Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber IV

Having established the truth concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, St. Thomas intends to resolve the reasons adduced by some to the contrary ¹: although, as he says, they are scarcely worthy of an answer.

I. The first reason is because the Lord, speaking of the procession of the Holy Spirit, said that he proceeds from the Father, with no mention made of the Son: as is evident in John 15, where it is said, When the Paraclete comes, etc. But concerning God nothing is to be held except what is said in Scripture.

But St. Thomas says first that, on account of the unity of essence, what is said in the Scriptures of one person must be understood of another as well, unless it is incompatible with its personal property, even if an exclusive word is added: as is evident when it is said in Matthew 11, that no one knows the Son except the Father; for it is clear that the Holy Spirit is not excluded from the knowledge of the Son, nor even is the Son himself. Therefore, even if it were said in the Gospel that the Holy Spirit does not proceed except from the Father, it would not on this account be precluded that he proceeds from the Son, since this is not incompatible with the property of the Son.

He says secondly that it is no wonder the Lord spoke thus: because he is accustomed to refer all things to the Father, from whom he has whatever he has; as when he says, John 7, My doctrine, etc.

He says thirdly that in the aforementioned authority the Lord did not keep entirely silent ² that he is the principle of the Holy Spirit, when he said that he is the Spirit of Truth: for he had said earlier that he himself is the Truth.

II. Concerning the first statement of this response, a doubt arises. For it does not seem that the unity of essence in the Father and the Son is a sufficient reason for being the principle of the Holy Spirit to belong to the Son just as to the Father. For unity of essence does not cause anything to be common except those things that accompany the essence. But to be the principle of the Holy Spirit is not among those things that accompany the divine essence, otherwise it would belong to the Holy Spirit himself as well: rather, it implies a relation of origin. Therefore, etc.

It is answered, and said first, that St. Thomas did not refer this to the unity of essence alone, but along with this, to the non-incompatibility with the personal property of the Son.

It is said secondly that the things that accompany the divine essence are twofold. For some accompany the divine essence simply and absolutely; and of this sort are those that we call attributes; and these are common to all the divine persons. But some accompany it not simply and absolutely, but in those supposits in which nothing incompatible with it or opposed is found. In this way the spirative power, as it includes the very relation of principle, accompanies the divine essence: for it is found where there is no opposed relation or anything incompatible. And because in the Father and the Son there is nothing incompatible with the spirative power and with spiration, but indeed there is in the Holy Spirit, in whom is the relation of being spirated: therefore the spirative power is in the Father and the Son, but not in the Holy Spirit, who is spirated, and has a relation opposed to active spiration. — When therefore it is said that to be the principle of the Holy Spirit does not accompany the divine essence: it is said that, although it does not accompany it simply and absolutely, it nevertheless accompanies it in a supposit in which there is nothing incompatible with such a relation of principle. And therefore St. Thomas says very well that, on account of the unity of essence, what is said of one person is understood also of another, unless it is incompatible with its personal property: because, namely, everything of this sort accompanies the essence either simply, or in a supposit in which there is nothing incompatible.

2. If it is said that paternity belongs to the Father, and yet does not belong to the Holy Spirit, in whom there is nothing incompatible with paternity, for procession, which is the property of the Holy Spirit, is not relatively opposed to paternity: — it is answered that, although procession is not relatively opposed to paternity, nevertheless the one proceeding is relatively opposed to the Father as to his productive principle: and therefore in the Holy Spirit there is something incompatible with paternity, inasmuch as in him there is procession incompatible with the spiration existing in the Father; wherefore the same divine person proceeding cannot also be the Father.

This answer is evident from a parallel case from the statements of St. Thomas, De Potentia, q. 10, a. ult., ad 13, where he says that, although filiation is not relatively opposed to procession, nevertheless the one proceeding is relatively opposed to the Son: and through this procession is distinguished from filiation.

3. But it seems that this response does not satisfy. For if paternity is not in the Holy Spirit because, although procession is not incompatible with paternity, it is nevertheless incompatible with spiration which is conjoined to paternity: it will follow that, by the same reasoning, the divine essence, which is in the Father, will not be in the Holy Spirit, because procession is incompatible with spiration, which is conjoined to the essence.

It is answered that the case is not the same with the essence and paternity: because the essence is common; but paternity is an incommunicable property of the Father. Now, that which is common in the divine is compatible with opposed relations, but that which is incommunicable is not: just as animal is compatible with rational and irrational, but not Socrates with white and black at the same time.

III. The second objection is because in the Creed drawn up in the Councils, mention is not made of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. Moreover, in certain Councils, namely the Ephesian ³ and the Chalcedonian, it is found prohibited under threat of anathema that anything should be added to the Creed drawn up in the Councils.

St. Thomas answers, and says first, that the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son is implicitly contained in the Synod of Constantinople, in that it is said that he proceeds from the Father: because what is understood of the Father must also be understood of the Son, as has been said ⁴. And therefore nothing is added to it. This is made clear through what is said in the Synod of Chalcedon concerning the Synod of Constantinople.

He says secondly that for adding this, namely that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, the authority of the Roman Pontiff suffices ⁵, through which the ancient Councils also are found to have been confirmed.

2. Concerning the first statement of the response, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, First Part, q. 36, a. 2, ad 2; and De Potentia, q. 10, a. 4, ad 13, that in the Nicene Creed the doctrine of the Catholic faith was sufficiently handed down. And therefore the holy fathers in the subsequent Councils did not intend to add anything, but on account of heresies that arose, they set forth explicitly what was implicitly contained in it. Whence, because after the Nicene Synod a heresy had arisen saying that the Holy Spirit was not God, in the Council of Constantinople ⁶ this was expressly set forth in the Creed. — Likewise, because after the Council of Constantinople the error of those saying that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son arose, in a certain council gathered in western parts this was expressed, and explicitly set forth in the Creed. Which nevertheless was implicitly contained in the fact that it was said to proceed from the Father. — Concerning these Councils see in the Decretum, dist. 16.

3. Concerning the second statement, it must be noted that St. Thomas holds the authority of the Roman Pontiff to be superior to the authority of a Council, when he says that the ancient Councils were confirmed by his authority: for confirmation belongs to a superior. He also adds in the places cited above, and in the Treatise Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem ⁷, that a synod can be gathered by the authority of the Roman Pontiff alone, and that an appeal can be made to him from a synod: which two things show that he is superior to a synod. Moreover, St. Thomas takes these things from the Decretum, dist. 17; and Decretales, de Elect., chap. Significasti ⁸. But that the formulation of the creed belongs to him, he shows in II-II, q. 1, a. 10, because it belongs to him to determine those things that belong to the faith: whence the Lord said to Peter, I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren. But because it would be too long here to discuss whether the Pope is above a Council, I will omit this question: especially since, after Juan de Torquemada, it has also been most ingeniously treated by the Most Reverend Cardinal Cajetan ⁹.

IV. The third objection is because, since the Holy Spirit is simple, he cannot be from two: and because, if he proceeds perfectly from the Father, he does not proceed from the Son.

St. Thomas answers that these can easily be resolved. Because the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, on account of the unity of divine power; and by one production they produce the Holy Spirit.

Note that from this response St. Thomas satisfies the two parts of the objection very well. For when it is said that, because he is simple, he cannot be from two: he satisfies it, because a simple being can be from two having one numerically same power, and consequently having the character of one principle. When it is also said that, because he proceeds perfectly from the Father, he does not proceed from the Son: the implicit consequence is very well denied. For if the Father and the Son produced by diverse powers and diverse productions, this consequence would hold: The Father perfectly produces the Holy Spirit, Therefore not the Son. But because they produce both by one power and by one production, therefore the consequence does not hold: on the contrary, it follows, The Father perfectly produces, Therefore also the Son, because one is the power of the Father and of the Son.

2. But it seems that the said response is not sufficient. For although the power of the Father and of the Son is one, yet by this the redundancy or accidentality of the Son in the production of the Holy Spirit is not removed, if the Holy Spirit proceeds perfectly from the Father. For an effect is said to proceed perfectly from some cause when it does not need for its production another cause of the same genus and of the same order: for if a ship could be sufficiently towed by one person, it would not require several in order to be towed. In like manner therefore, if the Holy Spirit is perfectly and sufficiently produced by the Father, it follows that he does not necessarily proceed from the Son, however much he has the same power that the Father has, and produces by one production with him.

It is answered, and said first, that an effect proceeding perfectly from some cause can be understood both on the part of the effect, inasmuch as namely the whole perfection of the effect is produced by it: and on the part of the cause, because namely in the cause there is a perfect and complete power productive of the effect. In both ways the Holy Spirit is said to proceed perfectly from the Father. For both all his perfection proceeds from the Father; and in the Father is the perfect power productive of the Holy Spirit.

It is said secondly that from this it does not follow that the Son is redundant, or is not necessary, in the production of the Holy Spirit. — But when this is proved because an effect is said to proceed perfectly from a cause when it does not need another cause: it is said that it is understood of another cause producing by another power, and by a numerically different operation; but not of another cause, or of another principle, in which the numerically same power and the same operation is found which is in that cause from which it perfectly proceeds. Rather, as is found from the First Part, q. 36, a. 2, ad 6; and I Sent., d. 11, a. 1, ad ult., when there is one numerically same power and one operation of several, as is in the Father and the Son, if the effect proceeds from one, it necessarily proceeds from the other: just as a creature also, although it proceeds perfectly from the Father, is not thereby excluded from proceeding from the Son and the Holy Spirit; rather, it is necessary that it proceed perfectly from them also, since the creative power is the same in all the divine persons, and the operation is numerically the same.

3. From these things it is clear that the reason of Scotus when he argues, in I Sent., d. 12 ¹⁰, that, because the will is as equally perfect in one supposit as in two; and one supposit is as equally perfect, with the perfection required for an acting supposit, as two: therefore the will can equally be the principle of producing in one as in two, — is of no force. For from the fact that the will is as equally perfect in one supposit as in two, etc., it does not follow that it can thus be the principle of producing in one alone as in two. Rather, the opposite follows. For from the fact that the will is numerically the same in two, and equally perfect, it follows that it cannot be the principle of producing in one without being the principle of producing in two, namely in the Father and the Son, in whom there is no relation opposed to spiration.