Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

Having premised those things that were necessary for showing the necessity of penance, St. Thomas consequently wishes to show that the sacrament of penance itself is necessary.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows the fittingness of this sacrament; second, the necessity of its parts ¹.

I. As to the first, this conclusion is laid down: The sacrament of penance was fittingly instituted. — It is proved. The abundance of divine mercy, and the efficacy of the grace of Christ, does not allow that one sinning after baptism should be left without a remedy. But man cannot have this remedy through baptism, as was clear ². Therefore, another sacramental remedy was fittingly instituted by which sins may be purged, namely, the sacrament of penance, which is as it were a spiritual healing.

It is explained from the likeness of bodily things. Because, namely, just as those who have attained natural life through generation, if they incur some disease that is contrary to the perfection of life, can be cured of the disease, not indeed so that they are reborn, but so that they are healed by a kind of alteration ³; so baptism is not repeated against sins committed after it, but they are healed through penance, as through a kind of alteration.

II. As to the second ⁴, he shows the necessity of the parts of penance. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he premises certain necessary points; second, he shows the proposition ⁵.

As to the first, he premises first that bodily healing is indeed sometimes wholly from within; but sometimes from within and without at the same time; yet it is never wholly from without. But spiritual healing cannot take place wholly from within: since man cannot be freed from guilt except by the help of grace, as was shown in the Third Book. Nor can it be wholly from without: because the health of the mind would not be restored unless ordered movements of the will were caused in the man. From which it remains that it must be from within and from without.

He premises secondly that, just as for someone to be cured perfectly of a bodily disease, it is necessary that he be freed from all the harms that he incurred through the disease; so also the spiritual cure of penance would not be perfect unless man were relieved of all the detriments into which he was brought through sin: which are the disorder of the mind, according as it is turned away from the unchangeable good, namely God, and turned toward sin; the liability to punishment, according as punishment is owed by the most just ruler, God, for any guilt whatsoever; and the weakening of natural good, according as man by sinning is rendered more prone to sinning, and slower to act well.

III. These things having been premised, he shows the necessity of the parts of penance: and first, of contrition; second, of confession ⁶; third, of satisfaction ⁷.

As to the first, the first conclusion is: For spiritual healing, contrition is necessary.

It is proved first. In penance the ordering of the mind is required: namely, that the mind be turned to God; and turned away from sin, grieving over what was committed, and proposing not to commit it. But this belongs to the nature of contrition. Therefore contrition is necessary in penance, or in spiritual healing.

Secondly. For this healing it is required that the offense against God be removed, and that man be freed from the liability to eternal punishment. But this takes place through contrition. Therefore etc.

The minor premise is proved. The reordering of the mind cannot be without grace. But the liability to eternal punishment cannot coexist with grace and charity. Therefore etc. — The major premise is proved. Because our mind cannot be duly turned to God without charity. Charity, however, cannot be had without grace. The minor, however: because there is no eternal punishment except through separation from God, to whom man is conjoined by grace and charity.

It must be noted, when it is said that the mind cannot be duly turned to God without charity, that duly was added on this account, in order to exclude an imperfect conversion. For someone can be imperfectly converted to God without charity: but a perfect conversion, which may suffice for the wiping away of guilt, cannot be without charity, as is clear from what was said in the Third Book ⁸; and in Qq. Verit. ⁹; and in the Prima Secundae ¹⁰.

Because, however, St. Thomas said above ¹¹ that spiritual healing must proceed from within and from without, he infers that this is clearly the case in contrition: because this reordering of the mind, which consists in contrition, proceeds from free choice with the help of divine grace.

IV. The second conclusion is: Through contrition man does not always obtain the remission of sin perfectly, namely, as to the purging of guilt, and as to the remission of the whole punishment, but sometimes so, whereas sometimes there remains an obligation to some temporal punishment.

For this conclusion St. Thomas premises, first, that it is necessary for man, in order to be freed from sin, not only to adhere in mind to God, but also to the mediator between God and men, Jesus Christ. Both because the merit of Christ works toward the expiation of all sins. — And because in the conversion of the mind to God spiritual salvation consists, which we cannot obtain except through the physician of our souls, Jesus Christ, who saves his people from their sins.

It must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Tertia, q. XLIX, a. 1; and in III Sent., d. XIX, q. 1, a. 1, that the passion of Christ is the cause of our liberation from sin both by way of merit and by way of efficient cause. Therefore two reasons are touched upon here why it is necessary to adhere in mind to Christ in liberation from sin. The first is because the merit of his passion works toward the expiation of sins. The second, because he is the physician of our souls: in which a certain efficiency with respect to health is shown.

2. He premises secondly that the merit of Christ is indeed sufficient for the total removal of all sins, since he takes away the sins of the world, as is said in John 1: nevertheless, not all obtain the effect of remission perfectly, but according as each one is conjoined to Christ.

From this follows the difference between baptism and penance. For because our conjunction to Christ in baptism is not according to our operation, but from Christ, since no thing generates itself; the remission of sins in baptism takes place perfectly and entirely, according to the power of Christ himself, so that not only the impurity of sin is removed, but also all liability to punishment is completely dissolved; unless perhaps accidentally in those who approach insincerely. In this spiritual healing, however, we are conjoined to Christ according to our operation informed by divine grace. Therefore we do not all always obtain the effect of remission totally and equally through this conjunction: but sometimes man obtains this on account of a vehement conversion of the mind to God and to the merit of Christ, and to the detestation of sin; but sometimes not, when, namely, the conversion is not so vehement.

3. From these things St. Thomas wishes to have this argument for the conclusion. In spiritual healing, which is through contrition, we are conjoined to Christ according to our operation informed by divine grace. But our operation is not always equal and perfect. Therefore we are not always equally and perfectly conjoined to Christ. Therefore we do not always equally and perfectly obtain the remission of sin, namely, as to guilt and punishment. Therefore sometimes an obligation to some temporal punishment remains.

The second consequence is proved. Because each one obtains the remission of sin to the extent that he is conjoined to Christ. — The last, however: because divine justice demands that guilt be ordered through punishment.

V. For the evidence of these points, it must be considered first, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Quarta, d. XVII, q. II, a. 5 ¹², that the vehemence of contrition can be attended to both on the part of charity, which causes displeasure; and on the part of sensible grief, which the will excites in contrition. And in both ways it can suffice for the wiping away of punishment and guilt: namely, both from the intensity of charity in its act; and from the intensity of sensible grief, because that too is a kind of punishment. On account of the first, St. Thomas said that man sometimes obtains absolution from the whole liability on account of a vehement conversion of the mind to God. On account of the second, he added, and into detestation of sin: for from vehement sadness and displeasure over sin sensible grief is excited.

2. It must be considered secondly, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Verit. q. XXVIII, a. 4; and Prima Secundae, q. CXIII ¹³, that our conjunction to Christ and to the merit of his passion, required for this spiritual healing which is through penance, is a conjunction through faith, love, and hope. For it is necessary, in order for man to be justified—speaking of adults—that he attain the justifying cause through his own act, which is an act of intellect and will: just as in bodily things an action is not completed except through the mutual contact of agent and patient, when both are naturally apt to touch and be touched. But the cause that justifies and causes the remission of sins is not only God as considered according to his divinity alone, but also Christ. Therefore it is necessary also to adhere to Christ himself and to his passion, both through faith, by which we believe that he is the Savior and Redeemer, and by the merit of his passion has merited for us the remission of sins; and through love, with the hope of obtaining pardon from him.

3. It must be considered thirdly, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Tertia, q. LXIX, a. 2, that the remission of sins takes place through baptism inasmuch as the baptized person is incorporated into Christ as his member. And therefore the passion of Christ is communicated to him as a remedy just as if he himself had suffered and died. Whence, since the passion of Christ itself is sufficient satisfaction for the sins of all men, the baptized person is so freed from the liability to the whole punishment owed by him as if he himself had sufficiently satisfied for all his sins. On this account St. Thomas rightly shows here that in baptism sin is totally remitted, because it is remitted according to the sole power of Christ himself, that is, according to the power and sufficiency of his passion. In spiritual healing through contrition, however, remission does not take place through the sole sufficiency of the passion of Christ, but from the application of it to us through our operation of free choice. Therefore it is not necessary that in the healing itself sin be always totally remitted as to punishment, but more or less according to the greater or lesser perfection of our operation: for the power of the first cause receives a certain limitation in the second cause. Therefore it is rightly shown that sin is not always totally remitted to us in this spiritual healing, from the fact that in it we are conjoined to Christ through our operation.

4. It must be considered fourthly that he is said to approach baptism insincerely, as is gathered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Tertia, q. LXIX ¹⁴; and in the Fourth Book, d. IV ¹⁵, who shows that he wishes to renounce the old life and begin a new one through the reception of baptism, and nevertheless his will is still in the oldness of sin: either because he does not have faith; or because he despises the sacrament; or because he does not celebrate it rightly; or because he approaches without devotion. Now, it is clear that such a one who is baptized does not obtain the remission of sin, not indeed on account of the insufficiency of the sacrament, but on account of his indisposition. Therefore it was well said that through baptism the liability to all punishment is removed, unless perhaps it should turn out otherwise accidentally in those who do not obtain the effect of baptism because they approach insincerely.

VI. But a twofold doubt occurs at this point. The first is because it does not seem well said that our conjunction to Christ in baptism is not according to our operation, as spiritual healing is. For the opposite of this seems to be said in the Tertia, q. LXVIII, a. 6; and q. LXXXVI, a. 2, where it is said that interior confession, by which namely man, recollecting his sins, grieves over them, is required for baptism.

The second doubt is because, just as baptism is a sacrament, so also is penance. But sacraments do not operate except inasmuch as they are instruments of the passion of Christ. Therefore the effect of penance is to be weighed from the power of the passion of Christ alone, and not from any work of ours, just as the effect of baptism is. Therefore sin is not less totally remitted from penance than from baptism.

2. For the evidence of the first doubt, it must be considered that the conjunction of man to Christ through baptism is one thing, and the conjunction through penance is another. For that is a conjunction through a certain incorporation, inasmuch as man becomes a member of Christ; but this is through a certain reintegration of friendship. To the first union with Christ it is manifest that man does not effectively concur: because such incorporation takes place through spiritual generation; but nothing, as St. Thomas says, generates itself. To the second union, however, he can effectively concur in some way: inasmuch as human act belongs to the essence of the sacrament of penance, through which such union is caused.

To the doubt, therefore, it is said that, although some human acts, and interior penance itself, are required for baptism as dispositions for it, as is said in the Tertia, q. LXXXIV, a. 1 ¹⁶; nevertheless they are not required as existing of the essence of the sacrament. Human acts, however, are required for spiritual healing as existing of the essence of the sacrament that causes this kind of union. And according to this sense the difference laid down here between the union of baptism and the union of penance is to be understood.

3. To the second doubt it is said that, although penance is a sacrament and operates in the power of the passion of Christ, this is nevertheless in one way in baptism and in another in penance. For toward the removal of the liability to the punishment owed for sins through baptism the passion of Christ alone operates, and man totally participates in the power of the said passion, as is said in the Tertia, q. LXXXVI, a. 4, ad 3; and in IV Sent., d. XVIII, q. I, a. 3, q. 2. Toward the removal of the liability through penance, however, not the passion of Christ alone concurs, but the acts of the penitent man themselves also concur: nor does the penitent necessarily participate in the whole power of this passion, but according to the manner of his own acts. Therefore, since the passion of Christ is sufficient for removing all liability, but not every human act, even in its own order, is sufficient for this; in baptism all liability is removed; but not in every spiritual healing, and in every interior or exterior act of penance.

It must be noted further that the liability that is said to remain after the act of sin is not something real and absolute, nor some real relation, as Scotus in the Fourth Book, d. XIV, q. 1 ¹⁷ seems to impute to St. Thomas: but it is a certain relation of reason. For it is an obligation to future punishment on account of the voluntary transgression of the divine law, whose proximate foundation is the defect left behind from sin, as is said in II Sent., d. XLII ¹⁸, a. 2: either, namely, the stain of sin; or the inequality of justice between man and God, while man, even after the removal of guilt, has not yet satisfied for his sin. This relation, however, has indeed actual being and completion through the act of the intellect understanding the sinner in relation to punishment: but it has fundamental being in the sinning man himself, who is obligated to the payment of punishment. Whence the proximate cause ¹⁹ of this obligation is the will of the sinner, from which proceeds the act of sin, and the defect that follows this kind of act: the first and remote cause, however, is the divine will decreeing that one transgressing the law be obligated to punishment.

On this matter see Capreolus, Fourth Book, d. XIV, q. I, concl. 3 ²⁰.

VII. In the second place St. Thomas shows that the second ²¹ part of penance, which is confession, is necessary. And he lays down three conclusions.

The first is: It was necessary that confession be instituted. It is proved thus. To undergo punishment for guilt, to which namely he who has sinned is bound, requires a certain judgment. Therefore it is necessary that the penitent, who has committed himself to Christ to be healed, await the judgment of Christ in the assessing of the punishment. Therefore it was necessary that confession be instituted.

The second consequence is proved. Because, since Christ exhibits such judgment through his ministers just as also the other sacraments, but no one can judge concerning faults that he does not know, it is necessary that the guilt of the penitent become known to the minister of Christ, which takes place through confession. It must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book ²², that the precept concerning confession had its institution from God, and was promulgated by James ²³. Although, however, an express institution of this by Christ is not read, a prefiguration of it is nevertheless found: both in that those who were being prepared by his baptism for the grace of Christ confessed their sins to John ²⁴; and in that the Lord sent the lepers to the priests, in whom the priesthood of the New Testament was signified ²⁵.

VIII. The second conclusion is ²⁶: It is necessary that the minister to whom confession is made have the authority to know concerning the guilt, and the power of absolving or condemning, which are called the two keys of the Church.

It is proved. Both because these two are required for judicial power. But the minister to whom confession is made must have judicial power in the place of Christ, who was appointed judge of the living and the dead.

And because the Lord committed these to Peter, according to that of Matt. XVI, To thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven, so that, namely, through him it might be derived to others: otherwise sufficient provision would not have been made for the salvation of the faithful.

IX. The third conclusion ²⁷ is: For those who sin after baptism there can be no salvation unless they submit themselves to the keys of the Church through confession either in act or in intention. It is proved. Without baptism either actually received or desired according to intention, when necessity, not contempt, excludes the sacrament, there cannot be salvation for men. Therefore neither without the keys. — The consequence is proved. Because the keys have efficacy from the passion of Christ, through which, namely, Christ opened to us the gate of the heavenly kingdom, just as the passion itself also operates in baptism.

Concerning this argument, it must first be noted that by saying that the keys have efficacy from the passion of Christ, St. Thomas does not intend this alone, that they have the power of saving from the passion of Christ, as the words superficially seem to sound: but that they are both instituted and given by God for salvation after actual sin. And therefore, just as one does not obtain the salvation to be caused by the power of the passion of Christ without baptism instituted for the removal of original sin, so neither can anyone be saved after actual sin without the keys of the Church.

It must be noted secondly, that necessity excluding the sacrament, but not contempt, is said when someone has the intention of receiving the sacrament, but cannot put it into execution. And then the sacrament, received in desire and intention, is said to work salvation just as if it were received in act: because, as is said in the Fourth Book, d. IV, q. III, a. 3, q. 2, the will is reputed for the deed to him who does not have time for working.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Peter in Acts IV, There is no other name, etc. — It must be noted that this authority confirms the proposition, inasmuch as it intends that no one can be saved except in the faith of Jesus Christ: and consequently, not except through the sacraments instituted by Christ for the removal of sin. For in this way it follows that, just as no one can be saved except in the faith of Jesus Christ, so neither can he be saved unless he is submitted to the sacrament of penance in act or in intention.

X. Through this, however, St. Thomas says, the error of certain people is excluded who say that man can obtain the pardon of sins without confession and the intention of confessing; or that it can be dispensed by the prelates of the Church that one is not bound to confession. For this is clearly false.

Both because the prelates of the Church cannot act so that the keys of the Church are frustrated, in which their whole power consists: supply: they would be frustrated, however, if without them someone could obtain the remission of sins; for the power of the keys would be superfluous.

And because they cannot act so that without the sacrament, which has power from the passion of Christ, someone may obtain the remission of sins, just as neither can they act so that someone is saved without baptism: but this belongs to Christ alone, who is the institutor and author of the sacraments.

2. For the clarification of this point, two things must be noted from the teaching of St. Thomas, in the Fourth Book, d. XVII, q. III, a. 1²⁸. The first is that the institution of the Church is presupposed for the operation of the ministers, just as the work of creation is presupposed for the work of nature: since the ministers of the Church are instituted in an already founded Church²⁹, and the Church is founded upon faith and the sacraments. Therefore, it belongs to the ministers of the Church neither to put forth new articles of faith, or remove those put forth, nor to institute new sacraments, or remove those instituted, but to Christ, who is the foundation of the Church. And the second argument of St. Thomas proceeds according to this. For when he says that ministers cannot grant a dispensation so that anyone may obtain remission without a sacrament having efficacy from the passion of Christ, he gives it to be understood that, if the sacrament had efficacy and power from the ministers themselves, as having been instituted by them, they could grant dispensations regarding them. But because they do not have efficacy from them, but from the passion of Christ, by whom they were instituted, therefore Christ alone can dispense regarding them, but not the ministers of the Church.

The second is that, when it is said that ministers cannot dispense so that someone may obtain remission of sins without confession, this is understood of confession according as it obliges by virtue of the sacrament, but not according as it obliges by the precept of the Church. For although the Pope cannot dispense so that someone who has committed a mortal sin should never confess it, he can nevertheless dispense so that he may defer confession longer than has been instituted by the Church. — But as to when one is bound to confess from the obligation of divine law, see St. Thomas, in the cited article, question 4.

3. It must be noted further, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. XVII, in the literal exposition³⁰, that the aforesaid opinion, which is also related by the Master of the Sentences, is now a heresy on account of the determination of the Church under Innocent III in the chapter Omnis utriusque sexus³¹. For it is a heresy, not because it is explicitly contrary to some article, or is preceding or following upon it, but because it implicitly contains something contrary to faith, namely that the keys of the Church are not necessary for salvation (which St. Thomas in this place calls frustrating the keys), and it has been determined by the Church that something contrary to the faith follows.

4. Further, because St. Thomas posited that baptism and the keys of the Church, to which a man submits himself through confession, are equal in necessity, he notes that, just as baptism has efficacy for the remission of sin even before it is received in act, while it is in resolution, yet in the actual reception itself it confers a fuller effect both of grace and of remission, and sometimes grace is conferred and fault is remitted to him to whom it was not previously forgiven; so also must it be said in all respects concerning the keys.

For the evidence of this, it must be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. XVIII, q. I, a. 3³², that sometimes a sufficient preparation for receiving the effect of baptism and penance precedes the reception of the sacrament itself in time. And then, in such preparation and disposition, with the resolution of receiving the sacrament, grace and the remission of fault and liberation from the liability to eternal punishment are conferred; but in the actual reception of the sacrament itself, grace is increased by virtue of the sacrament, and the man is absolved from the liability to punishment, either totally, as in baptism, or with respect to some part, as in confession. Sometimes, however, a sufficient disposition for the effect of the sacrament, namely for grace and the remission of sins, does not precede in time, although some insufficient preparation precedes, even with the resolution of receiving the sacrament. And then, from the sacrament according as it is in resolution, grace is not conferred nor is the remission of sins caused: but in the reception of the sacrament itself, by its virtue, grace is conferred through which fault is forgiven, because a sufficient disposition is caused in the reception of the sacrament itself, for example when one from being attrite becomes contrite; which indeed takes place in confession and absolution itself by the power of the keys, unless one places an obstacle to grace. Hence it is well said in this place that through baptism and confession grace is sometimes conferred according as they are only in resolution, but sometimes according as they are in act.

XI. The fourth conclusion is³³: The minister of the Church, in absolving, by the power of the keys remits something of the temporal punishment of which the penitent remained debtor after contrition; but by his injunction he binds the penitent to the remainder.

He proves the first part, because in confession and absolution itself a fuller effect of grace and remission is conferred.

The second part, however, he leaves manifest: because, since the remission of punishment does not occur except by the power of the keys, if through absolution the entire punishment is not remitted, it is manifest that that which remains to be paid of the punishment must be assessed and imposed by the judgment of the one who holds the keys.

2. It must be noted, when it is said that by the power of the keys something of punishment is remitted in absolution, that this is understood on the supposition that contrition was not sufficient for the blotting out of all the punishment due. For if all the punishment had been remitted in contrition, none of it would be remitted in absolution.

It must also be noted that the greater the grace received, the less remains of the impurity of the preceding sin: and therefore a lesser cleansing punishment is due, as is said in the Fourth Book of the Sentences, in the previously cited article³⁴. For this reason, since fuller grace is conferred in confession and absolution itself, it is well inferred that something of the punishment of which the penitent remained debtor after contrition is remitted: for when the cause is increased, the effect must also be increased.

It must be observed, however, that by virtue of the keys the punishment of individual sins is remitted proportionally, as St. Thomas says in the previously cited article, question 2, to 3; but not equally according to absolute equality. For it is not the case that, if some quantity of punishment due to a great sin is remitted by the power of the keys, just as great a quantity of punishment due to a lesser sin is remitted. Because it could be that to the lesser sin no greater quantity of punishment is due than that quantity due to the greater sin which is remitted, and thus the lesser sin would remain entirely without punishment. Which is not fitting to occur by the power of the keys: although from the vehemence of contrition that could happen, as was said above³⁵. But, other things being equal, if through one absolution by the power of the keys a tenth part of the punishment due to a greater sin is remitted, through the same absolution a tenth part of the punishment due to the lesser sin is remitted: and so must it be said concerning the other parts.

XII. Concerning the essence of the keys of the Church, of which mention has frequently been made, it must be noted that Scotus, in the Fourth Book of the Sentences, d. XIX³⁶, holds that keys of this sort are distinguished essentially from the sacerdotal character, which is the power of consecrating the body of Christ³⁷: because the latter was conferred on the Apostles at the Last Supper, but the power of the keys was conferred on them after the resurrection. — He also holds³⁸ that the two keys of the Church, namely the authority to take cognizance of guilt and the authority to pass sentence, or of absolving and condemning, are essentially distinct: because one authority can be given to someone without the other. — St. Thomas, however, in the Fourth Book of the Sentences, d. XVIII³⁹, a. 1, question 2, to 1, holds that the sacerdotal character and the keys are essentially the same; and that they do not differ except rationally, in relation to different effects.

Now, to the argument of Scotus, it is said according to the opinion of St. Thomas himself in the Fourth Book, d. XXIV, q. II, a. 3, to 2, that the sacerdotal power which was given at the Last Supper with respect to the first and principal act, which is to consecrate the body of Christ, was afterward given the same after the resurrection with respect to the secondary act, which is to absolve and to bind.

As to the keys themselves, St. Thomas also expressly holds, in dist. XVIII⁴⁰, a. 1, question 3, that according to the essence of authority it is one, but two keys are distinguished by comparison to the acts, one of which presupposes the other.

Nor does what Scotus says stand in the way, namely that one authority can be conferred without the other. For it is not unfitting that certain things in certain subjects be diverse and separated, but in some subject be one: just as the separate intellective substance is distinguished from the sensitive substance existing in brutes; and nevertheless in man the intellective and sensitive substance are really the same.

XIII. As to the third point⁴¹, namely concerning the necessity of satisfaction, this conclusion is laid down: Satisfaction is necessary.

Now St. Thomas does not lay this down explicitly, but it is implicitly deduced from the preceding points and established from the proofs.

First, it is proved thus. The one absolving obliges the penitent to the remainder of the punishment of which he remains debtor after contrition and the remission made by the power of the keys. Therefore satisfaction is necessary. — The consequence is proved. Because the fulfillment of the said obligation is called satisfaction.

It must be noted, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Tertia Pars, q. XC, a. 2, and the Fourth Book, d. XVI, q. I, a. 1⁴², that, since the recompense for the offense which is made through penance is made according to the judgment of God, against whom sin is committed, in that in such recompense the restoration of friendship with God is sought; it must be made according to the judgment of the minister of God. Now such a recompense according to the judgment of God, or of his minister, is called satisfaction. Therefore, from the fact that the priest binds the penitent by the power of the keys to the payment of some punishment, it is very well concluded that satisfaction is necessary for the penitent wishing to make recompense for the offense against God.

2. It is proved secondly. For spiritual healing it is required that a man be freed from that weakening of natural good which he incurred through sin, as was said above⁴³. But this is done through satisfaction: namely, while a man abstains from evil things and becomes accustomed to good things; subjecting the spirit to God through prayer; taming the flesh through fasting so that it may be subject to the spirit; and by external things, through the giving of alms, joining his neighbors to himself, from whom he had been separated, namely by the separation of charity, through fault. Therefore etc.

It must be noted that St. Thomas in these words enumerates all the satisfactory works posited by the Master of the Sentences in the Fourth Book, d. XV, which are almsgiving, fasting, and prayer. For through almsgiving we withdraw something from ourselves of the goods of fortune; through fasting, something of bodily goods; but through prayer we totally submit the goods of the soul to God. And thus through satisfactory works of this sort that weakness of natural good which is contracted through sin is healed.

XIV. From the aforesaid, St. Thomas infers this corollary: Not every priest can absolve everyone from sin, but only him over whom he receives power. It is proved. Because the minister of the Church in the use of the keys exercises a certain judgment: but judgment is committed to no one except over those subject to him.

For the evidence of this, two things are to be observed. The first is from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. XIX, q. 1, a. 3, question 1⁴⁴, that power is twofold: namely, the power of order, and the power of jurisdiction. The power of order is called the power that accompanies order: for example, the power of consecrating the Body of Christ, the power of binding and loosing in the tribunal of the soul, and the like. But the power of jurisdiction is that by which someone can declare the law to another, and bind and absolve him, in the contentious forum. The power of order is equally in all priests, and, as far as it is in itself, extends to all and to all sins: because, namely, in itself it is sufficient to absolve every penitent from every sin. But the power of jurisdiction is not equally in all priests: but in Peter and his successors it is in respect of all the faithful; in others, however, it is according to the limitation given to them by the Pontiff mediately or immediately; because jurisdiction was given to Peter over all without distinction, when it was said to him, To thee I will give the keys⁴⁵ etc., and Feed my sheep⁴⁶; but to others it is divided according to the commission of Peter. Although therefore the power of order, as far as it is in itself, extends to absolving everyone, yet the use of such power cannot be extended except over him over whom the priest has the power of jurisdiction, through which he over whom the use of the keys is exercised is made subject to the one absolving. Therefore the Pope can absolve every penitent from sin: because he has jurisdiction over every Christian; but another priest can absolve only those who are subject to his jurisdiction by commission of the Pontiff. And this indeed St. Thomas gave to be understood in this place when he said that, because the minister of the Church in the use of the keys exercises a certain judgment, therefore a priest cannot absolve except him over whom he receives⁴⁷ power. For in these words he wills that, besides the power of order, there must also be in the absolving priest the power of jurisdiction over him who ought to be absolved.

Nor does it stand in the way that penance is a voluntary judicial sacrament. Because, although it is voluntary on the part of the penitent, as to this, that no one can absolve him against his will; yet it is not voluntary as to this, that he can choose for himself whatever confessor he wishes by whom he may be absolved.

Nor does it also stand in the way that the Pope can be absolved by one to whose jurisdiction he is not subject. Because the Pope is committed particularly to the care of no one: but all others are committed to his care, and to the care of those to whom he himself wills. Therefore it is not the same with the Pope and with other men.

2. Secondly, it must be observed that those things which are said here are to be understood outside the case of necessity. For in the point of necessity, namely when there is no supply of one's own priest and one is bound to confess, as in the case of death, one can be absolved by any priest, according to St. Thomas in the place cited above⁴⁸. And St. Thomas says in the Fourth Book, d. XX, q. 1, a. 1, question 2, to 1, that this is of the will of the Church, which accepts that any priest may absolve anyone in the article of death. Nor nevertheless on this account is the minister of penance changed: but he only has it in some way from the Church that he can exercise the use of jurisdiction over anyone in such a case, which use he does not have outside this case.

See concerning this matter more fully in Capreolus, Fourth Book, d. XIX⁴⁹.

XV. In the last place, because in the preceding points it was said both that penance is a sacrament⁵⁰ and that it has the parts enumerated above⁵¹, so that a more complete knowledge of this matter may be had here, first it must be seen, from the teaching of St. Thomas both in the Tertia Pars⁵² and in the Fourth Book of the Sentences⁵³, how penance is a sacrament; secondly, how contrition, confession, and satisfaction are its parts⁵⁴.

For the evidence of the first, it must be considered first that penance is taken in two ways: in one way, as it is a virtue; in another way, as it is a sacrament. In the first way, it is a habit existing in the will by which one grieves for sin, with a resolution of amendment; whose interior act is contrition, but exterior act is confession and satisfaction. In the second way, it is some sensible sign that signifies and effects holiness, primarily ordained to the removal of actual sin.

It must be considered secondly that, since in every sacrament there are three things: namely that which is the sacrament only, which I say is only a sign of holiness; that which is the reality and sacrament, that is, the first effect of the sacrament, which is a reality caused by the sensible sign and signifies the ultimate effect of the sacrament; and that which is the reality only, that is, the ultimate effect of the sacrament; in penance, according to St. Thomas⁵⁵, the sacrament only is the exterior act performed both by the penitent sinner and by the absolving priest; the reality and sacrament, however, is the interior penance of the sinner; the reality only is the remission of sin.

XVI. But concerning this a difficult doubt occurs⁵⁶. For it does not seem possible that interior penance is the reality and sacrament, or the first effect of penance.

Both because contrition, which is interior penance, is posited as a part of the sacrament of penance. But a part of a sacrament cannot be its first effect: otherwise the same thing would be cause and effect.

And because interior penance precedes confession and absolution. But an effect does not precede its cause.

XVII. To remove this difficulty, Capreolus in the twenty-second distinction⁵⁷ of the Fourth Book, following Peter of Palude, inclines to this, that in the sacrament of penance it is necessary, according to the mind of St. Thomas, to posit besides interior penance some adornment in the soul, which is the first effect of the sacrament, and a disposition to grace after the manner of first act. And this he says is that which St. Thomas calls sacramental grace, that is, the proper effect for which the sacrament of penance was instituted, besides the effect common to all sacraments, which is grace. And he says that this adornment is naturally effected and caused by the sacrament of penance before interior penance is the effect of the sacrament: indeed, that perhaps it has some causality over it with respect to its completion. — Now, to that which St. Thomas says, that interior penance is the reality and sacrament: he says that this is not understood as to its essence, and its production and inception, but as to some completion of it: for example, as to its intensification, or its formation through grace and charity, or as to the power of healing sin. Hence, for that duration which precedes absolution, it is not the reality and sacrament in act, but only in aptitude.

2. But this opinion, with respect to this, that it is necessary to posit some adornment besides interior penance which is a part of the sacrament of penance, and that such an adornment is the grace which St. Thomas calls sacramental, does not seem to me to be according to the mind of St. Thomas. Because, since, where he speaks intentionally and particularly concerning penance itself, he says that interior penance is that which is the reality and sacrament, as is clear in the Tertia Pars, q. LXXXIV, a. 1, to 3, and the Fourth Book, d. XXII, q. II, a. 1, question 2; and he makes mention of nothing else as reality and sacrament of this sort; it does not seem to me that one should depart from this view on account of certain things generally said by him which seem to be opposed to this view. — Moreover, it seems expressly repugnant to his mind that sacramental grace is such an adornment that is a disposition to grace. For with him, as is clear in the Fourth Book, d. I, q. I, a. 4, question 5, sacramental grace is posited not as a disposition to grace, but as an effect of grace according as it is caused by the sacrament, just as the gifts and virtues are effects of grace. — It also does not seem, even positing such an adornment, that it could have any causality over interior penance. Because the sacrament, as to every part of itself, must precede the first effect of the sacrament at least by nature: now interior penance is in some way a part of the sacrament of penance, according even to Capreolus. Therefore it is necessary that by nature it precede such an adornment.

3. It does not contradict the foregoing, first, that St. Thomas, in Verit., q. xxvii, a. 7, says that the sacraments reach their proper effects, which are called sacramental graces, upon which follows the infusion of grace that makes one well-pleasing to God, or its increase. For it is said that the proper effect of a sacrament is twofold. One is the first and immediate effect, which is called the res et sacramentum and is in some called character. The other is that which is counted among the ultimate effects of the sacrament, and to which the sacrament was chiefly instituted. And either can be called sacramental grace: because each has a relation to the grace caused through the sacrament. But they differ — first, because the first effect is a disposition to grace, and at least by the order of nature precedes grace itself. The second, however, is an effect of grace insofar as it is caused through the sacrament: for it is a certain effect consequent upon the grace caused through the sacrament, for repairing some defect that has fallen upon one from sin; and it is sometimes called by St. Thomas divine help for attaining the end of the sacrament, which is the removal of some defect left behind from sin. — They differ, secondly, because the sacrament attains the first effect directly, whereas the second the sacrament does not attain directly, just as neither does it attain grace, but only dispositively. For all the sacraments dispose to grace: but insofar as they are distinct sacraments, they dispose to it in distinct ways; that is, insofar as from grace there arise different and different effects against the defects that come upon one from sin.

Therefore, the statement of St. Thomas is understood of sacramental grace in the first way: but not in the second way, as Capreolus seems to understand it. But that sacramental grace is not distinguished in the sacrament of penance from interior penance, insofar as it is an effect of the sacrament: for interior penance stands to the sacrament of penance just as the character does in the other sacraments that have a character.

4. Nor does it stand in the way, secondly, that St. Thomas, in Quarto, d. xvii, q. i, a. 3, q. 2, ad 3, says that adults are able to receive grace through baptism while sleeping, because of the habitual disposition from a preceding movement of free choice. For it is said, first, that this statement is not to the point. For we are not speaking here of the disposition that precedes the sacrament, of which kind is the movement of free choice preceding the reception of baptism: but of the disposition to grace produced through the sacrament, by whose production the sacrament is said to produce grace, which in the sacrament of baptism is the character, but not the movement of free choice. — It is said, secondly, that that habitual disposition from the preceding act of free choice is not something real left behind from the act of free choice, but only denotes a certain relation of reason to that preceding act. For it is from the fact that one has had such an act while awake that he is disposed to receive grace through baptism while sleeping.

5. Nor does it stand in the way, thirdly, that the sacrament of penance has its effect in one approaching feignedly, when the feigning recedes, according to St. Thomas⁵⁸. But this does not seem able to come about unless the sacrament leaves behind after itself some effect other than the movement of free choice. — For it is said that the minor premise is false. For although in baptism, and in the other sacraments in which a character is impressed, when the feigning recedes one is said in some way to attain the effect and fruit of the sacrament by the power of the sacrament, inasmuch as a character is left behind from the sacrament, which, once the impediment is removed, is the dispositive cause of such an effect; nevertheless in the sacrament of penance one is not said, when the feigning recedes, to attain the fruit of the absolution, because from the absolution itself there remains in the feigned person some absolute disposition in which the power of penance is preserved; but because the feigning present in the sacrament of penance, which imports an imperfect sorrow for sin or an imperfect disposition, is removed by true contrition, which is the disposition to the remission of sins, which is the fruit born to be attained from the sacrament of penance; and in the man who approached feignedly there remains the relation of reason to the sacrament received. Hence from the fact that one subjects himself to the sacrament of confession, true contrition supervening, he attains, the divine power acting, that to which the sacrament of confession is ordered; and he is not bound to confess the same sins again, but only his feigning, because he truly received the sacrament before.

It can also be said, and perhaps better, that although from the sacrament of penance there remains in the feigned person some disposition through which, when the feigning recedes, he attains the effect of the sacrament; nevertheless that disposition is not something distinct from interior penance, but is penance itself made in some way more perfect through the reception of exterior penance: although it has not attained such perfection as to be sufficient for the ultimate effect of penance. Moreover, that disposition is said to remain, even when the actual sorrow passes, in the way in which something is said to remain habitually as a purpose in the will after the act has passed.

XVIII. Therefore, on the supposition that through the sacrament of penance there is not caused in the penitent something that is the res et sacramentum, distinct from interior penance, the doubt raised above⁵⁹ is to be resolved.

For the resolution of which, it must be premised, first, that since the sacrament imports some sensible thing, which is the sign and cause of sanctification; and the matter in the sacrament of penance is not some bodily matter, but the act of the penitent; contrition does not have that it be a material and integral part of the sacrament of penance unless it is manifested by some sensible sign: for insofar as it is in the mind, it is only a part of interior penance, but not of exterior penance, which is the sacrament.

2. It must be premised, secondly, that although in some sacraments the sacrament, insofar as it exists in intention, is the cause only of that effect which is called the res, or the ultimate effect of the sacrament, but not the cause of that which is called the res et sacramentum, except when it is actually exhibited, as is clear in baptism, by which a character is not caused except when it is actually exhibited: nevertheless in the sacrament of penance, in which no indelible disposition is impressed, and in which the human acts themselves are the disposition to its ultimate effect, the sacrament itself causes the res et sacramentum effectively not only insofar as it is actually exhibited, but also insofar as it exists in intention. Hence, since it is the effective cause of grace instrumentally, from the fact that it causes that which is the res et sacramentum, which is the disposition to grace, it follows that even insofar as it exists only in intention, it is the cause of its whole effect.

3. It must be premised, thirdly, that the sacrament of penance differs from the other sacraments as regards the matter: because, as is said in IV Sent., d. XXII, q. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2 and 3, that which is material in the others has some power causative of grace, and consequently causative of the disposition to grace, which is the res et sacramentum; but that which is material in the sacrament of penance is in no way an efficient cause of grace, and consequently neither of that which is the res et sacramentum; but only that which is formal in it, namely the absolution of the priest made by the power of the keys. And if St. Thomas sometimes says that the remission of sins is caused by the power of the acts of the penitent, as he says in Tertia, q. LXXXVI, a. 6, it is understood not secundum se, but as from them and from that which is formal is made one. For from the fact that the acts of the penitent have an order to the keys of the Church, which effect the remission of sins, they could themselves be said in some way to cause that remission: inasmuch, namely, as the form of that of which they are the matter has its causative power. Hence St. Thomas, in Verit. q. XXVIII, a. 8, ad 2, says that contrition, if it be considered secundum se, does not stand to grace except by the mode of a disposition: but if it be considered insofar as it has the power of the keys in voto, then it operates sacramentally by the power of the sacrament of penance. He also adds that from this it is not had that contrition is, properly speaking, the efficient cause of the remission of guilt, but the power of the key.

4. It must be premised, fourthly, that interior penance can be considered in two ways, as is said in IV Sent., in the cited article, q. 2⁶⁰: in one way, as it is a certain act of the virtue, coming namely from the habit of penance, which is a virtue; in the other way, as it is an act operating unto the healing of sin, which is the ultimate res of the sacrament of penance. In the first way it is not considered as something pertaining to the sacrament of penance: but it is so in the second way.

XIX. With these things premised, it is said to the doubt⁶¹, first, that contrition and interior penance is the effect of the exterior sacrament of penance as that which is the res et sacramentum, according as it has the efficacy of healing sin, but not insofar as it is an act of the virtue. But this efficacy of healing I understand not by the mode of an efficient cause, but by the mode of a material disposition. This is clear because St. Thomas, in the place cited above, in the second reason in opposition⁶², wills that on that account interior penance is the res of exterior penance, because it immediately causes the remission of sins, which is the ultimate res of exterior penance. And he gives the example of the character. But it is certain that the character does not immediately cause the ultimate res of the sacrament, according to him, by the mode of an efficient cause, but only by the mode of a disposition. Therefore, etc.

It is said, secondly, that this efficacy penance sometimes has simply, from exterior penance actually exhibited, as when someone approaches confession not fully contrite: for then, unless one places an obstacle, a full contrition is caused by the power of the keys, which is a sufficient disposition to the healing of sin. But at other times it has it not simply, but according to a certain intensification of itself, as when one fully contrite approaches confession: for then, when exterior penance or absolution is actually exhibited, contrition itself is intensified, and becomes a more perfect disposition to the healing of sin, on account of which grace is increased, and the healing becomes more perfect.

2. When, however, it is urged, first, that contrition is a part of penance. But the same thing cannot be both the effect and the cause⁶³: — it is said, first, that contrition is not the effect of itself, but of that which is formal in exterior penance, namely of the power of the keys and of the absolution: because, as has been said⁶⁴, the material part of this sacrament is not secundum se the cause of grace. But it is not inconvenient that that which is formal in this sacrament be the cause of some material part as regards some perfection of it.

It is said, secondly, that even if it is admitted in some way that, from union with the keys, the matter of this sacrament is the cause of grace, it is not inconvenient that the same thing be the cause of itself according to distinct modes of being and according to distinct respects. And so contrition is said to be the cause of itself. For it, insofar as it is manifested by some sensible sign, or insofar as it exists in the intention of such manifestation, is the cause of itself as it has interior being, not indeed as regards its essence, but as it is healing of sin by the mode of a complete disposition. For a will sorrowing over sin, having the intention of confession and of manifesting such sorrow to the priest by some sensible sign, has a perfect sorrow, and one sufficient for the healing of sin: which would not be unless it were joined to such an intention. Similarly, the actual confession itself and the other sensible signs significative of contrition, joined with the absolution of the priest, increase and perfect this sorrow.

3. When it is also urged that contrition precedes confession and absolution⁶⁵: it is said that although it can in some way precede confession and absolution, not however as it is healing of sin: for it does not have this power unless confession and absolution are held at least in intention and desire. Hence if contrition is taken according as it is an effect of exterior penance existing in intention, so it does not precede the sacrament of penance, but is posterior in nature: since it has the power of healing sin from that intention. If, moreover, it is taken according as it is an effect of penance according as it is actually exhibited outwardly, so also it does not precede the sacrament itself, but naturally follows it: since from it it has that power, either simply or as regards its intensification. Hence interior penance in no way precedes exterior penance according as it is its effect.

XX. For the evidence of the second point⁶⁶, it must be considered, first, that penance is a certain essential whole and a certain integral whole, just as a man is. For insofar as it is an essential whole, its parts are the matter and the form: insofar as it is an integral whole, its parts are parts of the matter. Therefore the essential part of it which holds on the side of the matter are the acts of the penitent: but the part which holds on the side of the form is the absolution of the priest having the power of the keys. But its integral parts are contrition, confession and satisfaction. Hence these parts taken together, compared to the whole sacrament composed of matter and form, can be called an essential part of penance; but compared to the whole matter itself, they can be called its material parts and integral parts: just as the parts of the human body, compared to the whole composed of soul and body, are its essential part; but compared to the body of man alone, they are called its material and integral parts. When, therefore, contrition, confession and satisfaction are called parts of the sacrament of penance, it is understood that they are its material and integral parts. Hence these acts are indeed acts of the virtue of penance, but not its matter: but of penance which is a sacrament, they are the matter and material parts.

It must be considered, secondly, that because the acts of the penitent, which are the matter of penance, are not all simultaneous, but succeed one another; penance, insofar as it is a certain integral whole, is not a permanent whole, but a successive one. Hence it is not necessary that, once one part of penance is posited, all its parts be posited, although for the existence of each part, penance itself is said in some way to be: for in successive things, the whole is said to be when some part of it is in act.

It must be noted that this sacrament is not absolutely of necessity for salvation: but it is necessary, presupposed sin, against which it was instituted.