Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

After St. Thomas has determined concerning the Incarnation of the Son of God for the redemption of the human race, he further determines concerning the effects of the incarnate Christ in us¹. Now, there are two effects of this kind: namely, liberation from guilt, which we obtain through the sacraments; and liberation from death, which we shall obtain through his resurrection at the end of the age. Therefore, first, he determines concerning the sacraments; second, concerning the resurrection of our bodies, in chap. LXXIX.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he determines concerning the sacraments in general; second, in particular, in chap. LIX.

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he shows the necessity of the sacraments; second, he shows the distinction between the sacraments of the New Law and the sacraments of the Old Law, in the following chapter; third, he explains the number of the sacraments of the New Law, in chapter LVIII.

I. As to the first, he sets down two conclusions. The first is: It was necessary that some sacraments be delivered to men.

It is proved. It was necessary that certain remedies be provided for men, through which the benefit of Christ's death might be in some way conjoined to them. Therefore, sacraments were necessary. — The consequence is proved. Because remedies of this kind are said to be the sacraments of the Church. — The antecedent, in turn, is proved, because the death of Christ, according to the things said ² above, is, as it were, the universal cause of human salvation; but a universal cause must be applied to each particular effect.

Concerning the conclusion itself, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, in IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, quᵃ 1, that the sacraments are not said to be necessary by absolute necessity, as it is that God is: since they were instituted from divine goodness alone. Nor by necessity of the end in the sense in which that is called necessary without which the end cannot be had: because God did not bind his power to the sacraments. But by necessity of the end which implies a certain fittingness and utility, in the way in which a horse is said to be necessary for a journey. For we understand the sacraments to be necessary in this way, because through them the restoration of man is brought about more fittingly, although it could have been brought about otherwise.

Concerning the proof of the conclusion, however, it must be noted that the sacraments are called remedies because they heal man from sin effectively, yet instrumentally, like certain medicines. Whence Hugh of Saint Victor says ³ that they were instituted as medicines for sin.

II. The second conclusion is: Remedies of this kind had to be delivered with certain visible signs.

It is proved first. The condition of man is such that he is naturally led through sensible things to grasp spiritual and intelligible things. Therefore, it was fitting that spiritual remedies be delivered to men under sensible signs. — The consequence is proved. Because God provides for man according to his condition, just as he does for other things.

Second. The first and universal cause of human salvation is the incarnate Word. Therefore, it was fitting that the remedies through which the power of such a cause reaches men should have its likeness: namely, so that in them divine power might work invisibly under visible signs. — The consequence is proved. Because instruments must be proportioned to the first cause.

Third. Man had fallen into sin by unduly clinging to visible things. Therefore, lest visible things be believed to be evil by their own nature, but might rather appear good by their own nature, and to become harmful to men insofar as they use them inordinately, but salutary insofar as they use them ordinately: it was fitting that remedies of salvation be applied to men through visible signs.

2. For the evidence of this conclusion, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Tertia, q. LX, a. 1, and in IV Sent., d. 1⁴, that a sacrament, according to its proper acceptance in which it is accepted by Catholic doctors, is placed in the genus of sign. For a sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing, not in any way whatsoever, but insofar as that sacred thing, such as grace, is sanctifying men. Nor does every sign of a sacred thing properly have the character of a sacrament, but only a sensible sign, or a sensible thing signifying spiritual goods, or sacred things by which we are sanctified. And therefore St. Thomas says that it was fitting for spiritual remedies—that is, the sacraments themselves through which the power of Christ's death comes to us, which are called spiritual because they both operate by a certain spiritual power, and are remedies of the spirit and soul, and work spiritual salvation—to be delivered with certain visible signs, understanding every sensible thing under the name of visible.

3. For the evidence of the first reason, it must be considered that the condition of man, insofar as he is rational, is such that his sanctification should become known to him. And because he naturally has knowledge arising from the senses, it is therefore fitting for him that his sanctification be manifested to him through sensible things. Since, therefore, the sacraments are certain signs and also causes of sanctification, such sacraments were fittingly instituted in sensible things. And the first reason consists in this.

Concerning the second reason, it must be considered that the incarnate Word implies two things: namely, the divine person itself, and the divine power, which is invisible; and human flesh, according to which the divine Word is in some way visible. Therefore, it is fitting that the remedies and sacraments, through which as instruments the power of this universal cause reaches men, should be such that under visible signs divine power operates invisibly: for thus are instruments proportioned to the principal cause. And it is according to this that this reason proceeds.

III. From these things—says St. Thomas—is excluded the error of those wishing all visible things of this kind to be removed from the sacraments of the Church, as thinking that all visible things are evil by their own nature, and produced by an evil author: which we refuted in the Second Book.

There is also excluded the doubt that could arise, because it seems unfitting that spiritual salvation should be ministered through visible and bodily things. But St. Thomas says that this is not unfitting: since visible things of this kind are, as it were, certain instruments of God incarnate and having suffered, and therefore do not work spiritual salvation from the property of their own nature, but from the institution of Christ himself, from which they obtain instrumental power; for an instrument does not operate by the power of its own nature, but by the power of the principal agent.

It must be noted, concerning this last statement, that it is understood of an instrument insofar as it is an instrument. For a certain operation indeed belongs to an instrument by the power of its own nature, just as cutting hard things belongs to a saw: but this operation belongs to it not insofar as it is an instrument, but insofar as it is such a nature. The operation, however, which belongs to an instrument insofar as it is an instrument, belongs to it insofar as there is in it the power of the principal agent by way of a certain intention, that is, by way of a form having transient, but not fixed and stable, being. For such a power is in the instrument only so long as it is moved by the agent: just as the power of art is in the saw for making a bench.

IV. But concerning this there occur doubts touched upon by Scotus, in the Fourth Book, d. 1, q. v⁵, through which he wishes to prove that there is no supernatural power in the sacraments. For he argues thus: —

First. Either that power would be in the sacrament indivisibly, or divisibly. Not the first: because among forms perfecting bodily matter, only the intellective soul is posited as such. — Not the second: because it would then be extended accidentally in the subject, which is contrary to the ratio of a spiritual power.

Second. Since many words are required in the sacraments, either in each syllable there is entirely the same power: and the same accident would migrate and remain after the subject has ceased to be. Or there are different powers in different syllables: and thus the sacrament would not have any one power. — If it is said that it has an aggregated power composed of many powers of the parts, this is not valid. Both because it would not be possible to assign which of these would be the principle of causing that spiritual effect in the soul; and because it does not seem probable that one sacrament should have so many supernatural powers aggregated together.

Third. This power is caused in this sacrament either before its application to the act or use, or in the application itself. If the first, therefore its causation ⁶ is purely miraculous. — If the second, this is unfitting: because no instrument is formally fit for use simply because someone uses it as an instrument.

Fourth. There is no necessity for positing a power of this kind. Therefore, etc.

Fifth. Artificial instruments are not formally active, but only receptive of a prior effect ordered to the ultimate effect. Therefore, etc.

V. To the first, it is said that that power is in the sacrament indivisibly: that is, whole in the whole, and whole in each part. — To the disproof, it is said that only the intellective soul is such among complete forms: but it is not the only such form among forms absolutely, because certain other forms having intentional being in a subject are also such.

To the second, it is said first, that such power is in the last syllable in relation to the preceding ones: that is, as it completes the signification of the whole speech. — It is said secondly that, even if there were diverse partial powers in diverse syllables, no unfittingness follows on account of this: for all of them would integrate one complete, yet successive, power. Nor is it unfitting for one sacrament to have several incomplete supernatural powers, yet containing one total power.

To the third, it is said that such power was given to the sacraments inchoatively in their very institution; but they receive this power completively in the application itself to their proper uses. That is: in the very institution of the sacrament the sensible thing, such as water, was determined to being fit for baptism and being receptive of divine power for the sacramental effect; while in the application to the proper use of the sacrament, it formally receives the supernatural power itself. — Nor are the objections to the contrary valid. For it is conceded that the causation ⁷ of such power is entirely miraculous, as is also the institution of the sacraments; and that it is not unfitting for more to be given to an instrument by the principal agent while he is actually using it for the induction of the effect principally intended, than before the use of such an instrument.

To the fourth⁸, the assumption is denied. For although an instrument does not act toward the effect principally intended except when it is moved by the principal agent, nevertheless, while it is moved, it receives from the principal agent a power by way of intention, which operates instrumentally toward the intended effect.

See the rest in Capreolus, in the Fourth Book, d. 1, q. 1⁹.