Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

The third error was that of the Antiochene¹, who posited in Christ only one operation and will. Concerning this, however, St. Thomas does two things. First, he refutes the error itself; second, he shows whence it took its origin².

I. As to the first, he argues first. If this is so, it follows that there is only one nature in Christ: which is the Eutychian heresy. — The consequence is proved. Because, since to every nature there belongs some proper operation, from the fact that the form according to which each nature has its proper species is the principle of operation; it is necessary that, just as there are diverse forms of diverse natures, so also there are diverse actions.

Secondly. To have a will belongs to the perfection of the divine nature; and likewise to the perfection of human nature, since man has free will. Therefore etc. — The consequence is clear. Because in Christ each nature is perfect.

Thirdly. If in Christ there is no other will besides the will of the Word, it follows that there is in Christ no other intellect besides the intellect of the Word: and thus the position of Apollinaris will return. — The consequence is proved. Because the will is one potential part of the human soul, just as the intellect is.

Fourthly. It follows that Christ merited neither for Himself nor for us by His passion: which is contrary to the Apostle, Phil. II. — The consequence is proved. Because, if in Christ there was only one will, it must be that that will was divine: for the Word could not lose His own will. But it does not belong to the divine will to merit: because merit belongs to one tending toward perfection.

It should be noted, because St. Thomas takes it here as an absurdity that Christ merited neither for Himself nor for us through His passion, that, as is found in the Tertia Pars, q. XIX, a. 3; and in III Sent., d. XVIII, q. I, aa. 4 and 6, Christ merited for us in one way, and for Himself in another. For for us He merited the cancellation of sin, the infusion of grace, and the opening of the heavenly gate. But for Himself He did not merit these things, because this would diminish Christ's dignity: but only those things which pertain to the glory of the body, such as immortality and impassibility; and those which pertain to His outward excellence, such as ascension, veneration, and other things of this sort.

Fifthly. It follows that Christ, according to the assumed nature, did not have free will: since man has free will according to the will. And consequently that Christ as man did not act after the manner of a man, but after the manner of brutes, which lack free will. And furthermore that nothing in His works was praiseworthy and virtuous, and to be imitated by us: and thus it is said in vain in Matt. XI, Learn of me etc.; and in John XIII, I have given you an example etc.

Sixthly. Diverse operations are multiplied not only according to diverse subjects, but also according to diverse principles by which one and the same subject operates, and from which operations also draw their species. For in one pure man, although he is one in supposit, there are nevertheless several appetites and operations according to diverse natural principles: for there is in him a will, the irascible and the concupiscible, and a natural appetite; likewise, according to the eye he sees, according to the ear he hears, etc. But the divine nature is much more distant from the human than the natural principles of the human nature are from one another. Therefore etc.

Seventhly. In Christ there was a will common to Himself and to the Father, just as also a nature; and there was in Him a proper will, besides the will of the Father. Whence He Himself says in John vi, I came down etc.; and in Luke xxii, Not my etc. — Similarly in Him there was one operation common to Himself and the Father, whence it is said in John v, Whatever things the Father etc. There was also in Him another operation which does not belong to the Father: such as to hunger, to sleep, and the like. Therefore etc.

II. As to the second³, St. Thomas says that this position seems to have had its origin from the fact that its authors did not know how to distinguish between that which is one simply and that which is one by order. For, seeing that the human will and operation of Christ was ordered under the divine, inasmuch as Christ willed nothing by His human will, or operated according to human nature, except according as the divine will disposed Him to will, according to that of John viii, The things that are pleasing etc.; and that His human operation attained a certain divine efficacy from the union of divinity, on account of which every action and passion of His was salvific, whence Dionysius also calls it theandric, that is, God-manly, and also because it is of God and of man: they judged that there was in Christ only one will and operation, although only a unity of order is found there.

Note that this word theandric is composed of theos, which is God, and andrikos, which signifies manly. Therefore St. Thomas well interprets the theandric operation as the God-manly operation, or the operation of God and man.

It should be noted, however, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Tertia Pars, q. xix, a. 1, ad 1; and in III Sent., d. xviii, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, that Dionysius, in ch. ii of the Div. Nom., calls the divine operation theandric, or God-manly, not because he posits simply one operation of the humanity and of the deity in Christ: but because His divine operation uses the human, and the human participates in the power of the divine operation.

It should also be noted that those heretics, positing one operation in Christ, as is said in the Tertia Pars, in the place cited⁴, considering that, where there are several ordered agents, the lower is moved by the higher; and on the part of the operation of the first itself there is one operation, while on the part of the things themselves that are moved there is diversity in the things wrought: because in Christ the human nature is ruled by the divine, said that the operation is the same and indifferent on the part of the divinity itself, inasmuch as the divinity itself wrought every operation in Christ, and thus every operation of His was divine; nevertheless the things wrought are diverse, inasmuch as the divinity wrought one thing by itself, such as that He upheld all things by the word of His power, but another through human nature, such as that He walks. But in this they were deceived. Because, although an operation which belongs to a thing solely according as it is moved by another is perhaps not another besides the operation of the one moving it, just as to make a bench is not an operation of the ax other than the operation of the art: nevertheless, an operation which belongs to the moved thing according to its own proper form does not belong to the mover, except inasmuch as he uses a thing of this sort for his own operation. Whence the operation of the mover is one, and the operation of the moved is another: just as the operation of fire is one, and the operation of the blacksmith using fire to heat iron is another. Since therefore in Christ the human nature has a proper form and a proper power by which it operates, and likewise the divine, therefore the operation of each is distinct: although the divine nature uses the operation of the human nature, from which they have a certain unity of order, but not unity simply, as is said here.

III. But concerning that which St. Thomas says, that Christ willed nothing by His human will except according as the divine will disposed Him to will, a doubt occurs: because He Himself seems to say the opposite when He says to the Father, Not what I will, but what thou⁵. Whence Augustine, in Contra Maximinum⁶, said that from these words Christ showed that He willed something other than the Father.

Now to this it can be answered in two ways, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Tertia Pars, q. xviii, a. 5; and in III Sent., d. xvii, a. 2⁷. First, that, since in Christ there was a twofold will according to human nature, namely, the will of sensuality, which is called will participatively; and the rational will considered as nature; and the same rational will considered as reason: this saying of St. Thomas is understood of the rational will as it is reason, by which, namely, it wills something in order to an end. But the saying of Christ Himself is understood of the will of sensuality, and of the rational will as nature.

Secondly, it can be answered that the saying of St. Thomas is not understood of the conformity of the wills in the thing willed, because the sensual will and the will as nature willed something other than what the divine will willed, in which way the saying of the Savior is understood, for the latter willed that He should suffer and die, whereas the former willed that He should not suffer and not die: but of conformity as to the act of willing. For the divine will willed that the sensual will and the will as nature should have that act of willing, because that is their proper act: namely, that the sensual will should shrink from the evil of nature; and the will as nature should shrink from that which considered absolutely is an evil. Whence St. Thomas did not say absolutely, Christ willed nothing by His human will except what the divine will willed: but, except what the divine will disposed it to will.