Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

I. To the things that present difficulty in the third place,¹ St. Thomas says first that it cannot be denied that the accidents of bread and wine remain, since sense infallibly demonstrates this.

He says secondly that neither the body or blood of Christ nor the substance of the air is affected by them, but they are without a subject; yet in the aforesaid manner,² namely that dimensive quantity alone subsists without a subject and itself affords support³ to the other accidents.

He says thirdly, to the first reason to the contrary,⁴ that it is not impossible for an accident, by divine power, to be able to subsist without a subject. Because just as divine power can produce the effects of any secondary causes whatever without those secondary causes themselves—both on account of its infinity and because it bestows on all secondary causes the power of acting—so too it can conserve their effects in being (in esse) without them. And in this way, in this sacrament, it conserves the accident in being (in esse), after the substance that was conserving it has been removed.

He says fourthly that this can especially be said of dimensive quantities, which even the Platonists posited to subsist, because they are separated according to the intellect. For God can do more in operating than the intellect can in apprehending.

He says fifthly, to the second objection,⁵ that dimensive quantity has this property among the remaining accidents, that it is individuated according to itself, because position, which is the order of parts in the whole, is included in its definition. But wherever a diversity of parts of the same species is understood, individuation must necessarily be understood. Hence many whitenesses cannot be apprehended except insofar as they are in diverse subjects; but many lines can be apprehended even if they are considered according to themselves, on account of diversity of site.

He says sixthly, from the premises, that the primary root of multiplication seems to be from dimension. Because in the genus of substance as well, multiplication occurs according to the division of matter, which cannot even be understood except insofar as matter is considered under dimensions, since, if quantity is removed, every substance is indivisible, as is said in Physics I.⁶ But accidents of the same species are multiplied on the part of the subject.

He infers seventhly, in answering the second objection, that we need not say that the accidents in a sacrament of this kind are not individuated, since we posit that dimensions subsist per se and that other accidents are founded in them as in a subject, because the root of individuation remains in the dimensions themselves.

2. It should be noted first that from this response St. Thomas means to say, regarding this proposition, Accidents cannot be individuated except through a subject, that it holds true of accidents other than quantity, but not of quantity itself.

It should be noted secondly, when he says that an accident can be conserved without a subject by divine power, and yet that many whitenesses cannot be apprehended except insofar as they are in diverse subjects, that his mind is—as was said above⁷ in response to Scotus (1)—that every accident can indeed subsist without a subject by divine power, but it cannot so subsist without a subject as to retain individuation, namely according to the things that are known to us.

Moreover, how quantity affords support to the others, and likewise how it is the root of multiplication, has been shown in the preceding sections.⁸

It should be noted thirdly, concerning this proposition, The divine power can produce the effects of any secondary causes whatever without those secondary causes themselves, that it holds true of efficient causes, but not of material and formal causes. Hence St. Thomas assigns the reason for this: because it bestows on all such causes the power of acting. Nor does it hold true—according to the opinion of those who posit that a proper passion, which is an entity really distinct from the subject, cannot be separated from its subject even by the power of God—of every effect of a secondary cause, but only of an effect produced by it through an intermediate action. Hence they say that it cannot produce a passion without a subject, because it flows from the subject by natural concomitance, not, however, through an intermediate action.

II. But concerning the aforesaid points certain doubts arise.

For concerning the third statement there is doubt. First, because it seems to be repugnant to an accident to be without a subject, since the definition of an accident is that it is a being having being in a subject.

2. Secondly. There seems to be no greater reason why God could make the proper accident of something to be without it, than that he could make the subject itself to be without its proper accident. But God cannot do the second. Therefore neither can he do the first.

The major seems manifest: because a proper passion depends more upon its proper subject, from which it has being (esse) and support, than the subject upon its accident, which is by nature prior to any accident of its own.

The minor, however, is proved in many ways. First. The conclusion of a demonstration is per se,⁹ and necessary,¹⁰ and incorruptible,¹¹ according to Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.¹² But a proposition in which the predicate is the proper passion of the subject is the conclusion of a demonstration. Therefore it is necessary and incorruptible. Therefore the predicate cannot be separated from the subject. Therefore, even by divine power, the subject cannot be without its proper passion.

Secondly. The soul, by divine power, cannot be without its potencies. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved by the authority of St. Thomas in Questions on Spiritual Creatures, a. 11, ad 7; and in Questions on the Soul, a. 12, ad 7, where he holds that the soul can neither be nor be understood without its potencies, because here there would be a repugnance of concepts; and he says the same universally of every subject with respect to its proper passion.

Thirdly. The relation of creation is a proper passion of the creature. But without this, not even by divine power can a creature be, as St. Thomas holds, Quodlibet VII, a. 10, ad 4. Therefore etc.

Fourthly. As St. Thomas said in the Second Book,¹³ God cannot make a triangle not have three angles equal to two right angles. But it is evident that this is a passion of the triangle, which is demonstrated of it in Euclid I.¹⁴ Therefore etc.

Fifthly. If God were to make an angel without an intellect, or the sun without light, it is asked whether the angel would be intellective, and the sun luminous, or not? If the first is granted, it follows that there will be a formal effect without the form. But if the second, it follows that the thing will be without that which belongs to its essence: for an angel is essentially intellectual, and the sun luminous. But each of these is impossible in itself. Therefore etc.

III. Against the last statement it is argued by the reason brought forward by Scotus, In IV Sent., d. 12, q. 4,¹⁵ that certain other accidents also remain in the sacrament without a subject, besides quantity: because, since the species of the Eucharist are rarefied and condensed, rarefaction and condensation have no subject.

It is proved. Because then the prior quantity and the posterior quantity are diverse; and nothing of the prior remains in the posterior, and nothing of the posterior was present beforehand in the prior. Which is proved, both because the terms of motion must be incompossible, from Physics V;¹⁶ and because each part of what is rarer is greater according to quantity than before; consequently each is quantitated with a new quantity.

IV. To the first of these¹⁷ it is said, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, In IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1,¹⁸ and Third Part, q. 77, a. 1,¹⁹ that the definition and account of an accident does not consist in its being a being actually existing in another, but in its being a nature to which being in another is due: and this can never be separated from an accident. But being actually in another can be separated from it: because it is not unfitting that what is due to something according to the ratio of its quiddity should, through the agency of divine power, not belong to it.

But it should be noted that for something to be due to something according to the ratio of its quiddity can be understood in two ways. In one way, because it is of the ratio of the quiddity, just as rational is due to man according to his quiddity: and in this way it is evident that this can by no power be separated from that to which it is thus due. In another way, because it accompanies the quiddity and the nature of the thing left to its own nature and its own power, just as to burn disposed matter that is approximated is due to fire according to the ratio of its quiddity. And it is not unfitting for such a thing to be removed from the thing by divine power and not belong to it, just as fire, through the agency of divine power, did not burn the youths placed in the furnace of the Chaldeans.²⁰ And in this way we understand here that what is due to a thing according to the ratio of its proper quiddity can, by divine power, not belong to it. For inhering in a subject in this second way is due to an accident by reason of its quiddity.

V. To the difficulty touched upon in the second argument,²¹ namely, Whether a subject can be separated from its proper passion?, after carefully considering and examining those things that are expressly found in the doctrine of St. Thomas, it seems to me that according to his mind it must be said that, just as God can bring it about that an accident is without a substance, although this cannot happen naturally, so he can bring it about that a subject has being (esse) in nature without its proper passion, although nature cannot effect this. And I speak of a passion that is an accident really distinct from the subject, not, however, of a non-repugnance to something, which some say is signified by the name of a proper passion.

2. I am moved first because, if it were repugnant to divine power to make a subject be without its proper passion, this could only be because a contradiction was absolutely implied: for this alone, as was clear above,²² is not subject to divine power. But this is false. Therefore etc.

The minor is proved. If it implies a contradiction for a subject to be without a passion, this is either because the passion is of the essence of the subject; or because the subject is its material cause; or because it is its final cause; or because it is its efficient cause through a true intermediate production; or because it is its cause through natural resultance.

Not the first: since the passion does not enter into the essence of the subject, but rather the subject enters into the definition of the passion, as is clear from Posterior Analytics I.²³

Nor the second. Because it is not of the ratio of a material cause absolutely, as such, that it cannot be without an accident inhering in it; since we see a given subject change from one accident into another, just as matter too is changed from one form into another.

Nor the third. Because it is not repugnant for an end to be without that which is ordered to the end, when that which is ordered to the end is not the cause of the end, but is posterior to it, as pre-

(1) Perhaps read ad sextum for ad Scotum? or inferius for superius? An objection of Scotus somewhat corresponding to this observation is found below in no. III.

supposing, in the order of nature, that the end is. In this way, however, a passion is ordered to the subject as to an end.

Nor the fourth. Both because St. Thomas everywhere holds that a subject is not the cause of a passion through an intermediate action. — And because, just as God applies any agent cause to its action, such that without divine motion no secondary cause can act, as is clear from what was said above;²⁴ so God can suspend every action of an agent cause by withdrawing his influx.

Nor, finally, the fifth, which might seem more plausible. Because an action of burning disposed matter naturally accompanies fire without an intermediate action: for an action does not proceed from an agent by means of another action; and yet God prevented this action when those three youths were placed in the furnace of fire, of whom mention is made in Daniel. Therefore etc.

But because it could perhaps be said that God did that by causing some accident rendering the bodies of those youths indisposed to receive the action of fire by way of a corrupting agent, although this has no foundation in the Scriptures, the thesis is proved otherwise. For it implies no contradiction that what is naturally prior to another, and in no way depends upon it according to its being (esse), should be found without it, at least by divine power: indeed it seems to imply that it could not be without it by divine power and yet not depend on it according to its being (esse); for it follows that it would depend and not depend on it. But that from which something flows forth by natural resultance is naturally prior to it, as a cause is to its effect; and in no way depends on it according to its being (esse), since that thing is neither a part of it, nor a necessary disposition of a part, but presupposes the whole constituted in its perfection. Therefore etc.

3. I am moved secondly, because the proper being (esse) of actual existence follows a form placed in nature no less than a passion follows its subject: for it per se follows the form, as was declared above, Book II, chap. 55;²⁵ and it belongs to it according to itself, just as roundness belongs to a circle, as is said in the same place by St. Thomas. But in Christ the soul does not have its own proper being (esse): as is according to the mind of St. Thomas,²⁶ according to the common opinion of Thomists. Therefore etc.

I am moved thirdly, because St. Thomas in Quodlibet IX, a. 5, ad 1, says that, notwithstanding that the subject is posited in the definition of an accident on account of the natural dependence of the accident on the subject, God can conserve accidents without a subject; nor does it follow that contradictories are simultaneously true, because the subject is not of the substance of the accident. But this reason is also found in the subject with respect to its proper accident: namely, because it is not of the substance of its subject, nor indeed even of its definition. Therefore etc. — It is confirmed. Because, although aptitudinal inherence is of the essence of an accident, actual inherence is nevertheless its proper passion, as naturally and necessarily accompanying it if it is left to its own nature. And yet, by divine power, an accident comes to be without a subject in the sacrament of the Altar. Therefore etc.

I am moved fourthly, because St. Thomas, In IV Sent., d. 10, a. 2, q. 3, ad 3, holds that God could make the substance of the body of Christ to be without its proper accidents, although he could not make it to be without them without a change in itself. Therefore etc.

I am moved fifthly, because in De Potentia, q. 5, a. 7, and In IV Sent., d. 57, q. 2, a. 2, q. 2, St. Thomas does not regard it as impossible for the elements after the renewal of the world to remain without their proper qualities, although he does not think this probable. Indeed, he seems there to admit that they can be removed for a time through violence. Therefore, by divine power, they can be separated from their passions.

4. I am moved sixthly, because in the First Part, q. 66 and 67, and In II Sent., d. 13 and 14, St. Thomas does not consider impossible the position of those who hold that there was a succession according to duration in the creation of the universe; indeed, he strives to preserve it to the best of his ability. But that position, even according to St. Thomas's exposition, holds that bodies were first produced with respect to substantial forms, and then received their proper powers, such as light and other properties. Therefore it was brought about by divine power that a substance was without its property, for example the sun without light. — Nor does it suffice to say that they received light and other powers not with respect to their entity, but with respect to the production of some effect. Because from the words of St. Thomas it manifestly appears that he is speaking of powers with respect to their entity, the bestowal of which he says pertains to the work of distinction and adornment, but not to the work of creation. Hence in the places alleged above he holds that through the work of distinction active and passive powers common to moving every species were bestowed upon things previously created; through the work of adornment, however, powers moving toward determinate species were bestowed.

But concerning this reason a doubt arises. For according to the mind of Augustine,²⁷ in the first creation of things one does not seek a miracle, but what the nature of things has. But without a miracle a subject cannot be without its proper passion, since this can be done by divine power alone. Therefore, according to the mind of Augustine, substance ought not to have been produced first in the creation of the world, and the passion given to it afterward. And thus the reason brought forward is null, because it is founded upon something false.

He answers that this was not absolutely a miracle, although it could be done only by divine power, for the nature of the thing so required. For as is said in In II Sent., d. 12, a. 2 in the responses to the arguments, in creation there ought to have been shown not only the power of divine might, but also the order of wisdom, so that the things that are prior by nature were also instituted first.²⁸ For although the nature of an already perfected thing requires that the substance exist simultaneously with all its properties, nevertheless the nature of the thing as it is in its becoming requires that one be produced prior to another: just as in a perfected man the heart cannot be without the other parts of the animal; in the formation of the embryo, however, the heart is formed before all the members.²⁹

I am moved lastly, because Capreolus, In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 3, in responding to the arguments of Durand and Scotus against the third conclusion, expressly holds, following the opinion of Peter of Palude, that God can separate a subject from its proper passion: as is clear when, by a miracle, two bodies are in the same place.

From these points, therefore, it is clear that it is according to the mind of St. Thomas that it is not repugnant that God can separate a proper passion from its subject, although this can in no way be done by the power of nature.

VI. To the things brought forward to the contrary,³⁰ however, response is made. To the first, indeed, it is said first that one must speak in one way of necessary propositions in the first mode of per se predication, and in another way of those necessary in the second mode of perseity. For the former can in no way be false, and their opposites imply a contradiction per se. Therefore a subject cannot be separated from a predicate by divine power: for it cannot be taken away from man that he is rational. But the latter, although they cannot be false naturally—that is, although no natural cause can falsify them by separating the predicate from the subject, and the subject left to its own nature cannot be without the predicate, since the predicate accompanies the subject by natural concomitance—can nevertheless be false by divine power, since God can separate the predicate from the subject.

It is said secondly that, although they can be falsified by divine power, Aristotle and other philosophers nevertheless say that they are necessary and of everlasting truth, because they consider what belongs to the nature of a thing according to itself from within, not, however, what could happen to it by a divine miracle.

Moreover, I do not approve of that response which could perhaps be given: namely, that those propositions are necessary when their predicate expresses the nature of the subject, but not when it expresses an accident superadded to the nature of the subject; as that this proposition is necessary, man is capable of laughter, if it signifies that man has a nature that is apt to laugh, but not if it signifies that man has some accident through which he can laugh. For then that proposition, properly speaking, according to the mind of the philosophers, would not be in the second, but in the first mode per se, because the predicate would be of the essence of the subject.

VII. To the second,³¹ the assumption is denied. To the authority of St. Thomas it is said first that he is not speaking of the soul and its potencies in relation to divine power, but in relation to the power of nature.

It is said secondly that there would be a repugnance of concepts if the soul left to its own nature were without the proper potencies of that soul, because it would follow that the potencies of the soul were natural to the soul, and not natural. There would not, however, be a repugnance of concepts if by divine power the soul were made to be without its potencies: because it is not repugnant for something necessarily to accompany another when left to its own nature, and yet for it to be brought about by divine power that it does not follow from it; as is clear from the things that were said above in this chapter to the first argument of this first doubt.³²

VIII. To the third,³³ according to those who hold that the relation of creation is immediately founded on the substance, and that the relation is not distinguished from the foundation, it would easily be answered that such a relation cannot be separated from the creature, because it is really the same as the creature. We, however, are speaking of a passion that expresses an entity really distinct from the subject. Therefore that authority is not to the purpose.

2. Following, however, this opinion that a relation is really distinguished from its foundation—which opinion we showed above ³⁴ to be according to the mind of St. Thomas—it is said, first, that the relation of creation, and every other relation following upon the creature's dependence on God, is not a proper accident (passio) of the creature, but belongs to its intelligible structure (ratio), insofar as it is a being dependent on God, which cannot in any way be removed from it; for it cannot be brought about by God that a creature not depend on Him, just as He cannot make it be preserved in being without His own action. Hence, although such a relation is an accident of the creature, it nevertheless belongs to its intelligible structure: just as the accidents of Socrates by which he is individuated belong to his intelligible structure, and would be placed in his definition if he were defined, insofar as an individual is quantitatively and numerically distinct from others. For although a relation of this sort can be called a property and accident of a thing insofar as it does not constitute the thing's essence, it is not, strictly speaking, a proper accident; because it belongs to the intelligible structure of the created thing insofar as an existing creature is a being dependent on God.

And in this sense is understood the saying of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. XLIV, a. 1, ad 1, when he says that such a relation does not enter into the definition of the being that is caused, but follows upon those things that belong to its intelligible structure. For the sense is that it does not enter into the definition of such a being as a part of its substance and essence, but is an accident accompanying such a substance insofar as it is such; nevertheless, it belongs to its intelligible structure insofar as it is a being participating being from another. Nor is it an obstacle that an example is given concerning the risible; for the likeness between the risible and this relation is understood with respect to being outside the essence and substance of the thing, but not with respect to being a proper accident. Moreover, that it is not a proper accident of the creature is clearly maintained in De Potentia, q. III, a. 3, ad 3, where St. Thomas says that it is an accident of such a kind that it is not caused from the principles of the subject.

Through this solution many other instances can be resolved by which certain things are adduced as proper accidents of things on the grounds that they are their accidents, although, strictly speaking, they are not proper accidents, but belong to the definition of the thing as determinations of the substance; just as accidents and individual traits also belong to the intelligible structure of an individual.

3. It is said, secondly, that from that passage it is gathered rather that God can separate a subject from a proper accident than that the opposite is gathered. For after St. Thomas said that God cannot make a creature exist without the relation of creation and similar accidents—namely, those that follow upon its dependence on God—he subjoins that nevertheless He could make it exist without other accidents. And it is clear that he is speaking of all other accidents, because this is what the argument to which he is responding was demanding.

IX. To the fourth ³⁵, it could be said, first, that the proper accidents of mathematicals are not really distinguished from them. Therefore, the fact that a triangle cannot exist without having three angles equal to two right angles is no obstacle to the proposal, since we are speaking of a proper accident that is really distinguished from the subject.

But because the relation of the equality of the angles of a triangle to right angles seems no more to be really identical with its foundation than the equality of other things, it can, secondly, better be said that a triangle having three angles equal to two right angles can be understood in two ways: in one way, as having actually the relation of equality to two right angles; in another way, as having that equality fundamentally and radically, that is, as being such a thing upon which, by natural concomitance, such a relation is naturally suited to follow.

If it is understood in the first way, I say that equality can be separated from a triangle, not only by divine power, but even naturally, if it were posited that it could naturally happen that there were no right angles in nature; for, the term being removed, the relation would cease to be.

If, however, it is understood in the second way, then that equality cannot be separated from a triangle; just as it can be separated from a body of two cubits that it not have the actual relation of double to a body of one cubit, for instance if there were no body of one cubit, yet it cannot be separated from it that it be such that upon its nature such a relation is naturally suited to follow. And in this sense St. Thomas understood that it cannot be removed from a triangle that it have three angles equal to two right angles.

But then it is said that having three angles equal to two right angles in this way is not a proper accident of a triangle, but is the essence and nature of a triangle; unless perhaps the posterior intelligible aspect were said to have the manner of a proper accident with respect to the prior intelligible aspect, in which way Euclid perhaps proves this intelligible aspect of a triangle through another intelligible aspect of it.

Moreover, that this is the mind of St. Thomas is clear because in the same place he counts this among those propositions whose contraries cannot be brought about by God, because they are taken from the formal principles of the thing, without which it cannot be brought about by God that the thing exist in nature. Hence he gives the example of this proposition, A genus is predicable of a species, saying that God cannot bring about its contrary. But it is clear that to be predicable of a species belongs to the intelligible structure and essence of a genus insofar as it is a genus, since that is the definition of a genus. It is also clear that to have fundamentally this relation which is to be predicated of a species necessarily belongs to, and is of the nature and essence of, that thing which is a genus; but the actual relation itself does not, since that does not belong to the thing except according as it is in the intellect. Therefore St. Thomas does not take these propositions as per se propositions in the second mode, but as per se propositions in the first mode. Or, if he takes them as propositions of the second mode, he takes them as the predicate expresses some intelligible aspect distinct from the intelligible aspect of the subject and posterior to it, but not as it expresses an entity really distinct from the subject.

X. To the fifth ³⁶, it is said that for something to be intellective can be understood in two ways: in one way, because it has an essence and nature to which it belongs to be the root and primary principle of understanding, or upon which the intellective power is naturally suited to follow; in another way, because it has in itself the proximate principle of understanding. In that case, an angel would be intellective in the first way, but not in the second way; and similarly it is said that in that way the sun would be luminous. — Now it does not follow, if they are such in the first way, that a formal effect exists without its form: because to be intellective in that way is not the effect of the intellective power, but of the nature and essence of the thing; nay rather, it is the essence and nature of the thing. — Nor does it follow, if an angel is not intellective in the second way, that it exists without that which belongs to the essence of the thing; because to be intellective in that way does not belong to the essence of the thing, but accompanies the nature and essence of the thing left to itself and not impeded by divine power.

St. Thomas intended this response in Ia IIae, q. CX, a. 4, ad 4, where he says that, if the soul were without its powers, it would nevertheless still be called intellectual or rational: not because it would have these powers in act, but on account of the species of such an essence from which such powers are naturally suited to flow forth.

It is clear therefore, with respect to the argument principally adduced ³⁷, that the minor premise is false; and that the arguments adduced for its proof do not conclude.

XI. To the doubt against the last statement ³⁸, it is said, first, that rarefaction and condensation then have as their subject the quantity of the sacrament itself, if they are motions toward quality.

If, however, they are motions toward quantity, they are that quantity itself; and thus it does not follow that another accident besides quantity exists without a subject.

It is said, secondly, that it is false that in rarefaction and condensation the first quantity is totally corrupted and an entirely new one arrives. For quantity, remaining numerically the same, can now receive a greater extension, now a lesser: as seems to be according to the mind of St. Thomas in Physics IV ³⁹; Ia IIae, q. LII, a. 2, ad 1; and IIa IIae, q. XXIV, a. 5, ad 1.

To the first disproof of this, it is said that the terms of a motion taken formally are incompossible; but not when taken materially, as is clear in the intension and remission of the same form. Hence, if the motion of rarefaction and condensation is posited to terminate primarily at quantity, the same quantity is the term from which and the term to which, but under one degree and another. For, as is said in IIa IIae ⁴⁰, quantity, insofar as it is an accidental form, has increase after the manner of intension and remission, just as other accidental forms do, although this does not belong to it insofar as it is quantity. If, however, such a motion is posited to terminate primarily at quality, positing that rarity and density are qualities, as St. Thomas seems to intend in the Third Part, q. LXXVII, a. 2, ad 3, it is clear that the term from which and the term to which are not entirely the same.

Through this the response to the second objection is clear. For this consequence is not valid: Every part of the rarer thing is rarer; therefore it is quantified with a new quantity.

On this matter see Capreolus, in Second Book, d. XVIII ⁴¹; and Fourth Book, d. XII, q. I ⁴².