Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

I. As to the second point, St. Thomas shows that the mystery of the Incarnation was most fitting,¹ saying that to him who considers it piously ever more and more admirable reasons for this mystery are made manifest. Now he adds, to him who considers it piously: because for him who has not considered this kind of mystery with piety and reverence, but with arrogance, deeming impossible everything for which he did not see necessary reasons, it is difficult even to find probable reasons. But he who will have wished to consider this with reverence and humility can easily be enlightened: and many probable reasons for the fittingness of the Incarnation can be shown to him.

1. St. Thomas therefore proves the fittingness of the Incarnation from this: that it was the most effective help for man tending toward beatitude.

It is proved first thus. By this man's hope of beatitude is raised up. Therefore it was most fitting that God should assume human nature.

The assumption is explained. Because it could seem to someone that, on account of the distance of the natures, the human intellect could never be immediately united to the divine essence itself as an intellect to an intelligible object, in which man's perfect beatitude consists; and so man would grow lukewarm in the pursuit of beatitude, held back by despair itself. But the opposite of this is most evidently demonstrated by the fact that God willed to unite human nature to Himself in person.

It is confirmed by a sign. Because after the incarnation of Christ men began to aspire more to heavenly beatitude: according to what is said in John x, I came etc.

II. Second. By this the impediments to attaining beatitude are taken away from man. Therefore etc.

The assumption is proved. From ignorance of his own dignity man could be impeded from participation in true beatitude. But God most fittingly showed man's dignity through the Incarnation. Therefore etc.

The major premise is explained. Because, since man's perfect beatitude consists in the enjoyment of God alone, whoever finally clings to those things which are below God is impeded from participation in true beatitude. But from ignorance of the dignity of his nature man could be led to cling to the things which exist below God as to an end. A sign of this is that some, considering themselves according to their corporeal and sentient nature, seek a certain bestial beatitude in bodily things and the delights of the flesh. Others indeed, considering the excellence of certain things over men as to some respects, bound themselves to their worship: worshipping the world and its parts, on account of the magnitude of their quantity and the length of time; but spiritual substances as exceeding man in immortality and keenness of intellect, thinking that beatitude is to be sought in them.

But the minor premise is explained. Because according to the order of the end, nothing is higher than man except God alone, in whom man's perfect beatitude consists. And God most fittingly showed this dignity of man, namely that he is to be beatified in the immediate vision of God, by the fact that He Himself immediately assumed human nature.

This reason is confirmed by a sign. Because from the incarnation of God we see this spectacle, that a great part of men, having set aside the worship of any creatures whatsoever, having also spurned all bodily things, gave themselves to worshipping God alone, in whom alone they expect the fulfillment of beatitude: according to what the Apostle admonishes, Coloss. III, Seek the things that are above etc.

Note that St. Thomas sometimes says that man's perfect beatitude consists in the immediate vision of God, but sometimes in the enjoyment of God alone, because in the present passage he makes no difference between the beatific vision and enjoyment. For he does not take vision as it is distinguished from enjoyment; nor enjoyment as it is separated from vision: but so that by the name of divine vision enjoyment is comprehended, as a property naturally accompanying it; but by the name of enjoyment vision is comprehended, as that which necessarily precedes it.

2. Concerning what is said, that according to the order of the end nothing is higher than man except God alone, it must first be considered that something is said to be higher than another according to the order of the end, when either it is ordered to a higher end, or it itself is its end. And therefore, because no creature is ordered to a higher end than man, whose end and beatitude consist in God; nor is any creature the end and beatific object of man: man is exceeded by no creature as to the order of the end. God, however, is said to exceed man according to this order, not because He Himself is ordered to a higher beatific object, since even God is blessed by Himself: but because He Himself is the end and beatific object of man and of every intellectual nature.

III. Third. The cognition by which man is directed to the ultimate end must be most certain, since it is the principle of all things which are ordered to the end: for even the naturally known principles are most certain. Therefore faith too. But to attain perfect certainty about the truth of faith, man must be instructed by God Himself made man. Therefore etc.

The first consequence is proved. Because, since man's perfect beatitude consists in that cognition of God which exceeds every created intellect, it was necessary that there be in man some foretaste of it, by which he would be directed to the end. This indeed is done through faith.

But the assumed minor premise is proved. For that man must be instructed about the truth of faith by God is proved because, since what is held about God through faith is not known to man per se, in that it exceeds the capacity of the human intellect, it was necessary that this be manifested through him to whom it is first known per se: for the most certain cognition of something cannot exist unless either that thing is known per se, or it is resolved into those things which are known per se. But God is the first principle, to whom this is naturally known per se, and from whom it becomes known to all: — although to all who see the divine essence it is in a certain way known per se. Therefore, etc. — But that this kind of certainty of faith must be made for us by God made man, he proves because thus man received divine instruction according to the human manner.

The same minor premise is confirmed by the authority of John I, No one has seen God etc.; and John XVIII, For this I was born etc.

The reason is confirmed by a sign. Because we see that, after the incarnation of Christ, men were instructed more evidently and more certainly in divine cognition: according to that of Isaiah XI, The earth shall be filled etc.

2. Concerning what is said, that what we here hold about God through faith is in a certain way known per se to all who see the divine essence, it must be considered that something can be said to be known per se to someone in two ways. In one way, from this alone that it is evident to him, and does not need any proposition by which he comes through discourse into cognition of it. In another way, because it is evident to him even naturally, that is, from natural cognition: and this properly and perfectly is said to be known per se, because it is known per se not only from the evidence of the thing known, but also from the natural disposition of the one knowing. To the blessed, therefore, what we hold about God through faith is said to be known per se in the first way only, not however in the second way: for although they know it evidently and clearly, this nevertheless is not from their natural habit, but from the divine essence, in which they see all things, clearly representing it. And therefore it is not said to be known to them per se simply, but in a certain way. To God, however, who most perfectly knows it by His natural cognition, it is said to be known per se simply and wholly.

IV. Fourth. It was necessary that man tending to perfect beatitude be led to divine love. But nothing leads us to the love of someone as much as the experience of his love toward us. But the love of God toward men could in no way be shown to men more effectively than by the fact that He willed to be united to man in person: since it is proper to love to unite the lover with the beloved as much as is possible. Therefore etc.

The assumption is proved. Because it was necessary that man's affection be disposed toward the desire of divine enjoyment: since man's perfect beatitude consists in this. But the desire of the enjoyment of some thing is caused by the love of it.

2. Fifth. It was expedient that there be friendship between man and God. But this was more familiar with God made man. Then because even man is naturally a friend to man, ut sic (1). — Then because those things which are greatly unequal do not seem able to be joined in friendship. — Then because, while we know God visibly, we are drawn into the love of invisible things. Therefore etc.

Note that St. Thomas, when he had said that man is naturally a friend to man, added, ut sic: to give to understand that one man is indeed naturally a friend to man, insofar as both communicate in human nature, but nevertheless from other causes a man can be an enemy to man.

3. Sixth. Beatitude is the reward of virtue. Therefore those tending to beatitude must be firmly disposed to virtue. Therefore there must be someone of whose goodness an infallible opinion is had. Therefore it was necessary that God become incarnate.

The first consequence is well known. — The second is proved. Because we are provoked to virtue by words and examples. But the examples and words of someone lead to virtue the more effectively, the firmer an opinion of his goodness is had about him. — The third, however, is proved: because of no pure man could an infallible opinion of goodness be had, but only of God.

It is confirmed. Because He Himself, John XIII, says, An example etc.

V. Seventh. It is necessary for the human race, which abounds in sins, that a remedy against sins be applied to it. But this remedy cannot be applied except through God incarnate. Therefore etc.

The major premise is evident. Because man is impeded from beatitude by sins.

But the minor premise is proved thus. Sin brings an impediment to beatitude from three things: first, because it induces a certain inordination in the soul, leading it away from the order of the due end; second, because it offends God, from whom the reward of beatitude is expected, and sin is contrary to divine charity; third, because man, having consciousness of this offense, loses the confidence of approaching God, which is necessary for attaining beatitude. But to the first two a remedy cannot be applied except through God, who both can reduce man's will to the due order; and can remit the offense committed against Himself. To the third, however, a remedy cannot be applied unless God Himself become man. Because in order that man be freed from the consciousness of a past offense, it is necessary that he be certain of the remission of the offense. But he cannot be certain of it with certainty unless he is certified by God. Therefore etc.

This minor premise is confirmed by the authority of Matt. IX, But that you may know etc.; and of the Apostle, Hebr. IX, The blood of Christ etc.

2. For the evidence of what was said, that man offends God through sin, with the reasons there assigned, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas IV Sent., d. XIV, q. II, a. 1, quª 1 et 2, that an offense, as such, is a certain inequality, by which one has taken away from another what was owed to him. But to God there is owed by us love before all things, as to a Father and Creator. Honor also is owed, insofar as our beatitude is to be expected from Him, as from Him who has care of human acts. And both are removed through sin. For the honor due to God is taken away, which is owed to Him insofar as the reward of beatitude is expected from Him, while something is irreverently committed against His precepts. Likewise the due love and affection are taken away, insofar as man, by sinning mortally, loves something more than God. Therefore it is rightly as-

(1) The words ut sic are indeed found in the text of St. Thomas, but they are connected otherwise. For they are joined with that phrase dum visibiliter etc. This must be kept in mind while the following paragraph, Advertendum etc., is read. Cf. Text., 174, b 23.

-signed as the reason why man offends God through sin: because namely both the reward of beatitude is expected from Him, and sin is contrary to divine charity, that is, to the love by which God is loved above all things.

Note further that to be freed from the consciousness of a past offense can be understood in two ways. In one way, because man no longer remembers that he offended God. And St. Thomas does not speak here of this liberation. — In another way, because he no longer has the remorse of conscience that God is offended at him and an enemy on account of the past offense. And he speaks in this place of this liberation, when he says that in order that man be freed from the consciousness of a past offense, it is necessary that he be certain of the remission of the offense through God.

It must also be noted that when St. Thomas wills this certification of the remission of the offense² to be necessarily made by God incarnate, by the name of necessity he understands a certain fittingness, just as he very often uses it in the preceding and following passages. Whence in the conclusion he does not use the name of the necessary, but of the fitting and expedient.

VI. Lastly. From the tradition of the Church we are taught that the whole human race is infected with sin. Therefore, in order that it be freed from such a sin, it was necessary that someone satisfy: because according to the order of divine justice, sin is not remitted by God without satisfaction. But no pure man could do this: since each one is something less than the whole universality of the human race. Therefore it was necessary that there be someone who was man, to whom satisfaction would belong; and would be something above man, so that his merit would be sufficient for satisfying. Therefore for this it was necessary that God become man: because nothing is greater than man, as to the order of beatitude, except God alone; for even the angels are beatified by the same.

This reason is confirmed by the authority of John the Baptist, saying, Behold the Lamb etc.; and of the Apostle, to the Romans, saying, As sin etc.

2. Concerning what is said, that according to the order of divine justice sin is not remitted by God without satisfaction, it must be noted that St. Thomas added 'according to the order of divine justice' for this reason, to give to understand that absolutely indeed God could relax sin without satisfaction, but not according to the determination of His justice, according to which the ordinary power of God is attended to. Whence in the Third, d. xx, q. 1, a. 1³, ad 3, he says that, as far as the power of God is concerned, God could remit sin without any punishment, nor would He be unjust if He did this: but as far as it is on the part of the sinner, according to the order which God has now imposed on things, this fittingly cannot be done.

3. Concerning what was said, that a pure man could not satisfy for sin, because he is something less than the whole universality of the human race⁴, it must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas III Sent., q. alleg., a. 2; and d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, ad ult., that human nature has a certain infinity, insofar as supposits can be multiplied in it to infinity; and from this its sin is in some way infinite, as removing the good of nature, which is infinite. But any singular pure man has that nature itself with a certain limitation. And consequently his operation is limited, and it cannot be worth as much as the good of the whole nature, which is taken away through sin, so that a worthy satisfaction could be made for it. Therefore it is fittingly argued that a pure man cannot satisfy for this kind of sin because he is something less than the whole universality of the human race.

VII. But then a doubt occurs. For according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, although actual sin has a certain infinity, man nevertheless, informed by grace, can satisfy through his work, insofar as it is informed by grace: because, as such, it has a certain infinity, although not insofar as it is produced by free will. Similarly, therefore, it will be able to be said that, although through his work a pure man could not satisfy for sin insofar as it proceeds from his free will, because, as such, it proceeds from him as he is something less than the whole nature: he could nevertheless have done this from divine grace, through which his work had a certain infinity. And so it was not necessary, for satisfaction for this sin, that God become man.⁵

2. It is answered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Third Part, q. I, a. 2⁶; and IV Sent., d. xv, q. 1, a. 2; and according to the determination of Capreolus in the Fourth, d. xv⁷, that we can speak of satisfaction in two ways: namely either of perfect satisfaction in itself, and equivalent according to the rigor of justice; or of imperfect satisfaction, sufficient however according to the acceptance of him who is content with it. For the first satisfaction it is required that the goodness of the satisfactory act be equivalent in goodness to the malice of the sin; and that the one satisfying be the principal and total cause of the goodness of such an act, not however he to whom the satisfaction is made; and that he satisfy through something that is totally his own, not however of him to whom the satisfaction is to be made. — For the second satisfaction, however, it suffices that the satisfactory act be sufficient according to the acceptance of him to whom the satisfaction is made; even granted that the one satisfying is not the principal and total cause of that act; nor is such an act totally his own, but is also owed on another account to him to whom the satisfaction is to be made.

It is said, therefore, that a pure man, even with the grace of God, cannot satisfy God for the sin of the whole nature with a perfect and equivalent satisfaction, simply and in itself: because the value of the satisfactory act, in some way infinite, does not belong to the act principally and totally from the one satisfying himself, but from God moving the will to the act, and from the grace informing it. And further, whatever goodness is found in the act of a pure man is all owed to God, on account of the benefits conferred on man by God. And so that act, insofar as it is good and satisfactory, is not totally the man's who satisfies, but is also God's, who moves to such an act and through it satisfies Himself.

3. But when it is argued against this, that man through indwelling grace can satisfy for the act of mortal sin: — it is said first that this is false of perfect satisfaction: although it is true of imperfect satisfaction.

It is said second that, although for actual sin a pure man can satisfy from divine grace, according to the divine ordination; it does not however follow, the divine disposition standing, which is made known to us through Sacred Scripture, that he can satisfy for original sin. Because although grace gives to the act of a pure man a certain infinity with respect to the personal good, it does not however elevate that act itself so that it equals the good of the whole nature lost through sin.

VIII. From these things it is evident how vain are the arguments of Scotus, IV Sent., d. xv, q. 1⁸, arguing that from the absolute power of God man could satisfy God for sin. For it is evident that this is false of perfect satisfaction, and sufficient by the adequation or excess of the amends to the offense: since man owes God everything that he has; and that is more God's than the man's own; and moreover he cannot be the principal cause of this satisfaction, which is made through grace; although he can satisfy imperfectly, or according to the acceptance of divine mercy relaxing that which it could exact from the rigor of justice.

2. But if it is argued from this that it also follows that it was not necessary that God become man in order to satisfy for the sin of human nature: because, although man cannot entirely perfectly satisfy for sin, aided nevertheless by divine grace he could satisfy according to God's acceptance; just as it is not necessary that God become man in order to satisfy for the actual sin of some sinning man, because that man himself, aided by divine grace, can satisfy: — it is answered by denying the consequence. Because even if man could in some way satisfy through divine grace, the incarnation of God was nevertheless useful and fitting, in order that man be more glorious, perfectly satisfying for his own sin. For it is more glorious to satisfy fully and by the equivalent absolutely, which was done by man through the incarnation of the Son of God, than only imperfectly and according to the acceptance of him to whom satisfaction is made. — But that this is not done for the actual sin of one man as such, is because the good of nature outweighs the good of one individual; and it is greater extensively; and more diligent care is to be applied in the reparation of the whole human race than in the reparation of one single man.