Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

After St. Thomas has shown what kind of beings rising men will be, he subsequently intends to show what kind of parts the risen will have ¹. Now, concerning this he does two things: first, he shows what kind of bodies the risen will have; second, what kind of souls they will have before the resurrection, ch. 90. — Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows what kind they will be in terms of nature; second, what kind they will be in terms of conditions superadded to nature, in the following chapter.

I. Regarding the first, he lays down this conclusion: Rising men will have palpable bodies, composed of flesh and bones.

Now concerning this conclusion he does two things: first, he adduces certain errors; second, he refutes them ².

Regarding the first, he states that by occasion of the premises, certain persons erred concerning the conditions of the risen, saying that they do not have bodies composed of contraries, because a body composed of contraries seems of necessity to be corrupted.

Hence some said that these are changed into spirit: moved by the authority of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 15, saying, It is sown etc.

Others indeed said that they will be subtle, and similar to air and winds.

Still others said that in the resurrection souls will resume bodies that are not earthly, but celestial: moved by what is said in the place cited, There are celestial bodies etc. And again, Flesh and blood etc.

II. Regarding the second, St. Thomas argues against these errors: and first, generally against all of them; second, individually against each one of them ³.

Therefore, he first argues as follows. Christ after the resurrection had a palpable body consisting of flesh and bones, as is shown in Lk. the last chapter. Therefore, other rising men will as well. — The consequence is proved. Because our resurrection will be conformed to the resurrection of Christ, according to that of Phil. 3: He will reform etc.

Secondly. The soul is the same in species. Therefore, it will have the same matter in species. Therefore, it will be the same body in species after the resurrection as before. Therefore, etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because the soul is united to the body as form to matter. But every form has determinate matter, since there must be a proportion between act and potency.

Thirdly. If man after the resurrection will not have a body of this kind as he now has, the one who rises will not be of the same species, but will be called man only equivocally. Because man is a natural thing. But when matter is varied according to species, the species of a natural thing is varied, since matter is placed in the definition of natural things.

Fourthly. The soul cannot be united anew to the body of another man, as was shown in Book Two. Therefore, much less will it be able to be united to a body of another species. — The consequence is proved. Because the body of another species is more distant from the soul of one man than is the human body of another man.

Fifthly. If the body of the one rising will not be from those fleshes and those bones of which it is now composed, the rising man will not be numerically the same: because for this it is necessary that his essential parts be numerically the same.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Job saying, I shall be clothed again etc.

III. Secondly ⁴, he argues specifically against each one of those errors.

Against the first indeed, first as follows. There cannot be a sharing in matter between spiritual and corporeal things. Therefore, it is impossible for a human body to pass into a spiritual substance. — The consequence is proved. Because only things that share in matter pass into one another.

Secondly. It either passes into the soul itself, or into another spiritual substance. If into the soul, then after the resurrection there will be nothing in man except the soul, just as before. Therefore, the condition of man will not be changed after the resurrection. — If into another, then from two spiritual substances something one in nature will be made. Which is impossible, since every spiritual substance is per se subsistent.

Note that, just as in the resurrection it is posited that the soul is reunited to the body, so it is posited that one thing is made from them just as before the resurrection. If, therefore, we posit that the body in the resurrection is converted into a spiritual substance, it will be necessary to say that the soul is united to that spiritual substance into which the human body is converted, and that from them one thing in nature is made, just as from soul and body. Therefore, St. Thomas rightly infers that it would follow that from two spiritual substances one thing in nature is made.

It must also be noted, from Aristotle, Metaph. IX ⁵, that for one thing per se to be made from two, it is necessary that one be related as act, but the other as potency. Therefore, from two things of which each is an act, one thing per se cannot be made. For this reason St. Thomas rightly argues that one thing in nature, that is, one natural being, cannot be made from two spiritual substances, because each is per se subsistent, that is, an act having being of itself, but not formally from another; and it depends on no subject according to its being.

2. Against the second error he argues first as follows. Air is not terminable in itself, but only by an alien boundary. Therefore, it is not possible for the body of a rising man to be airy or similar to winds. — The consequence is proved. Because the body of a man, and of any animal, must have a determinate shape in the whole and in the parts. But such a thing must be terminable in itself, since a shape is that which is comprehended by a boundary or boundaries.

Secondly. An airy body cannot be tactual, that is, it cannot have the power of touch, just as neither can any other simple body: since such a body must be a mean among tangible qualities, so that it may be in a certain way in potency to them, as is said in II De Anima. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the body of a rising man must be tactual, since man is an animal.

3. Against the third error he argues first as follows. A celestial body is not receptive of tangible qualities, since it is neither hot nor cold, nor anything of this kind, either in act or in potency, as is proved in I De Caelo. Therefore, the body of a rising man will not be celestial. — The consequence is clear from what has been said.

Secondly. A spherical shape is naturally owed to celestial bodies, as is proved in II De Caelo. Therefore, they cannot receive the shape that is naturally owed to the human body. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because those bodies are incorruptible, and thus they cannot be transmuted from their natural disposition.