Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

The last thing that St. Thomas lays down¹ is that, although the human nature assumed by the Word is a creature, it cannot nevertheless be stated simply that Christ is a creature: although it can be said with this addition, "inasmuch as he is man," or, "according to human nature."

I. The first part is proved thus. In a rational nature, to be created belongs to a hypostasis or person. But in Christ there is no created person or hypostasis. Therefore, etc.

The major premise is proved. To be created belongs to that which has subsistent being: since to be created is to become, and becoming terminates at being simpliciter, which belongs to a subsistent thing, but not to a form or part, except secundum quid. But of this sort is a complete individual in the genus of substance: which in a rational nature is a hypostasis or person. Therefore, etc.

The minor is proved, because in Christ there is no other hypostasis or person than that of the Word of God, which is uncreated.

2. For the clarification of the second part of the conclusion, St. Thomas notes that, although on account of parts and accidents becoming simpliciter, which is proper to it, is not said of a subject that is an individual of the genus of substance, but only secundum quid; because sometimes they follow naturally upon the accidents or upon the parts according to their proper ratio, they are predicated simpliciter of the subject;

as "seeing" of a man on account of the eye, and the like. And thus those things which follow properly upon human nature can be stated simpliciter of Christ, as that he is man, that he is visible, etc. But that which is proper to the person is not stated of Christ on account of the human nature except with some addition, either expressed or understood.

II. For the clarification of what is said, that becoming terminates at being simpliciter, it must be noted that St. Thomas is speaking of becoming simpliciter and absolutely, namely without any addition, as when it is said absolutely, this becomes: but not of becoming this, as when it is said, a man becomes white, which is becoming secundum quid.

But a doubt arises. For there seems to be a contradiction in the words of St. Thomas. For he says that becoming is proper to an individual of the genus of substance and to a hypostasis, from which he wishes to hold that to be created is proper to an individual and hypostasis; and that to become and to be created do not belong to the human nature in Christ; and consequently that Christ cannot be called a creature. And yet he posits that the human nature assumed by the Word is a creature; and that Christ can be called a creature with this addition, inasmuch as he is man, or according to human nature. And thus he seems to say contradictory things: namely, that the human nature in Christ is a creature; and that it is not a creature.

He answers that there is no contradiction. Because when becoming and being created are said to be proper to a hypostasis or person, proper is not taken for that which belongs to someone alone, but for that which belongs to someone primarily and per se. For becoming and being created belong primarily and per se to a complete and subsistent individual, just as does being: because it is that which is, properly speaking. Secondarily, however, it belongs also to a nature and to a part. Whence the human nature in Christ is indeed called a creature secondarily, insofar as it has being in its own way after non-being. But it is not called a creature primarily and per se, as a thing subsisting per se: since it does not have being except in the divine supposit. And because in some way it is a creature, therefore it can fittingly be said that Christ, inasmuch as he is man, is a creature: because, since all conditions of human nature belong to him whether primarily or secondarily, they can be predicated of Christ with this addition, inasmuch as he is man.

III. For the evidence of the clarification of the second part of the conclusion², it must be considered, as is shown in Book Three, d. xi³, that the intention of St. Thomas is that certain things belong to parts in such a way that they are not apt to belong to the supposit and the whole, just as curliness belongs to the hair: and these St. Thomas says in this place naturally follow upon the parts according to their proper ratio. But certain things belong to parts in such a way that they are also apt to belong to the whole and to the supposit: as whiteness. From the first dispositions the whole and supposit are apt to be denominated simpliciter: for we say absolutely that a man is curly, if he has curly hair. But from the second they are not apt to be denominated the whole simpliciter, but only secundum quid and with the explication of the part: for if someone has white teeth, he is not called white simpliciter, but is well called white according to his teeth. Therefore, because becoming and being created so belong to the human nature, just as to accidents and parts, that it also belongs to the subsistent individual, nay rather is proper to it, that is, it belongs priorly and more principally to the individual and supposit; on account of the becoming and being created of the human nature, Christ cannot be said to become and be created simpliciter, but well secundum quid, and with this addition, inasmuch as he is man.

2. From these things it is clear that the foundation of this conclusion is that, if Christ were said simpliciter to be a creature, it would be signified that the supposit imported by the name Christ, which is an eternal and divine supposit, is a creature: because to be created is apt to belong primarily and principally to the supposit in created things, and not only to the form, to which it is not apt to belong except secondarily. But if Christ is said to be a creature inasmuch as he is man, it is not signified that he is a creature: but only that the human nature existing in him is a creature; just as, when it is said, a man is white according to his teeth, nothing else is signified than that his teeth are white.

IV. Whence the arguments of Scotus in Book Three, d. xi, q. 1, adduced by Capreolus, dist. xi of the Third Book of the Sentences⁴, although Scotus does not bring them directly against St. Thomas, conclude nothing against us. For when it is said first that, just as Christ is called dead, although dead signifies non-being after being; so it seems not to be repugnant to him that he be a creature, in which is imported having being after non-being: - he answers that dead, when it is said of Christ, does not import the non-being of Christ after being: because the divine supposit, for which this name Christ stands, did not lose being simpliciter through death, but being man; that is, it ceased to be of that supposit to have the relation of personal union to the human nature.

When it is said secondly, that mortal and immortal, which are said of Christ, are as formally repugnant as created and uncreated: - he answers that it is not similar concerning mortal and immortal, and concerning created and uncreated. Because created is just as apt to belong to the supposit in creatures as to the nature: nay rather more so, as was shown above⁵. Therefore, since the supposit of Christ is not created, it cannot be said that Christ is created. But mortal is a property of the animate body and of the human nature in Christ, which is in some way his part, insofar as the supposit of Christ subsists in two natures. Therefore it can be said of Christ that he is mortal: for from a property of a part the whole is apt to be denominated, just as from the curliness of the hair a man is said to be curly.

When it is said thirdly that, just as it is repugnant to the divine nature to be a creature, so also to the human nature to be a creator. And yet it is said absolutely that Christ is the Creator: - he answers that it is not similar concerning creator and creature. Because to be a creature is repugnant both to the divine nature and to its supposit: and on that account it cannot be said absolutely of a name standing for such a supposit. But to be the creator, although it is repugnant to the human nature, is nevertheless not repugnant to the divine supposit subsisting in it. Therefore it can be said absolutely of this name Christ, which stands for a supposit of this kind.

V. Durandus also argues, in Capreolus⁶, because to be begotten is becoming simpliciter, and is apt to belong as much to the supposit as to the nature. And yet Christ is said absolutely to be begotten.

But it is said first, that to be begotten is becoming simpliciter where through generation some new supposit is constituted in being: but not where an eternal supposit draws some nature to its being, as happens in Christ.

It is said secondly, that one must speak in one way of being begotten, and in another of being created. Because, although both are apt to belong as much to the supposit as to the nature, nevertheless to be begotten does not belong to the supposit except by reason of the nature, which is the formal terminus of generation. And therefore in order that the supposit be said to be begotten simpliciter, it is necessary that through generation it have a nature and form; and if it receives a nature, this suffices for it to be said to be begotten simpliciter. But to be created belongs to the supposit by reason of being itself, which is the formal terminus of creation. And therefore in order that the supposit be said to be created simpliciter, it is necessary that it receive being through creation; and if it receives being, this suffices for it to be said to be created simpliciter. Because therefore the divine supposit received human nature from the Virgin, therefore Christ is said simpliciter to be begotten. But because he does not receive being through the Incarnation, therefore he is not called created except with this addition, according to human nature.

Whence that proposition, When something is apt to belong to a part and to the whole, it is not said of the whole from the fact that it belongs to the part, has truth concerning that which is apt to belong to both of them as to a subject, such as creation: but not concerning that which is apt to belong to the one as to a subject, and to the other as to a formal terminus, such as generation. For when a form is said to be begotten as the formal terminus of generation, the supposit receiving such a form is said to be begotten by way of a subject, and as that which is begotten, from the fact that it receives such a form. For it is repugnant that some form should be the formal terminus of generation, and that the one acquiring such a form should not be begotten.