Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

Having established the truth concerning the fittingness of the Incarnation, St. Thomas next wishes to answer the objections.¹

I. And to the first he says first that it is not against the order of things that God become man. Because man, according to the order of his nature, has God Himself as his end, and is born to be united to Him through intellect. As an example and proof of this union, the union of God to man in person was made, with the property of each nature preserved.

He says second that, on account of the perfection and immutability of divine goodness, nothing of dignity is lost to God from any approaching of a creature to Him, even though from this something of dignity may accrue to the creature: because He communicates His goodness to creatures without detriment to Himself.

To the second he says that, although the divine will suffices for doing all things, yet divine wisdom requires that each thing be provided for by God according to its fittingness. And so, although God could by His will alone have brought about in the human race all the benefits which we say have come from God's Incarnation, yet it was fitting, for the reasons set down above,² that they be brought about through God made man.

To the third he says first that what is done for man's salvation seems to pertain to the whole of nature. Because man, being constituted from a corporeal and a spiritual substance, holds, as it were, a certain boundary position of both natures. And therefore it was fitting that the universal cause of all things assume that creature, namely the human one, into unity of person, in which it communicates more with all creatures.

He says second that it was not fitting that God assume some irrational creature. Because the assumption of such a creature by God had to be one that could act per se, as a principal agent. But it belongs to the rational nature alone to act per se: for irrational things are rather driven by natural impulse than act by themselves. Hence, if something had to be done through some irrational creature, it sufficed, according to the condition of such a creature, that it be moved by God alone: but not that it be assumed to unity of person.

II. But concerning this response a doubt occurs. For even human nature in Christ does not seem to act per se: since it does not have its own supposit, whose it is to act per se; and it is itself also an instrument of the divine person. Therefore this is not a sufficient reason why He assumed human nature, but not an irrational one.

For the evidence of this, it must be considered first that we can speak of human nature in two ways: in one way, as it prescinds from the supposit; in another way, as it includes the supposit itself. When, therefore, it is said that acting per se belongs to the rational nature alone, this is understood of nature as it includes the supposit: because, as was said, acting properly belongs to the supposit. And in this the rational nature differs from the irrational: because not only does the irrational nature itself not act per se, but neither does its supposit.

It must be considered second that through the assumption of a created nature by the Word into unity of person, the Word itself becomes the supposit of that nature, acting through it as a supposit acts through a nature. For this reason, since it is not fitting for the divine supposit to be acted upon, or to be an instrument, but to act per se as a principal agent, it was necessary that such a nature be assumed by Him into unity of supposit whose supposit it befits to act per se. Because, therefore, it befits human nature to act per se, for that reason it could fittingly be assumed by the divine Word, and the divine supposit be called a human supposit. But it does not befit the supposit of an irrational nature to act per se, but rather to be acted upon. Therefore it does not befit it that the divine supposit become its supposit through its assumption to unity of person. And this is the intent of this response. Hence, when he says that the assumption of such a nature by God had to be one which could act per se, it is not understood that it itself, separated from its own supposit, can act per se, but that it befits its supposit to act per se.

2. But when it is urged that human nature in Christ does not have its own supposit: — it is said that, although it does not have its own supposit, that is, the supposit which it is born to obtain when left to itself; yet it has its own supposit, that is, the supposit which subsists in it and is called a human supposit.

When it is further said that it is an instrument: — it is answered that it is such an instrument of the divinity that even if it were left to itself, it befits it to act per se. But it is not such an instrument that it does not in any way befit it to act per se.

III. To the fourth he says that human nature was more fittingly assumed than angelic nature. First, because sin in man can be expiable: in that his choice is not borne immovably toward something, just as neither is his reason, which, because it gathers truth from sensible things and through certain signs, has a way to each of the opposites. But the sin of an angel cannot be expiable: since it has an immovable choice, as also an immovable apprehension, as one knowing immovably through the simple intellect. But it is established from the Sacred Scriptures that the principal cause of the divine Incarnation was the expiation of sins.

Second, because in man nature is one thing and person another: but not in the angel. But the assumption of a creature by God is in person, not in nature.

Third, because, since the angel was closer to God according to the property of his nature, it sufficed for him to be instructed by God intelligibly concerning the truth of the divinity. But for man, whose knowledge arises from the senses, it was fitting that God instruct him sensibly about Himself. Which was done through the Incarnation.

Fourth, because, since the distance of man from God seemed more to conflict with divine fruition, man needed more than the angel to be assumed by God, in order to conceive hope of beatitude.

Fifth, because, since man is the terminus of creatures, as one who naturally presupposes all of them in the order of generation, through a union of this kind the perfection of things is concluded, by a certain circulation, to the first principle.

2. Concerning the first reason assigned here, it would have to be seen how choice in the angels is immovable. But because St. Thomas touches this also below,³ and more to the purpose, therefore let it be deferred until then.

3. Concerning the second reason, it must be considered that in the angels the lack of a distinction of nature from person does not remove that God could absolutely assume an angelic nature into unity of person. Because, as is said in Tertia, q. iv, a. 1, ad 3, God, by producing a new angelic nature, could join it to Himself in unity of person. And He could also deprive some angelic nature now existing of its own existence and its own personality, and draw it to Himself in unity of person. But he argues that this is not fitting. Because it is not fitting that an angelic nature, preexisting and assumed, be deprived of the perfection which it previously had. Nor does it befit such a nature to be anticipated in its production by a divine supposit: since it does not proceed into being through generation, so that the nature is found first in passive potency and then in act. But human nature proceeds into being through generation; and it is first in potency and then in act. Therefore it can fittingly be anticipated by a divine supposit, so that, namely, in that instant in which it would have to have its own being and its own personality, it is supposited by the divine supposit.

But someone will ask: What does the fact that human nature is distinguished from the supposit contribute to this fittingness of the assumption: since a singular nature is assumed, which in other men is a supposit, according as it has being per se?

It is said that it contributes to this, because in material things, where the supposit adds something intrinsically above the nature, namely the individuating principles, being is less intrinsic to the nature considered in itself, as one that cannot befit it unless it is individuated through something altogether other than itself. But where the supposit is not constituted through something altogether extrinsic to the nature, but the nature itself is in itself this and individual, being, which is born to befit the individual according as it is constituted in its personality, is more intrinsic and closer to that nature in itself. Therefore it is more fitting that, where the supposit is distinguished from the nature, the nature be assumed without its own being and without a supposit, than where supposit and nature are the same. For the fact that the nature, as individuated through signate matter and constituted in its personality, is the immediate recipient of being, does not remove that being is less intrinsic to that nature than to a nature individual through itself: because to the latter being befits from something of its own kind, but to the former from something added.

4. Concerning the last reason, it must be noted that, since God in the creation of the universe preserved what befitted the nature of each one and created man in the last place after all creatures, this is a sign that it naturally befits man to presuppose all other creatures in the natural order of generation, as the terminus of all creatures. And therefore, so that the last might be joined to the first principle, and thus there would be made, as it were, a circle, which is the perfect figure, it was fitting that human nature be united to God. And this is the meaning of that reason.

IV. To the fifth he says that by this no occasion of error is given to man, so that he would consent to those saying that God is not exalted above all things. Because the assumption of human nature was not made into unity of nature, but of person.

2. To the sixth he says first that far more errors were removed after the Incarnation than had arisen around the Incarnation.

He says second that, just as some evils have followed from the creation of things, in accordance with the condition of creatures; so it is no wonder if, when the truth was made manifest, some errors have arisen from the defect of human minds.

He says third that these errors exercised the talents of the faithful to seek out and understand the truth of divine things more diligently: just as God also orders the evils of creatures to some good.

From this response St. Thomas wishes to have it that, although some errors have arisen around the Incarnation, the Incarnation was nevertheless not useless. Both because this is from the defect of human minds. — And because also from those errors some good has arisen, besides the other benefits brought forward above⁴ which have come to us from the Incarnation.

Hence this consequence does not hold: Many errors have arisen around the Incarnation. Therefore it was not fitting for human salvation that God be incarnated.

V. To the seventh he says first that the aforesaid Incarnation brought no small benefit to the world: since from it human salvation has followed, than which nothing greater can be in created things, because it consists in the very fruition of divine goodness.

He says second that it was not necessary that all men be saved from the divine Incarnation, but only those who would adhere to it through faith and the sacraments of faith. Because although the power of the divine Incarnation is sufficient for the salvation of all men, yet from the indisposition of some who are unwilling to inhere in God through faith and love, it happens that they do not attain the fruit of the Incarnation.

He says third that the freedom of the will was not to be taken away from men: lest man's good be coerced, and consequently without merit and unpraiseworthy.

2. For the evidence of what is said about the sufficiency of the power of the Incarnation, it must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas Tertia, d. xix, q. 1, a. 1, qu. 2, that for something to be able to induce an effect in another, it is required on the part of the agent that it have sufficient power for inducing that effect; on the part of the recipient, however, that it be disposed to receive the action of the agent. Because, therefore, on the part of Christ there is sufficient power to lead all to beatitude, in that the action of His divine power is a divine action; but on the part of men it happens that some are not disposed through faith and charity to receive this action of Christ leading to beatitude: therefore such men do not arrive at beatitude. Well, therefore, was it said that the power of the divine Incarnation is sufficient for the salvation of all, and yet some, from their own indisposition, do not arrive at beatitude.

VI. But then results the doubt of Scotus in III Sent., d. xix,⁵ arguing thus: Christ not only merited that those having grace, however and from wherever this might be, would have glory from the merit of Christ: but he also merited for us the first grace, and the baptismal grace in the New Testament, and the grace given in the sacrifices or circumcision of the Ancients. Otherwise, from where would that first grace come to us? Therefore he merited that those not joined to him be joined. Therefore he not only merited that those joined to him should further work, and thus at last be glorified; but also that those not joined be united to him, even those who never dispose themselves.

2. It is answered, and it is said first that, as far as pertains to the present place, St. Thomas does not speak of the universal merit of the incarnate Christ: but of the power of the Incarnation, or also of the merit of the incarnate Christ, with respect to salvation and beatitude. And he means that through the power of the Incarnation only those attain beatitude who adhere to the incarnate God through faith and love, and through the sacraments of faith. And this indeed is fitting. Because, as can be had from his doctrine Tertia, q. xlix, 1,⁶ and Verit., q. xxix, a. 7, ad 8, since the Incarnation is the universal cause of human salvation; and the effect of a universal cause is not received in anything unless through particular causes its power is applied to the subject and movable: it is necessary, in order that human salvation, which is the effect of the Incarnation, reach this man, that the power of the Incarnation be applied to him through the sacraments of faith, and through faith and charity, as through particular causes by which is made the remission of sins and the attainment of beatitude.

3. It is said second, if one asks about the universal effect of the Incarnation, that its power extends even to the first habitual grace: so that it is not only the cause of the beatitude of those who are united to God through the sacraments of faith, and faith and love; but it is also the cause of the first habitual grace, upon which, as was shown in the Third Book,⁷ faith and charity follow. For this seems to be of the mind of St. Thomas in Qu. Verit., art. alleg.; and Iª IIae, q. cxiv, a. 6.

Hence it is clear that the argument of Scotus does not proceed against the mind of St. Thomas. For although it is true that the merit of Christ, according to its ultimate efficacy, extends only to the remission of sins and the beatitude of those men who are united to Him through faith and love; yet it does not follow from this that it is not the cause of the first habitual grace; rather it is the cause of the remission of sins because it is the cause of the grace through which sins are remitted.

3. But whether some disposition is required for the first grace of which the merit of Christ is not the cause? — it is said that the disposition to grace is twofold: one imperfect, which in time precedes the infusion of grace itself, such as the recollection of sins, and attrition, and the like; but one is perfect, which is called the necessity for the form, which is infused at the same time as grace, as is the movement of the will toward God proceeding from charity. If we speak of the imperfect disposition, certainly some is required: and of it the merit of Christ is not the cause. For this St. Thomas seems to wish in Qu. Verit., cited article. — But if we speak of the perfect disposition, then indeed it is required, but of it the merit of Christ is the cause, just as it is the cause of the grace which this disposition accompanies.

4. But I do not approve what Capreolus says in Tertia, d. xviii,⁸ namely that the movements of faith, hope and charity, as they proceed from the theological habits, are a concomitant disposition, and such a disposition Christ merited. But as they are unformed, they are a remote and prior disposition: and so they are not given from the merit of Christ, but from the mere divine liberality. For this does not seem to be according to the mind of St. Thomas, who in nearly infinite places holds that unformed charity cannot be, nor can it stand with mortal sin: as is clear from IIª IIae, q. xxiv, a. 12, ad 4; Tertia, q. lxxix, a. 1; II. Sent., d. xxvi, a. 4, ad 5; III Sent., d. xxvii, q. ii, a. 4;⁹ and Ver., q. xxvii, 2, ad 6; likewise above in Book III;¹⁰ and below in this Fourth Book.¹¹

VII. To the eighth he says first that the Incarnation of God was made manifest by sufficient indications through the works which were done by Christ above the laws of nature: as that He gave light to the blind, cleansed the lepers, and the like. For it is proper to God to be able to change the laws of nature, by working above nature something of which He Himself is the author. Hence also to those asking, Are you the one who is to come, etc., through these works He made manifest His divinity.

He says second that it was not necessary for Him to create another world: neither the reason of divine wisdom, nor the nature of things required this.

He says third that Christ performed these miracles much more excellently and divinely than others. Because others are read to have done these things by praying: but Christ by commanding, as one working miracles, as it were, from His own power. And He granted to others the power of doing the same and greater things, who worked miracles of this kind at the mere invocation of His name.

He says fourth that not only corporeal miracles were done through Christ, but also spiritual ones, which are much greater: as it was that through Him, and at the invocation of His name, the Holy Spirit was given, through whom hearts would be set on fire with the affection of charity, and minds would be suddenly instructed in the knowledge of divine things, and the tongues of the simple would be rendered eloquent; which no mere man could do.

It is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, in ad Heb., saying that the salvation of men, etc.

2. For the evidence of the things said here, presupposing those things which were said in the Third Book, where miracles were treated,¹² it must be considered that St. Thomas touches a twofold reason why the miracles of Christ showed His divinity. The first is from the manner of doing. Namely, that He did them by His own power and His own authority, which is proper to God: but other saints worked miracles by the power of another, namely of God, of whom they were instruments. And of this He shows a twofold sign. One is, that other saints worked miracles by praying, but Christ by commanding: for to command belongs to one having authority. The other is, that He gave to others the power of doing similar and greater miracles, who worked miracles at the mere invocation of His name. For unless He Himself had the power of working miracles by His own authority, He could not have communicated this power to others; nor would miracles be done at the mere invocation of His name; for he is invoked to do something by whose power and authority something is done.

The second reason is from the greatness of the deeds: namely because those spiritual miracles which he recounts, made namely after His ascension, are greater than any miracles done by others.

He adds, moreover, super Ioan., cap. xv,¹³ that he also did miracles greater than those of others, while he was in this mortal life: as that he raised Lazarus, dead four days,¹⁴ and gave sight to the man born blind,¹⁵ whence they said, It has not been heard from the beginning of the world, etc. — He adds also another reason in the same place, and Tertia, q. xliii:¹⁶ namely because the miracles of Christ exceeded the miracles of others in multitude; for it is said in Luc. vi¹⁷ that power went out from him and healed all; and in Matth. xiv,¹⁸ that all, as many as were sick, he cured. — There is added also another reason in the Tertia Pars,¹⁹ which seems to me, among others, most efficacious: namely because Christ Himself said that He was God, and worked miracles for the confirmation of His doctrine. But unless it had been true that He Himself was God, His doctrine would not have been confirmed by miracles worked with divine power: since God is not the author of falsehood.

3. It must be noted concerning the first reason that although other saints in the working of miracles sometimes perhaps used an imperative mode, yet they did not do this except with prayer premised, or with the invocation of the divine name, tacit or express: for when Elias said, If I am a man of God, let fire descend from heaven, etc.,²⁰ he tacitly showed that he was imploring the divine power. But Christ, although he was sometimes seen to pray before he worked a miracle, as in the raising of Lazarus,²¹ nevertheless showed that he prayed to God as to the Father, to whom, abiding in him, he attributed all his works,²² by this also showing that he was God.

VIII. To the ninth he says that God did not have to become incarnate from the beginning of the world. First, because medicine is not fittingly brought against sin to someone unless he recognizes his own defect. But man could presume about himself both as regards knowledge and as regards virtue. Therefore he had to be left to himself for a while, so that he might experience that he himself did not suffice for himself unto salvation, neither through natural knowledge, because before the time of the written law he transgressed the law of nature; nor through his own virtue, because, once knowledge of sin had been given to him through the law, he still sinned through weakness; and at last efficacious help against both defects had to be given to him. And so it came about that there were three states of the human race, namely: before the Law; under the Law; and under grace.

Secondly, because the condition of human nature requires this: that it be not led at once to the perfect, but be led by the hand through imperfect things so that it may arrive at perfection; as is evident in the instruction of children and of the multitude. But through God incarnate perfect precepts and teachings were to be given to men. It was fitting, therefore, that the human race should first be instructed in the things pertaining to salvation through some light and lesser teachings, through the Patriarchs, and the Law, and the Prophets, and that at last the perfect doctrine of Christ should be set forth on earth: according to that saying of the Apostle, ad Gal. iv, "But when the fullness of time came, etc."; and in the same place, "the Law was our pedagogue, etc."

Thirdly, because many things had to precede the coming of God to earth, as the coming of a great king, by which men would be prepared to receive God incarnate.

On this fittingness of the time of the Incarnation see also St. Thomas, Tertia, q. 1, a. ult.; and III Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4; and Iª IIae, q. cvi, a. 3; likewise IV Sent., d. ii, q. 1, a. 4, quª. 2.

2. Concerning the second reason a doubt occurs. Because the Old Law seems to have been heavier than the New Law: whence in Matth. xi²³ the Lord says: "My yoke is sweet, and my burden is light." Therefore it was not well said that the human race had to be instructed through some light and lesser teachings before the coming of the perfect doctrine of Christ.

It is answered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Iª IIae, q. cvii, a. 4, that we can speak of the new law and the old in two ways: in one way, as regards the exterior works of the virtues which are commanded by the law; in another way, as regards the interior acts of the virtues. In the first way, the old law was much heavier than the new law is: because it bound to more exterior acts in manifold ceremonies than does the new law. In the second way the new law is heavier and more difficult: because in the new law the interior evil movements of the mind are prohibited, which were not expressly prohibited in the old law in all points, although in some points they were prohibited, in which, however, no penalty was attached to their prohibition. But this is most difficult. Thus, therefore, the precepts of the old law were lighter and lesser as regards the interior acts of virtues and vices, and in this sense what is said here is understood: although they were heavier as regards exterior works.

Note, however, that when it is said that the precepts of the new law are heavy as regards the interior acts of virtues and vices, namely that all interior acts of vices be avoided, and that the acts of virtues be done promptly and with delight, this is understood of one who does not have virtue. Whence Augustine, explaining what is said in I Ioan. v²⁴, that commandments of this sort are not heavy, says that they are not heavy for the one who loves, but for the one who does not love they are heavy²⁵.

It can also be said that St. Thomas is speaking of the things pertaining to faith: because, namely, before the incarnation of Christ fewer things were proposed to be explicitly believed than after the incarnation; and so they were also light and lesser to believe. But this seems to agree with the text, which makes mention of the teachings pertaining to salvation by which the human race was instructed: for these are chiefly teachings of faith.

IX. To the tenth it is said that it was not fitting that Christ should dwell with men until the end of the world. Because, seeing him like other men, they would have esteemed nothing of him beyond other men, and thus his reverence would have been diminished: but when, after the wonders he had done, he withdrew his presence from them, they began to revere him more. For this reason he did not give the disciples the fullness of the Holy Spirit while he dwelt with them, but after the ascension into heaven: as if their souls were made more ready for spiritual gifts by his absence. Whence he said to them, "If I do not go away, etc."

To the eleventh he says that God did not have to take up impassible and immortal flesh. First, because it was necessary for men that they recognize the benefit of the incarnation. But in order to make manifest its truth, he had to take flesh like that of others, namely passible and mortal: otherwise it would have seemed to men that it was a phantasm, and not the truth of flesh.

Secondly, because, since it was necessary for God to assume flesh so that he might make satisfaction for the sin of the human race, he had to assume the penalty owed to it: for one can make satisfaction for another, as was shown in the Third book²⁶, when he voluntarily assumes the penalty owed to another for sin, which is not owed to himself. But the penalty consequent upon the sin of the human race is death and the other passibilities of the present life, as is clear through the Apostle, ad Romanos.

This reason is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, ad Romanos, saying that God sent his Son, etc.

Thirdly, because by having passible and mortal flesh he gave us examples of virtue more efficaciously, by strongly overcoming the passions of the flesh, and by using them virtuously.

Fourthly, because if he had assumed immortal and impassible flesh, no occasion would have been given us of hoping for immortality. But now it is given, while we know that he himself was changed from the state of passible and mortal flesh into the immortality and impassibility of the flesh.

Fifthly, because the office of the mediator required that he have passible and mortal flesh in common with us, and power and glory with the true God: so that, taking away from us what he had in common with us, he might lead us to that which was common to himself and to God.

X. To the twelfth it is said that it was not expedient for God incarnate to lead an opulent life in this world, elevated in honors or dignities. First, because, since he had come for this, that he might draw the minds of men away from earthly things and raise them to divine things, he had to draw them by his example into contempt of riches.

Secondly, because otherwise what he did divinely would have been attributed more to secular power than to the power of the divinity. Whence the most efficacious argument of his divinity was that without the support of secular power he changed the whole world for the better.

From which the answer to the thirteenth is also evident.

XI. To the fourteenth he says first that it is not far from the truth that Christ, obedient to the precept of the Father, underwent death, according to the doctrine of the Apostle, when he most perfectly fulfilled the act of charity, undergoing death for the salvation of men. Because the precept of God to men is about the acts of the virtues: and the more perfectly someone performs the act of virtue, the more he obeys God.

He says secondly that this does not conflict with the divinity of Christ. Because the union was so made in the person that the property of the human and of the divine nature would remain. And therefore, with Christ suffering, the divinity remained impassible: just as also in us, with the flesh dying, the soul remains immortal.

To the fifteenth he says that, although the will of God is not toward the death of men, it is nevertheless toward the virtue by which a man strongly endures death. And so it was with the death of Christ, insofar as he undertook it out of charity and strongly endured it.

Note that it is not inconsistent that something be not eligible in itself, which yet becomes eligible from some added condition: as the amputation of an arm, considered in itself, is not eligible, since it is a certain evil; yet insofar as it is preservative against imminent death, it becomes eligible, for thus it takes on a certain character of good. So also death in itself, since it is a certain evil, has nothing from which it should be chosen: and thus the death of Christ was not willed by God. Insofar, however, as it proceeds from the virtue of the one enduring death, it is a certain good, and it is eligible. And in this way it was willed by God.

To the sixteenth he says that it was not impious and cruel that God the Father willed Christ to die. Because he did not compel him unwilling: but the will by which he undertook death out of charity was pleasing to him. Whence he even worked that very charity in his soul.

XII. To the seventeenth he says first that it is not unfittingly said that Christ willed to suffer the death of the cross for the sake of showing humility.

He says secondly that in truth humility does not fall upon God: because he does not have a superior, but exists above all things. But humility consists in this, that one subject himself to a superior. For even if someone subjects himself out of humility to an equal or to an inferior, this is because he judges him to be in some respect superior to himself.

He says thirdly that humility nevertheless befits Christ according to his humanity. Which is also rendered more praiseworthy from his divinity: because no greater dignity of a man can exist than that he be God; but the dignity of the person adds to the praise of humility.

He says fourthly that the humility of God is found most praiseworthy, when he endured the abject things which it was expedient for him to suffer for the salvation of men: namely, that by his most abject death he might transform the minds of men from the love of worldly glory into the love of divine glory; and that by the example of his death he might encourage them to despise even an abject death.

To the eighteenth he says that, although men could have been formed to humility, instructed by divine discourses, yet because deeds provoke more to action than words; and the more efficaciously the more certain the opinion of the goodness of him who does such things is held: it was most expedient that men should be provoked by the example of God, whom it is certain could not have erred, and whose humility is the more wonderful as his majesty is the more sublime.

To the nineteenth he says first that Christ had to suffer death so that he might purge the sins of others, taking upon himself in satisfaction the penalty owed to others.

He says secondly that, although the grace of God alone suffices for remitting sins, something is nevertheless required on the part of the one to whom it is forgiven, namely that he make satisfaction to him whom he offended. Which indeed Christ did for all.

XIII. To the twentieth he says that, although in punishing it is necessary that he who sinned be punished, in making satisfaction, nevertheless, one can bear the penalty of another. Because when a penalty is inflicted for sin, the iniquity of the one punished is weighed. But in satisfaction, when someone voluntarily takes up a penalty, the charity and good will of the one satisfying is considered, which appears most of all when someone takes up a penalty for another.

Note first, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Quarto, d. xx, a. 2, quª. III, that a penalty, insofar as it pertains to the payment of a debt, has the power of satisfying most of all by reason of charity. And therefore if someone is in charity, he can make satisfaction for another, voluntarily and out of charity enduring in himself the penalty owed to another. For charity can do no less with God than with men: but we see that one man can out of love pay a debt for another.

Note secondly that the punishment of sin differs from satisfaction: because in punishment someone endures a penalty entirely against his will; but in satisfaction someone endures a penalty in some way voluntarily. Rather, with all conditions weighed, the penalty of the one satisfying is simply voluntary, although in a certain respect it is repugnant to the will. But it is not fitting that a penalty be inflicted against the will of him who did not sin, for the sin of another: but indeed God accepts a penalty voluntarily undertaken by someone for the sin of another, for the recompense of the offense done to himself by another, by reason of the charity in which both he who satisfies and he for whom satisfaction is made communicate. Therefore it is well said here that he who sinned must be punished: but one can make satisfaction for another.

XIV. To the twenty-first he says that neither could a mere man make satisfaction for the whole human race, nor was an angel sufficient: both because, although he is more powerful than man as regards some natural properties, yet as regards the participation of beatitude, to which he was to be led back through satisfaction, he is his equal. - And because the dignity of man would not be fully restored, while he himself remained under obligation to the angel making satisfaction.

To the twenty-second he says that the death of Christ had the power of satisfying from his own charity, by which he voluntarily endured death: not, however, from the iniquity of those who killed him.

To the twenty-third he says that Christ did not have to die as many times as men sin: because the death of Christ was sufficient to expiate the sins of all. Both because of the outstanding charity by which he endured death. - And because of the dignity of the person satisfying, who was God and man. For even in human affairs, the higher the person is, the greater the penalty which he endures is reputed.

To the twenty-fourth he says that the death of Christ was sufficient for the sin of the whole human race. Because although he died only according to his human nature, yet from the dignity of the person suffering, which is the person of the Son of God, his death was precious. For just as it is a greater crime to inflict an injury on a more worthy person, so it is more virtuous, and proceeding from greater charity, that a greater person subject himself voluntarily to passion for others.

To the twenty-fifth he says that it is not inconsistent that, although Christ sufficiently made satisfaction for original sin, the penalties consequent upon original sin should still remain in all, even those who are partakers of the redemption of Christ: because it was fittingly and usefully done that the penalty should remain, even with the guilt removed. Both so that there might be a conformity of the faithful to Christ, as of members to the head, bearing the insignia of the passion of Christ, so that they might attain the likeness of his glory: according to that which is said ad Rom. VIII, "Heirs, etc." - And because, if those coming to Christ attained immortality and impassibility, more would approach him for these corporeal benefits than for spiritual goods: which is against the intention of Christ. - And because this would in a certain way compel men to receive the faith of Christ: and thus the merit of faith would be diminished.

To the twenty-sixth, the consequence is denied. Because the death of Christ is as it were a certain universal cause of salvation. But a universal cause must be applied to each one specially, so that it may share in its effect. And therefore the effect of the death of Christ must reach each one through spiritual regeneration and the other sacraments.

To the twenty-seventh - which, however, is lacking in many books, and seems to be of this sort: because it would follow that children who are born of regenerated parents would not be born with original sin, and would not need the sacraments of salvation: - he denies the consequence. Because the outflow of salvation from Christ into men is not through the propagation of nature, but through the pursuit of good will, by which a man adheres to Christ. And thus what each one obtains from Christ is personal. And on that account it is not derived to posterity, as the sin of the first parent is.

XV. For the evidence of what was said²⁷, that the death of Christ was sufficient for original sin by reason of the person suffering, although Christ died only according to his human nature, it must be considered, in accordance with what was predetermined in the preceding chapter²⁸, that there is a difference between the action of a mere man, even one existing in grace, and the action of the man-God. Because although the action of a mere man has a certain infinity from grace for making satisfaction for actual personal sin, yet his action is not infinite by reason of the operating supposit, but only by reason of the Holy Spirit principally moving. And likewise it is not of man alone, but also of God, to whom the satisfaction is made: to whom man owes every good that he has. And therefore his action, even for actual sin, is not a perfectly equivalent satisfaction, but has sufficiency from divine acceptance. - But the action of Christ, even the human one, has a certain infinity by reason of the operating supposit: because that supposit is a divine person, who is infinite, whose power is preserved in such an action; for it was said above²⁹ that human nature is as it were an instrument joined to the divinity. - Moreover, such a supposit is not bound to render to God what it has from any prior obligation. And therefore the will of Christ, by which he willed to undergo death for the satisfaction of the human race, and consequently his death, as proceeding from such a will, was fully sufficient and equivalent for making satisfaction for a sin of this sort, although he underwent death only according to his human nature.

It must be noted, however, that we do not say that the human will of Christ was infinite as if it had infinity intrinsically and formally in its essence, as Scotus, III Sent., d. XIX³⁰, seems to impute to St. Thomas: but because it was infinite extrinsically, as proceeding immediately from an infinite person as from a supposit; and from the grace and charity of Christ, which were in some way infinite.

2. Nor does what Durandus objects avail, in Capreolus, Tertio, d. XVIII³¹, saying that, just as Christ, insofar as he is man, could not render an equivalent for the benefits received from God, so he could not, insofar as he is man, make satisfaction to God for sin with condign satisfaction.

For it is said first that what was assumed is false. Because Christ, by reason of the infinity of the person, whose immediate operation the human one is, as of a supposit, can condignly render to God an equivalent for the benefits granted to his humanity.

It is said secondly that even the comparison does not hold. Because however much a thanksgiving could not be equaled to the benefits received, since every good that is in a creature is from God, and thus in giving thanks the matter of giving thanks always grows: yet he could worthily make satisfaction for sin by a penalty equivalent to the guilt, because in satisfaction the matter of satisfaction does not grow, but is diminished.

XVI. Concerning the aforesaid, another doubt occurs, not to be dissembled, and discussed by Capreolus, III Sent., d. I³². For it has been said many times that the Son of God assumed human flesh so that he might make satisfaction for the sin of the human race. From which the incarnation of Christ seems to be ordered to the redemption of the human race as to an end. And from this it further follows, since, with the cause removed, the effect is removed, that, if the human race had not needed redemption, Christ would not have been incarnate. And because, if it had not sinned, it would not have needed reparation, it follows that, if man had not sinned, the Son of God would not have been incarnate. That which St. Thomas expressly holds, Tertia, q. 1, a. 3.

2. Against this, however, Scotus argues, III Sent., d. VII, q. III, ad 1m dub.³³. First, prior by nature to anything being foreseen about the sinner, whether concerning penalty or concerning sin, God pre-elected to the heavenly court all those whom he willed to have, both men and angels, in certain and determinate degrees. Therefore he predestined the soul of Christ before he foresaw anything concerning the sin of the human race. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, the Son of God would have been incarnate.

It is confirmed first. Because no one is predestined only because another was foreseen to fall. Therefore this is much more true of the soul of Christ.

It is confirmed secondly. Because among the predestined, to whom God wills glory in an ordered way, he seems first to will glory to him whom he wills to be nearer to the end. But it is certain that he wills the soul of Christ to be nearer to the end than the souls of other men.

3. Secondly³⁴. The redemption, or the glory of the souls to be redeemed, is not so great a good as is the glory of the soul of Christ. Therefore it does not seem that the incarnation of Christ is ordered to it.

It is confirmed. Because it is not likely that so great a good among beings, and so supreme, was only occasioned on account of a lesser good.

XVII. For the clarity of this difficulty, it must be considered first, from what was said above in the First Book,³⁵ that in the volition of the divine will no order is found on the part of the act of willing itself: since by one single act the divine will is borne toward all willed things and simultaneously, so that it is not borne into this willed thing prior to that one, but all things that God wills, He wills from eternity. And therefore it cannot be said, as far as concerns the divine will, that one willed thing is the cause of willing another. Yet along with the fact that God willed all things willed by Him simultaneously and eternally, it remains true that among His willed things He willed there to be a certain order, namely in such a way that one is ordered to another, and one is for the sake of another: just as in nature He willed the parts of the universe to be ordered to the good and perfection of the universe itself, and among those parts that those which are more imperfect be ordered to the more perfect; similarly in spiritual goods He willed grace to be ordered to glory.

It must be considered secondly that, although there is not any order in the divine volition on the part of the act of willing itself, our intellect can nevertheless understand the divine volition, according as it terminates at diverse things, with a certain order, as if one thing were willed prior to another, according as our will is borne into many things in an orderly way, by willing one prior to another. And that order is called an order of reason: because it is an order according to our mode of considering. Hence in no way is any order of nature to be conceded in the divine volition on the part of the act of willing according as it is ordered to diverse things, such that on the part of the act, according as it is in itself, one thing is conceded to be willed prior to another. But an order of reason can well be conceded there, insofar as our intellect considers the divine will first as terminating at one thing, then as terminating at another, proportionally to the things themselves, namely according as one thing is prior and another posterior, and according as an order has been placed by the divine will in the willed things.

It must be considered thirdly, as is the mind of St. Thomas, Tertia, q. 1, a. 3; and III Sent., d. 1,³⁶ that, since those things which proceed from the sole will of God above every due of the creature (of which kind is the Incarnation of the Son of God, and the reason for it on the part of the thing willed) do not become known to us except insofar as they are handed down in Sacred Scripture: we cannot demonstrate by necessary reason that the Son of God was incarnate solely for the redemption of the human race. Yet nevertheless, because in Sacred Scripture the reason for the Incarnation is everywhere assigned to the sin of the first man, it can suitably be said that such an Incarnation was ordered by God as a remedy for sin, such that, if man had not sinned, there would not have been an Incarnation; although it could also have been done otherwise by God.

XVIII. Hence to the arguments of Scotus, insofar as they prove that it was not fitting that the Son of God assumed human flesh solely for the restoration of the human race, and that He would have been incarnate even if man had not sinned: he answers.

To the first,³⁷ the assumption is denied. Because in the divine volition there is no priority or posteriority ex natura rei outside the intellect; nor can several instances of nature be given outside the intellect in one of which God wills one thing, and in another wills another; or in which He wills one thing prior to foreseeing another; since all divine acts are eternal and are really the same as the divine essence. And thus it is not true that God, prior by nature to foreseeing concerning the sinner with respect to punishment or with respect to sin, pre-elected to the heavenly court whom He willed. Rather simultaneously, on the part of the thing, He predestined the elect; and decreed that the Incarnation of His Son should be the cause of human salvation; and that the Son Himself should take on human flesh on account of the salvation of the human race.

2. If it is said that at least prior according to reason, or according to our mode of understanding, He predestined all the elect before He foresaw anything concerning sin or the remedy of sin: — he answers that this is also false. Because according as it becomes known to us from Sacred Scripture, we must first understand that God foresaw the fall of the human race, and willed its remedy; then that He willed to bring a remedy to it through the Incarnation of His Son. And consequently we must first understand in God the foreknowledge of the sin of Adam, prior to the predestination of the soul of Christ. Hence St. Thomas, Tertia, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4, says that, because predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things, God predestined the work of the Incarnation as a remedy for human sin.

3. To the first confirmation, it is evident through the same point. For the assumption is false.

To the second confirmation it is said in the same way: that the assumption is false, whether it is understood of priority of nature or of priority of reason, on the part of the act of willing. — If, however, it is understood of the order maintaining itself on the part of the willed things: because that order implies nothing other than that one willed thing is prior to another, and that one is ordered to the other, thus the glory of the soul of Christ can be called prior to human glory and salvation. For in the genus of formal cause it is prior, because that which is more perfect is compared to that which is more imperfect in the same order as formal: but it is agreed that the glory of the soul of Christ is more perfect than the glory of other souls. — Similarly it is prior according to the ratio of final cause: insofar as from the glory and salvation of men, which men obtain through the Incarnation, greater glory redounds to the soul of Christ. For in one way that is called the end of another, to which some utility proceeds from it: as is evident through St. Thomas, II Sent., d. 1, q. II, a. 3. — It is said thirdly, that the consideration of the glory of the soul of Christ, to which God preordained it, is one thing: and that of the Incarnation of the Son of God is another. For although the glory of the soul of Christ is prior to the glory and salvation of other men in the genus of formal and final cause, as was said; nevertheless the Incarnation itself is posterior to the salvation of men in the genus of final cause, because it was done on account of the salvation of men.

XIX. To the second³⁸ it is said first, that we do not say that the glory of the soul of Christ is ordered to human salvation as to an end: but we say that the Incarnation of Christ itself is ordered to the salvation of the human race; while human salvation, as caused through Christ, is ordered to the glory and exaltation of Christ.

It is said secondly, speaking of the Incarnation in order to human salvation, that although the Incarnation itself, insofar as it is terminated at the union in the divine person, is a greater good than the salvation of the human race, as St. Thomas seems to hold, Prima, q. xx, a. 4, ad 1; and III Sent., d. xxxii, a. 4, qu.ª 4, it is nevertheless not unfitting that it be ordered to human salvation as to a proximate and partial end. For a greater good can in this way be ordered to a lesser good: especially when from that ordering some excellence results for the greater good; just as Christ through His Incarnation and the things that He suffered attained that He should be the universal cause of human salvation, and received the greatest exaltation from this. Hence to the argument, the consequence is denied.

To the confirmation it is similarly said that it is not unfitting for so great a good as is the Incarnation of the Son of God to be occasioned on account of a lesser good as on account of a proximate and secondary end; but to be ordered to something higher as to a principal end, namely to the fulfillment and perfection of the universe, and to the fuller manifestation of the divine goodness.