Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

After St. Thomas has shown that the resurrection of bodies will take place, he consequently determines concerning the condition of those who rise again¹. Now regarding this he does two things: first, he shows the condition of men rising again; second, the condition of their parts, in chapter LXXXIV.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows what is proposed; second, he infers a certain corollary, in the following chapter.

1. As to the first, he posits three conclusions. The first² is in this chapter, and it is that Men in the future resurrection will not rise again to die once more, but to be immortal. From which he infers one corollary in the following chapter.

First, however, an argument is made for the conclusion as follows. The necessity of dying is a defect in human nature arising from sin. But Christ repaired this kind of defect by the merit of his Passion. Therefore those who, freed from death, rise again through the merit of Christ will not suffer death any further. — The minor is proved by the authority of the Apostle, Rom. 5, who wills that the merit of Christ is more efficacious for taking away death than the sin of Adam was for bringing it in.

Second. If men who rise again die once more, so that death thus lasts forever, death has not been destroyed by the death of Christ: because what is to last forever has not been destroyed. But this is false: because it is now destroyed in its cause, which the Lord had foretold in Hosea 13; but at the last it will be destroyed in act, according to that text of 1 Cor. 15, The last etc. Therefore etc.

Third. Christ rose again not to die once more: as is said in Rom. 6. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection. But an effect is assimilated to its cause.

Note that this argument seems to proceed from the causality of an exemplary cause, not however of an efficient cause. For, as was said above³, the resurrection of Christ is the instrumental cause of our resurrection in the genus of efficient cause. But an effect need not be assimilated to an instrument. Therefore it does not seem to follow from this causality that our resurrection is assimilated to the resurrection of Christ. But because it is not only an efficient cause, but also an exemplary one; and an effect must be assimilated to its exemplar: therefore it well follows that our resurrection, from that causality, is assimilated to the resurrection of Christ.

Fourth. If those who rise again die once more, either they will rise again from that death, or not. If the second, their souls will remain perpetually separated, which is incongruous, as was said above⁴. — If the first, either they will rise again to die once more, or not. If the second, for the same reason this will have to be posited even⁵ in the first resurrection. If the second, the alternation of death and life in the same subject will proceed to infinity. But this is incongruous: because it is necessary that the intention of God who raises them⁶ be directed to something determinate; but this successive alternation of death and life cannot be an end, since it is a kind of change, which tends toward something else. Therefore etc.

Note that it is not the intention of St. Thomas that God cannot intend a perpetual successive alternation: for thus one would have to say that the motion of the heaven cannot be perpetual even by divine power; which is not according to the mind of St. Thomas. But he means that this kind of perpetual alternation cannot be intended as an end ultimately intended, because, since motion tends to bring about the term of the motion, it does not have the character of an end, but rather of that which is ordered to an end. And therefore one must say that the intention of God who raises men intends something else as the end of his work, and not the perpetual alternation itself of death and life. Since it does not appear that this is to be acquired through this kind of alternation, and thus it would seem to be in vain, it remains that one should not say that this kind of perpetual alternation will be, but rather that man will rise again so as not to be about to die any more.

Fifth. The intention of an inferior nature in acting is directed to perpetuity. Therefore much more so the action of God himself. But the resurrection is not ordered to the perpetuity of the species: since this must be preserved through generation. Therefore it is ordered to the perpetuity of the individual. Not, however, according to the soul alone: because the soul already had this. Therefore according to the composite. Therefore etc. - The antecedent is proved. Because every action of an inferior nature is ordered to generation, the end of which is that the perpetual esse of the species be preserved. - But the first consequence is proved. Because nature does this in the power of God, which is the first root of perpetuity. On account of which the end of generation is posited by the Philosopher⁷ to be that generated things participate in divine esse according to perpetuity.

Note that this argument proceeds from a comparison of the divine action by which something from the genus of generable things is immediately produced into esse by God, to the action of nature, by which an individual of the same nature is produced through generation.

II. But a doubt arises. For it seems that Adam in his first production ought to have been produced immortal even according to his nature, and not only through a gratuitous gift; and similarly that all animals immediately produced by God ought to have been perpetual according to the individual; if the reason assigned here holds. For these were immediately produced by God, just as men are immediately raised by God. If therefore, because men will rise again by a divine action that tends toward something perpetual, the individual of the man rising again must be perpetual; for the same reason, the things that were mentioned also ought to have been perpetual. The opposite of which is clearly true.

He answers that the account is one for the raising of man after death, and another for the creation of Adam and of other animals. For the raising of man is not ordered to this, that a multiplication of men may take place through generation, by which the perpetual esse of the species is intended: but to this, that the man himself who had died may have esse again. Therefore not only the perpetual esse of the species is intended through this kind of action, but also the perpetual esse of the individual. But the creation of man and of the other animals was for this, that they might be multiplied in esse through generation. Therefore such an action was ordered to perpetual esse, not of the individual, but of the species: not indeed simpliciter, but for as long as the state of generation would remain.

III. Sixth. The first life that man attains through generation follows the ordination of a corruptible body in that he is deprived of life through death. Therefore the second life also will be perpetual, according to the condition of the incorruptible soul. - The consequence is explained. Because just as according to the first generation the creation of the soul follows the generation of the body, so on the contrary in the resurrection the body will be adapted to the pre-existing soul.

Seventh. If life and death succeed each other in the same subject to infinity, the alternation itself of death and life will have the form of a kind of circulation. Therefore it will be caused by a heavenly body. But this cannot be: because the restoration of a dead body to life exceeds the capacity of nature's action. Therefore this kind of alternation is not to be posited. Therefore etc. - The first consequence is proved. Because every circulation in generable and corruptible things is caused by the first circulation of incorruptible bodies.

Note that this argument proceeds according to the consideration of the order found in created things, which requires that every change depend on the local motion of the heavenly spheres: not, however, according to the consideration of the divine power. For the divine power could cause the said alternation of death and life with no causality of the heavenly bodies intervening.

IV. Eighth. The separated soul is not subject to the motion of the heaven: since it exceeds the whole of corporeal nature. Therefore the alternation of its separation and of its union with the body is not subject to the motion of the heaven. Therefore it is not such a circulation as follows if those who rise again die once more. Therefore etc. - The first consequence is proved. Because whatever things succeed each other in the same subject have a determinate measure of their duration according to time. But all such things are subject to the motion of the heaven, which time follows.

Note first, that the soul is related in one way to the motion of the heaven and to time while it is conjoined to the body, and in another way while it is separated. For while it is conjoined, it is subject per accidens to this kind of motion both as to esse, and as to operating. As to esse indeed, as is the mind of St. Thomas in Pot., q. III, a. 10, ad 8, not simpliciter, but as it communicates that esse to the body, which is subject to variation and to time; and therefore it can be separated from the body through this kind of motion. But as to operating: because in its operation it requires sensitive powers, which are attached to corporeal organs, and on that account are subject to variation and to time. But separated from the body, it is in no way subject to the motion of the heaven: because neither is its esse then communicated to any variable thing, nor in its operation does it use the ministry of the senses. Therefore St. Thomas does not say absolutely that the soul is not subject to the motion of the heaven: but that the separated soul is not subject to this motion, such that by its power it could again be reunited to the body.

Note second, that those things that succeed each other in the same subject are among the number of variable things. But variable things have a determinate period of their duration. Therefore it is well said here that whatever things succeed each other in the same subject have a determinate measure of their duration according to time.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Isaiah 25, and Revelation 21.

V. Through this is excluded the error of certain Gentiles, adduced by Augustine, XII de Civ. Dei, who believe that the same cycles of times and of temporal things are repeated etc. To which, on the testimony of Augustine himself, some wish to refer that text of Eccles. 1, What is it that hath been? etc. - But it is said that this is not to be understood in this way as if the same things in number were repeated through various generations, but the same according to species: as Augustine resolves in the same place; and Aristotle teaches at the end of the book de Generatione.