Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

I. In the second ¹ place, St. Thomas treats of the distinction between the sacraments of the Old and the New Law. And he lays down this conclusion: The sacraments that preceded the Incarnation of Christ signified, and in a certain manner promised, salvation; but the sacraments that follow upon the passion of Christ bestow salvation upon men, and do not merely point it out by signifying ². It is proved. Sacraments must be of such a sort as to be congruent with the salvation wrought through Christ, since they have their efficacy from Christ's passion and represent it in a certain manner. But before Christ's Incarnation and death, this salvation was indeed promised, but not bestowed; yet the Word incarnate and suffered has wrought salvation of this kind. Therefore etc. 2. By this a twofold error is excluded. The first is that of the Jews, who say that the legal sacraments, because they were instituted by God, are to be observed forever, since God does not repent nor is He changed. — To whom it is said that it happens without any change or repentance in the one who disposes, that he disposes different things according to the congruence of different times, as is clear in the master of a household. And thus God congruently gave certain sacraments and precepts before the Incarnation, and others after the Incarnation. The second and more irrational error was that of the Nazarenes and Ebionites, who said that the legal sacraments are to be observed together with the Gospel. For they imply contraries: because, while they observe the evangelical sacraments, they profess that the Incarnation and the other mysteries of Christ have been accomplished; but while they observe the legal sacraments, they profess that these are yet to come. II. Concerning the aforesaid, a twofold doubt arises. The first concerns the difference between the sacraments of the New Law and the Old. — The second concerns the observance of the legal sacraments ³.

1. Concerning the first, there is doubt, because St. Thomas holds that the sacraments of the New Law differ from the sacraments of the Old Law in this, that the latter only signify and promise salvation, whereas the former effect salvation. For from this difference it follows—since human salvation depends formally on grace, in that through grace there is remission of sins and man is made worthy of eternal life—that the sacraments of the Old Law did not confer grace, whereas the sacraments of the New Law certainly do. Against this, however, it is argued: First: Grace is produced through creation. Therefore the sacraments of the New Law are not the cause of grace, just as the sacraments of the Old Law were not. — The consequence is proved: Because in what precedes ⁴ it was shown that the power of creating cannot be communicated to any creature, neither, I say, as a principal agent, nor as an instrument. Second: and it is the argument of Aureolus in Capreolus, in the Fourth Book, d. 1, q. II ⁵. If the aforesaid sacraments differ only in that manner, it follows that they are of equal dignity. — The consequence is proved, granting that in circumcision grace was conferred, as St. Thomas also concedes: The nobility of an instrument, and of anything ordered to an end, is taken from the character of its utility. But circumcision was of as great utility as baptism is now, if in both grace is conferred. Therefore etc.
2. Concerning the second, there is doubt ⁶, because St. Thomas seems to hold that after the publication of the Gospel, the legal observances could not be observed. Against this, however, Scotus argues in the Fourth Book, d. III, q. IV ⁷, because in Acts XXI ⁸ we read of Paul that he went up to Jerusalem and there, by the counsel of James and the other brethren, after the fourth council held at Jerusalem, having been purified according to the Law, went up into the temple and offered sacrifice. III. For the clear understanding of the first doubt, it must be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas, Tertia, q. LXII ⁹, and the Fourth Book, d. I ¹⁰ and II, that the sacraments of the Old Law, such as sacrifices, oblations, tithes, and the like, in no way conferred grace from any power inherent in them; nor was grace even conferred in them, unless perhaps from the devotion of the recipient; with the exception of circumcision ¹¹, in which grace was indeed conferred, but not from any power inherent in it. The reason for this is that the sacraments have the power of justifying from Christ's passion, namely inasmuch as they contain within themselves a power flowing from Christ incarnate and suffered. But that which is not yet in the nature of things does not move according to the use of exterior things, although it can move according as it precedes in the act of the soul, in the manner in which the end is said to move while it is in the intention. Therefore the power of Christ's passion could not, before that passion was in actu, justify through sacraments, which consist in the use of exterior things, although the ancient Fathers were justified through faith in Christ's resurrection, just as we are. But the sacraments of the New Law justify effectively, inasmuch as by a power existing in them from Christ's passion, as was said above ¹², they cause grace in us. Hence the sacraments of the ancient Law were a sign of the salvation to come through Christ, inasmuch as they prefigured Christ's passion itself and His other mysteries, but they were not a cause of salvation; whereas the sacraments of the New Law are both signs of salvation and a cause, inasmuch as they both signify grace existing in us and cause it in one who receives the sacrament rightly. Wherefore St. Thomas, well assigning the distinction between these sacraments, says that the former represented and promised salvation, whereas the latter bestow salvation, and do not merely signify it.

It must be considered, secondly, that an instrument is twofold: one which by its action attains the ultimate perfection that the principal agent intends; and another which does not attain the ultimate perfection itself, but some disposition toward it. Yet an instrument, inasmuch as it is an instrument, always reaches something beyond that which belongs to it according to its own nature. The sacraments, therefore, are called the cause of salvation and of grace, not because by their own action they reach grace, since grace is created in the soul by God alone, but because they dispose to grace itself, by causing something in the soul inasmuch as they are instruments of the divine power ¹³, such as the character or the ornament, by which the soul is made disposed to receive grace.

IV. But this manner of positing that the sacrament is the cause of grace dispositively, through the character or the ornament which it immediately causes in the soul, is attacked by Scotus ¹⁴ and by others. Yet their attacks are most sufficiently resolved by Capreolus, in d. I of the Fourth Book ¹⁵. I will bring forward only one objection of Scotus, in d. I of the Fourth Book ¹⁶, similar to the doubt that was raised, which is as follows: A creature cannot act instrumentally toward the term of creation, and especially not a corporeal substance. But this disposition toward grace, which is called a character or ornament, is a term of creation, because it is simply a supernatural form, and is not educible from the natural potency of matter. Therefore a corporeal agent, such as a sacrament is, cannot act instrumentally toward it.

He answers that it is one thing with the principal form which the supernatural agent intends, and another with the disposition toward such a form. For it is not unfitting that the principal form should be entirely supernatural and unable to be produced except by a supernatural agent, and yet that the disposition toward such a form can be produced instrumentally by a natural agent, though not by the power of nature, but by a supernatural power given to it; just as we see that by the power of human seed the ultimate disposition toward the intellective soul is caused, and yet the intellective soul is created by God alone.

Hence to Scotus it is said that the minor premise is false. To the proof, it is said that for a form to be entirely supernatural can be understood in two ways. In one way, because it can in no way be produced by a natural agent, neither, I say, by its own power nor by a superadded power, nor be educed from the potency of matter; and in this way it is denied that the character or ornament is an entirely supernatural form. In another way, because it cannot be educed from the potency of matter, nor produced by a natural agent by the power of its own nature, although it can be produced by it instrumentally through a supernatural power given to it. And then it is conceded that such a disposition is a supernatural form, but it is denied that every such form is a term of creation. For in order that a form can be the term of creation alone, it is required that it not be educible from the potency of matter and that it can in no way be produced by a natural agent, neither, I say, by its own power nor by another's. — These things I have said following the opinion of Capreolus in IV Sent. ¹⁷, which is also expressly that of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. I ¹⁸, and Pot., q. IV, a. 3, ad 8.

V. There are some, however, who hold that it is of the mind of St. Thomas that grace is not created, but reached instrumentally by the sacraments: — both because in the Tertia Pars, q. LXII, a. 1, it is said absolutely that grace is caused instrumentally by the sacrament, with no mention made of dispositive causation; — and because, when grace ceases to be, it is not annihilated.

But I do not think this is according to the mind of St. Thomas. For since to be created is for something to be made from nothing, and it clearly appears that grace is made from nothing, it remains that it is created, in the manner in which it belongs to an inherent form to be created, namely because according to it something is created; according to which manner St. Thomas says, Ia IIae, q. CX, a. 2, ad 3, that grace is created because according to it men are said to be created, that is, established in a new esse.

If it be said that it is not created, because it comes to be in a subject: — it is certain that this does not take away the nature of creation for a form, according to St. Thomas. For in order that it not be created, it is required that it be educed from the potency of matter, as is said in Pot. Dei, q. III, a. 8, in the replies to the arguments ¹⁹. But grace is not educed from the potency of matter ²⁰, as is said in the same place, and in I Sent., d. XIV, q. III.

Nor does what is first adduced stand in the way. Because the words of St. Thomas in the Tertia Pars are to be expounded only in accordance with the sense expressed elsewhere. — Nor do I approve the interpretation of Capreolus when he says ²¹ that St. Thomas meant that the sacraments cause sacramental grace effectively, but not sanctifying grace. For, since sacramental grace is an effect of sanctifying grace, if the latter is not caused effectively by the sacraments, neither can the former be caused.

Nor does what is secondly adduced stand in the way. For a falsehood is presupposed: namely, that when grace ceases, it is not annihilated. For St. Thomas holds the opposite of this in II Sent., d. XXVI, a. 2, ad 5, where he says that when grace is corrupted, it at the same time returns into nothingness. Which is to be understood because no part of it remains, nor the matter from whose potency it was educed, although the subject that was informed by it remains.

VI. But then the doubt remains: since the character is no more educed from the potency of matter than grace, why is creation attributed to grace rather than to the character, and why can the sacraments by divine power cause the character, but not grace?

It can be said that the reason for the diversity is that grace is above the whole order of nature, as formally joining man to God. Therefore it has to be produced by the agent alone who is above all nature. The character, however, is not above the whole order of nature; on the contrary, it is below certain natural things of its own genus: for in the genus of dispositions to grace there is the act of free choice, which is nobler than the character itself. And therefore it is not unfitting that it should be produced instrumentally by a creature, since something of its genus is produced by the power of nature.

Nor does it stand in the way that it seems to be produced from nothing. — For it is said that it is not produced entirely from nothing, because it is produced in something that is in natural potency to something of its genus; and this suffices for an accidental form to be said sometimes to be produced through some simple change, and not through creation.

This reply can be had from Qu. de Pot., q. III, a. 8, ad 5, where St. Thomas holds that, although artificial forms are totally from without, they are nevertheless not introduced through creation: because they do not exceed the order of nature, as grace does; indeed, they are below the order of nature, because every natural thing is nobler than an artificial one.

VII. From these things the reply to the first objection of the doubt is clear ²². For the consequence concerning the dispositive cause of grace is denied. — To the proof, it is said that we do not say that the sacraments are the cause of grace as though they created grace instrumentally, but because they cause some disposition toward grace.

To the second, the consequence is denied. To its proof, the minor is denied. For although in both of those sacraments grace is conferred, they are nevertheless not of equal utility. Indeed, circumcision was of no utility, because it did nothing toward grace; for that is called useful which confers something toward the attainment of the end. But baptism is useful, because it has a power productive of grace, in the manner stated. But if 'useful' is taken improperly, namely for that from which some good proceeds, whether as from a sine qua non cause or as from an effective cause: this consequence is denied, 'These are of equal utility, therefore they are of equal dignity'; because it is more dignified to confer grace through an inherent power than merely as a sine qua non cause.

It must be noted, however, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, Tertia, q. LXII, a. 2, and IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qu. 5, that not only are the sacraments of the New Law the cause of sanctifying grace in the manner stated, but they are also the cause of certain particular effects proceeding from sanctifying grace according as it is caused through the sacraments, which are called sacramental graces. For just as from sanctifying grace proceed the virtues and gifts, by which the powers are perfected in order to their acts, so from grace itself, according as it is caused through the sacraments, proceed certain dispositions, which are remedies against certain particular defects; for example, through the grace of baptism is caused a remedy against original sin; through penance, a remedy against actual sin; through matrimony, a remedy against concupiscence; through confirmation, a remedy against shame and timidity in confessing the name of Christ; and so of the others, which remedies and dispositions, because they do not have a proper name, are called sacramental graces. See in Capreolus in IV, d. 1, q. III ²³, concl. 4.

VIII. For the clear understanding of the second doubt ²⁴, it must be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. CIII, a. 4 ²⁵, and IV Sent., d. 1, q. II, a. 5 ²⁶, that concerning the observance of the sacraments of the Old Law, three times are to be distinguished according to Augustine ²⁷, whom St. Thomas follows in this matter against Jerome. The first was before the passion of Christ; the second after the passion, up to the promulgation of the Gospel; the third was after the promulgation of the Gospel. In the first, sacraments of this kind were alive, and the Jews were bound to observe them. In the second, they were dead, because they were of no utility and had no obligating force; yet they were not deadly, because they could be observed without sin. In the third, they are not only dead, as being of no utility, but they are also deadly, because they cannot be observed without mortal sin. What is said here, therefore—that it is an error to hold that the legal sacraments are to be observed together with the Gospel—if it is understood with respect to the necessity of observance, must thus be referred to the whole time after the passion of Christ: for it is an error that, with the Gospel current, after Christ's passion converts to the faith of Christ were bound to keep the legal observances. But if it is understood with respect to the permission of observance, it must thus be referred to the third time: for it is an error to say that, after the publication of the Gospel, the legal observances can be licitly observed.

But it must be noted that the publication of the Gospel was twofold. One was imperfect, by which, namely, through the Apostles and others, the necessity of observing the sacraments of the New Law and the precepts of Christ was preached. The other was perfect, by which, namely, the sufficiency of the New Law without the observance of the legal sacraments was also preached, along with the uselessness of the legal observances and their harm. When, therefore, we speak here of the publication of the Gospel, we speak of its perfect publication. And to Scotus it is said that Paul observed the legal rites after the imperfect publication of the Gospel indeed, but not after the perfect publication.

IX. But a doubt remains concerning the reason by which St. Thomas refutes the aforesaid error ²⁸. For just as, once the Gospel is published, through the sacraments of the New Law we profess that the Incarnation and other mysteries of Christ have already been accomplished, whereas through the legal sacraments we protest that they are yet to come, and therefore those who keep both say contrary things in deed; so also after the passion of Christ before the publication of the Gospel. Therefore, just as after the publication of the Gospel it is not licit to use the legal sacraments, so neither before the publication. The contrary of which was said.

He answers that the account of the signification of such sacraments is one thing before the publication of the Gospel, and another after such publication. For before it had been published that these things were harmful, and that they were not to be observed because they had been instituted to signify the Incarnation and passion of Christ as future, and not as already accomplished and perfected; they could be observed, not as signifying this, but out of reverence for God, as something instituted by God for a certain time, which was not yet entirely abrogated and made harmful. But after the perfect publication, when it was preached that such sacraments were abrogated and were harmful, it is not licit to observe them, because of their abrogation and the signification of falsehood.

When, therefore, it is urged that even before the publication of the Gospel the legal sacraments signified that the Incarnation and passion of Christ were to come: — it is said that, although the sacraments themselves were primarily instituted to signify thus, nevertheless those observing them during that middle time did not intend that signification, but only reverence toward God; which was then licit, because it had not been shown that they ought not to be observed. But once the perfect publication has been made that they ought not to be kept, one who observes them is not excused on account of reverence for God, because it is not licit to act against the law of God out of reverence for God. And while someone observes them, pertinaciously acting against evangelical doctrine, he professes by his deed that he is Judaizing, and professes that Christ is yet to be born and to suffer, and not that Christ has been born and has suffered, as those sacraments were instituted by God for that purpose.

It can be answered, secondly, that before the Gospel was perfectly published, Christ's passion was not yet perfectly in actu as regards the all-inclusive publication of its power, although in itself it was past; and therefore it could be signified in some way as future. But after the perfect publication, it was in actu completely in every way; therefore it can in no way be signified as future. Wherefore, before the publication, the legal sacraments that signified Christ's passion as future could be kept, but not after the publication.