledge, and on account of utility, as is said in Metaph. I ¹⁰; and in both ways there is pleasure according to sense. But the first belongs to humans alone, because it belongs to man alone to apprehend knowledge itself as a proper good; the second, however, is common to humans and brutes. Therefore the first is found in the blessed, because the knowledge itself of sense is not repugnant to the state of incorruption; the second, however, does not belong to them, because the utility of sensible things, which is considered in relation to the preservation of animal nature, belongs only to the state of corruption, in which nature needs something extrinsic both for the preservation of the individual and for the preservation of the species.

3. To the objection, therefore, it must be said that St. Thomas does not intend that the use of the senses in the blessed is for the sake of pleasure as if the blessed ordered the operation of sense to pleasure as to an end, as those whom St. Thomas refutes said concerning the pleasures of touch; but that they use the senses on account of the very knowledge of sense, which is pleasurable in itself to them, and not on account of some utility ordered to the preservation of nature, since their nature is incorruptible and does not need an extrinsic preserver.

V. Concerning the impassibility itself of the bodies of the blessed, it must be noted, as can be gathered from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. 44 ¹¹, that this impassibility arises from the full dominion over the body of the soul immovably enjoying God. For because the human body, and whatever is in it, will be perfectly subject to the soul, just as the soul will be perfectly subject to God, therefore no change will be able to occur in the glorious body contrary to that disposition by which it is perfected by the soul.

Whether, however, besides the power and dominion of the soul, it is necessary to posit some positive quality in the glorious body itself that prevents all passion: St. Thomas seems to say, in the place cited above, that it is not; but that impassibility imports only privation and negation in itself. Yet it has a positive cause: namely, the very dominion of the soul over the body: for the soul itself, which fully dominates the body, wholly binds its passive potency, so that it can receive no disposition contrary to the form.

But although it is not expressly maintained by St. Thomas in that place that impassibility denotes a positive form existing in the body, he nevertheless gives this to be understood from the fact that he counts it among the dowries of the body, in the Fourth Book, d. 49, q. 4 ¹², where he says that the dispositions that are in the glorious body by which the body is made perfectly subject to the soul are called the dowries of the body, just as the dispositions that are in the soul for the perfect operation by which it is joined to God are called the dowries of the soul. The same is also held in dist. 44, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 1.

And according to this it must be said that, just as agility denotes a certain quality flowing from the glorified soul into the body, through which it is rendered apt for motion and all operations of the soul; so impassibility denotes a quality flowing from the soul into the body, through which the body is rendered apt for subjection to the soul as its form preserving it in being, and through which it resists every disposition that is contrary to the form; so that formally impassibility denotes a negation, but materially it denotes something positive.

VI. But against the aforesaid things certain doubts occur¹³. For Scotus argues, in the Fourth Book¹⁴, that such impassibility does not arise from the dominion of the soul over the body by reason of a quality flowing into the body. First, because it would be either a celestial quality, or an elemental quality or one of mixture. Not the first: because the human body is not receptive of a celestial quality. Nor the second: because then it would be of the same genus with the others, and consequently would not prevent every action of theirs.

Secondly. If it were repugnant to the other qualities, it would not prevent every action: because it would be of the same definition with them. If, however, it were not repugnant, it would not prevent the action of any of them, since those other qualities are mutually repugnant.

2. Aureolus, however,¹⁵ argues that such impassibility does not arise from some form inhering in the body, both because the body does not seem to have impassibility with respect to translation from place to place through any quality: otherwise through it it would become stronger and more universal in resisting than any created power is in acting; and because to suffer and to be corrupted belongs per se in the second mode to what is composed of elements: but no created power can take away that which belongs to something in the second mode of speaking per se.

3. Durandus also¹⁶ proves the same by this reason: because impassibility and incorruptibility correspond to each other. But the incorruptibility of the bodies of the blessed will not be through any power inhering in them: because that will be common both to the good and to the wicked; in the wicked, however, it will not be through any inhering form, as seems to be conceded by others.

VII. For the solution of these, it must be premised that, according to the aforesaid, a twofold cause must be assigned for this impassibility of the bodies of the blessed, according as it imports a negation: namely, one remote, the other proximate. The remote cause is a certain power supernaturally implanted in the soul, through which it fully dominates the body with respect to its preservation. And it was said¹⁷ that this impassibility arises from the full dominion of the soul. The proximate cause, however, is a certain quality flowing from the glorified soul itself into the body, through which the body is made apt to be perfectly subjected to the soul with respect to its preservation, by preventing every disposition contrary to the soul. And because this quality flows from the soul as blessed and endowed with a supernatural quality, therefore it too is a supernatural quality, and not elemental or celestial, or arising from the mixture of the body. And therefore it is not necessary that it be of the same genus with the qualities from which the body itself is composed, which are natural and educed from the potency of the subject, although they are received in the same receptive subject. — And through this the response to the first argument of Scotus is clear.

2. To the second argument of the same author, it is said that for one quality to be repugnant to another quality or to its action can be understood in two ways. In one way, by formal repugnance, which is through the opposition of form to form, one of which expels the other from the same subject: in which way heat is repugnant to coldness. In another way, by material repugnance, which namely is the repugnance of matter or of a material disposition to a form: when, I say, some quality renders the subject altogether indisposed and inept for receiving some form or its action; just as we say that the qualities of fire are repugnant to the intellective soul, and the qualities of a celestial body are repugnant to corruptible qualities and forms, because through them matter is rendered indisposed to these forms. When, therefore, Scotus asks whether this quality is repugnant to the qualities of the body or not, it is said that it is repugnant materially, but not formally; namely because it makes the body inept for receiving their inordinate actions, but not because it prevents their actions by its own action.

When it is urged first that, if it is repugnant, then it does not prevent every action, because it is of the same definition: — it is said that the consequence does not hold, and its proof is null. For it is not the case that, if it is materially repugnant, it is of the same genus as it would be if it were formally repugnant: for contrary forms belong to the same genus, but not disparate forms.

When it is urged secondly that, if it is not repugnant, it does not prevent the action of any of them, — it is said that this would indeed be true if it were repugnant to them neither formally nor materially: but we say that it is materially repugnant, and therefore it prevents all immoderate actions of theirs.

VIII. To the first argument of Aureolus¹⁸ it can be answered first that the impassibility which we say comes to the body from some inhering quality is understood as preservative from corruptive or cast-off passion of some intrinsic disposition, but not from translation from place to place: because perhaps this is not from an inhering quality, but from divine protection.

It can be answered secondly, conformably to the aforesaid, that just as, in order for something to be receptive of some form from some agent, it is required that it be disposed with a determinate disposition for receiving that form and the action of that agent, so in order for it to be changeable from place to place by some mover, it is required that it be disposed for the reception of motion from such an agent. And therefore, just as through some quality matter can be indisposed and rendered inept for receiving the action of some agent, so it can be made inept and indisposed for receiving motion from a mover. Hence it is denied that the glorious body does not have impassibility with respect to translation from place to place through a positive quality.

When it is proved that then through it, it would become stronger and more universal in resisting than any created power in acting: — it is said that, if we speak of formal resistance, which is according to the contrariety of form to form, that does not follow. But if we speak of material resistance, which consists in rendering the subject inept and indisposed to the reception of motion from a created agent, that is not an absurdity. For a supernatural form, as being of a higher order than a natural form, can indispose matter and render it inept for receiving action and motion from any created power whatsoever.

2. To the second, it is denied that suffering and being corrupted belong per se in the second mode to a compound of elements: but to have the potency for suffering and corruption does indeed belong to it per se. And this will always be in glorious bodies as to its entity, but, as is said in the Fourth Book, d. XLIV¹⁹, such a potency will be bound so that it cannot go forth into act, on account of the victory of the soul over the body.

IX. To Durandus²⁰ it is said that there is indeed some common cause of incorruptibility in the Blessed and the damned, namely the cessation of the motion of the heaven, and the dominion of the soul over the body as to its vivification and conservation in esse²¹. But besides these common causes there is a certain particular cause in the blessed that is not in the damned: namely, the glory of the soul; and a quality flowing from the glorified soul into the body. Therefore there is also a greater impassibility in the Blessed than in the damned: because the latter will suffer with some afflictive passion, but not the Blessed. Hence that consequence does not hold: The incorruptibility of the damned will not be through any quality inherent in the body. Therefore neither is the incorruptibility of the Blessed. For dowers are not assigned to the bodies of the damned, but they certainly are to the bodies of the Blessed.

X. The fourth conclusion is²²: The body of one who rises again will be subject to the soul in every mode of the perfection of nature. It is proved. The soul enjoying God will adhere to Him most perfectly, and will participate in His goodness in the highest degree, according to its mode. Therefore the body will also be perfectly subjected to the soul. Therefore it will also participate in its properties, as far as is possible, in the perspicuity of the senses, in the ordering of the bodily appetite, and in every mode of the perfection of nature. — The second consequence is proved. Because a thing is all the more perfect in nature, the more perfectly its matter is subjected to its form. — St. Thomas does not prove the first consequence, but leaves it manifest from the fact that the body will be related to the soul in its own mode just as the soul in its own mode will be related to God.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle saying that there shall rise a spiritual body: not indeed understanding it thus: that it is a spirit, that is, a spiritual substance, or air or wind; but because it will be entirely subject to the spirit; just as now too it is called an animal body, not because it is an animal²³, but because it is subject to animal passions, and stands in need of nourishment.

2. Regarding this conclusion, it should be noted that St. Thomas through it wishes to give to understand that there is another dower in the bodies of the Blessed, which is called the dower of subtlety. For by this nothing else is understood, as he explains in the Fourth Book²⁴, than the all-inclusive and perfect subjection of the body to the soul for participating specific being. For because, as is said in the same place, the name of subtlety is taken from the power of penetrating; and something is penetrative both by reason of the smallness of quantity, especially according to breadth and depth, and by reason of the paucity of matter; but in rare bodies the form dominates the matter more: therefore the name of subtlety has been transferred to those bodies that are most well-subjected to form, and are perfected by it in the most perfect manner.

3. It should also be noted concerning the other things that St. Thomas enumerated, namely that the body participates in the properties of the soul as to the perspicuity of the senses, and as to the ordering of the bodily appetite, that these neither belong in every way to the dower of subtlety, as Durandus²⁵ seems to have wished, nor are they entirely excluded from the dower of subtlety, as Capreolus²⁶ seems to have wished by attributing them to the dower of agility, but they belong in one way to the dower of agility and in another way to the dower of subtlety. For sense and appetite can be compared to their operations in two ways. In one way, as to the ease and readiness of operating: and thus they belong to the dower of agility. For it was said above²⁷, according to the mind of St. Thomas, that by agility the body is rendered prompt to obey the soul as to motion, and as to the operations of the soul that are exercised through the body. — In another way, as to the perspicuity of sensing; and as to the due ordering of appetition, namely that the lower appetite is borne toward its object according to the inclination of the higher appetite. And thus they belong to the dower of subtlety, through which the body is perfectly subjected to the soul as to the perfection of nature. For the more perfect the nature is, the more perspicuous also is the sense, and the more regulated is the lower appetite.

Moreover, that this is according to the mind of St. Thomas is clear. Both because here he enumerates these among those things that belong to the dower of subtlety. — And because below in chapter 89²⁸, he explains that the bodies of the damned will not be subtle, because their soul will be carnal through affection. For from this he gives to understand that it belongs to the subtlety of bodies that the bodily affection and appetite of the soul be subjected to the spirit, or to the inclination of the higher appetite.

4. It should further be noted that, just as from the glory of the soul and from its full dominion over the body there flows into the body itself a quality through which it is apt to obey the soul as to motions and operations, which is called agility; and another through which it is born to obey it as to the prohibition of every dejecting passion, which is called impassibility: so too subtlety designates a certain quality flowing from the soul into the body, through which it is apt for subjection to the soul as to every mode of specific perfection. For St. Thomas posits this in the Fourth Book, d. xliv, q. ii, a. 3, qu^a 1.

XI. From the aforesaid things St. Thomas infers first, summarily gathering the dowers of the body, that just as the soul of man will be elevated to the glory of the celestial spirits, namely so as to see God through His essence; so his body will be sublimated to the properties of celestial bodies, because it will be bright, impassible, mobile without toil and difficulty, and most perfectly perfected by its form. On account of which the Apostle calls the bodies of those who rise again celestial: not, namely, as to nature; but as to glory. Whence he afterwards adds that the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another.

He infers secondly, that just as the glory of the soul exceeds the natural power of the celestial spirits, so too the glory of the bodies of those who rise again exceeds the natural perfection of celestial bodies: so that there is greater brightness, firmer impassibility, easier agility, and a more perfect dignity of nature.

Note that the impassibility of those who rise again is said to be firmer than the impassibility of the celestial bodies, not because celestial bodies can be changed from their impassibility: but on account of a greater and more perfect cause of impassibility, as St. Thomas says concerning the Blessed. For although impassibility is in them equally, if it is considered according to itself, namely as to the negation that it expresses; it is nevertheless greater in one than in the other as to the cause of impassibility.