Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

For the response to these objections¹, St. Thomas premises that God, in the institution of human nature, bestowed upon the human body, above what was due to it from its natural principles, a certain incorruptibility, through which it is fittingly adapted to its form, whose nature is perpetual life.

He premises, secondly, that such incorruptibility, even if it were not natural with respect to the active principle, was nevertheless in a certain way natural from the order to the end: namely, that the matter might be proportioned to the natural form, which is the end of the matter.

He premises, thirdly, that when the soul², contrary to the order of its nature, turned away from God, such a disposition, which had been divinely implanted in its body, was withdrawn, and death followed. From which it follows that death is, as it were, supervening per accidens upon man through sin, considering the institution of human nature.

He premises, fourthly, that this accidental condition was taken away through Christ, who by the merit of His passion destroyed death by dying. And from this it follows that by the divine power, which gave incorruption to the body, the body is once again repaired from death unto life.

II. Concerning the first thing that is premised, a doubt occurs. For its opposite seems to be stated in the First Part, q. xcvii, a. 1. For there St. Thomas holds that the first man was not immortal formally through some vigor existing in his body, but effectively only, inasmuch as there was in the soul a certain power divinely given supernaturaliter, through which it was able to preserve the body from all corruption, so long as the soul remained subject to God. But here it is said that incorruptibility was in the body itself, as a disposition through which it was adapted to the soul.

It can be answered that it is one thing to say that the body is immortal and incorruptible through some quality existing in it, having the vigor that preserves it from corruption; and it is another thing to say that the body has in itself some disposition through which it is apt to obtain incorruption from the soul. For the first belongs to the formal cause; but the second belongs to the material cause, for the disposition of matter to form is reduced to the genus of the material cause. St. Thomas therefore intends in this place that God gave Adam a certain disposition in order that he could be preserved incorruptible by the soul, which disposition he calls incorruptibility: hence he says that it was given to the body in order that it might be fittingly adapted to its form, and in order that through the soul it might be able to live perpetually. In the First Part, however, he denies that the body was incorruptible through a form inhering in it, giving it incorruptibility formally.

It should be noted, however, that neither was there in the soul the power to be able entirely to preserve the body from every extrinsic harmful thing: but only that it could prevent intrinsic corruption, yet through the consumption of food. But from corruption arising from without, it would have been preserved partly indeed by reason anticipating harmful things, and partly by divine providence, so guarding it that nothing would happen to it unexpectedly by which it might be harmed, as is said in the First Part³, and in De Veritate, q. xxiv, a. 9.

2. Concerning the second thing that is premised, it must be observed that natural from an active principle is said of that which is produced by a natural agent; but natural from the order to the end is said of that which belongs to a thing as it is ordered to a natural end. Because, therefore, that incorruptibility of the body did not belong to it from a natural agent; but it was given that it might be proportioned to the soul, to which it is ordered as to its end: for that reason it is well said that it was not natural with respect to the active principle, but from the order to the end. But in a certain way is added because, simpliciter, a disposition of matter is not called natural unless it is introduced into matter by a natural agent.

3. Concerning the third thing that is premised, it must be considered that death can be compared to human nature in two ways. In one way, as it is considered according to its essential principles only: and thus death does not belong to man per accidens, but per se, at least as to the possibility of dying; because, since the human body is composed of contraries, it is of necessity corruptible. In another way, according as it is considered with respect to all the things that were conferred upon it in its institution. And thus it came to man accidentally, inasmuch as it happened that man through sin was deprived of that power which was able to preserve him incorruptible. For, while nature stood in that integrity and perfection in which it had been instituted, man was not corruptible and mortal, but rather incorruptible and immortal. Therefore it is well said here that death came to man as it were accidentally through sin, considering the institution of human nature: that is, it did not come accidentally simpliciter, but according as nature was thus instituted.

4. Concerning the fourth thing that is premised, it must be observed that, since mortality is not taken away from man except through the restitution of immortality, if mortality has been taken away through Christ by divine power, it follows that through Him immortality has been restored: to be given, namely, according to the disposition of the divine will. And thus it follows that the divine power, which gave incorruption to the body in the institution of human nature, would the same once again repair the body to life and immortality. And this is what St. Thomas intends.

III. These things having been premised, to the first objection⁴ it is said, first, that although it cannot be brought about by the operation of nature that a corrupted body be repaired to life, nevertheless this can be done by divine power.

It is said, secondly, that nature cannot do this so that what has been corrupted is repaired the same in number, because nature always operates through some form; but that which has been corrupted has lost the form, which could be the principle of action. But the divine power, which produced things into esse, operates through nature in such a way that without it, it can produce the effect of nature. Whence, since the divine power remains the same even when things are corrupted, it can repair corrupted things to wholeness.

2. Concerning the reason by which it is proved that what has been corrupted cannot be repaired the same in number by the power of nature, it should be noted that it proves that a corrupted thing cannot be repaired through the nature of the corrupted thing itself, but not that it cannot be repaired through the nature of another naturally acting agent. For this was sufficient for the objection, which seems to proceed from this, that in none of natural things does that which has been corrupted seem to return into esse the same in number: as though, namely, it were in its own power to return to esse, just as he who has fallen from a bench rises by his own power.

Whether, however, any natural agent can by its own power recall to esse the same in number that has been corrupted, St. Thomas holds in Quodlibet IV, q. III⁵, that it cannot: because a natural agent cannot produce corruptible things of this kind into esse without motion; but an interrupted motion and action is not one, but many. Therefore, if a natural agent resumes the productive action of something, it does not resume the same action in number: and consequently the product is not the same in number; although it can produce the same according to species, if the same matter is present; in which way the saying of the Philosopher in VIII Metaphysics⁶ is understood, when he says that if the agent be the same and the matter the same, the effect will be the same.

3. But what Scotus says in The Fourth Book, d. XLIII, q. I⁷, does not stand in the way of the reason adduced: namely, that many local motions can be terminated at the same term; and in the matter at hand, that resurrection and natural propagation are terminated at the same thing in number, and yet they are actions that differ even in species.

For it is said, first, that when we say that many actions cannot be terminated at the same thing in number, we understand this of actions whose terms are produced into esse through them: but not through which a preexisting term is acquired for something, as happens in local motion. — Although it can also be said that the same intrinsic term in number is not acquired through diverse local motions, because the same where is not acquired, although the same extrinsic term, namely place, is acquired.

It is said, secondly, that that is also understood of the actions of creatures: but not of actions of which one is the action of a creature, and the other is a divine action, as are the generation of a thing and resurrection. For because the divine action is equivalent to every action of a creature, and indeed exceeds every one, it is not unfitting that through the divine action, without the action of a creature, which is with motion, there should be produced the same in number that had been produced through the action of a creature, after it ceased to be through corruption.

IV. But concerning the aforesaid things a doubt occurs, touched upon by Scotus in the place cited above, q. III⁸. For since the potency to the form once produced has remained in the matter after that form was destroyed — the sign of which is that it would make a per se unity with it if it were induced into it by God — and there also remains in the matter the same negation that was prior to the generation of the thing: there seems to be no reason why the same in number could not be repaired by a natural agent.

2. For the evidence of this, it must be considered, first, that since the potentiality of matter to form is nothing other than the matter itself with a relation to the form inducible into it by some agent; according as it is reducible to the act of the form by agents of diverse accounts, so too is its potentiality itself diversified. For if it is apt by nature to be reduced to the act of the form by a natural agent, it is called a natural potency; but if by a supernatural agent only, it is called an obediential potency. Because, therefore, matter, before it received the form educible from it, was able to be reduced to act through a natural agent; but after it lost the form, it cannot any longer be reduced to act through a natural agent, on the ground that such an agent cannot resume the same action in number, but only through a supernatural agent, whose operation always remains one in number: therefore the potency of matter before it received the form was a natural potency; but once the form was lost, it is an obediential potency only. And thus, although it is the same potency materially before and after, because each is the entity itself of matter with a relation to the form taken materially; it is not, however, the same formally, on account of the respects of diverse accounts implied by the name of potency, regarding the form as inducible into matter by some agent. — This, moreover, seems to be according to the mind of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. XLIII⁹, a. 4, qa. 3, where he holds that in the ashes from which the resurrection will take place, there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but only from the order of divine providence establishing that those ashes ought to be joined to the soul again.

In the same way it is said of the negation of the form: that it is of one account and of another before the reception of the form in matter, and after the loss of the form. For the first is the negation of the form educible from the potency of matter through a natural agent; but the second is the negation of the form inducible into matter through a supernatural agent only. Whence just as the account of the form is then diversified inasmuch as it is inducible into matter, although it is the same form materially, so too the account of the negation is diversified formally.

3. It must be considered, secondly, that matter does not regard the individual form primarily and per se, but the specific form. Therefore, although after the loss of the individual form the same account of potency does not remain in order to the individual form, it nevertheless remains the same in order to the specific form: because although it cannot again receive from a natural agent the same form in number which it lost, it can nevertheless receive a similar one according to species. And thus it can be said that the potency of matter remains the same simpliciter.

4. It is said therefore to Scotus, first, that the same potency does not remain formally in matter in order to this numerical form, which is required for this, that it could again be induced into matter by a natural agent: but the same potency well remains materially, that is, the substance itself of the matter. — When it is proved, because from matter and form there would be made a per se one just as before: — it is said that this is on account of the material unity of the potency in order to this form taken materially; and on account of its formal unity in order to the specific account of the form.

It is said, secondly, that if Scotus understands that the same potency of matter remains as it regards the specific form: — that being admitted, that consequence is denied, Therefore the same form in number which the matter lost can be recovered through a natural agent. But it well follows concerning the same according to species.

It is said, thirdly, that there is not the same negation formally before and after: but only materially, on account of the material unity of the subject, and on account of the material unity of the form. — Unless perhaps it should be said, as of the unity of potency, that it is the same even formally as it regards the specific form absolutely. But then it does not follow that the matter in which such a negation is present can receive the same form in number: but only that it can receive the same according to species.

V. Concerning that which is said, that the divine power can recall corrupted things to wholeness, it must be observed from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the same Quodlibet¹⁰, that this is understood of permanent things, but not of successive things. For since the unity of a successive thing, such as time and motion, has in its notion the continuity of duration, when such continuity is removed, it cannot be the same, or one in number. Therefore it is impossible that the same time or motion in number which has ceased should be repaired. For it would follow that it was one, and that it was not one: for it would be called one from the fact that it is posited to be repaired the same in number; but it would not be one, because there would not be continuity of duration, which is of the notion of the numerical unity of motion and time.

2. But then a doubt occurs. For St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. XLIV, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 2, to 3, seems to say the opposite of what he says here. For there he seems to intend that the same permanent thing, for instance the sensitive soul, if it has been corrupted, cannot be repaired.

Also in dist. XII¹¹, a. 2¹²; and in the Third Part, q. LXXVII, a. 5, he holds that that which is reduced to nothing cannot return the same in number. — Here, however, he says that through divine power corrupted things can be repaired to wholeness.

3. To that which is adduced in the first place, it is answered that St. Thomas considered there what the philosophers said, who posited that the same form in number which has completely ceased to be cannot return into esse again. For according to this position, if we posit that the sensitive soul in man is other than the intellective soul, and consequently ceases to be through the corruption of man, the identity of the one rising cannot be saved: because the same sensitive soul will not return according to number, but only according to species. Whence St. Thomas does not posit that as his own view, but presupposes it as from the view of the philosophers. Here, however, he speaks according to truth, and according to his own position.

4. To that, however, which is adduced in the second place, it can be answered in two ways. First, that he intends that an annihilated thing cannot return the same in number through the action of a natural agent: but not that it cannot return through divine action. This exposition is clear, because he adduces this proposition against those who said that in the corruption of the species of the Sacrament, brought about through the action of a natural agent, the substance of the bread returns, either according to the whole or according to a part.

Secondly, it can be answered that he does not intend that an annihilated thing cannot return the same in number through the divine power absolutely: but that it cannot return according to the divine power regulated by His wisdom. And then cannot is to be expounded for is not fitting. For it is not fitting for God to bring back to esse again a thing entirely annihilated: for, since annihilation tends to this, that the thing should entirely not be, God would seem to annihilate something superfluously if He wished to restore it into esse again. Whence, because He has determined to recall corrupted man to life, He does not entirely annihilate him, although He permits him to be corrupted, his nature so demanding: but He preserves the essential parts, namely matter and form, in esse, even when they are separated from one another. Whence St. Thomas does not say in the places cited above that what has been annihilated cannot be repaired the same in number through divine power: but in the Fourth Book he says that what has been reduced to nothing cannot be taken again as the same in number; and in the Third Part that what has been reduced to nothing does not return the same in number; which can indeed be fittingly understood if the order of divine wisdom is considered.

For the other things that belong to this matter, see Capreolus, in the Fourth Book, d. XLIII, q. 1¹³.

VI. To the second objection¹⁴ St. Thomas says, first¹⁵, that none of the essential principles of man yields entirely to nothing through death: but the rational soul remains, and matter, under the same dimensions from which it had that it was individual matter; from whose conjunction one man in number will be repaired.

2. He says, secondly¹⁶, that corporeity can be taken in two ways. In one way, for the substantial form of the body, according to which it is placed in the genus and species of substance, from which it is due to a corporeal thing that it have three dimensions. And this in man is not other than the rational soul, which in its matter requires that it have three dimensions. Because there are not diverse substantial forms in one and the same thing, through one of which it would be placed in the genus of substance, through another in the genus of body or animal, and through another in the species of man or horse: because if the first made substance, the subsequent forms would now supervene upon that which is a this something in act, and consequently would be accidental forms. — In another way, for an accidental form: namely, for the three dimensions themselves, which constitute the notion of body. Although, therefore, this corporeity yields to nothing when the human body is corrupted, it cannot nevertheless prevent the same from rising in number: on the ground that corporeity spoken of in the first way does not yield to nothing, but remains the same.

3. He says, thirdly¹⁷, that the form of the mixed body can be taken in two ways. In one way, for the substantial form of the mixed body. And thus, since it is not other in man than the rational soul, it cannot be said that, when man dies, it yields to nothing. — In another way, for a certain quality composed and tempered from the mixture of simple qualities. And thus, if it yields to nothing, it does not prejudice the unity of the rising body.

4. He says, fourthly¹⁸, that similarly, if by the sensitive and nutritive part are understood the powers themselves, which are natural properties of the soul, or rather of the composite: — when the body is corrupted, they are indeed corrupted, but the unity of the one rising is not impeded through this. — But if the substance itself of the sensitive and nutritive soul is understood: — each is the same with the rational soul.

5. He says, fifthly¹⁹, that humanity is not to be understood as a certain form arising from the conjunction of form to matter, as though it were really other than both: because then it would be an accidental form. — But some say that the form of the part and the form of the whole are the same: which is called the form of the part inasmuch as it makes matter to be in act; but the form of the whole, inasmuch as it completes the notion of the species. And according to this it is clear that it does not yield to nothing: because it is not other than the rational soul. — This, however, cannot be, because, since the humanity of a man is that which the definition signifies; but the definition of a material thing signifies form and matter: it is necessary that humanity signify the composite of matter and form, just as man does. Differently, however. Because humanity signifies all the essential principles of the species with the precision of the individuating principles, on the ground that it is that by which someone is a man: and therefore it is signified after the manner of a part. Man, however, signifies indeed the essential principles of the species, but does not exclude the individuating principles; rather, it includes them potentially: for he is called man who has humanity, from which it is not excluded that he can have other things. Therefore it is signified after the manner of a whole. But Socrates signifies both in act, namely both the essential principles and the individual ones: just as genus also has difference in potency, but species has it in act. From this it is clear that man returns the same in number in the resurrection, and humanity the same in number, on account of the permanence of the rational soul, and the unity of the matter.

It should be noted that in that response St. Thomas intends to deny that any of the essential principles of man returns to nothing through his death. For the substantial form remains; matter remains; and humanity itself remains with respect to its parts, although in itself it does not remain, but is corrupted.

VII. Concerning the first ²⁰ statement of the response, it must be noted first that St. Thomas in this place follows the opinion of the Commentator ²¹ concerning indeterminate dimensions: namely, that they are coeternal with matter; inseparable from it; precede form in matter; and remain with diverse forms. The opposite of this, however, he holds in the First Part, q. lxxvi, a. 6; and on the De Anima ²². But the reason for holding the Commentator's opinion here is that, since he is disputing against the Gentiles, the things of faith are better defended if one proceeds from what is conceded by them.

It must be noted secondly that by that statement St. Thomas does not intend to exclude that, even if some of the essential principles of a thing were annihilated, the same thing in number could be restored by divine power: rather, he only responds to what the objection assumes as a foundation, namely, that many of the essential principles of man are annihilated through death; and he shows that this assumption is false even according to the opinion of the philosophers themselves, given the immortality of the soul.

VIII. Concerning the second ²³ statement, it must be considered that, since the individuating accidents which pertain to the material unity of a material thing according to the order of the formal cause follow the substantial form as its effect, although according to the order of the material cause they are understood to precede it: if the same form remains, even though the accidents of the substance are varied, the cause of the accidents nevertheless remains, and thus the accidents themselves are said to remain in their cause; nor does it stand in the way of the numerically same substance being able to be restored by an agent capable of reuniting the form which remained to matter again. For this reason it is well said here that, although corporeity which is an accident yields to nothing; nevertheless, because corporeity which is a substantial form remains, it is not prevented that the numerically same man should rise again.

2. But a doubt occurs. For it seems that in this second statement something is said which contradicts what was said in the first. For there it is said that matter remains under the same dimensions; but here it is said that accidental corporeity, that is, the three dimensions themselves, yields to nothing through the death of a man.

To this it can be answered in two ways. First, that St. Thomas in this second statement is not speaking absolutely, but conditionally: namely, that if it is posited that this corporeity yields to nothing, it is not on this account prevented that the same man should rise again.

Secondly, it can be answered that, since the quantity which is in matter can be considered in two ways—namely, as it is indifferent according to its own nature to diverse terminations, and as it is terminated by a termination fitting to this man from his substantial form—in the first statement he understands that the dimensions of this man remain in matter as they are considered indeterminate by the termination of this form; whereas in the second statement he intends that they yield to nothing with respect to the termination which they had from this determinate form.

IX. Concerning the third ²⁴ statement, it must be considered that we can understand the form of mixture, which is a quality, in two ways. In one way, that it is a certain simple quality intermediate between the qualities of the elements, in which the qualities of the elements are virtually contained; which quality indeed differs from the qualities of the elements not as the remiss from the intense, but specifically, just as redness differs from whiteness and blackness. And thus Hervaeus holds, in the Tractatus de Pluralitate Formarum ²⁵, that the elements are contained in the mixed body through a quality of this sort.

In another way, that this intermediate quality virtually containing the elements is composed of parts of diverse notions, and has formally in itself something of heat, and something of coldness, and so of the other qualities, so that sometimes one part of it is intended and another remitted, and according to this the mixed body approaches more to this element or to that. And this way Capreolus follows, in the Second Book, d. xv ²⁶: and it seems to be of the mind of St. Thomas in the Tractatus de Natura Materiae ²⁷. — The same could also be had from what is said in the First Part, q. lxxvi, a. 4, ad 4, where it is said that the proper qualities of the elements remain in the mixed body, although remissly, in which is the power of the elemental forms; and that a quality of this sort is the proper disposition toward the substantial form of the mixed body. For from the fact that he first says in the plural that the qualities of the elements remain, but afterward adds in the singular that a quality of this sort, etc., he gives it to be understood that the form of mixture is one quality, not by a unity of simplicity, but by a unity of composition from several qualities. — This can also be had from the fact that here the form of mixture is said to be a composite quality, tempered together from the mixture of simple qualities: for composition is not except from parts.

Therefore the opinion of Capreolus seems to approach more to the mind of St. Thomas: although the opinion of Hervaeus can also be sustained. — Concerning this it was also spoken of in the second book, chap. lvi ²⁸.

X. Concerning the fourth ²⁹ statement, it must be noted that, although the sensitive and vegetative powers are corrupted in themselves when the body is corrupted, they nevertheless remain radically in the separated rational soul, as St. Thomas says in the First Part, q. lxxvii, a. ult., because the rational soul virtually contains both the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul. Therefore, when the rational soul returns to the body through the resurrection, they also return.

XI. Concerning the fifth ³⁰ statement, it must be noted that the form of the whole is distinguished both from every part taken by itself, and from all the parts taken together: but in different ways. For it is distinguished from every part taken by itself because it includes in its notion the other part: and thus it adds something real over it, which is a part of the whole. But from all the parts taken together it is distinguished, not indeed as an entity precinded from the parts themselves and entirely distinct from them, in the way a stone is distinguished from wood: but as including the parts themselves; for the parts of an essential whole belong to the integrity of the essence, which is the form of the whole. Whence St. Thomas says that humanity signifies something composite of matter and form. And thus it is understood when it is said here, that it must not be understood that humanity is a certain form arising from the conjunction of form to matter as though really other than both. For he does not wish to deny that humanity is really distinguished from its parts absolutely, since in the Third Part ³¹ and on the Third ³² and Fourth Book of the Sentences ³³ he expressly holds that it is really distinguished from its parts: but he denies that it is distinguished from them through an all-inclusive precision, like a certain form whose role it would be to actuate matter, in the way that the rational soul is distinguished from matter.

2. But then the doubt remains, how humanity is really distinguished from matter and form conjoined, and nevertheless essentially includes them. For it does not seem to be able to be really distinguished from them unless it adds something real. But it is asked concerning that added real thing what it is. For if it is some partial entity distinct from matter and form, then not only matter and form will be its essential parts, but also that entity: and thus humanity will be composed of those three. — But if it is the very entity of humanity taken in itself, this does not seem to be able to be. Because either humanity, which is distinguished by itself from matter and form, includes matter and form, or it does not. If the first, this cannot be. Both because that which includes matter and form cannot be that by which, as added to matter and form, something is really distinguished from them; just as, because we say Socrates is really distinguished from humanity through something really added to humanity, namely through individuating principles, therefore the individuating principles themselves do not include humanity in their substance, but are precinded from it according to entity. — If the second, thus it will be necessary to say that humanity itself is distinguished according to precision from matter and form. The opposite of which was said.

3. For the evidence of this matter, it must be considered that what causes the difficulty in this matter is that we imagine the whole to be really distinguished from the united parts as saying the parts themselves and superadding something else which is a part of the signified whole itself; so that the whole includes in its substance those parts and that other superadded thing, namely as several partial things integrating the whole itself, in that manner in which we say humanity is really distinguished from matter, because it includes it and adds the rational soul, so that each belongs to the essence of humanity as a part of it. But this imagination is far from the purpose. For humanity is not thus distinguished from matter and form as adding something over matter and form which is its part, constituting along with them the entity of humanity: but as including matter and form as parts constituting it, and adding its whole self, that is, perfect, over matter and form. Whence humanity expresses both the nature itself as a whole, and matter and form as parts constituting the nature.

4. To the doubt therefore it is said that humanity adds something real over the parts. — When it is further asked: What is that added real thing? It is said that it is the very nature of humanity which is called the whole, not however some part of it. — But when it is asked whether humanity includes those parts: — it is said that certainly, since they are its essential parts, it includes them. — To the disproof, the assumption is denied. For it is consistent that something includes matter and form as parts: and nevertheless is that by which it really differs from them, not indeed as by a part, but as by the whole nature itself.

5. Concerning what St. Thomas says, that humanity signifies only essential principles, it must be noted that it is understood that an exclusion is made from other principles which are called individual principles: not however from every other entity, as though the name of humanity signified nothing other than the essential principles of man. For it has been said that humanity is not the essential principles themselves, but that it is something composed of them, and really distinct from them.

Concerning what is said, that a genus has a difference of potency, it must be noted that this is understood of the constitutive difference of the species. For the genus does not include that in its notion, but it can through it be limited and determined to the species.

XII. To the third objection ³⁴ it is said that it rests on a false foundation, namely that the esse of man is taken away through death. For this is false. Because the esse of man, since it is the esse of the rational soul, just as in other things the esse of matter and of form is the same; and since it is not only in concretion to matter, like the esse of other forms, since it understands without the participation of a bodily organ: it remains when the body itself ³⁵ is dissolved, and, the body being restored in the resurrection, the numerically same esse is brought back which remained in the soul.

It must be noted that that proposition assumed in the objection, What is not continuous is not the same in number, does not have truth concerning the continuity of duration in permanent things, as is clear from the things said above ³⁶. But St. Thomas neither denies it nor also affirms it, because the other proposition which he denies is more manifestly false. For since he is disputing against the Gentiles, he denies only those things whose falsity can be more manifestly shown even from what is conceded by them.

XIII. To the fourth objection ³⁷ it is said first, that it is not required for this, that the numerically same man should rise again, that whatever was materially in him during the time of his life should be resumed: but only as much of it as suffices for the complement of the due quantity. Because even in the body of a man as long as he lives, the parts are not always the same according to matter, but only according to species. Nor is he on this account prevented from being one in number from the beginning of life until the end. — This is illustrated by the example of fire: which, when ³⁸ it burns continually, is said to be one in number, although wood is consumed and continually added. But that which does not prevent numerical unity in a man while he lives continually cannot prevent the unity of the one rising again.

It is said secondly, that that especially seems to be resumed which was more perfectly subsisting under the form and species of humanity.

It is said thirdly that, if anything was lacking for the complement of the due quantity, divine power will supply this from elsewhere. Nor does this prevent the unity of the rising body: because also by the work of nature something is added to a boy from elsewhere, without prejudice to his unity, whereby he arrives at perfect quantity.

2. For the evidence of this response, it must be considered first, from the Philosopher, I De Generatione ³⁹, that a part of a man, such as flesh, bone, and the like, can be taken in two ways: namely according to species; and according to matter. Which distinction indeed must not be taken in the way some take it ⁴⁰, that by a part according to species is understood that which first receives the human species and is taken from the generator; whereas by a part according to matter is understood that which is generated from nourishment: but it must be taken, as St. Thomas expounds, both in the same place and in the First Part, q. cxix, a. 1 ⁴¹, according to this sense, that the same principal part, such as flesh, can be considered in two ways: in one way, according to that which is formal in it, namely with respect to the nature and disposition of flesh absolutely; and according to that which is material, namely according to the particular parts of flesh from which it is integrated, each of which is nevertheless flesh. Therefore a part of this sort according to species always remains: for the nature and disposition of flesh always remains, and never, as long as man remains, is it brought about by any action of natural heat that there is no flesh in a man. But the part according to matter does not always remain, because by the action of natural heat it is continually consumed and restored: for some part of the flesh is continually lost, and in its place another is restored from nourishment. What is said of flesh is also said of the other material parts of man. For this reason St. Thomas well says that in the human body the form and species of individual parts remains, but the matter of the parts is both resolved by the action of natural heat and generated anew through nourishment.

It must be considered secondly, from St. Thomas in the place cited above ⁴² and in II Sent., d. xxx ⁴³, that it would have to be said otherwise if the whole flesh were lost at once, and another substituted in its place from nourishment; and otherwise if it is not all lost at once, but little by little one part of it after another is lost, and in place of the lost part another is joined through nutrition. Because in the first case the numerically same flesh would in no way remain: but in the second it remains the same, because the added part is made one with that to which it is added, and passes into the pre-existing; and thus, notwithstanding such a renewal of material parts, the numerically same individual remains, because the numerically same matter and the numerically same form remain.

It must be considered thirdly that, although the numerically same individual is said to remain from the beginning of life until the end, this must not nevertheless be understood according to an all-inclusive identity, as though there were no variation: for it implies a contradiction that something should be in every way the same, and nevertheless something of it be varied. But it can be said that one and the same man remains simpliciter from the beginning to the end of life, on account of the numerical unity of the form, and on account of some identity of the matter: because something of the prior matter always remains. But he is another and another secundum quid, on account of the continual variation of the material parts. — In the same way it must be said of the man rising again. Because if through divine power there is supplied to the body of the one rising again something of that which was lacking to it for the complement of perfect quantity, he is the numerically same man simpliciter and absolutely: but secundum quid he is another, because he has some part of matter which he did not have before.

3. Concerning what is said, that fire which burns continually is said to be one in number, although wood is consumed and added anew, it must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas on II De Anima ⁴⁴, that this must be understood according to exterior appearance, but not according to the truth of the thing. For properly speaking fire is not nourished: since it is not animate. And therefore while new matter is added to fire, it is not actuated by the form of the pre-existing fire, but another new form is generated in it. And thus one fire in number is not made, but one only through the heaping together of several fires. But nevertheless, with respect to exterior sense, it seems to be one in number simpliciter, which is nourished from the addition of wood, just as animate things are nourished from added nourishment.

XIV. To the fifth objection ⁴⁵ it is said first, that the resurrection of faith is not prevented even if some eat human flesh. Because, as was said, it is not necessary that whatever was materially in a man should rise again in him: and if anything is lacking, it can be supplied through divine power.

It is said secondly, that the eaten flesh will rise again in him in whom it was first perfected by a rational soul. But in the second, if he was not fed on human flesh alone, as much of other matter which came to him materially will be able to rise again as will be necessary for him to restore the due quantity of the body. — If, however, he was fed on human flesh alone, that which he drew from his parents will rise again in him, and what is lacking will be supplied by the omnipotence of the Creator. — But if even the parents were fed on human flesh alone, and thus their seed was generated from another's flesh, the seed will rise again in him who was born from the seed, and in its place supply will be made from elsewhere to him whose flesh was eaten.

It is said thirdly that, if something was materially in several men, it will rise again in him to whose perfection it more pertained. Whence if in one it was as radical seed, that is, as the seed from which he was begotten; but in another as supervening nourishment, it will rise again in him who was begotten from it as from seed. — But if in one it was as pertaining to the perfection of the individual, while in another as deputed to the perfection of the species, it will rise again in him to whom it pertained according to the perfection of the individual. Whence the seed will rise again in the one begotten, and the rib of Adam in Eve. — If, however, it was in both according to the same mode of perfection, it will rise again in him in whom it was first.

Concerning this matter see also in St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. xliv ⁴⁶.

XV. To the sixth objection ⁴⁷ it is said that the resurrection is natural with respect to the end, inasmuch as it is natural for the soul to be united to the body: not however with respect to the active principle.

Note that the resurrection is said to be natural with respect to the end because it terminates in the union of the soul and the body, which union indeed is according to the natural inclination of the soul, and, absolutely speaking, it is also naturally suited to be united to the body by a natural agent, as was said above ⁴⁸: although, this supposition being made that it has been separated from the body through death, it cannot be reunited to matter by the power of a natural agent. On which account the resurrection is said to be supernatural on the part of the agent.

XVI. To the last objection ⁴⁹ it is said that, because the Son assumed human nature for this purpose, that He might restore it, therefore that which is a defect of nature will be restored in all: and thus all will return from death to life. But a defect of the person will not be restored except in those who have cleaved to Christ, either by believing in Him, or through the sacrament of faith.

From these things St. Thomas wishes to deny that consequence: Through Christ we are freed from guilt, and from death, which is the effect of sin: Therefore those alone are to be freed from death through the resurrection who were partakers of the mysteries of God by which they might be freed from guilt.

2. But concerning this response a twofold doubt occurs. One is, because the consequence which is denied does not seem to be well denied. For if death is the effect of sin, no one seems to be to be freed from death except the one who is freed from guilt: since an effect does not seem to be to be removed unless the cause upon which it necessarily follows is removed. If therefore through Christ man is freed from death, that man alone seems to be to be freed who is also freed from guilt.

The other is, because it does not seem true that a defect of nature will be restored in all. Because many depart with original sin, from which they will never be freed. A sign of which is that they will be deprived of the divine vision forever.

3. To the first it is answered, from the teaching of St. Thomas, In IV Sent., d. 43, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 4, that the punishment of original sin is to die at some time, but not to be detained by death forever. Therefore, those who die in original sin, by dying have paid the punishment due to that sin. Yet they can rise again notwithstanding original guilt, on account of their conformity to Christ in natural things. Hence the argument assumes what is false: namely, that perpetual detention by death is an effect of original guilt necessarily accompanying it.

To the second it is answered that, as is clear in the following chapter, the proposition of St. Thomas is understood of a defect of nature having the character of a punishment accompanying sin, but not of a defect having the character of guilt, of which kind is original sin, which is a sin both of the nature and of the person, insofar as he is a part of nature. For in this way it is in some manner willed by the person and the individual man, as was said above.⁵⁰ Hence the argument has no force.