Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

After St. Thomas has shown that it is not impossible what the Catholic faith teaches about the Incarnation of the Son of God, he next intends to show that it was also fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature ¹. Concerning this he does two things. For since the Apostle in Rom. v seems to assign the reason for this fittingness to original sin, which passed into all, he first treats of original sin; secondly, of the fittingness of the Incarnation, ch. LIII. Concerning the first he does two things: first, against the Pelagian heretics denying original sin, he shows that men are born with original sin; secondly, he removes certain objections, in the following chapter. But it should be noted, so that the meaning of the name of original sin may be known (for the question of its reality will be treated below ²), that by the name original sin we understand a certain defect of nature, having the character of guilt, which we say a man contracts from his origin and generation; on account of which it is called original sin, as being, namely, contracted from the very origin of man. I. St. Thomas therefore proves that all men are born with sin of this kind. And he argues first ³ thus. In whatsoever there is found the necessity of dying, it is necessary that some guilt be found. But this necessity is found in every man from the beginning of his birth: hence some even die soon after birth. Therefore there is some sin in them. Not, however, actual sin: because children do not have the use of free choice. Therefore it is transmitted through origin. The major premise is proved. Death, and the necessity of dying, was inflicted on man for sin. But a punishment is not inflicted except for guilt. Therefore etc. — The major premise is proved. Because it is said in Gen. II: In whatever day you eat of it, you will die the death: which is understood, that is, you shall be bound to the necessity of death. But this would be said in vain if man had the necessity of dying from the institution of his nature.

Since, therefore, St. Thomas intends that man did not have the necessity of dying from the institution of his nature, but incurred it from sin, the institution of nature is taken in the second way. For as he declares below ⁴, although man has the necessity of dying from the condition of his body, yet He created him with the gift of original justice, through which he was freed from a necessity of dying of this kind.

II. It should also be noted from this procedure of St. Thomas that the necessity of dying is posited as the punishment of the sin of the first parent and of the original sin transfused into us, not, however, as the punishment of the necessity of having sin; and that where this punishment is found, sin must be found. Therefore those who say that original sin is so proportioned to death that only the necessity of dying corresponds to the necessity of having sin; and that just as it does not pertain to the faith whether individuals actually die, or whether someone by divine disposition does not die, so it does not pertain to the faith whether someone, by a special prerogative of grace, does not actually incur original sin; do not seem to interpret well the position of St. Thomas. For these men are asked: — What corresponds to original sin existing in a man as its punishment: namely, actual death, or the necessity of dying? If it is said that it is actual death: it follows that in all who actually die there is original sin; and so it could not be said to be in accordance with the faith that someone dies and is without original sin; which, however, these men must necessarily concede. And besides, this seems to be against the mind of St. Thomas, who both here; in I IIᵃᵉ, q. lxxxi, a. 3, ad 1; and in de Malo, q. iv, a. 6, ad 2, seems to hold that the punishment of the body from original sin is first and per se the necessity of dying, that is, the obligation to death, which a man at some time reaches, unless it is relaxed for him out of divine mercy. — If it is said that it is the necessity of dying: it follows, since a punishment is not justly inflicted except for guilt, that in whomever there is a necessity of dying of this kind, there is also guilt. But all seminally propagated from Adam, even according to these men, incur the necessity of dying, in accordance with the faith. Therefore all also, in accordance with the faith, actually contract original sin.

2. Besides, this obligation of having sin cannot belong to a man except when he exists: both because that which does not exist is obligated to nothing; and because a man is said from his origin and birth to contract original sin, that is, to be subject to sin. But it is certain that a man has being from his birth. Therefore it is an obligation to have it either in that instant in which the soul is infused into the body, and in which a man is first said to be: or after. If it is an obligation to have it in that instant in which he is generated and first exists: therefore, if someone by grace does not incur it in that instant, he will not be obligated. For if I owe you a hundred gold pieces payable tomorrow, and you give them to me, and you do not wish me to return them tomorrow, I shall no longer be your debtor tomorrow. Therefore such a one, who by grace does not incur sin, does not have from his generation the debt of having sin: as these men say. — If, however, this obligation is to have sin after the instant of conception, that is, of the infusion of the soul: therefore in the first instant of his conception a man does not contract original sin, by which he is infected from his generation. Which is against St. Thomas, de Malo, q. iv, a. 6, and elsewhere; and against all others who say that in the very infusion of the soul original sin is contracted by those in whom original sin is posited.

3. Besides, St. Thomas says in IV Sent., d. xliii, a. 4, qª. 1, ad 3, that it does not follow that, if it can be held without error that some do not die, it can be held without error that some are born without original sin, although death is the punishment of original sin: because God can out of mercy relax the punishment to which one is bound on account of past guilt. Where it is evident that he is speaking of sin actually existing in a man, to which punishment is owed. Therefore it is not according to his intention that it can be held in accordance with the faith that someone is born without original sin, just as it can be held that he has not actually died.

It is confirmed. Because in Qq. Mal., q. iv, a. 6, St. Thomas holds that it is erroneous to say that some are derived from Adam seminally without original sin.

III. Whether, however, absolutely speaking, God can grant to someone descending seminally from Adam that he be conceived without original sin: — it must be said that He can: as seems to be the mind of St. Thomas in III Sent., d. iii, q. 1, a. 1 ⁵, that God could so care for the parents of the Blessed Virgin in the state of the way that they could conceive their offspring without original sin.

If, however, it is argued: — God can absolutely grant to someone that he be conceived without original sin: therefore it does not pertain to the faith whether someone is conceived in sin or without sin: — I deny the consequence. Because although God can do that, it is nevertheless not manifest to us that He does it. For in accordance with the faith it is held that Christ, through His passion and death, is the Savior and Redeemer of all, as is evident in many places of Sacred Scripture, inasmuch as, as far as in Him lay, He made satisfaction for the sins of all: which assuredly would not be true if someone were conceived without original sin. Hence, just as this consequence does not hold — God absolutely could have saved the human race without the Incarnation of the Son of God; therefore it does not pertain to the faith whether the Son of God was incarnate for the salvation of the human race or not — so neither does the aforesaid consequence hold. For where something is handed down in Sacred Scripture as done for the common rule, as it is handed down that all sinned in Adam, the opposite cannot be held without error, unless it is certain that God did otherwise in some particular case, beyond the common rule; either, I say, through Sacred Scripture, or through a determination of the Church ⁶.

By this, however, I do not intend that those holding that the Blessed Virgin was conceived even without original sin are heretics, for it has not yet been determined by the Church what pertains to the faith in this matter: but that it seemed to St. Thomas that it pertains to the faith that all seminally propagated from Adam contract original sin, and that the necessity of dying is the punishment of original sin.

IV. Secondly ⁷ it is argued thus. According to the Apostle, in Rom. v, through one man sin entered this world, and through sin death, and so it passed into all, in whom all sinned. But this is not understood in the manner of imitation. For thus sin and death would have reached only those who sin in the likeness of the first man's sinning — which the Apostle excludes by the words he adds. Therefore it entered through one man in the manner of origin.

Then because he would rather have said that sin entered the world through the devil: as is expressly said in Wis. ii: By the envy of the devil etc.

2. For the evidence of the first argument against that false interpretation, which was that of the Pelagians, as St. Thomas says on the Epistles of Paul ⁸, it must be considered that those men say that those sin by imitation of the sin of Adam who commit an actual sin similar to the sin of Adam, which was the sin of pride. Hence, since through the sin which entered the world through Adam, death also entered as its punishment, it follows, as St. Thomas very well deduces, that sin and death reach only those who imitate Adam by actual sin. But this is plainly false in the infants who die and committed no actual sin. Therefore that interpretation is not the mind of the Apostle: but rather that through the origin and generation of the man seminally propagated from Adam sin entered the world.

3. For the clarification of the second argument to the same end, which St. Thomas took from Augustine against the Pelagians⁹, it must be noted that, if sin must be said to have entered the world through someone insofar as sinners imitate him, this must be attributed to him who first sinned and imitates no one, but whom all men imitate. This, however, cannot be said of the first man: because he did not sin first among intellectual creatures, but the devil did; and he imitated the devil in sinning with an actual sin of pride. Therefore St. Thomas well says that, if the Apostle understood the entry through imitation, he would rather have said that sin entered the world through the devil than through a man.

V. Third. David says: Behold, in iniquities etc. Which cannot be understood of actual sin. Therefore etc.

Fourth. In Job xiv it is said: Who can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed? From which it is given to be understood that some uncleanness reaches the man from the uncleanness of human seed. But this must be understood of the uncleanness of sin, for which alone man is brought into judgment: since it is premised, and dost thou think it meet etc. Therefore etc.

VI. For the evidence of what is said, that in the seed there is a certain uncleanness, from which the uncleanness of sin reaches the man, it must be considered that, since original sin is a certain defect of nature, and is a certain uncleanness of it insofar as it is the privation of original justice, an uncleanness of this kind is said to be in the paternal seed in the same way in which human nature is in it. Human nature, however, is in it not in act, but in virtue, as in an instrument: because the seed is the instrument of the man generating. Therefore also original guilt, that is, an uncleanness of this kind, is not in the seed in act, but only virtually, as in an instrument.

2. It should be considered secondly, that we can understand original sin to be in the seed virtually in two ways. In one way, because in the seed there is a certain particular power directly productive of a sin of this kind, existing in it after the manner of an intention, yet not having firm and permanent being. And in this way Capreolus seems to understand it, in II Sent., d. xxxi¹⁰. — In another way we can understand that in the seed there is no particular power that is directly productive of sin: since sin itself is nothing but a certain privation and evil, and a privation does not have a cause directly productive of itself, but one that is defective; as St. Thomas shows in many places, and it was shown above¹¹. But the power that is directly productive of human nature is said, through a certain concomitance, to be productive of the sin accompanying such a nature, insofar as that power is imperfect, as not being able to produce the nature with original justice. And in this way other Thomists understand original sin to be virtually in the seed. Which also seems to me more reasonable, and more conformable to the doctrine of St. Thomas. For in 1ª IIª, q. lxxxi, a. 1, ad 3, showing how the seed can cause sin, he says that although guilt is not in the seed in act, human nature is nevertheless there in virtue, which such a guilt accompanies.

3. But against this way there seems to be what St. Thomas says in Qq. de Malo, q. iv, a. 1, ad 9. For there he holds that original sin is in the seed according to a certain intention of it. From which it seems that in his mind there is in the seed a certain power productive of sin, having intentional being.

But it is answered that it is not his mind that there is in the seed some power productive of sin: but that there is in it a certain defect and a certain privation, from which it comes about that human nature, which is produced by the power of the seed, is subject to defect and guilt. Such a defect and privation, however, is said to be in the seed a certain intention of original sin, because it is a certain likeness of it according to proportion: for it is the privation of the power productive of nature with original justice, just as original sin is the privation of original justice in nature. That this, however, is the mind of St. Thomas is evident, because in the same place he says that from the sin of the first parent his flesh was deprived of that power, so that from it seed could be cut off, through which original justice would be propagated to others. And so in the seed the defect of this power is a defect of moral corruption, and a certain intention of it.

4. It should be considered thirdly, that the seed is not only causative of the uncleanness of the man according to a certain concomitance in the manner set forth, but also has in itself a certain uncleanness: on account of which St. Thomas says that from its own uncleanness a certain uncleanness reaches the man conceived from it. This uncleanness, however, does not have the character of guilt, since the seed cannot be the subject of guilt: but the character of a certain natural defect. For Adam had been so instituted by God with original justice that he could transfuse it into others through seminal propagation: and consequently in his seed there had to be an instrumental power causative of original justice. Through sin, however, just as Adam was deprived of the supernatural power productive of original justice, so also his seed has been deprived of such a power, and remains with only the natural power befitting it from the principles of nature. Therefore the defect of such a supernatural power, which ought to have been had considering the first institution of man by God, is called the uncleanness of the seed, from which uncleanness comes to be defectively in the man conceived from it: just as from some defect of power in the seed of a leprous man the defect of leprosy happens in the offspring, as is said in II Sent., d. xxx, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4. Hence when St. Thomas says, It must be understood of the uncleanness of sin when it is said that from the uncleanness of human seed some uncleanness reaches the man conceived from the seed, this is to be referred to the uncleanness of the man conceived, not however to the uncleanness of the seed.

5. From the aforesaid it is evident that the arguments of Scotus, in the thirty-second distinction¹² of the Second Book, by which he proves that there is in the seed no morbid quality productive of sin; and also that there is not in the seed, or in the matter from which the body of the offspring is formed, a power of this kind productive of sin; do not proceed against St. Thomas: because he posits no such quality in the paternal seed, nor does he posit in the seed of the mother, or in any matter whatever, a power productive of sin in any way. And if sometime there is found in his writings the saying that the soul contracts original sin from the flesh as from an instrumental efficient cause, by the name flesh is to be understood the carnal paternal seed, and it is to be understood as we have set forth.

VII. Fifth¹³. Baptism, according to the common custom of the Church, is administered to newly born children. Therefore there is some sin in them. Not actual: because they lack the use of free choice. Therefore it is transmitted through origin. — The consequence is proved. Because since baptism, like the other sacraments, is a certain remedy against sin, if the opposite of the consequent could stand with the antecedent, it would be administered to children in vain. Which must not be said of the works of God and of the Church.

If it is said that baptism is given to infants, not that they may be cleansed from sin, but that they may reach the kingdom of God, which no one can reach without baptism, according to that saying of John, Unless a man etc.: — this is vain. Because no one is excluded from the kingdom of God except through some guilt: since the end of every rational creature is to reach beatitude, which is in the kingdom of God alone, that is, in the ordered society of those who enjoy the divine vision; and nothing falls short of its end except on account of some sin.