Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

For the solution of these arguments,¹ St. Thomas first premises a certain necessary point; secondly, he responds to each one individually.²

I. He premises, therefore, that certain signs of original sin plausibly appear in the human race: namely, both bodily penalties, such as death and other things ordered toward it, for instance hunger, thirst, and the like; and spiritual penalties, such as the weakness of reason, from which it happens that it attains to the knowledge of truth with difficulty and falls easily into error, and cannot completely overcome bestial appetites.

If it should perhaps be said that defects of this kind are not penal, but natural, arising from the necessity of matter—because the human body is composed of contraries; and the sensible appetite is moved toward pleasurable things according to sense, which are sometimes contrary to reason; and the possible intellect is in potency, and born to acquire intelligibles from sense:—if someone considers rightly, he will be able to judge plausibly enough, divine providence being presupposed (which adapted fitting perfectibles to individual perfections), that God joined the higher nature to the lower for this purpose, that it might have dominion over it; and that every obstacle arising from a defect of nature might be removed by His spiritual and supernatural benefit; namely, so that it is believed that the soul was joined to the body under such a condition that nothing in the body could be contrary to the soul, through which the body lives; and similarly that reason in man was so joined to the sensitive appetite and the sensitive powers that it would not be hindered by them, but would rather have dominion over them. Therefore, according to the doctrine of faith, we posit that man was in the beginning instituted in such a way that, as long as reason was subject to God, the lower powers also served it without hindrance, and the body could not be hindered from subjection to the soul, since God and His grace supplied for the defect of nature; but once reason turned away from God, the lower powers also rebelled against reason, and the body received passions contrary to life. From which it is inferred that defects of this kind, although they seem natural to man when the lower part of human nature is considered, nevertheless, when divine providence and the dignity of the higher part are considered, can be proved plausibly enough to be penal, and thus that the human race is originally subject to some sin.

It must be noted that St. Thomas says the aforesaid things can be proved plausibly enough, in order to show that those things which are held according to faith concerning original sin and its punishment are not contrary to reason, but can be proved even by some plausible reason, presupposing divine providence, which true philosophers do not deny.

It must also be noted that it is rightly said that the aforesaid effects are penal, when divine providence and the higher part are considered. For through divine providence a supernatural benefit was conferred upon the first man from his institution: but to be deprived of that which is conceded even gratuitously is penal, as is said in II Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. 1.

II. These things being presupposed, St. Thomas responds to the objections made above.

To the first,³ indeed, he says first, that it is one way in those things which belong to one individual, and another way in those things which belong to the whole nature of the species: since many men, according to Porphyry, are one man by participation in the species. For a sin that belongs to some individual or person of a man is not imputed to another as fault except to the one sinning. If, however, some sin regards the very nature of the species, it is not unfitting that it be propagated from one into another, just as the nature of the species is.

He says secondly that, since sin is a certain evil of rational nature, and evil is the privation of good, according to that good which is deprived, a sin is to be judged as belonging to the common nature or to some proper person. For actual sins, which are commonly committed by men, take away some good of the sinning person, for instance grace and the due order of the parts of the soul. Therefore they are called personal; nor, when one sins, are they imputed to another.⁴ But the sin of the first man not only stripped the one sinning of that proper and personal good, but also of the good belonging to the common nature, namely this benefit, that the lower powers were perfectly subject to reason, reason to God, and the body to the soul—which benefit is called by some original justice. Because, when reason withdrew itself through sin from subjection to God, it followed that neither were the lower powers perfectly subject to reason, nor the body to the soul, not only in the first sinner, but also in his descendants, to whom original justice was to have come together with nature. Therefore the sin of the first man was both personal, inasmuch as it deprived the first man himself of his proper good; and natural, inasmuch as it took away from him, and consequently from his descendants, the benefit conferred upon the whole of human nature.

He says thirdly, that a defect of this kind, even in others besides the first parent, has the character of fault, insofar as all men are counted as one man through participation in the common nature: because thus a sin of this kind is found to be voluntary by the will of the first parent, just as the action of the hand has the character of fault from the will of the first mover, which is reason. For in the sin of nature different men are regarded as parts of the common nature, just as in a personal sin different parts of one man are.

III. Concerning the first statement of the response, it must be noted that those things which are proper to one man and one individual belong to him as he is distinguished from other individuals and persons: because, as St. Thomas says, one man is personally distinguished from another. But those things which follow upon the common nature belong to an individual, not according as he is personally distinguished from another individual, but according as he agrees with others in nature and has unity with them. Therefore it was rightly said that it is one way in those things which belong to one individual, and another way in those things which belong to the whole nature of the species, because of the unity of all men in the common nature.

Concerning the second statement, it must be considered that the order of the parts of the soul is twofold: one habitual, according namely as the lower part is born and disposed to follow entirely the motion and command of the higher; the other is actual, when namely the lower part is actually moved according to the harmony and motion of the higher part. When therefore it is said that actual and personal sins take away the order of the parts of the soul in the sinner, it is understood not of the habitual order, because that is lost through original sin, since it belongs to nature; but of the actual order, which belongs to the person, to whom it belongs to operate. For the man who sins operates according to the inclination of the lower part not regulated by reason, although he ought to follow the order of reason.

Concerning the third statement, it must be considered, as St. Thomas excellently clarifies in De Malo, q. 4, a. 1, that a singular man can be considered in two ways: in one way, inasmuch as he is a certain singular person; in another way, inasmuch as he is part of a multitude of men which is derived through natural origin from one. In the first way, there belongs to him the act which he does by his own choice and through himself; but in the second way, there can belong to him an act which he does not do through himself, but which is done by the head of this multitude inasmuch as he is such; just as also the act which is done by the leader of a body is said in some way to belong to each one of the body. For that multitude of men thus descending from one through natural origin is considered as one man, of whom all particular men are members, and of whom Adam himself is the head and moving principle. Because therefore the gift of original justice had been given to the first man not as to a singular person, but as to the principle of the whole nature, namely so that from him through origin it might be derived to his descendants; he lost this gift by sinning, both for himself and for his posterity. And this defect has the character of fault in all who descend seminally from Adam, by reason of the voluntary sin of Adam from which it proceeded, inasmuch as each one is considered as a member of the whole multitude of men of which Adam is the head. Therefore the comparison of St. Thomas between this defect transmitted to the offspring and the action of the hand holds with respect to this, that just as the action of the hand has the character of fault inasmuch as the hand is an instrument of the man moved by the first motive principle existing in the man, namely by the will, which nevertheless is not in the hand itself; so also the defect of nature coming into this offspring through generation has the character of fault inasmuch as this begotten man is part of human nature, into which a sin of this kind came by the will of the first parent voluntarily sinning. And thus it is clear that such a sin is said to be voluntary in this man, not by his own will simpliciter, but by another's; although in some way it can be said to be voluntary by his own will, inasmuch as, since he is part of the human multitude, the will of the first man can be called the will of each one in some way, with respect to those things that pertain to nature.

IV. But concerning those things which are said here, a doubt arises. For it does not seem true that a defect of nature of this kind has the character of fault inasmuch as it is voluntary by the will of the first parent. First, because it seems to have more the character of penalty than of fault. Secondly, because it is not seen how it is voluntary by that will.

The first is shown, because the privation of original justice is a defect following from the sin of the first parent. But a defect arising from sin does not have the character of fault: whence St. Thomas, Iª IIae, q. 85, a. 5, says that the withdrawal of original justice has the character of penalty, just as also the withdrawal of grace; and he is speaking of passive withdrawal.

The second is shown, because what is beside the intention cannot be called voluntary. But it is clear that Adam, in sinning, did not intend the privation of original justice.

2. It is answered, and said first, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Disputed Questions on Evil, in the place cited above, that this privation of original justice, if it is compared to this man descending through natural origin from Adam, inasmuch as he is a particular person, in this way does not have the character of fault, but of penalty, because it is in no way voluntary: for it is willed neither directly nor indirectly by the proper will of him who is generated, since from the beginning of generation the offspring has no act of the will. But if it is compared to him inasmuch as he is a certain member and a certain part of human nature, in this way it has the character of fault: because it is voluntary by the will of the principle and head of the whole nature; for every defect found in the nature of the offspring derived from the sin of the first parent has the character of fault, if it is in a subject capable of fault, as is said in De Malo, where cited above, a. 2. What therefore St. Thomas says, that the withdrawal of original justice has the character of penalty, is understood inasmuch as it is compared to this man as he is a particular person. But here we are speaking of it inasmuch as it is compared to this man as he is part of the whole nature, and as all men are counted as one man by participation in the common nature. But it is not unfitting that a defect of nature arising in another from the sin of another should have the character of original fault inasmuch as it is in some way voluntary.

It is said secondly, that a defect of this kind is not altogether beside the intention of the first sinner. For something can be called voluntary in two ways. In one way, because it, considered in itself, is willed; and such is said to be directly intended. In another way, because it is joined of necessity to that which is willed in itself, or follows of necessity upon the voluntary act; and such is said to be intended indirectly and concomitantly. The defect of nature arising through origin, therefore, is called voluntary by the will of the first man, not indeed in the first way, as namely willed in itself; but in the second way, inasmuch as it followed of necessity, according to the divine ordination, upon his voluntary sin. Therefore, although it was beside the primary and direct intention of Adam sinning, it was nevertheless intended by him indirectly and concomitantly. And therefore also in Adam himself such a defect of nature had the character of fault: not indeed of original fault, because it was not transmitted through natural origin; but of actual fault, inasmuch as it was in some way willed through an act of the will of the sinning man; and of natural fault, inasmuch as it was a defect accompanying nature from the voluntary sin of Adam himself. Whence St. Thomas, in II Sent., d. 31,⁵ a. 1, says that the infection arising from the inordinate will of the first parent was in him after the manner of actual sin, and after the manner of natural sin; but in subsequent generations it is only as natural sin.

3. It must be further considered that from the whole course of this response it is had that there belonged to the character of original justice not only that the body should be subject to the soul and the lower powers should be subject to reason, but also that reason should be subject to God. Which is clear from the fact that, after St. Thomas said that human nature was instituted with the subjection of the lower powers to reason, of reason to God, and of the body to the soul, he subjoins that this benefit is called by some original justice. From which it is clear that he intends that the subjection of the mind to God belongs to original justice: which he also posits more expressly in other places. From this, moreover, it can be had that original justice included grace, namely as its root: because just as the subjection of the body to the soul, and of the lower powers to reason, was supernatural, namely through original justice, which was a grace gratuitously given; so also it was necessary that the subjection of reason to God be supernatural, and consequently through sanctifying grace, to which it belongs to subject the soul supernaturally to God. On account of which St. Thomas says in the First Part, q. 100, a. 1, ad 2, that the root of original justice consists in the supernatural subjection of reason to God, which is through sanctifying grace. And for this reason he concludes both there and in q. 95, a. 1, that both Adam was created in grace, and children born with original justice would have had grace.

V. But a doubt arises. For St. Thomas seems to intend, as appears manifestly from this process, that the turning away of the will of the first man from God through actual sin was the cause of the loss of original justice; and the subjection of the will to God was the cause of its preservation. But the same thing is not the cause of itself. Therefore the subjection of the will to God was not something intrinsic to original justice.

2. To this it can be answered in two ways. First, that the subjection of the will to God is not posited as the preservative cause of original justice simpliciter, but only according as it was found in the lower powers of the soul and in the body. Now: it is not unfitting for the same thing, according to the effect which it places in one part of the soul, to be the cause of the effect which it places in other parts of the soul.

Secondly, it can be answered that the subjection of the will to God is twofold, just as the turning away is also twofold: namely actual or virtual; and habitual. That subjection which is posited as preservative of original justice was actual or virtual, namely in the supposit: for as long as the resolve of such subjection had lasted, original justice would have remained. But the subjection which belonged to original justice as its first effect was habitual. Just as also the actual turning away from God was the demeritorious cause of the privation of original justice; but the habitual turning away is included in original sin, as the first effect of the privation of original justice, which is in the essence of the soul, just as original justice itself was in it.

VI. To the second argument,⁶ St. Thomas says first that, although other men were not in Adam in act, they were nevertheless in him in virtue, as in their original principle.

He says secondly, that others are not said to have sinned in him as if exercising some act; but inasmuch as they belong to his nature, which was corrupted through sin.

It must be noted from this response that someone can be said to sin in two ways: either namely because he produces an act of sin; or because he has from another a nature subject to sin. In the first way, other men are not said to sin in Adam; but indeed in the second way.

VII. To the third, he says that the sin of nature is propagated in the same way as the very nature of the species: which, although it is perfected through the rational soul, nevertheless the soul is not propagated with the semen, but only the body naturally apt for the reception of the soul.

It must be noted that the sense of this response is that, although the rational soul, which is the subject of original sin, is not propagated with the semen, that is, is not educed from potency into act by the power of the semen, nevertheless there is propagated the body proportioned to it, from whose union human nature results, on account of which human nature is said to be propagated with the semen. And thus the soul is said to be propagated from the semen, not through the effective production of it, but through the disposition of the matter fitting and proportioned to it: according to that which St. Thomas says in Iª IIae, q. 83, a. 1, ad 3, that the soul of this man was not according to seminal reason in Adam sinning as in an effective principle, but as in a dispositive principle. Whence that proposition, An accident cannot be transmitted unless the subject is transmitted, does not have truth if it is understood of effective transmission only: but it suffices that the subject be transmitted by dispositive transmission; just as also this proposition, A nature is not transmitted unless the form through which it is perfected is transmitted, does not have truth if it is understood of the effective transmission and production of the form only, but it suffices that it be dispositively transmitted.

VIII. To the fourth, the consequence is denied. Because Christ received only the matter of the human body from the first parent, but the formative power was the power of the Holy Spirit. Whence also He received human nature from Adam not as from an agent, but received it from him as from a material principle.

It must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in Iª IIae, q. 81, a. 4, and De Malo, q. 4, a. 6, that those alone contract original sin who descend from Adam through active power in generation originally derived from Adam: because such sin is not derived to descendants from the first parent except inasmuch as they are moved by him through origin. Therefore it is rightly said in this place that Christ did not contract original sin, although He received the matter of His body from the Blessed Virgin descending from Adam, because His body was not formed by the active power of the semen descending from Adam, but by the power of the Holy Spirit.

IX. To the fifth, he says first, that the aforesaid defects are transmitted through natural origin for this reason, because nature has been stripped of the help of grace, which was to be derived together with nature to descendants.

He says secondly, that this defect takes on the character of fault, because this privation proceeded from a voluntary sin. From which it is clear that defects of this kind are both culpable, by comparison to the first principle, that is, to the sin of Adam; and are natural, by comparison to nature already stripped, according to that of Ephesians 2: We were by nature children of wrath.

It must be noted that St. Thomas intends to deny that proposition, What is natural to someone (in the manner to be explained below)⁷ is not sin in him. For what is natural can have the character of fault inasmuch as it arises from the voluntary sin of someone from whom nature, stripped of supernatural help, has its origin in another.

It must also be noted from this response that nature can be considered in two ways. Namely, according to itself: and thus the defects which are in nature are in no way culpable, but only natural. And as from the voluntary sin of the first parent they follow upon nature stripped of the aforesaid help, which prohibited defects of this kind: and thus they are culpable, although they are also natural.

X. To the sixth, granting the response given, it is denied, first, that the defect of origin does not arise from the defect of some principle: namely of the gratuitous gift conferred upon nature in its institution.

He says secondly, that this gift was in a certain way natural: not as if caused from the principles of nature; but because it had been so given to man that it would be propagated together with nature, that is, by the power of the semen it would come to the offspring. And therefore the origin is corrupted from the defect of a principle that is in some way natural, although not natural as caused from the principles of nature.

It must be noted that St. Thomas intends this distinction to be understood: namely, that "natural" is said in two ways. In one way, that which is caused from the principles of nature; and thus origin is not vitiated by the vice of original sin from a defect of a natural principle. In another way, because it is propagated together with nature; and thus origin is said to be vitiated on account of the defect of a natural principle.

It must be noted secondly that original justice was in some way in the seed of Adam before he sinned, inasmuch as it possessed a power that was in some way causative of that justice together with nature, whenever it should issue from him. Therefore, once the said justice was withdrawn from nature through the sin of Adam, it can be said that in the seed there is a defect of a certain principle through which origin is vitiated, and nature comes forth subject to sin.

XI. To the seventh, it is clear through the same thing. For the assumption is true concerning that which comes forth from a defect of a natural principle, that is, one pertaining to the nature of the species; but not concerning that which comes forth from a defect of a natural principle, that is, one superadded to the principle of the species, namely to the rational soul to be transfused together with the species.

To the eighth, he says that the assumption is true speaking of the vice of actual fault, which comes forth from the will of an individual person (understand: inasmuch as he is an individual), since the act of the generative power does not obey reason or the will. But it is not true concerning the vice of original fault, which pertains to nature, since even the acts of the generative power are called natural.

It must be noted that original fault is said to be in the act of the generative power, not indeed formally or subjectively, but virtually only, in the way in which it is also said to be in the seed. But for this it is not required that an act of this kind obey reason; rather, it suffices that it be an act of nature and causative of it, just as original fault itself is a vice of nature.

To the ninth, he says that, although the good of nature that pertains to the species of nature is not taken away from man through a sin of this kind, nonetheless the good of nature superadded through grace could be taken away, as has been said.

To the tenth, he says that, since privation and form correspond to each other, just as the gift bestowed upon nature, although it did not pertain to the character of the species, was nevertheless to be derived from the first man into the whole species by divine grace; so the sin through which that good is deprived is derived through the whole species.

From this response St. Thomas intends to deny this proposition: In those things that do not pertain to the character of the species, the son need not be assimilated to the parents. For it is false when something is given to the parent as to be derived into the sons, or when it is the privation of that which was to be derived into the sons.

XII. To the eleventh, he says that, although someone is cleansed through the sacraments from original sin inasmuch as it is fault—which is to be personally freed from such sin—and original sin is not in the begetter inasmuch as he is a certain person, and it may also happen that there is no sin in the act of generation: nevertheless nature is not totally healed. And on that account such sin remains in the begetter inasmuch as he is a natural principle of generation, and in the act of generation; and through this act, which is an act of nature, it is transfused into posterity.

2. For the clarity of this response, it must be considered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. lxxxi, a. 3, ad 2; De Malo, q. iv, a. 6, ad 4; and II Sent., d. xxxii, q. 1, a. 1, that, since original sin is opposed to original justice, and the latter brings about the subjection of the higher part of the soul to God, of the lower powers to the higher part, and of the body to the soul; all these rectitudes and subjections are taken away through original sin. Hence the formal element in original sin is the privation of the rectitude of the higher part toward God; and from this it has the character of fault, which is opposed to the rectitude of the will. But the material element, as will be explained below, ⁸ is concupiscence, or the fomes, or an aptitude for evil. Through baptism, therefore, original sin is removed as to that which is formal in it: namely, as to the very inordinateness of the will, or the privation of rectitude in the will, from which a defect of this kind has the character of original fault, and from which it has the power to infect the person with the stain of fault. But it is not removed as to concupiscence or the fomes. Therefore it is well said here that through the sacraments man is cleansed from original sin personally, and so that it is not imputed to him for punishment, but nature is not totally healed: namely, because the infection remains in the lower parts of the soul, though not in the higher part. And because man does not generate according to the higher part of the soul, but according to the lower, it is therefore well said that according to the act of generation, which is an act of nature from such a begetter to whom original sin has been remitted in the aforesaid manner, the said sin is transmitted into posterity.

It must also be noted that St. Thomas does not say that nature is simply not healed through the sacraments, but that it is not altogether healed: because, as is clear from the aforesaid places, especially II Sent., that disposition toward evil which is called concupiscence or the fomes is indeed taken away in a certain manner through baptism, inasmuch as it is diminished through grace, grace itself inclining in the contrary direction to that toward which the fomes disposed; yet it is not taken away totally, since it follows the condition of nature.

XIII. But a twofold doubt occurs. The first is because St. Thomas in De Malo, in the question cited, ⁹ ad 10, seems to hold that after baptism concupiscence indeed remains, yet not with the lack of original justice; from which it follows that in no way does original sin remain after baptism; for where original justice is, there original sin is not.

The second doubt is because it does not seem evident how a vice of nature under the aspect of fault can be transmitted by the begetter into the offspring if in the begetter himself it is not under the aspect of fault, since there is no vice in the nature of the begotten except on account of a vice of the nature of the begetter. For the effect does not exceed its cause.

2. To the first, it is said that we can speak of original justice in two ways. In one way, universally: namely, both as to the effect by which it perfects the higher part of the soul, and as to the effect by which it perfects all the other parts. In another way, only as it perfects the higher part of the soul: in which way original justice can also be said absolutely to be in man, because from the ordination in that higher part there follows ordination in the other, lower parts. Therefore, the statement of St. Thomas is not to be understood of the lack of original justice in the first way, but of the lack of it in the second way. For concupiscence remains, which denotes the lack of original justice as it perfected the lower parts; but it does not remain with the lack of original justice as it perfects the higher part, since through baptism grace is restored, through which the higher part of the soul is joined to God; and thus original justice is restored as to that effect, although it is not restored according to its essence. Hence in the Prima Secundae St. Thomas says ¹⁰ that after baptism original sin remains in act, but passes away in guilt: that is, it remains as to concupiscence, which is the material element in original sin; but it does not remain as to the privation of original justice as it perfects the higher part of the soul, which is the formal element, from which it has the property that punishment is due to it.

3. To the second, it is answered that there is no absurdity in a defect of nature not having the character of fault in the baptized person but only of punishment, and yet this defect being transfused into the offspring under the character of fault: because, as St. Thomas says in De Malo, where cited above, ¹¹ ad 7, and II Sent., d. xxxi, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4, it is not absurd that punishment should be the cause of fault, not indeed inasmuch as it is such, but inasmuch as it is caused by fault; for the power of the cause remains in the effect.

When, however, it is said that the effect does not exceed its cause: it is said, first, that this is false of an instrumental cause.

It is said, secondly, that this effect does not exceed its cause. Because what the vice of nature has in the begotten formally, the vice of nature has in the begetter virtually.

XIV. To the twelfth, he says that the first man could not satisfy for the whole of nature, nor restore the good of nature, through his own act: because his actual sin passed over into nature, inasmuch as nature itself through such a sin was destitute of the benefit bestowed upon it, and once destitute of this, his act was simply natural. But he could only satisfy to some degree for that which pertained to his own person.

2. It must be noted first, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Third, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, to the last objection, that since the good of nature instituted by God cannot be restored unless it is once again constituted under the benefit bestowed upon it from its institution; and this cannot take place except through an act having something of supernatural power, because such a benefit would be supernatural: where the act was merely natural, having namely nothing of supernatural power, nature could not be restored through an act of this kind; since through an act entirely natural nature cannot be elevated above the condition of its nature, but this belongs to the Creator of nature, to whom it also belongs to order the grade of natures. Therefore St. Thomas well shows that the first man could not restore the good of nature through his own act: because, since nature through the sin of the first man was destitute of the supernatural benefit, his act was simply natural.

It must be noted secondly that through a personal act the first man could not satisfy for the sin of human nature: because, as is touched upon below, ¹² and in the Tertia, q. 1, a. 2, as well as III Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, ad 6, a pure man is something less than the whole totality of the human race. But he could well satisfy for his own sin, inasmuch as it pertained to his person; yet not through himself fully, but only with the help of grace. Therefore it is well said here that he could satisfy to some degree for that which pertained to his own person.

It must also be noted that that proof of the consequence—namely, that good is more powerful in acting than evil—is not efficacious: because we do not say that the sin of Adam caused sin in others by way of efficiency, but by way of demerit. For through sin Adam demerited being deprived of original justice both for himself and for others, and thus that his act, namely as coming forth from nature, should remain entirely natural.

XV. To the last, he denies the consequence. Because, since the sins of subsequent parents find nature destitute of the benefit originally granted to it, there does not follow from them any defect that is propagated into posterity, but only one that infects the person of the sinner.

It must be noted that the response—as is also more clearly shown in Ia IIae, q. lxxxi, a. 2, and De Malo, q. iv, a. 8—tends to this: that the rationale is not the same concerning the sin of Adam and concerning the sins of proximate parents. Because through the sin of Adam nature was deprived of that which was to be transmitted into posterity; and therefore through an act of nature his sin was transmitted to posterity. But through the actual sins of proximate parents nature is not infected in any way, but is already previously infected. Therefore it does not follow that their sins are transmitted into posterity.

XVI. From these things St. Thomas concludes against the Pelagians that it is neither unfitting nor contrary to reason that original sin is in human beings.

Furthermore, because it was presupposed above ¹³ that original sin consists in the privation of original justice and includes concupiscence; lest from ignorance of the quid est of original sin the things that were handed down above should be less clear: we must see what we understand by the formal element and what by the material element of original sin.

All Thomists indeed agree in this: that two things are included in original sin, namely, one formal, which is the privation of original justice; and the other material, which is concupiscence; for St. Thomas expressly posits that these pertain to such a sin in the Prima Secundae, in the Disputed Questions on Evil, and in II Sent. ¹⁴ But in the explanation of these things they proceed by diverse paths.

2. For some say that by the privation of original justice is understood both the privation of that supernatural gift which is properly called original justice and the privation of subjection to God, which is the first effect of such a gift; but that privation belongs primarily to the formal element of original sin, while the latter belongs to it secondarily. By concupiscence, however, they say is understood every other inordinateness both of the will and of the other powers of the soul.

The first they take from the fact that St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. lxxxii, a. 3, speaking of such a formal element, says that the privation of original justice, through which the will was subject to God, is the formal element; and he adds that every other inordinateness of the powers of the soul is related as the material element. For from these things St. Thomas seems to intend that both the privation of original justice and the inordinateness of the will, which is the privation of the subjection of the will to God, pertain to the formal element. — But the second they take from the fact that in the same place it is added, not indeed that every inordinateness of the other powers of the soul is as the material element, but absolutely that every other inordinateness of the powers of the soul, including in this also a certain inordinateness of the will, namely the turning of the will to evil; which indeed absolutely pertains to the material element, but nonetheless among the material elements of original sin is related as formal. — They also add that original sin is not a pure privation of original justice, but is something positive, namely a certain quality and habit. But this they take from the words of St. Thomas saying, Ia IIae, in the question cited, a. 1, and ad 1, that it is a habit, and that beyond privation it has something positively, just as bodily sickness also does.

3. Capreolus, however, in the Second Book, d. xxx, ¹⁵ seems to understand by the privation of original justice the privation of that gratuitous gift, and every inordinateness in the will consequent upon it; but by concupiscence the inordinateness in all the powers of the soul other than the will. He also seems to hold that concupiscence does not denote any habit or any quality inclining to evil, but either a privation or a certain relation.

XVII. But it seems to me that the opinion of Capreolus is more in accordance with the mind of St. Thomas. As regards indeed the formal element of original sin, because everywhere St. Thomas distinguishes the will from the other powers of the soul, as the mover from the moved; and he says on this account that what pertains to the will is, as it were, formal; from which he concludes that, since the privation of original justice pertains to the will—understand: not formally and primarily, but inasmuch as the first effect of original justice was in the will—it is as the formal element in original sin. For from these things it is held that by the privation of original justice is understood the privation of that gratuitous gift existing formally in the essence of the soul, and every inordinateness of the will proceeding from it.

As regards the material element also, it is clear that only the inordinateness of the powers other than the will pertains to it: since St. Thomas says that, since on the part of the lower powers moved by the will there is a proneness to appetize inordinately, which can be called concupiscence, concupiscence itself is as the material element. For from this it is clear, since concupiscence alone is posited as the material element in original sin, that only the inordinateness of the lower powers pertains to such a material element.

That concupiscence, according as it is the material element of original sin, also does not denote a quality or anything positive and absolute is clear because in De Malo, q. iv, a. 2, ad 4, St. Thomas says that this concupiscence is habitual concupiscence taken through the removal of the bridle of original justice. And he holds the same both in II Sent. and in the Prima Secundae. ¹⁶

2. It must be said, therefore, that original sin denotes two things: namely, something formal, from which it has its species; and something material, which namely holds the place of matter. The formal element indeed is the privation of original justice inasmuch as it perfected the higher part of the soul: that is, the privation of that supernatural gift existing in the essence of the soul, and the privation of the subjection of the will to God, which was the first effect of that gift.

The material element, however, is the very natural inclination of the lower powers of the soul, proceeding from the privation of original justice—which regulated the lower powers of the soul lest they be borne inordinately toward their objects—together with a certain relation of reason to the sin of the first parent: for neither the privation of original justice nor the inordinateness of the lower powers has the character of fault except inasmuch as it has dependence on the actual sin of the first parent. Likewise also with a relation to appetizing inordinately: which can indeed be called a habit, as being a certain aptitude for inordinate acts. So that concupiscence, as we speak of it here, adds nothing over and above the natural inclinations of the lower powers of the soul except the said privation of original justice as a cause, and a concomitant relation.

3. But what others adduce for the confirmation of their opinion ¹⁷ does not help. For from the fact that St. Thomas says that the formal element in original sin is the privation of original justice, through which the will was subject to God, he does not infer that only that inordinateness of the will which is the privation of due subjection to God is the formal element, to the exclusion of the inordinateness which is through the turning of the will to a created good; but that inordinateness includes the latter, just as also the perfect subjection of the will to God through original justice included the turning of the will to God. And therefore through that manner of speaking St. Thomas intends to hold that the privation of original justice is the formal element in original sin, not as original justice was in all the powers of the soul through its effect, but as its effect was in the higher part of the soul, perfectly subjecting the will itself to God.

From the fact also that St. Thomas adds that every other inordinateness of the powers of the soul pertains to the material element, it is not held that some inordinateness of the will also pertains to the material element of original sin. For that statement is understood of the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul. Which is clear because, explaining more fully what he had said, he immediately adds: Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul can be called by the common name concupiscence. And therefore original sin materially indeed is concupiscence, but formally it is the defect of original justice. From which he gives it to be understood that by every other inordinateness of the powers of the soul he understood the inordinateness existing in the other powers of the soul, but not that which is in the will, which he had said pertained to the formal element.

What is further adduced to show that original sin is a quality superadded to the powers of the soul does not convince. Because St. Thomas there takes "habit" not for a quality superadded to a power, as he himself in the same place explains, but for an inordinate disposition of nature, which is called a certain aptitude for concupiscence. Now this aptitude is nothing other than the very natural disposition of the lower powers to resist reason when not subjected to the bridle of original justice, and consequently lacking the order that they ought to have had from the first institution of nature. Hence the comparison of original sin to bodily sickness is made ¹⁸ as to this: that just as, upon the dissolution of the harmony that existed among the parts of the soul from the removal of original justice, there follows the languor of the soul and inordinateness in its powers; so, upon the dissolution of the harmony of the humors in the body through the removal of health keeping them in order, there follows the sickness of the body. And just as sickness denotes something positive, so also original sin denotes something positive, namely concupiscence itself, which denotes the very powers of the soul with a certain privation and relation in the manner expounded. But not as to this: that, just as sickness denotes a certain positive quality superadded to the humors, so also original sin denotes a certain positive quality superadded to the powers of the soul.