Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

From all the aforesaid concerning the divine Trinity, St. Thomas infers one corollary¹, namely: That in the divine nature three Persons subsist: namely, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. And that these three are one God, distinguished from one another solely by relations: for the Father is distinguished from the Son by paternity and innascibility; while the Son is distinguished from Him by filiation; the Father and the Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit by spiration, so to speak; and the Holy Spirit from them by the procession of love. And besides these Persons it is not possible to posit a fourth in the divine nature.

St. Thomas proves only the last part of this corollary, since the rest are manifest. Concerning this he does three things: first, he shows the proposition²; second, he excludes the objection of certain thinkers³; third, he shows that in creatures there is a certain likeness of the divine Trinity⁴.

Note, however, as was said above⁵, that because names have not been assigned to the things pertaining to the procession of the will in the same way as to those pertaining to the procession of the intellect, we therefore signify both the active production of the Holy Spirit and the consequent relation itself by the same name, namely by the name of spiration. And therefore St. Thomas said that the Father and the Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit by spiration, so to speak. A doubt arises, however. For St. Thomas states first that the three persons are distinguished solely by relations. Afterward he states that the Father is distinguished from the Son by innascibility: even though innascibility is not a relation, but rather a negation.

It is answered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Prima, q. xxxiii, a. 4, ad 3, that innascibility also pertains to relation: not indeed directly, but reductively, insofar as a negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation, just as non-white is reduced to the genus of quality; for it expresses the negation of nativity and filiation, which is a relation.

I. The first reason, therefore, by which it is shown that there is not a fourth person in divine reality, is this. The divine persons cannot be multiplied except according to what the procession of intellect and will requires: because they cannot be distinguished except through a relation of origin; and these must be taken according to the immanent operations of intellect and will, as is clear from what has been said⁶. But in God there can only be one procession according to intellect, and one according to will: because His understanding is one, simple, and perfect, and likewise His willing. Therefore there are only two proceeding persons. And there is also one not proceeding, namely the Father. Therefore etc.

It should be noted that this reason is founded upon the numerical and formal unity of the act, and not upon numerical unity alone, which is identical unity: for in that way intellect and will are one, and thus, if it were understood concerning this unity, it would follow that the Son and the Holy Spirit were one person. But the reason is founded upon this: that the act of intellect, which is formally one, is also numerically one; and likewise the act of the will. The matters pertaining to this reason were explained above, chap. xiii⁷. Therefore it is not necessary to dwell longer upon it.

II. The second reason proceeds if it is posited that the persons are distinguished according to processions. And it is argued thus. There can only be a threefold mode of person with respect to processions: namely, that it be either entirely non-proceeding, which belongs to the Father; or proceeding from the non-proceeding, which belongs to the Son; or proceeding from the proceeding, which belongs to the Holy Spirit. Therefore there can only be three persons.

If it is said that relations of origin can be multiplied according to one species of procession—just as in other living things, for instance in human nature, there are many fathers and many sons—it is argued to the contrary: because filiation, since in one nature it is of one species, cannot be multiplied except according to matter or a subject, as is the case with other forms. But in God there is no matter or subject. And the relations themselves are subsistent.

2. Note from the words of St. Thomas the error of those arguing⁸ against him as against one saying that individuals in one species cannot be multiplied except through the matter from which they are composed, and adducing the Parisian articles⁹, in which mention is made of this matter. For since he says here that filiation, just like other forms, cannot be multiplied except through matter or a subject, it is clear that he does not mean that individuals of one species are multiplied through the matter from which alone, but either through the matter from which, or through the matter in which, that is, through a subject. Whence, when he sometimes states that they are multiplied through matter, by the name of matter he understands every subject, as is clear from this passage.

Note also that St. Thomas touches upon two reasons why filiation is not multiplied in divine reality through matter or a subject. One is because in God there is no matter or subject. The other is because the relations themselves are subsistent: from which it is clear that they are not in a subject, just as neither are other subsistent things; and consequently that they cannot be multiplied through a subject.

III. But against the aforesaid foundation, namely that numerical multiplication occurs through a subject, many argue, in Capreolus, in the First Book, d. vii¹⁰, especially Scotus, in V Metaphysics: namely because many forms distinct in number alone are found simultaneously in the same subject; just as many lights in one part of a transparent medium; and many species in the same part of the eye; and many paternities in the same father.

2. But to all these it is said that it is false that many such things, distinct in number alone, exist in one adequate subject. For this is against the mind of Aristotle, V Metaph.¹¹, saying that those things are one in number whose matter is one.

Nor is it true that many lights are in the same part of a transparent medium. For if two luminaries are brought near the same air, two lights are not caused, but one more intense than if it were caused by one alone. Nor are a direct ray and a reflected ray two¹²: but one more intense at the point of reflection than elsewhere.

It is also not true that many species of the same ratio, distinct in number alone, are in the same part of the eye or of the air. For if two visible things are placed in distinct locations, it is clear that their species in the air and in the eye are not of the same ratio, because one represents one visible thing with its position and figure, and the other represents another visible thing with another position: but visible species that represent diverse things according to species are not of the same ratio. But if two visible things entirely alike were placed in the same position, for instance two eggs (which indeed cannot occur except by a miracle), they would cause only one species in the eye, yet more intense than if it were caused by one alone, which species would indeed be representative of the two. And if one first caused a species, and afterward another were placed in the same position, the second would not cause another species, but would intensify the prior one. I think, however, that in such a case the two visible things could not be distinctly known through sense by means of that single species.

Finally, it is not true that in one father there are many paternities, as was shown above¹³, according to the mind of St. Thomas: but by a single paternity a father is related to many sons. Both because there is a single foundation in him; and because he regards none of the sons as an adequate terminus, but son absolutely. And therefore, when one son dies while others remain, the filiation does not cease: because its adequate terminus remains, although the relation of filiation to the deceased son ceases.

IV. But against that response, insofar as it posits that only one light in number is caused by many luminous bodies in the same part of the air, it can be argued: first, because then no intersection of rays could occur. Which is contrary to the teachings of optics.

Second, because if many opaque bodies are set opposite many luminous bodies, many shadows will be caused. But this could not happen unless many lights were caused by them.

Third, because it is a common proposition that A greater light obscures a lesser. But this could not happen unless the greater light and the lesser were two lights existing simultaneously in the same subject.

2. It is answered that it is entirely true that two lights are not caused by two luminous bodies in the same part of the air, but a single one, more intense, however, than if it were caused by only one luminous body. For this is according to the mind of St. Thomas, II Sent., d. xiii, a. 3, ad 2.

Whence to the first to the contrary, the consequence is denied. For the intersection of rays is not to be understood in the manner of two bodies touching each other at some point, as if the rays themselves, existing distinct, touch each other at some point: but because diverse rays proceeding from diverse luminous bodies are made one light at some point, more intense, however, than it would be if it were caused by only one luminous body, for the reason that both illuminative powers concur at the same point. And this St. Thomas seems to intend in the passage cited, when he says that conjunction and separation of lights are not understood except according to the intensification and remission of light.

To the second it can be answered in two ways, by denying the minor premise. First, that an opposing body does not take away the light caused by one luminous body: but the light that was intense, upon the placement of such an obstacle, becomes remiss on that side to which the action of that luminous body cannot freely arrive. Second, that although there is only one perfect privation of one light, namely one that removes it totally, there can nevertheless be many imperfect privations of it, each of which would remove it imperfectly and in part, insofar as it has extension in an extended subject, just as it also has division. Therefore it does not follow, if there are many shadows, that there are many lights, since any shadow deprives light only imperfectly and partially; as happens in the present case, when many bodies are opposed to many luminous bodies.

To the third it is said, as can be gathered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Tertia, q. v, a. 4, ad 2, and q. ix, a. 1, ad 2, that that proposition, A greater light obscures a lesser, is understood of light holding itself on the part of the illuminating body. For a more luminous body by its light prevents the light, or brightness, of a less luminous body from being distinctly seen: just as the light of the sun prevents the light of the stars from being seen by day. But it does not have truth concerning light holding itself on the part of the illuminated body; as though, I say, in one body, or in one part of the air, there were two distinct lights, namely some greater and some lesser, and the lesser were hidden by the greater; on the contrary, the light caused by a less luminous body, when a more luminous body supervenes, is intensified and perfected.

3. From these solutions it is clear, first, that the proposition of the opticists, The rays of visible things illuminate the medium without intermingling, does not intend that there are in the medium many lights distinct really and according to esse, but that the same light has distinct dependencies on diverse visible things, and distinctly represents them.

It is clear, second, that another proposition of the opticists, namely, A strong light rising upon sight and the medium hides certain visible things, has truth concerning visible things considered in themselves, but not in their effect.

4. From these things it is clear that the reasoning of those arguing that there could be many sons in divine reality is vain, because the preceding would be distinguished from the subsequent through a co-opposed relation¹⁴. For it is clear that this could not be unless there were many filiations. Since these cannot be multiplied except through a subject, it would be necessary to posit in God a subject and composition, and that they are not subsistent; both of which are manifestly false.

V. Regarding the second, St. Thomas removes a certain objection¹⁵. For it seems that there are many sons and many holy spirits. For in the Son, since He is perfect God, there is perfect intellective power; and in the Holy Spirit there is infinite goodness, which is the principle of communication. Therefore etc.

St. Thomas answers that that consequence is not valid: because, since the Son is God as begotten, the intellective power is in Him as in one proceeding by way of the word, not as in one producing the word. For in the Son is the whole fullness of divinity, and the numerically same fullness which is in the Father, but with the relation of nativity, whereas in the Father it is with the relation of active generation: otherwise the Father and the Son would not be distinguished, since they are distinguished solely by relations. Likewise, since the Holy Spirit is God proceeding, infinite goodness is in Him as in a receiving person, not as in one communicating to another, namely ad intra. Therefore the reason does not follow. Concerning the efficacy of this response, see above, chap. xiii¹⁶.

VI. It could be argued further against the aforesaid conclusion: first, because the ability to generate is a certain dignity of the Father; indeed, to have begotten God the Son is also a dignity. But every dignity is to be attributed to the Son.

Second, because from the Philosopher, IV Meteor.¹⁷, each thing is perfect when it can generate something like itself.

2. But to the first it is said, first, from the mind of St. Thomas, Prima, q. xlii, a. 4, ad 2, that dignity is an absolute and pertains to the essence. And therefore, just as the same essence is in the Father and the Son, so also is the same dignity: but in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation.

It is said, second, that the fallacy of the figure of speech is committed by arguing thus: Every dignity is to be attributed to the Son. The ability to generate, or generating, is a dignity. Therefore it is in the Son. For a what is changed into a toward something. For dignity is an absolute; and the ability to generate, or generating, is a relative, for it expresses an absolute with a relation. And by reason of the absolute, it pertains to dignity, but not by reason of the relation. Therefore it does not follow, if every dignity is in the Son, that in Him is the ability to generate: but only that in Him is that absolute which is included in what is said, the ability to generate.

3. To the second it is said, first, that something is then perfect when it has the potency of generating something like itself, that is, when that absolute which is imported by the name of generative potency is not lacking to it. And in this way it was conceded in the preceding passages¹⁸ that there is a potency of generating. But it is not necessary that it have it with respect to the relation which it expresses, because relation expresses no perfection.

It is said, second, that the proposition of Aristotle has truth in material things, in which there can be many individuals of the same species, but not in immaterial things.

It is said, third, that it does not have truth in a nature in which, on account of its perfection, there can only be one immaterial Son, of which kind is the divine nature.

VII. Regarding the third¹⁹, St. Thomas shows that a likeness of the divine Trinity is found in some way in creatures: and first, in the human mind; second, in other things.

In the human mind, therefore, there is a likeness with respect to this: that just as in divine reality there is unbegotten God, who is the principle of the whole divine procession, namely the Father; and God begotten by way of the word conceived in the intellect, namely the Son; and God proceeding by way of love, namely the Holy Spirit; nor is another procession found within the divine nature, but only a procession to exterior effects: so, when the mind, by understanding itself, conceives its own word within itself, and by loving itself, produces itself in the will as loved, and does not proceed further within itself, but only to exterior effects, by making something out of love of itself; three things are found in the mind, namely the mind itself, which is the principle of procession, existing in its nature; and the mind conceived in the intellect; and the mind loved in the will. Yet there is a difference between the trinity of the mind and the Trinity of God, because the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one nature, and each²⁰ of these is a perfect person: but in the mind those three are not of one nature, because neither the mind's understanding nor its willing is its esse; the mind understood and the mind loved are also not persons, since they are not subsistent; nor is even the mind itself, existing in its nature, a person, since it is a part of a subsistent thing, but not the whole. And on this account, the divine likeness is considered in man just as the likeness of Hercules in stone: namely, with respect to the representation of the form, but not with respect to the agreement of nature. Whence also in the mind of man there is said to be the image of God, according to that of Gen. 1, Let us make, etc.

In other things, however, a likeness of the divine Trinity is found insofar as every thing in its substance is one, through which it clearly represents the Father, who is the principle not from a principle; and is formed by a certain species, through which it represents the Son, for the conception of the intellect in intelligible esse is like the in-forming of a species in natural esse; and has a certain order, through which it represents the Holy Spirit, for love is like inclination or order in a natural thing. St. Thomas adds, however, that on account of this remote and obscure representation, there is said to be a vestige of the Trinity in irrational creatures, but not an image: according to that of Job 11, Can you comprehend the vestiges of God?

VIII. For the clear understanding of the things that are said here concerning the image, it must be considered, first, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Prima, q. xciii, a. 2, ad 4, and I Sent., d. iii, q. iii, ad 4, that image can be taken in two ways. In one way, for the likeness by which an artifact imitates the species of art that is in the mind of the artisan. And thus every creature is an image of that exemplar ratio, or idea, which it has in the divine mind. But we do not speak of image here in this way. In another way, for the likeness by which a thing imitates another according to species and nature: in which way we say that the son of a king is his image, or even his statue. And in this way we speak of image here. Whence for the ratio of an image taken in this way three things are required: namely, that it be a likeness of something; that it be expressed by it, at least as from an exemplar; and that it be a likeness according to species, or at least according to some accident of the species, and especially according to figure, which is demonstrative of the species.

2. It must be considered, second, that something is said to be a likeness of something according to species when it is of the same species and the same nature with it. But because in God there is properly neither species nor difference, since God is not of a limited nature of being, but is subsistent esse itself; man is said to have the image of God, and to be like Him according to species, because he agrees with God in the supreme degree of nature in which a creature can be assimilated to God, namely in the intellectual degree, which holds the place of the ultimate difference in God according to our mode of understanding. Whence, because in the same, yet analogical, ratio of the supreme divine degree man is assimilated to God, he is therefore said to be like Him according to nature and according to species. For man according to the mind is of an intellectual nature, just as God is; and in the human mind is found the procession of the word according to intellect, and the procession of love according to will, just as in the divine mind. Which is not found in other, lower creatures.

3. It must be considered thirdly that an image is twofold: namely, perfect; and imperfect. A perfect image is that which is considered according to an equality of perfection of nature, as a son is the perfect image of his father. And in this way the image of God is not posited in man. Indeed, St. Thomas signified this here when he said that the likeness of God is not found in him as to an agreement of nature, namely, according to equality of perfection. — But an imperfect likeness is that which is considered according to an agreement in nature in some way, yet not according to equality, like the image of Hercules in bronze; for a statue of bronze is not of the same nature with Hercules as to substance, yet it agrees with him in figure, which is a proper accident of the human species. And in this way the image of God is posited in man: because the divine nature indeed infinitely exceeds the human, but nevertheless in man is found a likeness of the supreme divine grade known to us according to a certain analogy and proportion. St. Thomas signified this here when he said that the divine likeness is considered in man just as the likeness of Hercules in stone as to the representation of form, that is, of figure. For this comparison is attended to in regard to this: that just as stone is not assimilated to Hercules as to the nature of the species, but as to something that follows upon the species, so the human mind does not represent the Trinity of persons as being of the same specific nature with God, but as having some likeness of God falling far short of the divine nature, as if it represented an accident of the divine nature, if one may speak in this way. This is also signified by the authority adduced from Scripture, Gen. 1. For when it is said, Let us make man in our image and likeness, it is denoted that in man there is an imperfect image of God: for that preposition "to" or "in", as St. Thomas says in the place cited above,²¹ signifies a certain approach, which belongs to a distant thing.

IX. For the evident understanding also of what is said about the trace, it should be known that a trace differs from an image, because an image represents according to a likeness of species, in the manner explained; but a trace does not, rather it represents as an effect represents its cause, with which it is not of the same intelligible character or species. Yet through it one arrives at the knowledge of the cause, from the fact that in it the causality of the cause appears, just as an impression left behind by the motion of an animal is called its trace; for it is not of the same species or intelligible character, but nevertheless through that impression it is shown that an animal passed through that place. By the same reasoning, ash is called the trace of fire; and the desolation of a land the trace of a hostile army.

In this way there is said to be a trace of the Trinity in an irrational creature. Because in it there is not a likeness of the supreme grade of the divine nature, namely, the intellectual; and consequently there is not in it a procession of the Word through the intellect, nor a procession of love through the will; but yet it represents these in some way, inasmuch as it is an effect, and it is necessary that these be in the first producing cause. For according as any creature is one created substance, it represents the substance of the Father, who is the principle not from a principle, in whom a certain unity is understood. — But according as it has a certain form and species, it represents the Word, according as the form of an artifact depends on the conception of art. And St. Thomas understood this when he said that the conception of the intellect in intelligible being is like the in-formation of a species in natural being: that is, the conception of the intellect, which has intelligible being in the intellect, is the exemplar according to which the species and nature outside the intellect is formed, as to its natural being. And therefore it is suitably said that through an irrational creature, inasmuch as it has a species, the divine Word is represented; for from the fact that it is produced by God through the intellect, we arrive at this knowledge, that in God there is a word. — But according as it has an order to something, it represents the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as from this we know that in God there is love and will, by which the creature is ordered to the good. And this is the assignment of the trace which Augustine posits in VI De Trinitate.²²

Because therefore irrational creatures do not represent God and the divine Trinity as similar to Him according to species in the manner previously explained,²³ but as effects falling short of the likeness of the cause, and representing the causality rather than the species of the cause; therefore St. Thomas calls this representation a representation from afar and obscure, and a representation after the manner of a trace. — On this matter, see Capreolus in the First Book, d. III, q. III.

Because in what precedes it was often presupposed that the divine persons are both constituted and distinguished by the relations of origin, it must finally be seen what causes difficulty in this matter in the doctrine of St. Thomas. For Capreolus abundantly dissolves the remaining difficulties in I Sent., dist. XXVI.

I bis. First, it causes a difficulty²⁴ because St. Thomas holds that relations of this kind are really the same as the divine persons, and are distinguished from them only by the mode of signifying through the abstract and concrete; for the divine persons, according to him, are the subsisting relations themselves, as is said in the Prima Pars, q. XL, a. 2, ad 1, and a. 3. But it does not appear how the same thing can formally constitute itself; for it is always necessary that the constituent be distinct from the constituted.

Secondly, it causes a difficulty²⁵ because he holds in De Potentia, q. VIII, a. 3, ad 7, and q. X, a. 5, ad 12, that the relations constitute the hypostases inasmuch as they are the divine essence; but in question x, a. 3, he says that a relation constitutes inasmuch as it is divine, because it has from this that it is the same with the divine essence. For from this it seems that primarily the divine essence itself is constitutive of the hypostasis, and not the relation.

Thirdly, it causes a difficulty²⁶ because according to him the relation does not constitute inasmuch as it is a relation, though it does distinguish, as is clear in the Prima Pars, q. XL, a. 4, and De Potentia, q. VIII, a. 3.²⁷ And thus it does not seem that it should rather be said that the divine persons are constituted by the relations of origin than by the origins, or by the essence, or by something of this kind. For since in God all things are really the same, except the persons themselves, nothing is to be attributed more to one than to another, unless this belongs to it from its formal character.

II bis. For the evident understanding of these points, it must be considered first that we can speak of the divine persons in two ways: in one way, in themselves, as, namely, outside our intellect they are in their real being; in another way, as they are in our cognition, and are expressed by us through determinate names. If we speak of them in the first way, it is not necessary to seek something by which they are constituted and distinguished. For since they are most simple, it is not fitting to assume in them a distinction of constituent and constituted, or of distinguishing and distinguished; for the Father and paternity are entirely the same on the part of the thing, and ground the same formal character. Hence in this way it must be conceded that they are constituted and distinguished by themselves, that is, not by anything distinct from them really or formally: just as also concerning God it is true to say that by Himself He is God, since on the part of the thing God and deity are entirely the same; and concerning Gabriel it is true to say that by himself he is Gabriel, if he is considered in himself on the part of the thing, for his nature itself by itself is this and individual, and not through anything else. — Now that this is the mind of St. Thomas is clear in the Prima Pars, q. XL, a. 2, ad 1. For in responding to this argument: "Simple things are distinguished by themselves; the divine Persons are supremely simple; Therefore they are distinguished by themselves," he says: It must be said that the persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine persons that they are distinguished by relations. For by this response satisfaction is not given to the argument except by conceding that by themselves the divine persons are distinguished, according as they have being outside the intellect in their real being, because, namely, the persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Moreover, he posits this more expressly in I Sent., d. xxvi, q. ii, a. 1, ad 5, where, in responding to a similar argument, he says that even the divine persons are distinguished by themselves, inasmuch as the persons in reality are the relations themselves.

If, however, they are considered in the second way, then it can be asked by what they are constituted and distinguished. For since we cannot know divine things except from perfections found in creatures, and we signify them according to the mode of creatures, as is clear from the above:²⁸ to signify the subsistence and perfection of divine things, we use concrete names, because with us those things that are perfect and subsisting are composite; but to signify their simplicity, we use abstract names, because by those we signify simple forms. And thus we signify one and the same thing in divine reality by an abstract name and by a concrete name, yet under different aspects: for we signify the divine nature by the name God and of deity; and we signify the hypostasis of the Father by the name of Father and by the name of paternity. Therefore, because this name Father is a concrete name, and consequently signifies, as to the mode of signifying holding itself on the part of the name, with a certain composition; and everything that is signified after the manner of a composite is signified as such through something simple: therefore it is suitably asked by what the Father has that He is Father; or, by what He is constituted, and by what He is distinguished from other supposits that are in the divine nature; and we say that by paternity He is Father, just as God is God by deity. In which indeed no distinction is shown between the Father and paternity on the part of the thing, but only a diverse mode of signifying. For one and the same thing is subsisting paternity: as it is signified by a concrete name, it is signified as constituted, because it is signified after the manner of a composite; but as it is signified by an abstract name, it is signified as constituent, because it is signified after the manner of a simple, namely, as that by which something is Father.

2. It must be considered secondly that in the way in which constituent and constituted are posited in a divine person, according to our mode of understanding and signifying, such a constitution is not understood after the manner of some whole, either integral or essential, as if the constituted had either several integral parts or several essential parts, out of which it would be understood to be constituted: but after the manner of a formal constitution from the form of the whole, which namely is the whole itself; just as humanity constitutes man, gabrielity Gabriel, and deity God. For in this way nothing else is signified than that humanity is that by which man is man, and gabrielity that by which Gabriel is Gabriel, and deity that by which God is God. Now in this mode of constitution there does not have to be, on the part of the thing, a distinction between constituent and constituted, nor real causality; but a diverse mode of signifying according to the abstract and the concrete suffices. For just as God by deity is God, if the diverse mode of signifying is considered, so, if the thing itself is considered in itself, God by Himself, and not by anything else, is God. When therefore we say that a divine person is constituted and distinguished by a relation,²⁹ we understand that, as to the mode of signifying, the relation, signified in the abstract, is that by which the person itself is this, say the Father, and by which He is distinguished; although, as far as is on the part of the thing, one person by Himself is such, say the Father, and by Himself is distinguished from the other, inasmuch as He is the subsisting relation itself. And this is in harmony with those things which are said about this constitution by St. Thomas.

III bis. To the first doubt³⁰ therefore, it is clear from what has been said that on the part of the thing, the divine persons are the same as the relations themselves, and are not constituted by them; but on the part of the mode of signifying, they are understood to be constituted. Now when it is argued that the same thing does not formally constitute itself: — it is said that this is true if it is considered according to itself and according to its entity; but it is false if it is considered according as it is in our cognition, and according as it is signified in diverse modes; for the same thing, signified by an abstract name, is understood as constituting itself according as it is signified by a concrete name.

From which it is clear that the arguments of Gregory and Aureoli,³¹ proceeding from the fact that the Father and paternity are the same according to reality, either are not against the mind of St. Thomas, or are of no efficacy.

It is also clear from this that when St. Thomas says in the Prima Pars, q. XL, a. 2, that relations distinguish or constitute persons inasmuch as they are the subsisting persons themselves, the word "inasmuch as" does not specify the formal character by which the relation constitutes, but explains the mode of constituting. For they do not so constitute that they are something distinct from the persons themselves; but in such a way that they are the constituted persons themselves according to reality and according to formal character; just as also deity, which is understood to constitute God, is really and formally the same with God as to the intelligible character of the thing signified.

IV bis. For the evident understanding of the second doubt,³² it must be attended to first that one must speak in one way of created relations, and in another way of divine relations. For relations of creatures are accidents, and are added to the substance of the thing that is denominated by them; but divine relations, by which we say persons are constituted, are not accidents, nor do they supervene upon the divine substance, but are the divine essence itself, and are the persons themselves. From which another difference follows. For to relations of creatures there belongs only that which is of an accident; but to divine relations, inasmuch as they are divine, there belongs also that which is of substance, since they are really the same as the divine essence, which is substance. And this belongs to it not only materially, but also formally: because it is of the intelligible character of a divine relation that it be a substance, just as it is of the intelligible character of a real created relation that it be an accident.

It must be attended to secondly, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, De Potentia, q. VIII, a. 3, that if the trinity of persons were not presupposed in divine reality, it would not be necessary to seek another constitutive and distinctive principle of the hypostasis besides the divine essence: for by deity itself God is something undivided in Himself and distinct from all things that are not God. But because, according to faith, we posit one essence in three persons, and consequently we posit the divine essence as common, it cannot be posited as the constitutive and distinctive principle of the hypostasis, of whose intelligible character it is to be incommunicable and relatively distinct from another hypostasis that is found in the same nature. And therefore it is necessary, besides the essence, to posit another constitutive principle which, beyond the character of subsisting, also has the character of the incommunicable and proper, and causes the hypostasis to be relatively distinguished from another hypostasis. It is necessary therefore that the relation which is posited to constitute the divine essence, besides the character of substance, have also the character of an incommunicable form, and the character of distinguishing relatively from this divine person as from its correlative, so that it can cause its constituted to be subsisting, to be incommunicable, and to be relatively distinct from another divine person.

It must be attended to thirdly that, although the relation has these three things in itself, and communicates them to the supposit; yet because the first thing to which it belongs to subsist in divine reality is the divine essence, from which we understand all other things in divine reality to have that they subsist; it belongs to the relation to constitute a subsisting thing, not from any proper character of its own, by which it would be distinguished from the essence, but from the character of the essence, with which it is identified, and from which it also has that it subsists; but to constitute an incommunicable and relatively distinct thing belongs to it from its own proper character, by which it is distinguished from the essence; for from the fact that it is an incommunicable form, taking the place of all individuating principles, it renders the person incommunicable; while from the fact that it is such a relation, say paternity, it relatively distinguishes the person from another person, namely, from the Son.

2. It is said therefore that when St. Thomas says that the relation constitutes the person inasmuch as it is essence, this is understood only as to the subsistence of the person, but not as to all things that are of the character of a person.

When it is urged to the contrary, because from this it follows that the divine essence is primarily constitutive of the hypostasis, and not the relation: — it is said that it is not unfitting for the essence to be primarily constitutive of the hypostasis in a qualified sense, namely, as to this alone, which is to subsist; although simpliciter, namely, as to all things that are of the character of a hypostasis, the relation is constitutive, as it is identified with the essence, and as it includes some other intelligible characters besides the character of the essence.

Now that this is of the mind of St. Thomas is clear. For in the Questions on Power, in the place cited,³³ he says that the relations make the hypostases subsisting inasmuch as they are the divine essence: because a relation, inasmuch as it is a relation, does not have that it subsists or causes to subsist. And in the same place, ad 9, he says that a relation distinguishes inasmuch as it is a relation, but constitutes a hypostasis inasmuch as it is the divine essence, and it does both inasmuch as it is the divine essence and a relation.

3. Now it does not stand against this that St. Thomas in the Prima Pars, q. XL, a. 2, attributes the constitution of the person to the relation as it is distinguished from the essence; and in a. 3³⁴ says that the Father by paternity is Father, and someone, and a hypostasis; and similar things are said in several places. For, first, it can be said that St. Thomas is speaking of the constitution of the supposit as to those things that are proper to each, namely, as to proper incommunicability and proper distinction from the other persons, but not as to subsisting, which is common to it and the others. — Secondly, it can be said that he is also speaking as to the complete constitution of the person. For completely to constitute the person belongs to the relation inasmuch as it includes the intelligible character of the essence, and superadds other characters to it, from which it has that it is formally distinguished from the essence, just as man is distinguished from animal: although it does not belong to the relation from that particular character which it superadds to the essence.

4. From these things it is clear how vain are the reasons of Scotus, in Capreolus,³⁵ by which it is shown that there is in God some absolute supposit, from the fact that to subsist belongs to the divine essence of itself. For it is evident from what has been said that to the intelligible character of a divine hypostasis, presupposing the faith of the Trinity, belongs not only that it subsist, which indeed it has from the divine essence, and from the relation inasmuch as it is the essence itself; but also that it be distinct from another divine hypostasis, which belongs to it from the relation inasmuch as it is a relation.

V bis. For the evident understanding of the third doubt,³⁶ it must be considered first that, since all the divine persons are eternal; and in eternity there is no prior and posterior; nor is there even in the divine persons themselves any priority or posteriority outside the intellect: there is no instant in which one person is constituted and undivided in Himself prior to being distinct from the other persons, but all simultaneously from eternity are constituted and distinct. And therefore, since it is of the intelligible character of a divine person to be undivided in itself and divided from another divine person; and that is properly said to constitute a divine person which both makes it undivided in itself, and distinct from the other to which it is relatively opposed; the divine relation, which does both simultaneously, is simpliciter said to be constitutive of the person; although, inasmuch as it is a relation, it does not constitute it in hypostatic being undivided in itself, but only relatively constitutes and relatively distinguishes.

VI bis. It must be considered, secondly, that among Thomists there is varied interpretation of the statement that relation is not constitutive inasmuch as it is a relation. For some ³⁷ interpret it as meaning that paternity can be considered in two ways: namely, as conceived, and as exercised. As conceived, indeed, under the express character of paternity, it constitutes the hypostasis; but not as exercised. Hence it does not constitute inasmuch as it is a relation, that is, it does not constitute by exercising the act of a relation as it is a relation, but by exercising the act of a hypostatic form. Hence they say that paternity, as it precedes generation, constitutes and distinguishes the relative person of the Father in relative hypostatic esse really and formally, but not as relatively exercised; and thus paternity is designated not as a relation, but as constitutive. But as it follows upon generation, it constitutes and distinguishes the same person not in hypostatic esse, but in relative esse as relatively exercised; and therefore it is designated as paternity as a relation.

2. But this interpretation, although it is subtle, nevertheless does not seem to be in accord with the mind of St. Thomas, nor to be true ³⁸, and it also seems to involve a contradiction in itself ³⁹. The first point is shown thus. What belongs to something according to its formal character belongs to it inasmuch as it is such, just as what belongs to an animal according to its formal character belongs to it inasmuch as it is an animal. But, according to you, to constitute a subsisting hypostasis belongs to paternity according to the express character of paternity. Therefore, this belongs to it inasmuch as it is paternity. But this is contrary to the mind of St. Thomas, who says that relation, as it is a relation, does not constitute ⁴⁰. Therefore, etc.

It will perhaps be said that relation does indeed constitute inasmuch as it is a relation, that is, inasmuch as it has the character of a relation; but it does not constitute inasmuch as it is a relation, that is, inasmuch as it exercises the act of a relation. — But this reply is nothing. Both because it is absolutely true to say, according to the usage of the philosophers, and especially of St. Thomas, This belongs to this inasmuch as it is such, when it belongs to it according to its formal character; and because, when any cause causes according to some character, the act of that character is then exercised; for to exercise the act of some character is to apply it to operation. If, therefore, relation constitutes according to the character of relation, it follows that it exercises the act of relation.

3. The second point ⁴¹ is also shown thus. No thing under one determinate character exercises the formal act of another character; for the divine essence under the character of wisdom does not make God formally just, but wise. Therefore, paternity, under the express character of paternity, does not exercise the act of a hypostatic form, if by a hypostatic form is understood a character other than the character of relation, as it signifies, namely, the act of paternity as it is paternity, which is to refer to another.

4. The third point ⁴² is shown thus. For a proper form to exercise an act about something is nothing other than to give to it its formal effect, just as for whiteness to exercise its proper act about a wall is nothing other than to make it formally white. But the formal effect of a relation inasmuch as it is a relation is to constitute something formally in relative esse, and to distinguish it relatively. Therefore, a relation that does this in something exercises its act about it. Therefore, it involves a contradiction to say that divine paternity, under the express character of paternity, as it precedes the act of generation, constitutes and distinguishes the relative person in relative esse formally, but not as relatively exercised, which is what they say; just as it involves a contradiction for whiteness to constitute a human being formally in qualitative esse, but not as qualitatively exercised.

VII bis. But others say, as does Capreolus in distinction 26 of the First Book ⁴³, and in my opinion more in accord with the mind of St. Thomas, that relation, under the express character of relation, for instance of paternity, does not constitute the divine person, but under the character of an incommunicable form of an intellectual nature.

For the evidence of this, it must be considered, first, that since relation, for instance paternity, in God is really the same as the divine essence, and is a substance subsisting per se, which implies something absolute, it is not unfitting for it to be conceived both by an absolute concept and by a relative concept. For the same thing that is outside every genus, and contains eminently in itself the perfections of several genera, can be conceived by either concept on account of its illimitation. And therefore it is not unfitting for it, according to our mode of understanding, to effect one thing formally as it is conceived by one concept, but another thing as it is conceived by the other concept.

2. It must be considered, secondly, that although there is no order of prior and posterior in divine reality, such that in some prior outside the intellect the Father would be a hypostasis before He generates and before He is relatively distinguished from the Son, nevertheless on the part of our intellect a certain order is found. For because, in our experience, the generating supposit is constituted in esse before it generates, we also understand in divine reality that the Father is first constituted in esse, and then generates the Son. But because the relation by which the Father is referred to the Son, inasmuch as it is such—that is, inasmuch as it implies a respect to another—follows upon the act of generation, therefore the Father, in that prior in which He is conceived by us as preceding generation and as constituted in hypostatic esse, is conceived not as something relative, and as positively distinct from the Son (since the Son is not then understood to be in that prior), but as something absolute. For He is conceived as a substance subsisting per se, undivided in itself, and incommunicable, in which no respect to the Son is implied. Hence there is no absurdity if the form that we signify as constitutive of the Father is understood, in that prior in which it constitutes Him before He generates, to constitute Him under some absolute character, since it is understood to constitute Him not in relative esse to the Son, but in absolute subsisting esse.

3. It is said, therefore, that paternity, since it is both an incommunicable form and a relation, can be conceived in two ways: namely, under the character of a relation; and under the character of an incommunicable form taking the place of all individuating principles in created things. If it is considered inasmuch as it is a relation, that is, as it implies an order to the Son, it distinguishes the Father from the Son relatively, but does not constitute Him in subsisting hypostatic esse. But if it is considered under the character of an incommunicable form, it thus constitutes hypostatically, but does not distinguish relatively from the Son. And this is what St. Thomas intends when he says that relation, inasmuch as it is a relation, does not constitute a divine person, but does indeed distinguish ⁴⁴. Hence it must be said that a divine person is indeed constituted through a relation, because that alone, among those things that are signified as forms and not as operations, is incommunicable; but nevertheless that relation, while it is conceived by us as constitutive of the person, before the notional and personal act, prescinding constitution in incommunicable esse from distinction from another person, is conceived by an absolute concept, and thus does not constitute under the express character of relation. But this is not unfitting, because, as was said, the person is then conceived not as something relative, but as something absolute.

4. When, however, it is argued ⁴⁵ that then the divine persons ought no more to be said to be constituted by relations than by origins or by essence: — the consequence is denied. Because such a constitutive principle must both be incommunicable and be signified in the manner of an intrinsic form. The first of these does not belong to the essence, which is common; while the second does not belong to origin, which, even inasmuch as it is real, is signified as going forth from a principle, and as a kind of way from a thing or to a thing, as is stated in the First Part, q. 40, a. 2. But both belong to divine paternity: for it is incommunicable to many; and it is signified in the manner of a form, not indeed inasmuch as it is a relation absolutely, but inasmuch as it is a real divine relation. Hence to constitute belongs to it from its formal character, not indeed belonging to it as it is a relation, but inasmuch as it is an incommunicable substance.

It can also be said that the constitutive principle of a divine person not only constitutes it in esse, but also in esse relatively distinct from another divine person. Both, however, belong to relation: to distinguish, indeed, from its proper and formal character inasmuch as it is a relation, as was shown above ⁴⁶; but to constitute in subsisting esse from another character, as has been declared. To distinguish, however, does not belong to essence or to origin formally. Therefore, it must rather be said that the persons are constituted through relations of origin than through the essence or through the origins themselves.

According to this declaration, therefore, the opinion of St. Thomas is manifest; and it is clear that the arguments of Scotus against St. Thomas in distinction 28 of the First Book, q. 3, and in the Quodlibets, Quodlibet 4, do not proceed against him.