Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

Having enumerated the difficulties against the truth of the sacrament of the Eucharist, St. Thomas proceeds to their resolution¹, in the order in which they were proposed, premising that, although the divine power works in this sacrament more sublimely and more secretly than can be investigated by man, yet, so that the teaching of the Church may not appear impossible to unbelievers, one must strive that every impossibility be excluded. From these words St. Thomas gives us to understand that the difficulties which arise concerning this sacrament are very great; and that one need not labor for its manifest understanding, but must strive to understand how no impossibility is found in it.

I. To the first difficulty, then, he says first² that it is utterly impossible for the body of Christ to begin to be under this sacrament by local motion. — Because then it would cease to be in heaven whenever the sacrament is enacted. — Because this sacrament could not be enacted at one time save in one place. — Because local motion cannot be instantaneous: but the consecration is completed in the last instant of the pronunciation of the words.

He says second³ that this is done by the conversion of the substance of bread into the substance of the body of Christ, and of the substance of wine into the substance of his blood.

He says third⁴ that from this it appears that the opinion is false both of those who say that the substance of bread exists together with the substance of the body of Christ in this sacrament, and of those who hold that it is reduced to nothing, or resolved into prime matter. — Because from both it follows that the body of Christ could not begin to be in this sacrament save by local motion. — Because, according to the first opinion, it should rather have been said to Christ, 'This is bread,' than, 'This is my body': because the substance of bread, which is seen, would be demonstrated. — Because, according to the second opinion, much of the matter first created would already have been reduced to nothing from the frequent celebration of this mystery. Which is not fitting to be done in the sacrament of salvation. — Because, according to the third opinion, either prime matter must be without form, if it were understood that a resolution into it were made: or, if it were understood that a resolution were made into the first corporeal elements, it would be necessary that this resolution be perceived by sense; and that there also be a local transmutation, and a bodily alteration of contraries, which cannot be instantaneous.

He says fourth⁵ that this conversion is of a different mode from all natural conversions. Because in any other a subject remains in which different forms succeed one another, whether accidental or substantial: whence they are called formal conversions. But in this one subject passes into subject, and the accidents remain. Whence it is called substantial conversion.

He says fifth⁶ that nature indeed cannot make this substance become that one, as this finger become that finger: since the operation of nature presupposes matter, by which the substance is individuated. But this can well be done by divine power: since matter is subject to it, in that it is produced into being by it. — It is declared. Because just as by the power of a natural agent, whose operation extends only to the change of form, given the existence of the subject, this whole is converted into that whole according to a variation of form, as this air is generated into this fire: so by divine power, which does not presuppose matter but produces it, this matter is converted into that one; and consequently this individual into that one, since the principle of individuation is matter.

He says sixth⁷ that, since in this conversion there is no common subject remaining after the conversion, and yet something must remain, so that what is said may be true, This is my body, which are the words significative and factive of this conversion: it is necessary to say that the accidents of bread remain.

He says seventh⁸ that, since among all the accidents quantity inheres most closely to substance; then the qualities are in the substance by means of quantity; then certain actions, passions and relations: so it must be held that the accidents of bread remain after the conversion, such that only the dimensive quantity subsists without a subject; in it indeed the qualities are founded as in a subject; and consequently the actions, passions and relations.

He says eighth⁹ that this conversion cannot properly be called motion, as motion is considered by the natural philosopher, in that it requires a subject¹⁰: but it is a certain substantial succession, as in creation there is a succession of being and non-being.

He says ninth¹¹ that from the aforesaid there is obtained one reason why the accidents of bread must remain: namely, that something remaining in the aforesaid conversion may be found.

He says tenth¹² that there are also other reasons for this. One is, because otherwise it would not follow that the body of Christ is according to substance where the bread previously was: because no relation of the body of Christ to the aforesaid place would remain. But, with the dimensive quantity of bread remaining, the body of Christ is made under the dimensive quantity of bread, and consequently in a certain manner obtains the place of the bread, by the mediation however of the dimensions of the bread.

Another is, because the merit of faith, which is of invisible things, is so much the greater concerning this sacrament as what is done is more invisible, the body of Christ being hidden under the accidents of bread.

The third is, because thus the use of the sacrament is more fitting and more honorable: namely, while under the species of bread and wine, which men more commonly use for eating and drinking, the body of Christ is set forth to be eaten and his blood to be drunk.

II. For the evidence of the first statement, one must consider that we do not say that the body of Christ thus begins to be under the sacrament, or under the species of bread, as if it began to be contained locally, properly and circumscriptively by the said accidents, as the thing located is contained by the place, for they are not properly compared to the body of Christ as place to the thing located: but because it begins to be under them as substance is contained under accidents; not indeed inhering in them, but separate, whereas previously they inhered in the substance to which this substance succeeds. Whence the relation of the body of Christ to accidents of this kind under which it is contained cannot properly be called a relation of the genus 'where', which is of the thing located to the place; it has however, as is said in the Fourth, d. x, q. 1, a. 3, qu. 1, ad 1, some likeness of it, insofar as to be in a place is to be in something separated outside one's substance, which is not its cause.

It has also a likeness to a relation of the genus 'habit': insofar as those species are called by the saints, as it were, a covering of the body of Christ.

III. For the evidence of the second statement¹³, one must consider first, that it is fitting that, from the fact that the body of Christ does not begin to be under the sacrament by local motion, St. Thomas infers that this must be by the conversion of the substance of bread into it. Because in only two ways can we understand the body of Christ to be together with the dimensions of bread: namely, either with the substance of bread remaining conjoined to those dimensions, so that the body of Christ would be said to be together with the substance of bread, as two bodies are said to be together in the same place, in which way, when Christ entered to the disciples through closed doors¹⁴, the body of Christ and the door were together: or with the substance of bread passing away, and the substance of the body of Christ succeeding under its dimensions. - The first cannot take place except by the local motion of the body of Christ approaching the place of the bread, as it approached the doors: because a body existing in one place cannot occupy the place of a body existing in another place, unless it be moved locally to that place; since the same body cannot be in several places at once. - The second however cannot take place unless the substance of bread be converted into the substance of the body of Christ: because, if the substance of bread were annihilated, or were converted into another substance, there would be no reason why the body of Christ, remaining in heaven, should be contained under the dimensions of bread. If therefore, according to those things which faith holds, it cannot be said that the body of Christ begins to be in the sacrament by the local motion of the body of Christ itself, since it does not leave its own place; it remains that it must be said that it begins to be in the sacrament by the conversion of the substance of bread into it.

2. One must consider second, that this is not so to be understood, as Scotus¹⁵ thinks we understand, as if the said conversion were the formal reason of the body of Christ being in the sacrament, since, with the conversion passing away, the body of Christ remains in the sacrament: but because the said conversion effectively and fundamentally causes an existence or presence of this kind, as the generation of fire from wood is in some way a cause that the fire is where the wood previously were; for the said conversion makes its first term succeed to the substance of bread under the very dimensions of bread remaining, and consequently causes a presence of this kind of the body of Christ to such dimensions and to their place. Nor is it true that Scotus¹⁶ says, that God can cause a relation of this kind without conversion, since conversion is a cause of it only in fieri. For when a cause in fieri, which is the very production, is the foundation or the reason of founding a relation, the relation cannot be made without such a production, as being namely its relative denominative: as paternity cannot come to someone without generation, that by it he may be a father. So also, because conversion is the foundation of the presence of the body of Christ to the species and place of the bread, such a relation cannot come to it without a conversion of this kind: in that the foundation is of the essence of a relation insofar as it gives relative being.

IV. But against the aforesaid one argues from Scotus¹⁷, IV Sent., d. x, q. 1, II, and III, and it is proved that it is not necessary to say that by conversion alone the body of Christ can be, without its local change, on the altar.

First¹⁸. There is no greater repugnance for the body of Christ to be together with the substance of bread than with its quantity: since substance does not more repugn to substance, than substance to quantity as regards such simultaneity. But, with the body of Christ existing in heaven, God can make the same body together with the quantity of bread. Therefore also with its substance. And consequently without conversion.

Second¹⁹. Wherever God can make a natural substance be not under its natural mode, or under a mode opposed to it, he can make it be under its natural mode. But God can make, indeed makes, the body of Christ sacramentally, that is, not under its natural mode, together in diverse places. Therefore he can make it in the same places under the natural mode, namely locally and dimensively. Therefore a conversion of this kind is not necessary.

Third²⁰. By no per se mutation is that which is posterior to its per se term obtained. But the presence of the body of Christ in the sacrament is something simply posterior to the substance of the body of Christ, which is the per se term of the conversion. Therefore it is not obtained per se by that mutation which is conversion or transubstantiation.

Fourth²¹. God can make the body of Christ present with the bread, the substance of bread remaining: since this presence is posterior to the substance of bread. Therefore without any mutation concerning the substance of bread, there can be a new presence of the body to the bread. Therefore another mutation must be given for a presence of this kind, which is not substantial. Therefore by substantial transmutation this presence is not had per se: for a term of the same kind as its term, such as presence is, is not properly and per se the term of two mutations distinct according to genus.

Fifth²². That which is converted into something preexisting more acquires its conditions than conversely: as is clear in nourishment. Therefore from the bare conversion of bread into the preexisting body of Christ, the converted bread more acquires a presence in heaven, than the body of Christ a presence of the species of bread on the altar.

Sixth²³. God could convert the bread into the body of Christ as having being in heaven. But then the body of Christ would not be had under the species of bread from the conversion itself. Therefore neither now.

Seventh²⁴. If the quantified bread were converted into the quantified body of Christ, that is, quantity into quantity, and substance into substance, the quantified body of Christ would not have circumscriptively the 'where' which the bread itself had. Therefore from the conversion of substance into substance the body of Christ does not have definitively the 'where' which was the substance of the bread. Therefore etc.

V. For the solution of these arguments, it must be premised that the body of Christ existing sacramentally on the altar has a twofold presence: one namely to the dimensions of bread, under which it is hidden; another indeed to the place of the bread. By the first presence we say that the body of Christ is under the dimensions of bread: by the second we say that it is in the place of the bread. Both these presences belong to it through the conversion of the substance of bread into it. But the first immediately follows such a conversion: for from the fact that the substance of bread is converted into the body of Christ, its dimensions remaining, it follows that the substance of the body of Christ succeeds to the substance of bread under those dimensions, which is the body of Christ being made present to dimensions of this kind. The second presence however belongs to it through the first: For because it is present to the dimensions, therefore it is present to the place circumscribing dimensions of this kind, which was the place of the bread. - The arguments of Scotus therefore are adduced against both presences: but it is easy to see that they do not prevail against the mind of St. Thomas.

VI. Whence to the first it is said that the major is false, the body of Christ not deserting heaven, and the bread existing elsewhere. - To the proof, the assumption is denied, in the same sense. For it is repugnant that a substance remaining in heaven begin to be together with a substance existing on earth, with no change made in either of them: because, as is the mind of St. Thomas IV Sent., d. xi, q. 1, a. 1²⁵; and in the Third part, q. LXXV, a. 2, it is impossible for something to be where it previously was not, unless it be changed, or something into it. Which indeed is understood of the existing place, not however of a newly produced place. But it is not repugnant for such a substance to be together with the quantity of a substance which has been converted into it: because a relation can be born from a change of one extreme alone, even with the other extreme unchanged.

Yet one must attend that when we say one substance, not changed from its place, cannot begin to be together with a substance existing in another place, this is understood on the supposition that no other substance also has been converted into it. Because if we hold, as we do hold, that the substance of bread is converted into the substance of the body of Christ, it is not incongruous that the body of Christ, not changed from its place in which it now is by reason of its own dimensions, be simultaneously by divine miracle with another substance by reason of the dimensions of the bread converted into it. For just as miraculously the body of Christ, according to its natural being, was simultaneously with another body when it entered to the disciples through closed doors²⁶; so by divine miracle I think it can come about that the sacramental body of Christ begin to be simultaneously with another substance, it not deserting its own place which it has in heaven.

2. To the second it is said first, that the argument sins in form. For it proceeds from four terms. For in the major a place is assumed singly for one determinate place. And it is a true proposition. For, whatever place being shown singly, it is true that, if in it God can make a natural substance be under a non-natural mode, he can make the same be in it under its natural mode. — In the minor however a place is taken for several places conjunctly. In which sense the minor is also true. For in fact God makes the body of Christ in the sacramental mode, which is not the natural mode, be simultaneously in several places.

It is said second that, if the argument be reduced to proper form, forming the minor thus, In however many places at once God can make a natural substance be not under its natural mode, he can make it be under its natural mode, the major itself is false. For the first implies no contradiction, and therefore can be done by divine power. But the second implies a contradiction. For it was shown above²⁷, against Scotus, that it implies a contradiction for one body to be in several places at once locally, and by reason of its own dimensions. Therefore it can be done by no miracle.

3. To the third, the major is denied: if it be understood of the first per se term. For by a mutation something that is posterior to the first per se term can be had per se, when it itself is also a per se term, but a secondary one. For, as is the mind of St. Thomas Verit., quaest. ix, a. 3, it is not incongruous that one mutation have two terms having a certain order between themselves: for we see that whitening is simultaneously terminated at whiteness, and at likeness given the white thing. If however it be understood of the per se term universally, whether namely first or secondary, the minor is false. For neither is the presence of the body of Christ to the species posterior to every per se term, since it itself is a secondary per se term: nor is the substance of the body of Christ alone the per se term of such a transubstantiation.

4. To the fourth, the whole is conceded, except the last consequence. For we concede that absolutely God can make the body of Christ simultaneously with the bread, the substance of bread remaining; and that the body of Christ can begin to be present to the bread without the conversion of the substance of bread into it. But the further consequence is denied, namely, Therefore by substantial transmutation this presence is not had per se.

To the proof, the assumption is denied, absolutely speaking. For the presence which fire has to the place of its generation, and the presence which it has to the place which terminates its local motion, is of the same kind: and yet one is acquired by substantial generation, the other indeed by local motion. For in extrinsic terms it is not incongruous that the same thing terminate diverse mutations. It is not incongruous also that the same thing be the intrinsic and first term of one mutation, and of another be the extrinsic and secondary term.

If however it were added to the antecedent, with none of them moved to the other locally, and with nothing else converted into the substance of the other, the assumption is denied. And to the proof, this consequence is denied, This presence is posterior to the substance of bread, Therefore it can be without any newness of the substance of bread, or of the body of Christ. For the relation of the thing located to the place is posterior to the located thing itself: and yet there can not be a newness of such a relation unless either the located thing itself be changed, or the place be changed about it.

Whence that proposition, From the newness of the posterior the newness of the prior does not follow, has no truth where the posterior results from the prior by a natural concomitance. For then there is no newness in the posterior except because of the newness of the prior: just as there is no new risibility except because of the newness of the man; and there is no newness in a real relation except because of some newness of the foundation or of the term.

5. To the fifth, the major is denied concerning the condition which is place, when something of the thing converted remains occupying the former place, and nothing of it added to that into which it is converted remains: as is the case in the proposed instance, where the quantity of bread remains occupying its place; and nothing of the substance of bread remains added to the body of Christ, in that the whole substance of bread, namely both matter and form, is converted into the body of Christ.

But what is adduced concerning nourishment does not help: rather it is the opposite of what is assumed. For the form of the one nourished, while it informs the matter of the nourishment, in some way approaches the place of the nourishment; especially when by a change the one nourished is increased.

6. To the sixth, the major premise is denied: if it is understood that God can convert the substance of the bread into the body of Christ as it has being in heaven, that is, as it is locally contained in heaven, the bread and its dimensions being in no way locally moved — dimensions which, after the conversion is made, remain in the place of the body of Christ. For since in such a conversion the body of Christ must succeed to the substance of the bread under the bread's own dimensions, if the body of Christ, existing under the dimensions of the bread, had no other ubi than that which it has in heaven, then the dimensions themselves would have to have such a ubi of the body of Christ: which could not be unless they were locally moved to the place of the body of Christ; otherwise the same thing would be at once in several places circumscriptively. — If, however, it is understood that God can do that, the bread and its dimensions being moved to the place of the body of Christ: that being granted, the minor is denied. Rather, from the very conversion the body of Christ would be under the species of the bread, which by its own motion would have come to his place.

7. To the seventh, the consequence is denied. Because in such a case, as St. Thomas said in the said tenth saying,²⁸ nothing of the bread would remain under which the body of Christ would succeed to the substance of the bread, which would be for it the reason of being in the place of the bread. Now, however, the dimensions of the bread remain, which are the reason for the body of Christ existing in the place of the bread. For the body of Christ is in the place where the bread was for no other reason than because, the conversion being made, the species of the bread remain occupying the place as before, through the mediation of which the substance of the bread was in that place.

The remaining matters that pertain to this subject, see in Capreolus, Quarto, d. x, q. 1; and d. xi²⁹.

VII. Concerning the third saying,³⁰ when St. Thomas says, if the substance of the bread remained, it would rather have to be said by Christ, Here is my body, than, This is my body, because by the word here the substance of the bread, which is seen, would be demonstrated: it must be noted that, if the substance of the bread remained, this proposition would not be true, This is my body, as is said in the Third Part,³¹ and in IV Sent.:³² because, as is said here, a demonstration of the bread would be made, whose accidents fall under sight, and the sense would be: The substance to which belong these accidents which are seen, is the body of Christ. For when we demonstrate something to sense, according to the common manner of speaking we demonstrate the substance to which the accidents that fall under sense and are demonstrated inhere; and not the content indistinctly contained under the accidents, as Scotus holds, in Quarto, d. xi, q. iii, a. 1.³³ But it would be false that the substance of the bread is the body of Christ. This proposition, however, would be true, Here is my body, taking this term here as it is an adverb of place: for it would be true to say that in this place in which the bread is, the body of Christ is.

2. Concerning what is said³⁴ — that in the consecration of this sacrament the substance of the bread is not annihilated — it must be considered first, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in V Quodlib., q. VI,³⁵ and in the Third Part,³⁶ and in IV Sent.,³⁷ that, since a motion takes its denomination from its term ad quem, in order to see whether some change is an annihilation or not, it must be seen whether its term is nothing at all, or rather something in some way: because, if it were altogether nothing, it will be an annihilation; if, however, it were something in some way, it will not be an annihilation.

It must be considered second, that in the denomination of a change one need not have regard to any term whatsoever, but to the term principally intended by the agent. For a change to the being of a man is called the generation of a man, because the agent principally intends the existence of the man: although there are many other preceding terms, both positive and privative. So also, in order to see whether some change ought to be named an annihilation, regard must be had not to any term whatsoever of that change, but to the term principally intended by the agent of such a change. In the change, therefore, by which the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ, a twofold term is found: namely, the not-being of the bread, and the body of Christ. But the sacramental being of the body of Christ is the term principally intended by God, by whom this conversion is principally made: the not-being of the bread, however, is ordained to this term. Therefore, since the sacramental being of the body of Christ is something, and not nothing, such a change of the substance of the bread cannot be called an annihilation. Indeed, not even from the very not-being of the bread, to which the said change is terminated as to a disposition of the principal term, can it be called an annihilation: because such not-being is not altogether nothing, but is the negation of the being of the bread in the sacramental body of Christ, into which the bread has been converted. For it does not suffice for the annihilation of something that nothing of it remain in itself or in another: but it is required that nothing also remain into which it might be converted.

I do not think, however, that what Capreolus holds³⁸ is the mind of St. Thomas — namely, that the bread remains in the body of Christ in obediential potency, so that from it the substance of the bread may return; and that for this reason the bread is not said to be annihilated. For St. Thomas nowhere says this, as far as I have seen. Indeed, in Tertia, q. LXXVII, a. 5, he says it is impossible that the body and blood of Christ be again converted into the substance of bread or wine. — But if it is said that this must be understood of ordinary potency, since we hold that the body and blood of Christ remain in the sacrament as long as the species of the bread remain, not however of absolute potency: this indeed I would not deny, although perhaps it would be denied by many; but in this way the substance of the bread being in the obediential potency of the body of Christ would not take away that the bread could be called annihilated. Otherwise nothing could be said to be annihilated by God: because, by the same reason, it would be said that it remains in the obediential potency of another creature: for just as, by absolute potency, God could convert the body of Christ into bread, so he could convert some other substance into an annihilated thing, by repairing the very thing again into being.

From these, all the arguments of Scotus and Durandus recited by Capreolus in Quarto, d. XI³⁹ can easily be solved.

3. Concerning what is said⁴⁰ — that the substance of the bread cannot in such a conversion be resolved into prime matter because prime matter would be without form — it must be noted that this follows because, if the substance of the bread were not converted into the body of Christ, and prime matter remained, it would not receive another form with which it would be the body of Christ, because for the same reason the body of Christ could not be with that form, itself not being locally moved, for which reason it could not be with the substance of the bread. Nor would it inform the substance of the body of Christ, as is manifestly evident. Therefore it would be left entirely without form.

VIII. Concerning the fifth saying, there is doubt. For St. Thomas seems to say contradictory things. For he says first that nature cannot make this substance become that one: then he adds that by the virtue of a natural agent this whole is converted into that whole, such as this air generated into this fire. For it is evident that, where the whole is converted into the whole, this substance is converted into that one.

It is answered that whole is taken in two ways: namely, as the same as what is perfect in species; and as the same as any part whatsoever. When, therefore, it is said that by nature the whole is converted into the whole, whole is taken for what is perfect in species: not, however, for any part whatsoever. It is evident that this is the mind of St. Thomas, because, expounding himself, he says that, the existence of the subject being supposed, this whole is converted into this whole by nature according to the variation of the species and of the form. From this, however, it does not follow that this individuated substance is converted into another existing individuated substance: but that one species is converted into another according to the succession of diverse forms in matter. Hence there is no contradiction.

IX. Concerning the sixth saying, it must be considered first that, since a demonstrative pronoun, demonstrating something to sense and to intellect at the same time, always presupposes something subject demonstrable to sense, it cannot be said of something, This is that, unless by the word this either the sensible thing itself per se is demonstrated, or something conjoined to the sensible thing. If, however, nothing remained, the conversion into the body of Christ being made, there would be nothing sensible by which the body of Christ could be demonstrated: for the sacramental being cannot be perceived by sense. Therefore it is well said that it is necessary that something of the bread remain, in order that what is said be true, This is my body.

2. It must be considered second, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in Quarto, d. VIII, q. II, a. 1, qu. 4, ad 1, that, since the things that are in speech are proportioned to those that are in the intellect; just as in the intellect there is some conception which is significative only of the thing understood — which conception, I say, presupposes the entity of the thing, as caused by it — some, however, is not only significative but also factive of the thing, as the practical conception, which does not presuppose the entity of the thing but causes it: so some locution is significative only; some, however, is significative and factive of the thing signified; such as this locution, This is my body, which from divine institution has the power of converting the substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ. Therefore it is well said here that these words are significative and factive of the said conversion.

3. It must be considered third that, since the signification of the whole utterance is completed in the pronouncing of the last particle, so that the significations of the preceding parts are compared to the signification of the whole utterance as matter, not, however, as parts integrating the signification of the whole utterance; the signification of the last particle, however, in relation to the preceding ones, has the character of form, so that the said words, which are significative and factive of the conversion, signify it only in the last instant of the pronouncing, and in that instant alone do they effect it: therefore at the beginning of the utterance the word this cannot demonstrate the body of Christ, because the substance of the bread is not yet converted into it. Nor can it determinately demonstrate the substance of the bread: because then the signification of the whole utterance, which is completed in the last instant of the pronouncing, in which there is no substance of the bread, would be impeded. But it is necessary, as St. Thomas says in the same place, that it demonstrate something indistinct and indeterminate, which is common, as it were containing both confusedly and potentially, neither, however, determinately in act — namely, that which I call the content under those species — so that the sense is, The content under those species is my body. — And just as we say that that pronoun does not demonstrate something distinctly signified, namely the bread or the body of Christ, as present at the time of the pronouncing of that pronoun this, but only something vague and indeterminate, so it must be said of this verb is, that it does not determinately import the present time measuring the pronouncing of that pronoun this, but the present measuring the last pronouncing of the whole utterance: because for that instant it couples the predicate to the subject in such factive utterances, just as in that instant the thing is effected through such utterances.

But against this sense the arguments of Scotus in VIII dist. of the Fourth⁴¹ do not prevail. Rather, they proceed from this false foundation — that according to St. Thomas the signification of the utterance is constituted from the significates of the parts: the opposite of which, however, he himself holds in IV Sent., in the place previously cited, and art. 3,⁴² ad 7.

X. Concerning the seventh saying, it must be considered first, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in Tertia, q. LXXVII, a. 2, that, since quantity is placed first among all the material accidents, and immediately inheres in the material substance, and consequently is the foundation of all the other material accidents, through which, as through a medium, they are in the substance; and the other accidents retain the being which they had in the substance, since by divine power the quantity subsists without a substance: it remains that in it all the other accidents are founded, and in it alone are as in a subject, just as they were in the substance through the mediation of quantity. Therefore, from the order of the accidents in comparison to the substance, St. Thomas fittingly infers that only the dimensive quantity of the bread remains after the conversion without a subject; the other accidents, however, are not without a subject, but are founded in the quantity.

It must be considered second, that the other accidents are not for this reason said to be founded in the quantity as in a subject, as if the quantity by the power of its own nature could provide support for them; for this belongs only to a thing subsisting from nature, as is the mind of St. Thomas in Virtut., q. 1, a. 3: but because this is conceded to it by divine power, just as it is given to it to subsist without a subject. Hence, when the quantity inheres in the substance, it does not provide support to the other accidents: unless perhaps in as much as, being supported by the substance, it is said to provide support to the others.

XI. Concerning the eighth saying, it must be considered that the said conversion is said to be a certain substantial succession, because it is the succession of one substance after another under the same accidents, although such substances relate to those accidents in one way and another. For by the conversion of the substance of the bread into the body of Christ, the body of Christ is made present to the accidents of the bread just as the substance of the bread was present to them: but it is true that those accidents inhered in the substance of the bread, they do not, however, inhere in the body of Christ. Hence such a presence of the body of Christ has nothing altogether similar in natural things: although in some way it can be assimilated to the presence of the located thing to the place, and of the clothed to the garment, as was said above.⁴³ Therefore to Aureolus, asking,⁴⁴ In what do these substances succeed one another? it is said that they succeed one another in the accidents of the bread and in its place. From which it is evident that this conversion is not said to be just any substantial succession, but a succession of substances under the same accidents, of which one passes into the other.

XII. Concerning the tenth saying, when in the first reason it is said that the body of Christ in some way obtains the place of the bread, St. Thomas adds in some way, because the body of Christ is not in the place of the bread, the conversion being made, by reason of its own dimensions, nor is it the subject of its ubi: but because it is present to the dimensions of the bread, which are in its place and are the subject of its ubi, it is said that it too is in that place. And so not by reason of itself, but by reason of another, it is in the place of the bread. Therefore he added, through the mediation, nevertheless, of the dimensions of the bread.