Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

After St. Thomas determined concerning the sacraments, by which we are freed from guilt through the incarnate Christ, he consequently determines concerning the resurrection of bodies, by which we are also freed by Christ from death¹.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he determines concerning the resurrection itself; second, concerning the final judgment accompanying the resurrection, ch. xcvi. — Concerning the first he does two things: first, he determines concerning the resurrection of bodies itself as to the an est; second, as to the quality of those who rise, ch. lxxxii.

Concerning the first he does three things: first, he shows that the resurrection of bodies will be future; second, he raises certain objections, in the following chapter; third, he solves them².

I. As to the first, he lays down two conclusions. The first is: It is of the necessity of faith to believe that the resurrection of the dead will be future.

But before he proves the conclusion, he premises, first, that, since we have been freed by Christ from those things which we incurred through the sin of the first man; and, when the first man sinned, not only was sin derived into us, but also death, which is the punishment of sin, according to that Rom. v, Through one man etc.: it is necessary that we be freed through Christ from both; whence the Apostle adds, If in the one etc.

He premises secondly that Christ, to demonstrate both to us in himself, willed both to die, to purge us from sin, according to that Hebr. ix, In what manner etc.; and to rise, to free us from death, according to that I Cor. xv, Christ rose etc.

He premises thirdly that we obtain the effect of Christ's death in the sacraments as to the remission of guilt, as is clear from the foregoing³. But we shall obtain the effect of his resurrection as to liberation from death at the end of the age, when we shall all rise through Christ's power.

2. These things premised, the conclusion is argued first through those things which the Apostle says, I Cor. xv, If Christ is preached etc.

If it is said — as some perversely understand — that this, and the other things which are read in the Scriptures concerning the resurrection, are to be referred to the resurrection of the soul, according to which some rise from the death of sin through grace: — it is argued against this. Because the Apostle himself, II Tim. ii, says, Profane and vain babblings etc. This could not be understood of the spiritual resurrection. Then because, to the Cor., after the adduced words he adds, It is sown a body etc., where he manifestly touches the resurrection of bodies. Whence he also adds, This corruptible must etc. — Then because the Lord promises both resurrections, John v. The spiritual indeed, when he says, Amen, amen, I say to you that the hour comes and now is etc.: for then the spiritual resurrection began to take place, while some adhered to Christ through faith. The bodily, however, when he says, The hour comes in which all etc.

Secondly, Job xix: I know that my Redeemer etc. Therefore etc.

3. Concerning what was said⁴ — that our liberation from death, when we shall all rise, is the effect of Christ's resurrection — it must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in Quarto, d. xliii,⁵ a. 2,⁶ that Christ's resurrection is said to be the cause of our resurrection, not because it effects our resurrection, but because the principle of Christ's resurrection, namely the power of the divinity existing in Christ, will make our resurrection in the likeness of that resurrection: just as, if a white man generates a white man, the whiteness of the generator is said to be the cause of the whiteness of the generated, not because it effectively produces the whiteness of the generated, but because its principles in the generator are generative principles making whiteness in the generated.

But although Christ's resurrection is not the principal cause of our resurrection, it can nevertheless be said, by reason of the conjoined divinity, an instrumental cause: as it is also said in the Third, q. lvi, a. 1. For the divine operations also, according to Damascenus, in the third book,⁷ were done through the mediation of Christ's flesh, as through a certain organ.

It can also be said an exemplar cause: inasmuch as our resurrection will be made in the likeness of Christ's resurrection.

II. The second conclusion is: For showing the future resurrection of the flesh, an evident reason lends support.

But it must be noted that St. Thomas does not intend that the resurrection of bodies can be proved by a demonstrative reason: for this is impossible for us, since it is among those things which belong to faith simply. But he intends to show that it can be persuaded by some probable reason, given those things which have been shown in the preceding. And this can be had from Quarto, d. XLIII, a. 1, quª 3, ad 2: for thus it is shown that the position of faith is not irrational.

2. For the first⁸ reason he supposes two things demonstrated in the preceding. The first is that the souls of men are immortal: and consequently they remain after the bodies, separated from bodies. — The second is that the soul is naturally united to the body: since it is by its essence the form of the body. — For these were shown in the second book.⁹

Then it is argued first thus, from the immortality of the soul. The soul is naturally united to the body. Therefore it is against the nature of the soul to be without a body. Therefore it is not perpetually without a body. Therefore it must be conjoined again to the body, which is to rise. — The first consequence is evident. — The second, however, is proved, because nothing that is against nature can be perpetual. — The last, however, is proved, because the soul remains perpetually.

III. To this reason Scotus responds, in Quarto, d. XLIII, q. II,¹⁰ in two ways. First, that there is a twofold natural inclination. One is toward first act, and of the imperfect toward the perfect: and thus what is against nature is not perpetual. The other is toward second act: and thus it is not unfitting that what is against nature be perpetual. But the soul's inclination to the body is natural in the second way, not in the first way. Therefore it is not unfitting that it remain perpetually separated from the body.

Second, he responds, according to the mind of Avicenna,¹¹ that the conjunction of the soul to the body is for this: that the soul, through the mediation of the body, acquire its perfection. Once conjoined, however, it has acquired as much as it simply desires to acquire in that way.

2. But none of these responses satisfies the argument. Not indeed the first: because it is manifestly false that the natural inclination of the soul to the body is as toward a second act, and not as toward a first act. For it is evident that it is inclined to the body so that, conjoined to it, it may have the complement of its species: for since it is essentially a part of the species, it itself is not something complete in the species, but is naturally ordered to the constitution of the human species. And because, separated from the body, it cannot obtain this, therefore it is naturally inclined to union with the body, so that from it it may obtain the complement of its perfection.

Nor does the second response satisfy. Because the soul is inclined to the body not only to acquire its accidental perfection through the body, but also to have the complement of its specific nature. And therefore there is not in it a natural appetite for such a union only at the beginning of its being, but always: and such an appetite is never satiated except while it remains united to the body.

IV. Therefore one could respond to this reason better, according to the mind of St. Thomas in Quarto, d. XLIII,¹² and Verit., q. XXIV, a. 10, ad 1, on behalf of the philosophers: that indeed the union of soul and body is natural; and the soul is naturally inclined to such a union, as a heavy thing is naturally inclined downward; and consequently the separation of the soul from the body is against nature; but the last consequence is denied.

When it is proved because nothing that is against nature can be perpetual: — it is answered that this is true where in nature some natural principle remains for inducing that which is according to nature: it is false, however, where no such principle remains. And so it is in the case at hand. For, once the soul is separated from the body, no active natural principle remains that is able to reunite it to the body: since the disposition for the intellective soul cannot be induced by a natural agent except from the seed through generation. And consequently no sufficient passive natural principle remains for this union: since natural passive potency must be reduced to act by a natural agent. Whence St. Thomas says that the resurrection is natural as to the term, but not as to the principle: namely inasmuch as the union of the intellective soul is, considered absolutely, natural, and can be dispositively caused by a natural agent; but, once they are separated through corruption, it can no longer be induced through a natural agent, just as sight is naturally united to the body, considered absolutely, but, given that someone has lost his sight and has been made blind, he can no longer acquire sight through a natural agent.

V. Secondly,¹³ The natural desire of man tends to happiness. But he cannot obtain it unless the soul is again conjoined to the body. Therefore etc.

The minor is proved. Ultimate happiness is the perfection of the happy one. Therefore, he from whom something is lacking for perfection does not yet have perfect happiness: because his desire is not yet totally quieted. But the soul separated from the body is in some way imperfect: as every part outside its whole. Therefore it cannot obtain happiness unless it is united to the body. But man cannot arrive at ultimate happiness in this life. Therefore it is necessary that, after the soul has been separated from the body, it be again reunited to the body.

2. To this reason Scotus responds¹⁴ that that proposition, Every part outside its whole is imperfect, is not true except of a part which receives some perfection in the whole. But the rational soul does not receive perfection, but communicates it.

But this response is nothing. For above¹⁵ it was shown that the soul separated from the whole is simply imperfect with the imperfection of the species; and that it receives some perfection in the whole, although it is in some way more perfect than when conjoined.

3. Whence it could be said better that one thing is the natural desire whereby the soul desires to be united to the body and to its species; and another is the natural desire whereby it seeks beatitude. For the first follows the very substance of the soul; the second, however, follows the will. Whence the quiet of one desire does not exclude the other desire, since they are not opposed, but it is compatible with it. Therefore the separated soul can obtain perfect beatitude, to which it is ordered according to the inclination of the will; and have the complement of its accidental perfection, which consists in perfect cognition; and its desire of obtaining beatitude can be totally quieted; although the natural desire of union with the body is not quieted, that is, is not reduced to act, because of the defect of the natural principle able to reduce that desire to act.

Whence the minor of the argument is false.¹⁶ Against the proof the consequence is denied, if the consequent is understood of the lack of substantial and specific perfection: especially since the separated soul is per se subsistent, and needs nothing for its being. But it follows well that he from whom something is lacking for accidental perfection, in which beatitude consists, does not yet have complete felicity.

4. If it is said that the separated soul knows itself to be a part of something perfect in species; and that the complement of its specific perfection is while it is united to the body; therefore it also seeks by the desire of the will to be united to the body; therefore, if it will never be united, the separated soul cannot totally obtain what it desires; and so the desire of its will will never be able to be totally quieted: — the first consequence is denied. Because just as, separated from the body, it knows itself to be a part of a composite, so it knows that it cannot be united to the body, because of the defect of the active natural principle. Therefore it does not follow that, with the desire following the cognition, it desires that union: because such a desire is not toward the impossible. — So, I think, the philosophers would respond.

VI. Third,¹⁷ In this life men composed of soul and body sin or act rightly. Therefore punishment or reward is owed to them according to the soul and according to the body. Therefore it is necessary to posit a repeated conjunction of the soul with the body. — The consequence is proved. Because from divine providence punishment is owed to sinners, and reward to those acting well. — The second, however, because in this life men cannot obtain the reward of ultimate happiness: many times even sins are not punished, nay rather, as it is said Iob. XXI, Here the impious live, etc.

2. To this reason Scotus says,¹⁸ first, that it does not appear through natural reason that there is one ruler of men according to the laws of retributive and punitive justice. — He says second that, if this were so, it would be said that retribution would be made sufficiently to each one in his own act.

But that this response is nothing is clear from the foregoing, where it was shown that the acts of men are punished and rewarded by God,¹⁹ and that sins are punished by God through the experience of something harmful.²⁰

3. But to this reason it could be said better, according to the philosophers holding the immortality of the soul, that it suffices that the soul separated from the body be punished or rewarded: because it itself through the will is the first and principal principle of good or evil operations; but the body does not concur in such operations except instrumentally, and as it is moved by the soul.

VII. And so it is clear that reasons of this kind proving the resurrection of bodies proceed only from probable premises, not from necessary ones. But I would have said this lest anyone think that the resurrection does not belong simply to faith, but is something demonstrable through natural principles.

But although the resurrection is not demonstrable by natural reason, it can nevertheless be shown effectively from the sayings of Scripture: as the Lord most subtly showed, Matth. xxii,²¹ from this which is said: I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Iacob. For since he is not the God of the living, it is necessary that Abraham, Isaac and Jacob live. Who, since they do not live actually, it is necessary that this be from the order of soul and body to the resurrection: as St. Thomas deduces in Quarto, d. xliii, a. 1,²² quª 1, ad 2.